The previous chapter outlined the concept of unity. It highlighted the intellectual trends which most contributed to Cusa's thought and discussed the manner in which this work would proceed in investigating the nature of his thought regarding unity and its implications for ethics. It is the purpose of this chapter to examine the fundamental principles upon which Cusa's philosophy is built. It will study the two most characteristic elements of Cusa's metaphysics, namely, his dynamic conception of being and his understanding of unity as pervasive in reality. It will consider as well the relationship between them with a view toward how these effect one's understanding of ethics.
The basic issue with which this work is primarily concerned is the relationship between the one and the many. Without understanding this relationship, it is not possible to comprehend the nature of unity in the world. This problem has vexed philosophers throughout the ages; too often they have resolved it by compromising either unity or multiplicity. Classically Parmenides is an example of one who emphasized unity at the expense of multiplicity, seeing the unity of reality as being so cohesive as to exclude all multiplicity and change. At the opposite end of the spectrum is Heraclitus, who sees change and multiplicity as being the fundamental principles of the universe and leaves inadequate place for unity in his system. Cusa's approach attempts to reconcile the opposition between multiplicity and unity, and to integrate both within his metaphysical system. By conceiving of unity as an harmonious diversity, Cusa resolves the competing demands of individuality and unity without compromising either. The way in which Cusa achieves this synthesis may best be analyzed by studying it in terms of five issues, namely: the structure of being, the nature of causality, the nature of unity, the relationship of entities, and knowledge. An overview of how Cusa does this can be found in the accompanying diagram.
This is the rationale for the structure of this chapter which in five sections
will seek to resolve the apparent mutual exclusion of unity and individuality. The
first two sections will examine the interactive nature of being. In the first section the
distinction and relation between actuality and potentiality in being will be
examined; while in the second section implications of formal causality for being
will be discussed. The third section will examine the nature of unity for Cusa's
dynamic conception of being. The fourth section will examine the implications of
this conception of unity for the hierarchy of being and the specific contribution
which Cusa makes to the traditional understanding of hierarchy. The final section
will examine reflectively Cusa's epistemology by discussing how Cusa understood
his ability to achieve these insights regarding the nature of being and unity.
Principle of Individuality< >Principle of Community
Each individual contraction The contraction of being
uniquely imparts to each makes each thing to be
entity an inherent value everything in a contracted
which makes it indispensable sense. This creates a
to the whole. community of being relating
all entities on an
ontological level.
Structure Potency and Matter: Act and Form: The
of The limitation of ability of a being to
Being each being to its relate to other beings
pp. 51-63 own particular through the contraction
possibilities. of all being.
Causality Material and Formal and Final
pp. 63-66 Efficient Causality: Causality: The
The differentiation relationship between
between beings. beings.
Unity Individual Unity: Contracted Unity: The
pp. 66-71 The ability of relation of each being
individual beings to to every being through
exist in accordance the contraction of
with their own being itself.
natures.
Relationship Hierarchy: Ranking Inter-relationship:
of each being in accord Relating each being to
Entities with the potency of every being in that
pp. 71-83 its particular every being contracts
nature. the same whole.
Knowledge Discursive Thought: Intellection: This
pp. 83-89 This compares seeks to see reality
various individual as a whole.
entities.
THE STRUCTURE OF BEING FOR CUSA
The nature of being within Cusa's thought is essentially dynamic. This is because as we will see, to be, for Cusa, is to be active, that is, to interact with other beings by influencing their being as well as being influenced by them. Also, the dynamic interaction of beings creates a unity of being as a whole, since each being reflects the whole of being. This chapter will begin by discussing the relationship between actuality and potentiality. As the two fundamental components which together comprise being, they provide insight into three crucial points in the thought of Cusa. The first is what it means for an entity to exist; the second is the unity of individual entities, as well as being in itself; the third is the dynamic nature of reality for Cusa. Only by understanding the metaphysical principles of individual entities can one come to know the developmental capacities of being. This is required in order to understand how individual entities can retain their own unique natures and still relate to each other on an ontological level.
Act and Potency in Cusa's Thought
At first glance Cusa's understanding of the two metaphysical principles of act and potency appears little different from the views articulated by such traditional philosophers as Thomas Aquinas. In fact, in an essay entitled "Il Possest del Cusano e Le Dottrine Aristotelico-Tomistiche dell'atto e Potenza e dell Essenza ed Esistenza" Carlo Giacon goes so far as to assert that, on this particular point, most of the differences between Cusa and the majority of his medieval predecessors are purely verbal and result from Cusa's inclination to use language in order to strike the imagination rather than to inform the intellect.1 For both, actuality refers to the real existence of an entity (e.g. the existence of water) and potentiality refers to the possibility of an entity to exist in a manner other than it does (e.g. cold water becoming hot).2
In De Possest, Cusa asserts that being requires a union of actuality and potentiality. He points out that if existence were not possible then nothing could exist, and if existence were only possible and not actual then nothing would exist.3 In De Docta Ignorantia, actuality and potentiality mutually define each other in reference to being. Here potentiality is seen to be limited by act, and the existence of pure possibility which is devoid of act is an impossibility. Likewise, act is itself limited by potency. Thus, for Cusa act "has no absolute existence save in potency, whilst possibility can have no absolute existence save when it is limited by act."4
Though actuality and potentiality are two distinct principles of being, there is, nonetheless, an inherently complementary unity between them in respect to being. Giacon points out that it is possible to say that even potentiality precedes actuality, at least in respect to limited being. This is because no limited being could possess actual existence unless the possibility for this existence was prior to the entities' actual physical existence.5 Thus, one can say that potentiality precedes actuality only in respect to finite being, and then only in reference to the entity's potentiality within the Absolute, as the source and totality of being.
