Where the previous chapter concentrated upon unity with regard to being as such, this chapter shifts the focus to the Absolute. It will be divided into three sections. The first section will discuss absolute unity in reference to the coincidence of opposites. The second section will examine in what sense it is possible to have insight into this type of unity. The final section will examine the various metaphors and paradoxes which Cusa uses to explicate the Divine. As we shall see, the principles of individuality and community play a fundamental role for understanding the nature of the Absolute and how it creates the harmonious diversity of reality. An overview of this may be seen in the accompanying diagram.
ABSOLUTE UNITY AND THE COINCIDENCE OF OPPOSITES
Here we will first discuss the nature of the Absolute unity of the Divine, then
outline the way in which the maximum and the minimum coincide within the
Absolute, and end by discussing the various options available for interpreting what
Cusa means by the phrase "coincidence of opposites". As the coincidence of
opposites is perhaps the single most characteristic concept in all of Cusa's
philosophy, its clear understanding is indispensable for any inquiry into the nature
of the Absolute in his thought. Furthermore, since Cusa's vision of the Absolute is
the focal point of his metaphysics and conditions everything else he has to say about
reality, this section clearly has special importance for understanding his thought.
Principle of Individuality< >Principle of Community
Each individual contraction The contraction of being
uniquely imparts to each makes each thing to be
entity an inherent value everything in a contracted
which makes it indispensable sense. This creates a
to the whole. community of being relating
all entities on an
ontological level.
The Retains the Resolves the
Coincidence distinctiveness of opposition of finite
of all individual being through the
Opposites entities, of which Absolute unity of the
pp. 90-101 only the Absolute Divine.
is capable of
entirely resolving
all opposition.
Knowledge One cannot know the One gains an awareness
of the Absolute as It is of the nature of the
Absolute in Itself since Absolute by postulating
pp. 101-117 there is no finite from the finite being
being which may be which contracts It.
adequately compared
with It due to the
unique nature of
the Divine.
Metaphors One cannot say what One can explicate the
and the Divine is, since Divine to the extent
Paradoxes no metaphor or that finite being is a
pp. 117-124 paradox can be contraction of the
entirely appropriate Absolute.
due to the nature
of the Divine.
The Nature of Absolute Unity
In order to understand the nature of the Absolute one must first understand
Its unambiguously unified and infinite nature. The Absolute for Cusa is all that it
possibly can be; therefore, it exists without any distinction between actuality and
potentiality.1 It is this ability to be all that it is capable of being that separates the
Absolute from the rest of reality and makes it entirely unique, in that it alone is
infinite. Cusa makes this clear in several places in De Visione Dei. He writes that
"in infinite being, the potential being of all things is infinite being itself."2 This is
because "the infinite is not liable to limitation but abideth absolute; if aught could
be limited in infinity it would not be infinite."3 Cusa elaborates upon this distinction
between the finite and the infinite when he writes, "a line ceaseth to be a line when
it hath no quantity or end. An infinite line is not a line, but a line at infinity is
infinity" and "the infinite cannot be limited unto anything so as to become aught
other than infinite. Infinite goodness is not goodness but infinity."4 Clearly for Cusa
there is a sharp distinction between the finite and the Absolute.
The Coincidence of the Maximum and the Minimum
For Cusa, the oneness of the Absolute precedes all the opposition and differentiation of finite being. One can see the way in which this coincidence of opposites works in Chapter IV of De Docta Ignorantia where Cusa discusses the coincidence of the maximum and the minimum within the Absolute. Cusa writes that because the Absolute is all that it can be it is simultaneously both as great and as small as it can be. Because neither the minimum nor the maximum can be less than it is (i.e. each is all that it can be), Cusa asserts that the two are identical within the Absolute.5 Cusa sees this as becoming even clearer when one confines oneself strictly to the realm of quantity. The maximum quantity is infinitely great while the minimum quantity is infinitely small. If one then removes the notion of quantity leaving only the maximum and the minimum, both are revealed to be the same in that both are superlatives. Because all finite opposition is transcended within the Absolute Cusa writes "the absolute maximum, in consequence, is all things and, whilst being all, is none of them; in other words it is at once the maximum and minimum of being."6
It is admittedly somewhat contradictory for Cusa to confine himself to quantity and then abstract from quantity, but this does not diminish his fundamental point that the Absolute embracing both the maximum and the minimum reconciles the distinctions between them. Henry Bett seems to miss this point when he criticizes Cusa's argument for the coincidence of the maximum and the minimum within the Absolute on the grounds that it requires one to dismiss quantity as irrelevant and without quantity the terms "maximum" and "minimum" become meaningless.7 As Julie C. Norman points out, Cusa has no desire to imply that the maximum and the minimum are equivalent in terms of quantity.8 What Cusa is trying to express is that both terms are absolutes in that they cannot be added to or subtracted from. To add to the maximum would mean that it was not originally maximum, i.e. all that it could be, while to subtract from it would mean that it was no longer the maximum.