The interrelationship between actuality and potentiality has important
implications for Cusa's understanding of the nature of being. Perhaps the most
important of these is the dynamic character it imparts to reality. For Cusa being is
not indifferent with respect to actuality and potentiality, but tends toward act. This
tendency reveals the role which final cause plays for Cusa's metaphysics in that
being naturally tries to fulfill its potentialities. Another important implication is the
role which potency and act play for the integration of individual beings into the
unity of being as a whole. In terms of act, each being is related to every other being
in that for Cusa every individual is a contraction of the whole. However, in terms of
potency, each being can reflect this whole only in a manner which is consistent with
its individual nature.
Matter and Form in Cusa's Thought. Cusa's ideas on potentiality are intimately connected to his concept of matter, which is one of the most difficult points in his entire philosophy. He identifies matter with potentiality, and asserts that absolute matter does not and cannot exist since absolute matter could be nothing other than pure potentiality.6 Because pure potentiality would entirely lack the actuality required to bring it into existence, it is an impossibility. Thus, in reference to matter, among all possibles pure possibility is the least capable of actually existing.7
In De Possest, Cusa's discussion of the three types of theoretical investigation would seem to support this view. He ranks three types of investigation, from the lowest to the highest, in reference to the degree in which each must deal with matter. The lowest type of investigation is physics, which studies nature by examining forms which inhere in matter and are, therefore, subject to change. The highest type of investigation is theology, which studies abstract but forms that are divine and nothing other than themselves. As entirely devoid of the potency of matter, they are eternal and immutable. Between these two extremes lies the middle realm of mathematics which studies stable forms which are free from corporeal matter, but not from intelligible matter. For Cusa the more the existence of a being is linked to matter the less perfect it is.8
From this one can see that Cusa clearly identifies matter with potentiality and form with actuality. We will first examine Cusa's understanding of form in De Dato Patris Luminum. Cusa asserts that though it is common for philosophers to say that form gives being to things this manner of speaking lacks precision. Cusa has no desire to identify form with being and claims that form gives being to a thing only in the sense that in every existing thing it is the form that makes that thing what it is and actualizes its potential for existence.9 This mutual dependence of form and matter is also expressed in De Visione Dei where Cusa claims that the form of human nature cannot exist outside of particular men and cannot be disassociated from individuated being. This is because for Cusa it is the form which enables a being to exist, but no specific form can exist apart from individuated being.10
Thus, though Cusa rejects the possibility of a separated realm of forms, he does not follow the Nominalists by rejecting the existence of the forms entirely. Forms remain for Cusa a necessary component of being which actualize existence only in concert with the potency of the individuated being in which they inhere. They can never achieve this independently of potency. Thus for Cusa, though forms are distinct in the order of essence they have in themselves no distinct existence.11 He confirms this view in De Docta Ignorantia where he points out that forms do not have any actual existence in the order of being but only in the order of nature. In other words, though forms have no being of their own, they define the nature of the being in which they inhere and within that being are real.
Only by being actualized in an individual entity can form move beyond the order of nature (e.g. species, genera, etc.) to that of reality; just as a line can attain actual reality only within a solid.12 By defining the nature of an individual being, the forms define the limitations of potentiality which allow beings to be actualized. They are not simply beings of reason since there are circumstances under which they do obtain real existence, though this is not something of which they are capable in and of themselves. Thus, for Cusa the form can achieve actuality only as a contraction of being itself. It is through contraction of being as a whole that form is related to every other being.
This idea of individual forms as contractions of being has lead some scholars to interpret Cusa's metaphysics in a manner which denies that individual beings possess any positive being of their own so that they differ from each other only in a purely accidental fashion.13 These commentators have supported their claims by citing Cusa's rejection of the existence of plural positive essences, extrinsic to real entities, and Cusa's assertion that the Absolute is the one true Essence of all reality.
In an article entitled "Nicholas of Cusa's Theory of Science and Its Metaphysical Background", Thomas McTighe asserted that the quiddity of a thing is nothing other than unity itself. Hence, by virtue of its positive content, the sun differs not at all from the moon or any other particular thing.14 The diversity which is exhibited by the natural world is merely the product of accidental differences; no object possesses any specific form which interposes itself between a particular existing thing and the source of their being e.g. the Absolute.15 All individual entities are nothing more than differing contractions of the whole devoid of any being of their own.
These interpretations seem directly to contradict some of the most basic principles of Cusa's philosophy as well as Cusa's own words. Cusa clearly believes that both the sun and the moon have forms or essences of their own and, therefore, must likewise possess their own positive being. Thus, the differentiation of limited entities must be founded upon something other than the purely accidental.16 This creates a true diversity of being, rather than an essentially sham diversity based solely upon accidental differences which would result in nothing more than a multiplicity of variations in mode upon a single consistent being. Cusa writes that "the restricted quiddity of the sun is distinct from the restricted quiddity of the moon, because the restricted quiddity of a thing is the thing itself."17 For Cusa, these essences are bound up in the very being of the entity in which they inhere and, as such, are distinct from all other entities. Thus one can see clearly that according to Cusa it is not the individual beings themselves which are contractions of the whole, but only the forms, and the forms themselves are not sufficient for being. Hence, the differentiation exhibited by individual being is based upon real distinctions of positive being.
When Cusa asserts that the earth is the earth because it is nothing other than the earth he is indicating the intimate link between an object's own individual form and its being. He singles out this link as the principle of the object's existence and identity. Should he attempt to account for the earth's identity by appealing to something other than itself, such as the form of earthiness, then he would have to identify the principle of that form and, thereby, become ensnared in an infinite regress. This can only be escaped by identifying some principle which appeals to nothing outside of itself for its existence. What is required, in short, is something which is what it is because it cannot be anything else.18
This by no means implies that Cusa is espousing some sort of nominalist
singularism where each creature is itself and has no internal relationship with any
other creature. Though the forms can exist only in individuals this does not
necessarily mean that each individual has a form all its own. This may well be true
for such singular entities as the earth, the sun, the moon, etc., but for entities which
are members of a class of beings, this is not the case. Each person or each horse
does not possess a unique form which is essentially different from that of every
other being of its type. Each one does, however, possess a form entirely its own
which is expressed in a unique fashion, but these particular distinctions are of
secondary significance.