A similar argument can be made for the minimum. For Cusa the absolute minimum and absolute maximum coincide in that both are ultimates on a continuum beyond which it is not possible to go. Cusa's own words at the end of Chapter IV support this view. There Cusa freely admits that he is not using the terms maximum or minimum in reference to any quantity of mass or force. Cusa speaks of the maximum and the minimum as "an absolutely transcendent value embracing all things in their absolute simplicity."9
The absolute maximum and absolute minimum represent not merely individual entities which serve as terminating points in a series, but expressions of being which cannot properly be placed within the order of magnitude. In short, the absolute maximum and absolute minimum cannot be increased or decreased because they represent the very concept of magnitude.10 Absolute maximum and absolute minimum is that by which all relative quantities receive their magnitude. Cusa accounts for the Absolute's resolution of all the oppositions of finite reality by making the Absolute the very source from which all such opposition is derived.
Interpreting the Coincidence of Opposites
In his essay on Nicholas of Cusa, Ewert Cousins describes three ways of interpreting the concept of the coincidence of opposites, each of which has very different implications with respect to unity.
The first interpretation is monistic and emphasizes unity. Here all distinctions are dismissed as mere illusions with no genuine reality of their own. All opposition is eliminated leaving nothing but a single undifferentiated unity. Strictly speaking, referring to this view as a coincidence of opposites is a bit misleading since it entirely eliminates all opposition, leaving nothing but a complete coincidence.11
The second interpretation of the coincidence of opposites is one of juxtaposition. This retains the opposition within reality, but does so at the expense of true unity. In this view, the coincidence is nothing more than an external juxtaposition creating a very attenuated unity which is similar to that espoused by such ancient Atomists as Democritus. Thus, the basic components of the universe exist as fundamentally separate and discrete units with no internal relationship.12
The third interpretation of the coincidence of opposites is the most genuine in that it simultaneously retains both its unity and its opposition. The opposites truly do coincide and yet, nonetheless, continue to exist in a separate manner. This interpretation not only refuses to obliterate the distinctions within reality but, in fact, intensifies them in "a coincidence of mutually affirming complementarity."13 In this view, the opposites complement each other in a union which mutually intensifies the individuality of each. An example of this perspective can most clearly be seen in the Taoist concept of Ying-Yang or, in a Western context, in the Incarnation where Christ is a hypostatic union of both God and man. According to Cousins, Cusa's conception of the coincidence of opposites is a hybrid of the monistic and complementary interpretations.14
It is difficult to determine precisely to which interpretation Cusa would subscribe. His monistic tendency is exhibited in his assertion that the undifferentiated unity of the Absolute transcends and reconciles the polarities of the finite world.15 On the other hand, the complementary interpretation of the coincidence of opposites often seems most accurately to fit Cusa's thought when he is discussing the relationship between the Absolute and the finite, particularly, in respect to their union in Christ.16 Since Cusa's Christological thought plays such a central role in his philosophy one might be tempted to affirm that Cusa's idea of the coincidence of opposites is best interpreted as a coincidence of complementarity.
Perhaps the best argument for a purely complementary interpretation of the coincidence of opposites is grounded upon Cusa's use of the not-other as a principle of identity. According to this view, finite reality can exist only by being itself, i.e. by being finite as opposed to being infinite. This assertion, however, is valid only provided one regards finite being as the antithesis of Absolute being, rather than as something both unfolded from the Absolute and also reflective thereof. Likewise, the purely monistic view also is found wanting since Cusa continually affirms the clear separation between the Absolute and the finite throughout his writings. Cusa affirms that the finite world possesses its own genuine reality, although that reality is dependent upon the Absolute.
Ultimately, Cousin's interpretation of Cusa's coincidence of opposites as a hybrid between the monistic and complementary views seems to be the most valid since Cusa's view of reality requires both a principle of individuality as well as one of community. The principle of community is in accord with the monistic element in Cusa's thought in that all reality is a contraction of the Absolute and possesses nothing which was not derived from the Absolute. The principle of individuality, however, is in accord with Cusa's understanding of the complementary. This is because the principle of individuality allows for a diversity where each being is unique and through its uniqueness is an indispensable contributor to the whole. Because Cusa retains both the principle of individuality and the principle of community he can construct a vision of reality that allows for a harmonious diversity where each being is possessed of an inherent value, yet, all of these beings are ontologically related to each other.
Within Cusa's metaphysics the Absolute permeates all finite being and provides the ground for its existence. The finite cannot be said truly to complement the Absolute in that the finite can contain nothing which was not derived from the Absolute. On the other hand, Cusa gives the finite world a genuine existence which though dependent upon the Absolute can hardly be properly incorporated into it.
This has important implications for the topics of dynamism and unity. If one interpreted Cusa's coincidence in purely monistic terms there would be little room for any dynamic activity. Within a monistic structure, the only action of which the one is capable is self-modification. Since there is nothing other than the one, it cannot act in a truly creative fashion by creating beings other than itself. In terms of unity, the monistic structure of reality permits only uniformity, since there is only one being in existence. The only diversity is on the level of the modifications of the one and can never achieve an ontological status.
Likewise, the solely complementary interpretation of the coincidence of opposites would create a reality faced with similar problems. In terms of dynamism there is plenty of interaction between beings; however, the idea of creative activity is precluded on the grounds that creative action requires one entity to impart being to another. One must bear in mind that this is true not only for creation but for all causal action. In order for this to occur, the caused entity cannot possess anything with which the causal entity did not endow it. To the extent that one entity complements another, one must be independent of the other and possess qualities the other lacks. With regard to unity, the complementary structure of reality creates a true diversity of individual beings, but the unity is merely an aggregate of the sum total of these diverse beings. There is no true sense of wholeness where, if a particular element were missing, its absence would be noticeable.
Only by interpreting the coincidence of opposites in a way which is partially monistic and partially complementary can one make sense of Cusa's philosophy as a whole. By combining these two interpretations one can create a structure of reality where truly dynamic action is possible. The One is capable of creating a diverse plurality of beings, each of which is inherently different from Itself. This view is not entirely complementary in that the created entities are not independent of the One and can possess their perfections only by participating in its perfection. On the other hand, it is not entirely monistic in that the One creates real beings which are other than Itself, rather than mere modifications of Itself.
The integration of the monistic and complementary interpretations have similar consequences in respect to unity. Cusa's concept of unity is built upon principles both of individuality and of community and, therefore, sees diversity as an enhancing rather than an inhibiting factor. In accord with the principle of individuality, each separate entity is regarded by Cusa as a particular contraction of the whole. A diverse plurality of such contractions can more perfectly express that whole than possibly could any series of beings. Cusa's thought manages to synthesize the diversity inherent in the complementary view through the principle of individuality with the unity which dominates the monistic perspective through the principle of community. Cusa does this by making all reality a contraction of the Absolute which creates a unity of all being through a common source and archetype. However, Cusa maintains also that each individual contraction takes place in a manner which is unique to it, whereby it is made indispensable to the whole. Thus, though a plurality of individual beings exist which is consistent with the complementary view, these beings are derived from and are reflective of the One which is consistent with the monistic view.
HUMAN KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE
Since we have already discussed the absolute unity of the Divine, the purpose
of this section is to show to what extent the finite mind may be said to know such an
entity. This section will deal with that question in two steps. The first step will
discuss the degree to which the human mind can attain knowledge of the Absolute.
The second step will examine two of the names which Cusa applies to the Divine
and why he does so. The importance of this section lies in the fact that as Cusa's
philosophy is, in essence, an attempt to express the Absolute, its understanding must
focus upon interpreting correctly what is said about the Absolute.
The Limitations of Human Knowledge of the Divine
For Cusa the ability of the human mind to grasp the unity of the Absolute is extremely limited. This is because the human mind operates essentially according to principles of discursive reasoning and can, therefore, gain knowledge only by comparing the known to the unknown. Since the human mind knows nothing which can adequately be compared to the Absolute it can never know absolute unity as it exists in itself. This, however, does not terminate man's ability to inquire into the nature of absolute unity.
One should bear in mind that Cusa is not an early existentialist, but a Neo-Platonist with mystical inclinations. His response to man's inability to comprehend the Absolute is, therefore, not one of "existential liberation, romantic longing and heroic resignation" but the pursuit of a mystical vision which can be attained by devout religious belief.17 It is through this mystical vision that one can gain a certain awareness of the Absolute and the unity which it possesses. One must also note that Cusa never doubts the fact that the Absolute is intelligible, but merely asserts the human inability to comprehend its nature. Therefore, Cusa does not simply doubt what can be said about the Absolute, but formulates a rule concerning what cannot be said about it.18 Thus, man need not abandon his attempt to comprehend absolute unity. In fact, Cusa encourages this attempt so long as in doing so one realizes that this attempt can yield only approximations of the Absolute and in no manner reveal its true nature.19
This ability to approximate the nature of the Absolute has profound implications upon one's inner nature. In respect to the Absolute, one remains always in a state of relative ignorance, but his situation never degenerates into one of total despair. This is because it would be impossible for one to desire what is entirely unknown, as Cusa himself points out.20
Luis Martinez-Gomez correctly asserts that "to renounce the goal [knowledge of the divine] because it is unattainable would be to renounce the most profound impulse of our [humankind's] living spirit. Here is the source of our interior desire (principium mentalis desiderii) which every mind seeks and it is also its crown and end."21 It is simply not possible for one to desire anything other than this or settle for less.
Many important epistemological considerations also must be taken into
account. Cusa's position on the reliability of human knowledge of the Absolute is
perhaps best summed up by Ernst Cassirer who writes that, "If human knowledge
can reach non-knowledge [i.e. approximation] of the Absolute it thereby gains
knowledge of knowledge itself. It does not grasp absolute unity in its pure
`whatness' but it does grasp itself as something different from the unity; that is to
say, it does grasp itself in its 'complete otherness'."22 Cassirer then goes on to point
out that this consciousness of the difference between finite and absolute implies
some sort of mediation of that difference, but this does not place the infinite in
proportion to the finite. Only the Incarnation can completely bridge the chasm
between these two types of reality.23 Thus, in knowing that God is undifferentiated
being in no way informs one of what God is any more than knowing that a horse is
differentiated being informs one as to what it is. The difference is that one has
considerable experience with finite being and can have a much more accurate
picture of it than is the case for Absolute Being. In the words of Jasper Hopkins,
to know that God is being itself is not tantamount to knowing what
God is. Similarly, to conceive of God as inconceivable is, in an
important sense, not to conceive of God. For though we conceive that
God is inconceivable we do not rightly conceive of what the
inconceivable God either is or is like.24
In other words, though humans cannot know God, they know why they cannot know God.