The Contraction of Being
Cusa's philosophy, however, is even less singularist than this because each individual being relates to all being in that each is a contraction (contractio) of the whole. In De Docta Ignorantia, Cusa defines the term contraction as the restriction of Being itself to some particular thing.
Thus the whole Being exists in a restricted fashion in each particular being.19 In this sense, each existing creature, reflects not merely every other creature, but also the entirety of being. Through contraction each being becomes ontologically linked to every other being since all entities derive their existence from a common source. It is important to note, however, that this presence of all Being in each being is by no means an actual presence in which every individual contains the totality of being as that totality is in itself. By restricting itself, Being becomes in each actually existing thing what that individual thing actually is.20 No actual presence of anything other than the thing itself is possible because it would destroy the actual unity of potency and act in the individual entity by making it be something other than itself and, thereby, make its existence impossible.21 In this manner Cusa retains the uniqueness and individuality of all existing entities.
These points are intimately related to Cusa's dynamic and unified conception of reality because each individual is not singular entity inherently isolated, but a contraction of the totality of being. Thus, all beings are united in that each is a contraction of the same whole. However, because each contraction is unique each being is simultaneously distinct from every other. This allows for a dynamic interaction between beings.
The forms play a key role in understanding what it means to be. For Cusa the forms communicate being in that they actualize existence. They are also responsible for the distribution of being in that they account for the multiplicity of beings as well as the diversity which these beings express. Furthermore, the forms also have an indispensable role to play in terms of participation. They do not merely provide essences as had been the case for the ancient Greeks, but account also for the multiplicity of beings as well. This ontological multiplicity is distinctively Christian and allows for a true dynamism not merely of interaction, but of creation itself.
Matter also plays an indispensable role for being in that it determines the way
in which each being is individuated from every other being. By being equated with
potency matter determines the possibilities which are open to each particular being,
thereby establishing the uniqueness of each individual being. Hence, though the
potency of matter resides in all being it is different in each being, since each being
can be only itself with its own possibilities.
The Principles of Community and Individuality. This idea of being as contractable gives Cusa's conception of reality a unique quality. For the Platonists, being meant possessing a certain form. With the Thomistic revolution the focus shifts from participating in one of a series of forms to participating in the existence of the Absolute. Cusa's idea of contraction, however, takes this idea of participation a bit further and brings two fundamental principles of being into operation.
The idea of contraction means that in order to be anything an entity must also be everything in a restricted (non-actual) manner. This relation of each being to the totality of being on an ontological level will be referred to as the principle of community. This principle is based upon the fact that each being is a contraction of being itself and, therefore, all beings are linked through their common source. It is imperative to note that the principle of community does not eliminate the uniqueness of the individual. For Cusa, each individual entity contracts being in a manner of which no other being is capable. It is the uniqueness of these individual contractions that makes each being itself and will be referred to as the principle of individuality. Thus, each entity has an inherent value which is unique to it alone (the principle of individuality).
Yet, simultaneously each entity is just as inherently related to the totality of
being and through it to every other existing being (the principle of community).
Cusa thereby establishes a metaphysics which allows for a harmonious diversity
that permits each individual being to remain distinct from the whole, possessing a
value which is uniquely its own; yet, Cusa's metaphysics also unites these separate
beings on an ontological level in that each being is a contracted reflection of the
whole.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF FORMAL CAUSALITY
This section on the dynamic nature of reality which flows from Cusa's conception of being will focus upon the interaction of being in terms of causality and some of its implications. One should also note that final causality will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter IV. The purpose here is to show how the structure of being makes reality inherently interactive and dynamic, and that this dynamism is the product of the harmonious diversity of reality.
For Cusa, formal, efficient, and final causality are the three types of causality whose operation have prime importance for being. In De Possest Cusa claims that the Divine is the formal, efficient, and final cause of all. This is derived from the fact that God is the form of all things.22 As the source of the forms of all beings, the Divine serves as their formal cause. Since the Divine creates both the form and the matter of which all beings are made It also serves as the efficient cause. It is worth noting that Cusa does not associate material causality with the Divine and this is further proof that it would be incorrect to interpret his thought in a pantheistic manner.
Finally, as the fulfillment of the potentiality of all beings the Divine serves also as the final cause of reality. Though formal cause is relatively static, since it creates its effect merely by its presence, efficient and final causality play a far more dynamic role. Final causality actively diffuses goodness and efficient causality communicates existence to its effect.23
Kenneth L. Schmitz points out in his work entitled: The Gift: Creation that the condition for a dynamic plurality of beings to exist is that they receive from others.24 For Cusa, this dynamism is not solely the product of the Divine but extends to all of being. In De Docta Ignorantia, Cusa asserts that by the mingling of elements new entities are constantly created.25 This recombination of elements is not solely the work of formal causality, since in creating new entities that combine elements in new ways efficient causality is also operative. The dynamism of reality, however, is hardly limited to a mere recombination of elements. Each entity has inherent in its being an activity which in functioning contributes to the perfection of the whole in that it actualizes possibilities which would not otherwise be brought into existence.26 As Jasper Hopkins points out, each existing thing in its functioning is of use to every other existing thing, even though it may not intentionally try to be so.27
An example of this can be seen in De Dato Patris Luminum where Cusa points out that the power of a seed to create a tree cannot be actualized without the light of the sun.28 This example expresses two of the most fundamental principles of Cusa's dynamic conception of reality. The first principle is the interaction between beings. The seed cannot actualize its potential without the sun's action. The second principle is the creative capacity of being. In fulfilling its potential, the seed brings a new being into existence, which being in turn is itself creative. Furthermore, in fulfilling its potential the seed has contributed to the perfection of the whole. In this manner, the tree which the seed produces is the effect of the final causality operative in the universe. Thus one can see that, for Cusa, individual beings continue both to communicate existence and to diffuse goodness in a fashion similar to that by which their existence was initiated.
It is the principle of individuality which is most closely related to efficient
and material causality. Material causality depends upon the potency of matter and
like formal causality operates in a relatively passive manner in that a form is
imposed upon it. Efficient causality requires individual beings; it would be
impossible for it to operate without an agent to initiate its action and a patient for it
to act upon. Final causality, however, is more related to the principle of community
in that it is produced by the tendency toward act which exists in all beings based
upon their achieving their end of approximating the Absolute. Formal causality is
also linked to act and establishes bridges between individual beings by determining
the appropriate manner for them to relate to one another. It achieves this effect by
establishing the natures of these beings.
THE UNITY OF BEING
In order for beings to interact with and reflect one another they must share some fundamental relationship. This section will examine the unity of reality which Cusa's conception of being makes possible as a response to the perennial philosophical problem of the one and the many. In order to elaborate Cusa's understanding of the harmonious diversity of reality it will distinguish four interrelated types of unity which exist within Cusa's metaphysics. The first type is the singular unity which exists between act and potency within the individual and allows it to exist. The second is based upon the contractibility of being which allows for the whole of being to exist within each individual entity. The third is the total being of the universe. The fourth is the absolute unity of uncontracted being in which all distinctions coincide. Each type of unity will be treated in turn in order to illumine this central element of Cusa's metaphysical thought.
It is perhaps best to begin by noting that not all of Cusa's interpreters see him
as having a fundamentally unified view of reality. Pauline Moffitt Watts, for
example, concentrates upon some isolated elements within Cusa's thought and
concludes that he finds the universe to be a place of fundamental discontinuity and
estrangement in which man is a stranger condemned to exist in a state of
metaphysical disjunction.29 Watts does not seem to take account of the fact that the
disjunctive elements within Cusa's thought exist within an overarching framework
of unity. Much of Cusa's philosophy is based upon the Neo-Platonic idea that unity
is a fundamental characteristic of being. In fact, in De Docta Ignorantia, Cusa
plainly states that being and unity are essentially convertible terms.30
The Four Kinds of Unity in Cusa's Thought
Individual Unity. The first type of unity in Cusa's metaphysics is the
individual unity of each particular existing being. This is in accord with the
principle of identity. As Thomas McTighe points out, Cusa subscribes to the
classical position that "A thing has being to the extent that it is one."31 For Cusa, in
order to exist, every being must be itself and, thereby, exclude every other being.
This inherent individual unity seems to create a fundamental opposition between the
various entities within reality.
Contracted Unity. Cusa resolves this opposition with the second type of unity expressed in his metaphysics and referred to here as contracted unity. This type of unity is in accord with the principle of community in which Cusa sees each individual being as a contraction of the totality of being. By the term contraction, Cusa means that each individual entity is a restricted image of the whole of being. Hence, Cusa creates a universal relationality between all entities in that by virtue of their ontological structure each entity is in itself a unique reflection of the same reality. Cusa thus forges an inherent existential bond between all entities and overcomes the opposition which the individual unity of each being seemingly created.
It is to this contracted unity that Cusa refers when he asserts that all beings
exist within each thing.32 In fact, as noted above, Cusa is quick to point out that he is
not referring to any actual presence, since this would destroy the individual unity
which he sees as a necessary precondition for all being.33 Hence, individual unity
does not inhibit the unity of the whole. In fact, since each individual is inherently
structured to contain the whole, the individual can only be itself by being, in a
sense, all reality. Because of this, the individual does not exist in diametric
opposition to the whole, but as its singular expression. In fact, through contracted
unity the unity of the individual enhances the unity of the whole in that the former is
structured in such a way as to express the latter. In this way Cusa lays the
groundwork for seeing unity as an harmonious expression of diversity.
The Unity of the Universe. The third type of unity is the unity of all being
within the universe. It would be a grievous error to regard the unity of the universe
as a whole to be nothing more than a simple aggregate with no internal relationship
between its constituent elements, as in the case of a pile of stones. De Docta
Ignorantia asserts that the relationship between the universe and its parts is
analogous to that of universal humanity to a particular person in that the actual
existence of the universal can exist only as contracted in the individual.34 Likewise,
the universe can exist only as it is contracted in its component parts. The universe
for Cusa serves as something of a super-genus which cannot exist independently of
its constituent elements, yet, through those elements the universe obtains real
existence. It is not a randomly assembled conglomerate, but a unified whole
expressive of the reality of the Absolute from which it derives its being.
Absolute Unity. For Cusa the unity of the Absolute is, and can be, only absolute unity which is devoid of all distinction and all plurality. Cusa makes this point clearly in De Docta Ignorantia where he asserts that the nature of the Absolute is such that it excludes all greater of lesser degrees.35 This is because the Absolute is actually all that it can possibly be and, therefore, its being cannot be added to or diminished.36 Because the Absolute is the source of all being in the finite world, the distinctions of the finite world do not apply within it. It is to this that Cusa is referring when he writes in De Visione Dei that "Nothing exists outside of God but in God these things are not other than God."37 This is because for Cusa "otherness in unity is without otherness because it is unity."38 Thus one can see that the nature of unity for the Absolute is significantly different than that in the finite realm. Whereas unity in the finite world requires diversity in order, more accurately to proclaim the whole, diversity in the Absolute would be both superfluous and impossible.39 The unity of the Absolute is a pure and simple unity where all the distinctions of the finite world coincide.
For Cusa, the absolute oneness of the Divine precedes all the oppositions of finite being and, by doing so, unites them as the source from which each derives its existence. The Absolute exists in a transcendent and undifferentiated manner; thereby it unites all opposition ontologically by being the ultimate cause of their existence. The oppositions of finite beings can conflict only on the individual level.