The difficulty in conceiving the Absolute is easily understandable. To
conceive of the Absolute as "X" is to restrict its being so much as to make this
conception false and risk reducing the Absolute to some finite thing.25 On the other
hand, to conceive of the Absolute as "not X" is true but empty, in that it provides no
positive information about the Divine and communicates nothing about Its nature.
Even to conceive of the Absolute as being beyond "X," though true, is vague and
imprecise.26 Hence, for Cusa, conceiving the Absolute becomes important not
because it will result in some specific knowledge about the Absolute, but because of
the understanding of the limits of knowledge which such an effort produces. L.
Martinez-Gomez compares the attempt to speak about the Absolute to a road which
leads to a city: although the road upon which one travels is never the same as the
city to which one travels, one can gain a glimpse of the city while following the
road.27
Cusa's Appraisal of Traditional Theological Approaches
Frederick Copleston's opinion supports that of Martinez-Gomez. Copleston writes that "to apply definitive predicates to God is to liken Him to [finite] things and to bring Him into a relation of similarity with them."28 This is what Cusa sees as the fundamental flaw of affirmative theology which, in attributing some qualities to the Divine, results in denying their contraries, therefore, it cannot adequately deal with a being whose unity is such that It exists without distinction. Cusa finds negative theology preferable to affirmative theology since by pointing out what the Absolute is not, it is less restrictive of God's being. Through negative theology one is enabled to gain some insight into the nature of absolute unity. Thus, though the human mind is incapable of discovering precisely what the absolute is like, it can know what the Absolute is not, i.e. that It is not subject to the distinctions of finite reality. Through this knowledge one can, to some degree, clarify one's notion of the Absolute through a process of elimination. Negative theology, however, is not in itself adequate for dealing with the human quest for knowledge of the Absolute.
This is why Cusa is unwilling entirely to abandon affirmative theology. To support this, Copleston correctly points out that God exists without distinction, transcends the realm of numbers, and cannot be called "one" in the sense of individual finite things. Nonetheless, as the Absolute is singular and the source of all the multiplicity of the finite world, it is not entirely inaccurate to refer to Him as the infinite One. In fact, it is, in a sense, more appropriate to refer to the Absolute as One than to do so with regard to any finite thing. This is because all finite things contain component parts (such as essence and existence) whereas in the Absolute all distinctions coincide. Human beings cannot, however, have any positive understanding of just what this infinite oneness entails. People quite naturally make positive assertions about the Divine and are justified in doing so as long as they realize that no positive statement can be made about the infinite which does not require a negative qualification. In other words, one can describe the Absolute as love so long as in making this assertion one realizes that the love of the Absolute is in no way like human love.
Thus, one can see that Cusa prefers negative theology to positive theology, but superior to both is what is referred to as copulative theology. Copulative theology combines both negative and positive theologies and conceives of God, in accord with the coincidence of opposites, as a being which is no particular thing.29 Copulative theology, in its negative aspect, denies that any finite quality can be predicated of the Absolute, while in its affirmative aspect it proclaims that the Absolute cannot be entirely distinct from any existing thing. Copulative theology is geared toward conceiving the Absolute as a coincidence of opposites since it refuses to equate the Divine with any particular thing and, yet, simultaneously relates It to each individual being.
In this way, the Absolute resolves the opposition which exists within finite being. One cannot point to any particular being and assert that this is God as opposed to every other being. At the same time, however, one also cannot assert that some particular being is excluded from and, therefore, independent of the Absolute. In other words, one should conceive of the Absolute as love, but only as infinite love which cannot be equated with the love that exists within the finite realm.
The principles of individuality and community which allow for an harmonious diversity provide the basis for Cusa's views on the various types of theology. The principle of individuality is in accord with negative theology in that in being itself each entity is unique and can be no other entity. Hence, no being can appropriately be compared to the Divine and, therefore, one can know only that God is none of them. Cusa bases affirmative theology upon the principle of community. This is because in accord with the principle of community each being is related to every other being in that all share a common source. In this sense, God is all things since nothing exists which does not come from and reflect His being.
Hence, it is not altogether inappropriate to make affirmations about the Divine since in knowing His creation one may come to know Him. Because Cusa links the principles of community and individuality, through the contraction of the Absolute he seeks to combine the strengths of negative and affirmative theology in copulative theology. Thus, in accordance with the sense of community which all being shares, one may make certain affirmative statements about the Divine and gain a certain awareness of the nature of the Absolute. On the other hand, in making these affirmative statements man must realize that, in accord with the principle of individuality, the Absolute is like no other being and, therefore, one never can come to know its nature with precision.