In this fashion, Cusa resolves the tension between the inherent unity of
individuals which provides the basis for the principle of individuality and the
inherent unity of Being as a whole which is the foundation of the principle of
community. This resolution is possible only because Cusa sees unity as being
enhanced by diversity, rather than destroyed by it. This derives from Cusa's
understanding of the nature of being as cohesive and unified, yet made up of a
variety of distinct individuals. Each individual is a contraction of the whole; though
all are interrelated, each remains distinct by expressing the whole in its own unique
fashion. Thus, a diverse variety of particular expressions more perfectly reflect the
nature of the whole than could any single expression or uniform series of
expressions, since variety is more comprehensive than uniformity.
UNITY AND THE HIERARCHY OF BEING
These same principles have additional metaphysical meaning for unity in relation to the hierarchy of being. According to Arthur O. Lovejoy, Cusa sees the order of being as existing in a single, perfect, continuous chain where the highest species of one genus is neatly linked to the lowest species of the next genus.40 This type of hierarchy creates a unity which is entirely extrinsic. Each species is directly related only to those species which are directly above and directly below it, but shares no immediate relationship with the remainder of the species upon the chain. Unity of this sort, however, can be recognized only from the outside.
Other interpreters of Cusa's thought claim that he rejects the hierarchical structure of universe entirely. Each individual being is equal to every other being, and none is any more perfect than the other.41 Cusa's view of reality, though innately cohesive, is hardly so egalitarian as to eliminate entirely the ranking of the various types of being. Cusa's writings leave absolutely no doubt that he accepted the traditional hierarchical order of being, running from the highest and most complete form of being to the lowest. In a work entitled Idiota de Mente, Cusa makes this point completely clear. He asserts here that rational creatures are more perfect than non-rational ones, that animal existents are more perfect than vegetative ones, and vegetative ones more perfect than non-animate ones.42 Cusa reiterates this view in De Dato Patris Luminum where he asserts that corporeal being is fulfilled by animate being, animate being by intellectual being, and intellectual being by truth.43
This hierarchy of being sheds a good deal of light upon various issues in Cusa's thought. Cusa's gradation of being descends to the degree that an entity has its existence rooted in matter and is, thereby, made more passive.44 The more perfect the entity, the more actual and active its existence. Cusa's gradation of being also provides evidence that the distinctions between individuals cannot be solely the product of accidental differences. A stone is not merely different from a man, but decidedly inferior to him inasmuch as the stone exists in a more passive manner.
The concept of a hierarchy of being provides a secure foundation upon which
can be erected various concepts of natural order.45 The conceptualization of
hierarchy in the Christian world was primarily the work of Pseudo-Dionysius and
St. Augustine.46 Pseudo-Dionysius is of particular importance since it was he who
first incorporated Hellenistic speculation into the Christian doctrine of salvation. By
adopting Greek philosophy, Pseudo-Dionysius gains a basis for the hierarchical
structure of reality in which the sensible and intelligible realms are regarded as
separate and somewhat antithetic. Pseudo-Dionysius bridges this gap with the nine
orders of angels and has all things in both the sensible and intelligible realms
emanating from the Divine, and then returning thereto.47 Cusa does not rearrange
the sequential order of the hierarchy, but his understanding of being enables him to
interpret the relationship of individuals within it in a profoundly different way.
Human Nature and the Hierarchy of Being
Cusa's most obvious alteration in the hierarchy is to see humanity, not a series of angelic orders, binding the intelligible to the sensible realm. Because Cusa equates unity with being, his ranking of man as the pinnacle of the natural world has important implications for his understanding of the meaning of unity. One can see clearly that the term unity does not refer to a simple uniformity when applied to finite being. Inanimate corporeal being, which is the most uniform type of being, is placed at the very lowest level of the hierarchy. Corporeal being, because of the exclusive singularity of its nature, exists in opposition to every other being. This exclusive singularity means that corporeal being embraces only itself and cannot contain the perfections of animate and rational being. Thus, unity for Cusa is epitomized by the harmonious diversity of which human nature is representative.
Human nature embraces the entire spectrum of finite reality from the rational to the corporeal. It possesses an even greater unity than that of the universe, not because of what it unifies, but because of the way in which this unity exists. Humanity does not simply contain diverse types of being as does the universe, but more adequately reconciles these distinctions into a single cohesive nature. This is because, as previously has been stated the universe functions as something of a super-genus which contains a variety of individuals, each possessed of its own particular form. The human being, however, reconciles all the diversity of the universe under the single form of human nature within each individual which possesses that form. In short, the unity of man is no more inclusive than the unity of the universe, but its distinctions are far less pronounced. Within the universe, the different natures contained exist in a somewhat divided manner, which is not the case for human nature.
This relates to the far more subtle and profound analysis Cusa makes in his interpretation of the hierarchy of being. As traditionally articulated, the hierarchy ranks the beings of the universe in a divisive manner where each being is exclusively itself and shares no internal relationship with any of the other beings in the chain. Cusa accepts the hierarchy as quite compatible with his understanding of the individual unity of existing things in accord with the principle of individuality as discussed in the previous sub-section. In short, each being is itself and thereby may be graded in relation to other beings.
However, for Cusa the principle of individuality is based upon each entity being a unique contraction of the whole and, therefore, implies the principle of community which relates all entities as being contractions of the same whole. In this manner one can see clearly that each entity possesses not merely individual unity but also a contracted unity through which it is related to all other beings. It is this inter-relatedness of all being which is Cusa's most profound contribution to the understanding of the hierarchy of being. For Cusa, each being not only is itself, but, as itself, is ontologically related to every other being.
The principle of community is far more enhanced in the human than in a stone. By virtue of the diversity of the human's nature one possesses a greater potentiality and is, therefore, more ontologically related to the totality of being. In respect to the principle of identity, however, human nature is not superior to that of the stone since either type of being is just as much an individual as any other.