Cusa clearly confirms this view in De Docta Ignorantia. He asserts that negative theology is an indispensable aid to affirmative theology since without it God would be adored only as a creature rather than as the source of creation, thereby, dragging humankind into idolatry.30 Negative theology allows one to approach the Absolute by a process of elimination, i.e. by articulating what the Absolute is not, one can gain a better glimpse of what it is.31 Cusa also believes that some negative statements about the Absolute are better than others. Cusa writes that "It is truer . . . to deny that God is a stone than to deny that He is life."32 Even negative statements, however, require at least some level of positive knowledge of the Absolute, such as its existence.33 Cusa is quite cognizant of the fact that religion requires some affirmative theology with which one can assign positive attributes to the Divine. It would not be possible for one to worship a reality of which one knew only what it is not. Cusa favors negative theology over affirmative theology, but he is not willing entirely to dispense with the latter in favor of the former. He finds the positive predication of divine attributes to be primarily, but not exclusively, related to creatures. Were this type of predication to be related exclusively to creatures, one could know nothing whatsoever about the Divine. In that case, even Cusa's idea of the coincidence of opposites would be without foundation.34
It is important to note that Cusa is not here espousing any doctrine of analogy. As H. Laurence Bond points out, "For Cusa analogy is legitimate only in a very general sense as a way of speaking about God subject to certain guidelines but not as the means of knowing God or as a logical device for the theological method."35 Because of the absolutely unified nature of the Divine (as seen in the third section of the previous chapter) Cusa sees speech about God as more poetic than philosophical in that its goal is to communicate a certain sense of the absolute transcendence of the Divine rather than provide specific knowledge of it.
Naming the Absolute
The human inability to comprehend absolute unity is why Cusa asserts that one cannot name the Divine. The process of naming can occur only after reason identifies a being and distinguishes it from other beings.36 For the Absolute, however, no such distinction is possible. In De Docta Ignorantia, Cusa approvingly cites Parmenides' description of the Divine as "the Being in whom being anything means being everything."37 Cusa also points out that it is the individual essence of a thing which makes it distinct from all other things and from which it receives its name. However, "Where there is absolutely no distinction, then there can be no proper name."38
This all embracing unity of the Absolute is also expressed in De Visione Dei. Here Cusa writes that God is beyond even the distinction of creator and created. The Absolute shares Its being among all creatures and is responsible for their existence. Thus, the Absolute is all in all and, yet, not identical to all since a cause cannot be identical with its effect.39 Cusa also writes that the Divine is apart from nothing; It moves with all mobile things and is at rest with every stationary thing. In this manner the unity of the Absolute resolves all the apparent oppositions finite reality.40
He claims that the Absolute lies beyond the coincidence of opposites which he describes as the wall of paradise; one can pass beyond this wall only by vanquishing the proud spirit of reason which guards the gate.41 Since the unity of the Absolute transcends human reason, Cusa suggests that his readers set aside strict Aristotelian reasoning.42 He then refers to Socratic ignorance and claims that it benefits humans by making them aware of their shortcomings, rather than encouraging them to continue, confident that they understand when, in fact, they do not.43
This is the reason why Cusa asserts that any attempt to articulate a true name for the Absolute is an entirely anthropomorphic endeavor which will reveal only the nature of the one who names but virtually nothing about that which one seeks to name.44 Despite this, Cusa, nonetheless, attempts to find a name which to some degree is applicable to the Absolute. The reason Cusa does this is because the attempt to name God, though vain, is beneficial in that it stretches the mind. Though giving no direct knowledge of the Absolute, it does allow one more accurately to approximate its nature. Therefore, it assists one in transcending the limits of discursive thinking and provides insight into the nature of absolute unity. There are two "names" for God about which Cusa writes extensively and which should be discussed here. The first to be discussed is that of "Actualized-Possibility" (Possest) which Cusa coins in a work entitled De Possest. Cusa claims that this is a sufficiently approximate name for the Absolute according to man's finite conception of Him, "For it is equally the name of each and every name and of no name."45 Thus, ontologically speaking, the Absolute is excluded from no finite thing and also is not limited to any particular thing.
Possest. The term "Possest" is a conjunction of the latin terms "Posse" (possibility) and "est" (actuality); it reflects the Absolute overcoming of the distinction between these two principles. Cusa justifies the term "Actualized-Possibility" by presupposing that anything which does, in fact, exist can possibly exist. If something can exist then possibility itself must be able to exist. For Cusa everything which exists does so in terms of "Actualized-Possibility" which is the actual existence of absolute possibility. Even this, however, is only an approximation of the actual nature of the Absolute. However, it enjoys the distinction of being the nearest approximation of the absolute of which human beings are capable. "Actualized-Possibility" is a sufficiently approximate name for the Absolute in that it refers to a being in whom all possible existents are actually enfolded.46 In the Absolute, actuality and potentiality must necessarily coincide. If potentiality had priority, God would actualize it as the supreme actuality of all being; and hence, God would exist before He existed. On the other hand, if actuality had priority then God would not be possible and so "He would be contradictory and could not be actuality."47
It is important to remember that what Cusa means by "Actualized-Possibility" is not what more traditional medieval thinkers meant when they spoke of pure act. The more traditional thinkers sought to point to an entity which was "an actuality that excludes all potency, an existential necessity and an essential fullness."48 Cusa wants to say much more than this. For Cusa, "Actualized-Possibility" "means simply that God is that which He can be without restriction, that is, that He is now and forever all that He can be."49 Since God is all that He can be, He must be also everything which can be at all, at the very least.50 The naming of God, although impossible, still retains a certain importance by being indicative of the fundamental relationship between what God is and how humans view Him.51
Not-other. Later in his career, Cusa articulates another name which he finds to be sufficiently approximate for describing the absolute nature of the Divine. In a work entitled De Li Non Aliud, Cusa coins the phrase "Not-other" (non aliud) to refer to the Absolute. This is not, however, a merely tautological term. When Cusa says that the Absolute is not-other than the sun, he is by no means attempting to identify It with the physical sun. To say that the Absolute is the sun in a sense which excludes It from the perfection of the moon, or any other finite thing is to limit It. The being of the Absolute includes all things before they were in any way opposed to each other. In fact, within the Absolute, and only within the Absolute, a particular entity being itself is not opposed to being another, due to the unity of the Absolute.52 As Peter Kampits points out, the term "not-other" should not be regarded in the strictest sense as a name for the Absolute, but represents something of a transliteration of the unnameable and unknowable name of God. Thus, the Absolute can remain infinitely distinct from all particular beings and, yet, at the same time retain an extremely close relationship with them.53 One can see here both the clear distinction between the finite and the infinite, and the unity of this pair. This is because "the not-other is in each being that which it actually is but not identical with it."54 Hence, finite beings can achieve actualization only through participation in the absolute unity of the Divine, but at no time can one identify finite being with the Divine, or even with a part of the Divine.