Thus it would be misleading to depict Cusa's view of reality as a straight
hierarchical chain. Though he does accept the hierarchy of being he stresses a
complex and dynamic interrelationship of all reality.48 The hierarchy requires
distinct individual beings which can be ranked in respect to their natures. However,
if one seeks to emphasize the dynamic relationship between these beings one must
find a way to transcend the hierarchical distinctions of the universe. This is possible
for Cusa precisely because he integrates the principle of individuality, which allows
for a hierarchical gradation of being, with the principle of community, which relates
all being to each being.
Cusa's Interpretation of the Chain of Being
In a characteristically paradoxical manner Cusa's attempt to reorient
philosophy in a more Platonic direction entails a rejection of the doctrine of the
separate realm of forms to serve as external archetypes for individual realities; this
had been perhaps the single most formative concept of Platonism.49 For Cusa, the
existence of a plurality of external exemplars would be an absurdity since each
object which emulated that form would have this as its infinitely true exemplar.
That would result in creating a plurality of infinitely true exemplars, but infinite
truth can be only singular in nature and multiple exemplars are both unnecessary
and impossible. In the Idiota de Mente, Cusa writes that,
the infinite form is only one and utterly simple. It is reflected in every
single thing which can be subject to form as its perfectly apt
paradigm. In this sense precisely, it will be correct that there are not
many separate exemplars and ideas of things.50
Because of this relationship between the infinite form and finite reality, the physical universe can no longer be depicted as a straightforward series of stages; but becomes a much more complex arrangement based upon constant existential interrelations. Thus one can see that for Cusa the universe is a place "which exists only in manyness and in which each particular thing contracts the universe to be that thing."51 The only reason this is possible is because the principle of community allows Cusa's view of finite unity as enhanced rather than destroyed by diversity; thus, distinctions need not necessarily result in fragmentation. In this manner, Cusa is able to construct a universe where each thing retains its own exclusive identity and, yet, is inherently linked to the rest of the universe. The principle of individuality does not contradict the principle of community, but is its consistent expression.
This provides the basis for Cusa's uncompromising insistence on the presence of unity as pervasive throughout reality upon an individual level, as well as for being as a whole. Cusa's dynamic conception of being which sees all existents as inherently active is closely related to his ideas on unity. This is because this unity is premised upon the dynamic nature of being, and only within such a unity would this type of dynamism be operative. This view of reality is fundamentally incompatible with the traditional medieval chain-of-being.
Other commentators are inclined to ascribe to Cusa a view of reality which is far more egalitarian. According to them, Cusa sees the universe as being analogous to a mosaic in which each individual entity contributes equally to the beauty and complexity of the whole.
The fundamental drawback to both the mosaic and the chain-of-being metaphors is that both are static and do not address the interactive nature of reality. For both of these metaphors, each component shares no internal relationship and has no direct effect upon the other components. The relationship between individuals is reduced to simple external juxtaposition. In failing to address this interactive nature, both of these metaphors point to an extrinsic unity where each individual is merely a component of the whole, rather than a reflection of it.
What is called for is a metaphor which binds the individual entities within
reality in an internal manner. In this manner, all existing entities are ontologically
linked and, therefore, influence the mode of existence of each separate entity. This
reality has an inherent and cohesive unity, and through this unity each entity
engages in the dynamic action of shaping the nature of existence.
The Trinity as a Paradigm for Cusa's Interpretation of Being. A more appropriate metaphor for Cusa's understanding of the relation between the one and the many in reference to being is that of the Trinity. It should be noted that this is not an attempt to shift the focus to a more theological realm. One must recognize, however, that Cusa himself would not accept the sharp separation of theology from philosophy characteristic of more modern thinkers. In examining Cusa's philosophy one must be sensitive to hermeneutic considerations and try to place it within the cultural context in which it was written. Thus one may legitimately use the theological concepts which Cusa accepted in order to elaborate the philosophical system which he saw as being entirely compatible and to some extent, expressive.
Just as the Trinity unifies the three distinct divine persons into a single God, the diverse multiplicity of entities is united within the whole of being. The three persons of the Trinity are consubstantial in nature in that each is equally God, yet, at the same time each person retains something peculiar to itself. Such distinctions are derived not from the opposition, but from the unique way in which each relates to the other. In respect to finite entities, each participates in the one source of all being in accord with the principle of community: in this sense they may be said to be consubstantial with each other. However, in accordance with the principle of individuality, each individual being participates in Being as a whole in its own unique way. Though the distinctions of individual entities are not simply distinctions in relation, but distinctions of being, these are based upon the way in which each individual relates to Being as a whole and to every other individual being as well.
The way in which individual beings interact with each other is in some sense analogous to the way in which the Trinity is active within itself, with the Son proceeding from the Father, and the Spirit proceeding from both the Father and the Son. In both cases, each constituent being partially defines the nature of the others and also creates new beings. Also, since the Father precedes the Son and both the Father and the Son precede the Spirit, one may in this sense speak of the Father as having a certain priority over the Son, and the Son as having a certain priority over the Spirit. This is reflected in the hierarchial ranking Cusa sees within being. But, whereas the distinctions within the Trinity are purely relational, those within being are based upon differences in being. Because of this, the hierarchy of being is based not upon relational priority but on a far more ontological basis, namely, the existential nature of the entities involved.
The persons of the Trinity may be interpreted as an expression of the principle of individuality. Each person of the Trinity is relationally distinct from the others and is, therefore, unique. Because of these relational distinctions one can organize the persons of the Trinity in a fashion which in some sense is hierarchical. One must bear in mind, however, that the principle of community is also in effect and this binds the persons of the Trinity into the unity of the Godhead of which each is uniquely reflective.