Within the finite realm the identity of an individual thing is determined by the fact that it excludes what is opposed to it. For the Absolute, however, this principle does not hold true. In respect to the Absolute, the term "not-other" is inclusive of even the other (non-identity). Kampits explains this by asserting that "The identity of the other is an identity in the exclusion of difference; the identity of the not-other is an identity of identity and non-identity, of identity and difference."55 Thus, for Cusa, the Absolute contains no juxtaposition between identity and non-identity and, therefore, within the Absolute all distinctions coincide.
Because not-other is a term which defines everything, Cusa seeks to apply it to the Absolute. If someone asks "What is X?" then one need only respond "Not-other than X." In fact, this term even defines itself since it is not-other than itself.56 For Cusa the term "not-other" preceded anything else which can be said. Even the term "the One" is less adequately applied to God "since one is nothing other than one [and therefore] it is other than not-other."57
Thus, Cusa sees "not-other" as a term which is simpler and, therefore, more adequately applied to the Divine than the term: "One". He writes that everything which is true can be seen as truth only to the extent that it is not-other than the truth, just as everything which has being does so only to the extent that it is not-other than itself (i.e. to the extent that it has unity). Thus, anything which is known or exists is able to do so only because of the not-other.58 One can, therefore, see that the identity of the Absolute is based upon its not being other than any existing thing. Likewise, the uniqueness of the Absolute which distinguishes it from every other existing thing is this identity with the rest of reality. In short, the "not-other" both identifies the Absolute with the whole of finite reality (i.e. the principle of community), and by this unique relationship (i.e. the principle of individuality), makes it distinct from that reality. Cusa writes that this term "defines itself, and, hence, all nameable things."59 Ultimately, however, Cusa feels that the Divine is unnameable and, therefore, even a term as all embracing as "not-other" can only roughly approximate the infinite nature of the Divine.
METAPHORS AND PARADOXES OF THE DIVINE
Cusa's attempt to name the Divine is, as has been said, not so much an attempt to communicate specific knowledge of the Divine as to communicate its all-embracing nature. An examination of the metaphors and paradoxes which Cusa uses to express the Divine will make this point more clearly because Cusa's metaphors more dramatically emphasize the inability of human reason to comprehend the Absolute than do the names which he applies to It.
The Importance of Metaphors
In De Li Non Aliud, Cusa expresses a hope that he will someday see the Absolute without symbols, but that this is not a possibility in this life.60 During this life man is forced to use symbols and metaphors, particularly those of a paradoxical nature, in order to approximate the nature of the Absolute. Werner Beirwaltes in his article entitled "Image and Counterimage? Reflections on Neoplatonic Thought With Respect to Its Place Today" points out that paradox attempts to unify affirmative and negative statements about the same thing in order to indicate its absolute otherness. He defines metaphor as an affirmative image of something which the mind cannot adequately conceive.61 Thus, one can easily see the appeal that paradox would have for Cusa. He seeks to combine the strengths of negative and affirmative theology knowing that no affirmative statement could be complete and no negative statement religiously satisfying.
Cusa rejects the application of the Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction to the Absolute. For Cusa, man's natural knowledge is not merely incomplete on a quantitative level with gaps that will be filled in by continuing study but is fundamentally and radically limited by its very nature. This is epitomized by the paradoxes which exist in knowledge's most secure realm, mathematics.62 In his article entitled "The Infinite Sphere: Comments on the History of Metaphor" Karsten Harries supports this view. He asserts that metaphors are required to help humankind transcend the limits of a finite intellect in an attempt to grasp the infinite.63 Harries also points out that mathematics is the field from which Cusa draws his most important metaphors and paradoxes for explicating the Divine. This is because he feels that the multiplicity of numbers is produced by an unfolding of unity, just as the multiplicity of creation is produced by the unfolding of the One.64
It is important to keep in mind Cusa's ideas on metaphor and paradox when
one reads him in De Li Non Aliud urging Ferdinand to reject anything which his
reason does not compel him to accept. Cusa does not mean the same thing by reason
as did the Scholastics, nor should anyone read into this any Cartesian implications.
For Cusa reason means anything which renders a particular solution more plausible.
Therefore, analogies, paradoxes, metaphors and symbols would all be included
along with much else.65 In De Docta Ignorantia, Cusa asserts that the study of
mathematics prepares the mind for knowledge of the Absolute by accustoming it to
dealing with the abstract. He also cites the fact that Pythagoras, Boethius, and
Augustine all used mathematics to approach the divine.66
Metaphors for the Absolute
The Infinite Line. Perhaps the most illustrative metaphor Cusa employs for the Divine is that of the infinite line. Cusa recognizes that Anselm was the first to compare the Divine to an infinite line, but Cusa pushes this metaphor much further than had Anselm. For Cusa, the infinite line is not merely infinitely long or infinitely straight, but encompasses every possible line simultaneously. It must be not only a straight line but also a triangle, a circle, a sphere, etc. Likewise, the infinite triangle, infinite circle, and infinite sphere must also encompass all these other options. Cusa points out also that the infinite circle must have an arc and a tangent which coincide because as the size of a circle increases one lessens the curve of the arc.67 A finite line is potentially all these configurations and the infinite line must actualize all of these possibilities.68 Cusa goes on to make similar arguments regarding, as well, the infinite circle, infinite triangle, and infinite sphere.69
The Infinite Triangle. In De Docta Ignorantia, Cusa further elaborates on the nature of the absolute by comparing the Trinity to an infinite triangle. He claims that the infinite triangle can possess only one infinite angle because no finite angle could possibly exist outside of it, just as no particular number can exist apart from finite number. Cusa asserts that the finite triangle has three angles, each distinct from the other, which form a unity of composition.70 The infinite triangle, however, has but one angle which is three without being numerically multiplied. Cusa quotes Augustine that "From the moment you begin to count the Trinity, you depart from the truth."71 and claims that for the Absolute distinction and non-distinction cannot be regarded as contradictory. Thus, unity and Trinity (multiplicity) are completely reconcilable and there is no difficulty in having a plurality of persons and a unity of essence.72
The Unity of the Circle. Later in De Docta Ignorantia, Cusa claims that the circle is the symbol of perfect unity.73 He goes on to say that he has already shown that the circle and the triangle coincide within the infinite line, therefore, the unity of the circle coincides with the plurality of the triangle. Cusa also cites the circle as a symbol of eternity in that it has no beginning point and no end point.74 He draws an analogy between the infinite straightness of the infinite curve and the simple infinite essence of the maximum which encompasses all other essences.75 As Dorothy Koenigsberger points out, the greatest circle, that which has the largest diameter, must have the smallest possible curvature. Thus, the infinite circle must have no curvature whatsoever causing the circle and the straight line to coincide.76
The Omnivoyant. In De Visione Dei, Cusa gives a non-mathematical metaphor for the Divine. This metaphor is a portrait which Cusa describes as an omnivoyant. It appears to be looking directly at everyone who looks upon it, regardless of the perspective they view it from, and even follows someone as they move. Cusa writes that such pictures are not unusual and he even sends one along with a copy of his treatise.77 Cusa finds this portrait to be an apt metaphor for the Absolute because of its gaze. Although the eyes of the portrait do not move, they appear to be constantly trained on the viewer, even when he himself is moving. Similarly, the infinite nature of the Absolute is such that its gaze can embrace each particular thing and the entirety of the whole simultaneously.78
The Top Spinning at Infinite Velocity. Another metaphor which Cusa uses in De Possest is that of a top which is spinning at infinite velocity. Cusa claims that if a top were spinning at infinite velocity then its center would be perfectly at rest while its circumference would be moving at optimum speed. Thus within the infinite velocity of the top, maximum and minimum motion coincide.79
Interpreting Cusa's Metaphors
Cusa claims that because there is no division in the Absolute one can reconcile contradictory statements about it.80 The characteristically unique feature of the Divine is its absolute nature, and this is what sets it off from the rest of reality. Because the Absolute is the source of finite reality it, naturally, reconciles the opposition it contains and cannot be entirely divorced from any particular aspect of it. This absoluteness serves as the driving engine of Cusa's philosophy and that to which he conforms his thought.
It is important to note that all of Cusa's metaphors are self-consciously contradictory in order to require the mind to abandon discursive reason. Only by operating in such an alien fashion can the mind ever hope to reach beyond its finite limitations and ascend to a place where it can gain some limited insight into the Absolute. The mind must conceive of a being which is, simultaneously, absolutely straight and absolutely curved, absolutely at rest and absolutely in motion. Looking one place and looking every place. This is the great truth which Cusa seeks to reveal about the all-embracing nature of the Absolute with his metaphors.
Cusa's use of self-contradictory metaphors are his attempt to express a reality
which embraces both the principle of individuality and the principle of community,
simultaneously. To the degree that Cusa's metaphors embrace all possible options
they reflect the principle of community by articulating the immanence of the
Divine. The inherently contradictory nature of Cusa's metaphors articulate the fact
that no finite reality can ever appropriately articulate the absolutely transcendent
nature of the Divine in a clear and concise manner. Thus, Cusa seeks to articulate a
reality which both transcends all finite reality and also is immanent in the very
ontological structure of each existing individual being.