The relationship of the persons within the Trinity suggests many implications for the relationship of act and potency in reference to finite being. The persons of the Trinity express the infinite according to the nature of that particular person. The Trinity as a whole, however, can be viewed as actuality in that it unites the persons of the Trinity within the Godhead. It is within the Trinity that the component persons realize their existence, and through the individual persons of the Trinity that the Godhead realizes its existence. Within the Trinity each person is an expression of the Godhead, and within each person the Trinity is expressive of that person. In this sense, each person of the Trinity is unique and distinct from the other two, but at the same time all three persons are related in the unity of the Godhead that each expresses in its own manner.
The unity of the Trinity manages to overcome the isolationist imagery of
both a mosaic and a chain-of-being, where each entity is essentially separated from
the others. It does not do this at the expense of individual identity, in that each
remains easily and genuinely distinguishable from the whole. The main advantage
of the Trinitarian over the mosaic and the chain-of-being metaphors is that within
the Trinity unity is not an extrinsic quality which can be recognized only when
viewed from the outside and examined as a whole. From an internal perspective,
each particular tile in the mosaic or link in the chain is self-contained and does not
see itself as the whole since nothing within it points to the great complexity to
which it serves merely as a contributor. In the Trinity, however, unity is an intrinsic
characteristic since the distinctiveness of each person is based upon its real relation
to the others so that each individual within the Trinity inevitably is reflective of the
whole.
The Nature of Knowledge for Cusa
The purpose of this section is to examine the manner in which one comes to
know being according to Cusa, with particular attention to the way in which one is
able to understand the concept of unity. It will lay the groundwork for
understanding human insight, not only into the nature of being which has been
discussed in this chapter, but also into the Divine, which will be the topic of Chapter
III. This section will concern also how one can know individual entities and how,
from this, one can then gain some degree of insight into the nature of being as a
whole.
Discursive Reasoning
Cusa sees two different types of knowledge. He calls the first discursive
reasoning, this is the lower form of knowledge and is based upon comparison.
When the mind encounters something which it does not know it compares that with
the things it does know and notes the differences and similarities. While in this
manner the unknown becomes known, this knowledge is always approximate52 for,
"our [human] intellect which is not the truth, never grasps the truth with such
precision that it could not be comprehended with infinitely greater precision."53 For
Cusa, humans having a decidedly finite mind, cannot know even the most
inconsequential grain of sand in an absolute sense. No matter how accurate the
ideas in such a mind, they fall short of the absolute truth; hence, a more accurate
idea always is possible. Cusa notes that the comparisons of discursive reasoning are
grounded in empirical sensation, pointing out that knowledge cannot completely
disregard the material conditions of things since without them the mind could form
no image of reality whatsoever. However, the mind cannot rest content with
knowing these material conditions; the more the mind abstracts from them the more
reliable its knowledge.54
Intellection
The second, higher, type of knowledge is called intellection. In respect to the infinite, one cannot make comparisons;55 there is no proportion between the finite and the Absolute, there is no known thing with which one can compare the unknown Absolute. Cusa compares human attempts to know the Absolute "to owls trying to look into the sun."56 The human mind, like the owl's eye is suited by nature to operate in the murky world of finite reality. Like the daylight, the overwhelming brilliance of the Absolute is beyond the mind's capacity to comprehend; like the owl's eye is rendered insensate by such brilliance. However, the mind's natural desire to know the Absolute cannot be frustrated. Therefore, when it fails to grasp the Absolute, the mind turns upon itself and, in coming to know its own limits, enters a state of learned ignorance.57 In De Docta Ignorantia, Cusa asserts that the better a person knows his or her ignorance the greater his or her learning.58 Cusa reaffirms this point in De Possest, where he asserts that the more the mind understands its inability to conceive the Absolute, the greater the mind: the learned man is the man who knows he does not know.59
Thus, though discursive reason fails to comprehend the Absolute, one has another mental faculty more suited to dealing with the Absolute. This faculty may be referred to as intellection and is an intuitive capacity by which one can formulate symbols and metaphors to explicate the Divine. Eugene Rice describes the distinction between discursive reasoning and intellection in his article entitled "Nicholas of Cusa's Idea of Wisdom." He points out that for Cusa the discursive reason is analogous to a traveller walking down a road, who can only see the sights the road offers one at a time or in succession as one moves along. The intellect, however, is like a person atop a mountain tower whose vision can encompass the entire valley at once.60 Though the latter does not have the particular knowledge of the one on the road, he or she does have a broad understanding of the valley as a whole. Thus, the process of intellection can give no particular knowledge of the Absolute, but recognizes that there is something which lies beyond the finite and is not subject to distinction. In short, the process of intellection is the use of imaginative human powers to reveal what the Absolute is like, once one knows that it is beyond the reach of discursive reason.
Cusa's understanding of human knowledge reflects the principles of individuality and community. Discursive reason, as comparative, operates in accord with the principle of individuality. It examines separate individual entities, and by noting the differences and similarities between them provides one with knowledge. Intellection, however, is related to the principle of community in that it does not compare entities but seeks to give insight into being as a whole.
Whereas discursive reason is analytic in character and gives knowledge of the component parts of being, intellection is something else entirely. For Cusa, intellection is the only truly authentic mode of knowing because it provides one not merely with knowledge of the various parts of reality, but with a vision of reality as a whole. Intellection, for Cusa, is not merely a type of synthetic knowledge but much more for it knows not merely how things fit together, but all the multifarious possibilities which are open to being. In short, intellection depends not upon the number of things which are known, but upon the imaginative thrust of the mind. Therefore, it is not a matter of possessing any particular knowledge, but an awareness of the nature of reality as a whole. Intellection thereby provides persons with insight into unity and, hence, a clearer understanding of the nature of being. In this manner, Cusa sees intellection as completing the partial knowledge of discursive reasoning by unifying it into a cohesive world view.