1. Nicolo Cusano Agli Inizi del Mondo Moderno (Florence, Italy: Sansoni, 1970), p. 78.
2. Nicholas of Cusa, The Vision of God (New York: Frederich Ungar Publishing Co., 1960), p. 71.
3. Ibid., p. 63.
4. Ibid., p. 64.
5. Nicholas of Cusa, Of Learned Ignorance, p. 12.
6. Ibid., p. 13.
7. Henry Bett, Nicholas of Cusa (London: Meuthen and Co., Ltd., 1932), p. 129.
8. Julie C. Norman, "Nicholas of Cusa, Apostolate of Unity," Downside Review, 99 (1981), 63.
9. Nicholas of Cusa, p. l4.
10. Luis Martinez-Gomez, "From the Names of God to the Name of God: Nicholas of Cusa," International Philosophical Quarterly, 5 (1960), 87.
11. Romano Stephen Almagno and Conrad L. Haskins, eds., Studies Honoring Ignatius Charles Brady Friar Minor (St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscian Institute, 1976), p. 178.
12. Ibid., p. 179.
13. Ibid., p. 180.
14. Ibid., p. 194.
15. Ibid., p. 195.
16. Ibid., p. l96.
17. Jasper Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa on God as Not-Other (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Arthur J. Banning Press, l987), p. 27.
18. M. L. Fuehrer, "The Principle of Contractio in Nicholas of Cusa Philosophical View of Man," Downside Review, 93 (1975), 296.
19. Hopkins, p. 19.
20. Nicholas of Cusa, De Idiota de Mente: The Layman About Mind, Clyde Lee Miller, trans. (New York: Alaris Books, 1979), p. 87.
21. Martinez-Gomez, p. 102.
22. Ernst Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1963), p. 39.
23. Ibid., p. 39.
24. Hopkins, p. 6.
25. Martinez-Gomez, p. 82.
26. Ibid., p. 83.
27. Ibid., p. 84.
28. Frederick Copleston, The History of Philosophy, Vol. III, Ockham to Suarez (Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1953), p. 235.
29. Ibid., p. 236.
30. Nicholas of Cusa, Of Learned Ignorance, p. 59.
31. Ibid., p. 60.
32. Ibid., p. 61
33. Norman, p. 71.
34. Germain Heron, "Forward" in Of Learned Ignorance Nicholas of Cusa (London, England: Routledge, Kegan, Paul, 1954), p. XX.
35. George Shriver, ed., Contemporary Reflections on the Medieval Christian Tradition: Essays in Honor of Ray C. Petry (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1974), p. 85.
36. Pauline Moffitt Watts, Nicholas Cusanus: A 15th Century Vision of Man (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1982), p. 57.
37. Nicholas of Cusa, p. 51.
38. Ibid., p. 53.
39. Nicholas of Cusa, The Vision of God, p. 57.
40. Ibid., p. 42.
41. Ibid., p. 44.
42. Nicholas of Cusa, "Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae" in Nicholas of Cusa's Debate With John Wenck, Jasper Hopkins, ed. (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Arthur J. Banning Press, l988), p. 43.
43. Ibid., p. 55.
44. Nicholas of Cusa, Of Learned Ignorance, p. 56.
45. Nicholas of Cusa, "Trialogus de Possest" in A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa, Jasper Hopkins, ed. (Minneapolis: Arthur J. Banning Press, 1986), p. 83.
46. Peter Casarella, "Nicholas of Cusa and the Power of the Possible", p. 20.
47. Ibid.
48. Martinez-Gomez, p. 90.
49. Ibid., p. 91.
50. Ibid., p. 92.
51. Donald F. Duclow, "Pseudo-Dionysius, John Scotus Eriugena, Nicholas of Cusa: An approach to the Divine Names," International Philosophical Quarterly 12 (June 1972), 262.
52. Martinez-Gomez, p. 94.
53. Peter Kampits, "Substanz und Relation bei Nicolaus Cusanus," Zeitschrift Fur Philosophische Forschung, 30 (1976), 15.
54. Ibid., p. 16.
55. Ibid.
56. Nicholas of Cusa, "De Li Non Aliud" in Nicholas of Cusa on God as Not-Other, Jasper Hopkins, ed. (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Arthur J. Banning Press, l987), p. 35.
57. Ibid., p. 47.
58. Ibid., p. 49.
59. Ibid., p. 51
60. Ibid.
61. H. J. Blumenthal and R. A. Markus, eds., Neo-Platonism and Early Christian Thought (London: Variorum Publications, Ltd., 1981), p. 246.
62. Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predecessors (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1969), p. 61.
63. Karsten Harries, "The Infinite Sphere: Comments on the History of Metaphor," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 13 (1975), 9.
64. Ibid., p. 8.
65. Herbert Matsen, "Jasper Hopkins on Nicholas of Cusa," International Studies in Philosophy, 14 (1982), 80.
66. Nicholas of Cusa, Of Learned Ignorance, p. 26.
67. Ibid., p. 28.
68. Ibid., p. 30.
69. Ibid., p. 32.
70. Ibid., p. 42.
71. Ibid., p. 43.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid., p. 46.
74. Ibid., p. 47.
75. Ibid., p. 35.
76. Dorothy Koenigsberger, Renaissance Man and Creative Thinking (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1979), p. 125.
77. Nicholas of Cusa, The Vision of God, p. 3.
78. Ibid., p. 7.
79. Nicholas of Cusa, "Trialogus de Possest" in A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa, Jasper Hopkins, ed.(Minneapolis: Arthur J. Banning Press, 1986), p. 89.
80. Ibid., p. 93.