Strictly speaking, the human intellect can never attain precise knowledge of the Absolute, but only a certain rather attenuated awareness. Cusa describes this relationship between the human mind and the truth, either absolute or finite, as analogous to that which exists between a circle and a polygon inscribed within it. The more angles the polygon possesses the more closely it will approximate the shape of the circle. However, regardless of the number of angles the polygon may possess, it can never match exactly the shape of the circle. Thus one can see that for Cusa all knowledge is essentially conjectural. This is particularly the case for discursive thought which, because it is essentially comparative, can never produce exact knowledge since no two beings are exactly alike.
This does not mean that Cusa reduces the status of human knowledge to that
of an arbitrary guess or random hypothesis. For Cusa, human knowledge consists in
a rough conformation of an idea to the reality it represents. No finite mind is
capable of formulating an idea which is so precise that it precludes the possibility of
the existence of another idea which is more exact. Thus, one is denied final
knowledge even of finite entities. On the other hand, though the human mind can
never attain absolute knowledge, it can attain knowledge which, though partial and
incomplete, nonetheless is valid.61 Hence, human knowledge of the finite realm is
relatively reliable, but is always capable of improvement. In respect to the Absolute
human knowledge not only is capable of being improved upon, but is basically
unreliable since there is nothing with which it can make appropriate comparisons.
1. Nicolo Cusano Agli Inizi del Mondo Moderno (Florence, Italy: 1970), p. 5.
2. Ibid., p. 378.
3. Nicholas of Cusa, "Trialogus De Possest" in A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa, Jasper Hopkins, ed. (Minneapolis: Arthur J. Banning Press, l986), p. 125.
4. Nicholas of Cusa, Of Learned Ignorance, Germain Heron, trans. (London: Routledge, Kegan, Paul, 1954), p. 95.
5. Nicolo Cusano Agli Inizi del Mondo Moderno, p. 378.
6. Etienne Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York: Scribner's, 1937), p. 539.
7. Ibid.
8. Nicholas of Cusa, "Trialogus De Possest" in A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa p. 147.
9. Nicholas of Cusa, "De Dato Patris Luminum" in Nicholas of Cusa's Metaphysic of Contraction, Jasper Hopkins, ed. (Minneapolis: Arthur J. Banning Press, l983), p. 118.
10. Nicholas of Cusa, The Vision of God, Emma Gurney Salter, trans. (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1960), p. 40.
11. Armand A. Maurer, Medieval Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 320.
12. Nicholas of Cusa, Of Learned Ignorance, p. 88.
13. Jasper Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa's Metaphysic of Contraction (Minneapolis: Arthur J. Banning Press, l983), p. 103.
14. Nicolo Cusano Agli Inizi del Mondo Moderno, p. 326.
15. Ibid., p. 327.
16. Hopkins, p. 104.
17. Nicholas of Cusa, p. 81.
18. Karsten Harries, "Cusanus and the Platonic Idea", New Scholasticism, 37 (1963), 197.
19. Nicholas of Cusa, p. 82.
20. Ibid., p. 83.
21. Ibid., p. 84.
22. Nicholas of Cusa, "Trialogus De Possest" in A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa, p. 81.
23. Theodore J. Kondoleon, "Exemplary Causality in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas" (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Philosophical Studies, No. 229, 1967), p. 151.
24. Kenneth L. Schmitz, The Gift: Creation (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1982), p. 80.
25. Nicholas of Cusa, Of Learned Ignorance, p. 119.
26. Ibid., p. 111.
27. Hopkins, 80.
28. Nicholas of Cusa, "De Dato Patris Luminum" in Nicholas of Cusa's Metaphysic of Contraction, p. 116.
29. Pauline Moffitt Watts, Nicholas Cusanus: A Fifteenth Century Vision of Man (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1982), p. 25.
30. Nicholas of Cusa, Of Learned Ignorance, p. 90.
31. Thomas P. McTighe, "The Meaning of the Couple, `Complicatio-Explicatio' in the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa," The Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 32 (1958), 209.
32. Nicholas of Cusa, Of Learned Ignorance, p. 88.
33. Ibid., p. 84.
34. Ibid., p. 88.
35. Ibid., p. l2.
36. Ibid., p. 15.
37. Nicholas of Cusa, The Vision of God, p. 66.
38. Ibid., p. 61.
39. Nicholas of Cusa, Of Learned Ignorance, p. 15.
40. Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 80.
41. Charles B. Schmitt and Quentin Skinner, eds., The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1988), p. 552.
42. Nicholas of Cusa, De Idiota de Mente: The Layman About Mind, Clyde Lee Miller, trans. (New York: Alaris Books, l979), p. 51.
43. Nicholas of Cusa, "De Dato Patris Luminum" in Nicholas of Cusa's Metaphysic of Contraction, p. 127.
44. Ibid.
45. Marion Leathers Kuntz and Paul Grimly Kuntz,eds., Jacobs Ladder and the Tree of Life: Concepts of Hierarchy and the Great Chain of Being (New York: Peter Lang Publishers, l988), p. 52.
46. Lovejoy, p. 65.
47. Ernst Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1963), p. 9.
48. Schmitt and Skinner, p. 585.
49. Dorothy Koeningsberger, Renaissance Man and Creative Thinking (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, l979), p. 105.
50. Nicholas of Cusa, De Idiota de Mente: The Layman About Mind, Clyde Lee Miller, trans. (New York: Alaris Books, 1979), p. 47.
51, Nicolo Cusano Agli Inizi del Mondo Moderno, p. 84.
52. Nicholas of Cusa, Of Learned Ignorance, p. 7.
53. Ibid., p. 11.
54. Ibid., p. 25.
55. Ibid., p. 8.
56. Ibid., p. 5.
57. Ibid., p. 8.
58. Ibid., p. 9.
59. Nicholas of Cusa, "Trialogus De Possest" in A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa, p. 115.
60. Eugene Rice, "Nicholas of Cusa's Idea of Wisdom", Traditio, 13 (1957) 358.
61. Henry Bett, Nicholas of Cusa (London: Meuthen and Company Ltd., 1932), p. 180.