The purpose of the chapter is to examine, specifically, the manner in which
all finite being is related to and reflective of the Divine. In order to fulfill this
purpose, the following chapter has been divided into three sections. The first section
will discuss the way in which being is said to emanate from the Absolute. The
second section will examine the way in which finite being directs itself toward the
Absolute. In the final section, the way in which the diversity of finite being
proclaims the Divine through the interaction of its parts will be examined. This is of
fundamental importance for the harmonious diversity which Cusa sees in reality in
that it establishes the genuine being of the finite realm with all of its multiplicity
and, yet, unites this multiplicity through a common source and a common end.
Again the principles of individuality and community play a fundamental role. The
principal of individuality allows for multiplicity within reality in that it provides the
framework of a number of separate entities each with its own unique element. The
principle of community allows for these diverse entities in that all share a common
source of which they are reflective, and a common end, toward which they tend.
The important implications which these twin principles of Cusa's metaphysics have
in reference to the unfolding of the Absolute may be viewed in the accompanying
diagram.
BEING AS DYNAMIC EMANATION FROM THE DIVINE
This section, as stated above, will discuss the emanation of finite being from
the Divine. It will, therefore, help to clarify the relationship between the Absolute
and Its creation. Unless one understands this point one cannot give Cusa's
philosophy the serious examination it deserves. In fact, the lack of such an
understanding is likely to result in transforming Cusa's metaphysics into pantheism
or manichean dualism. In either case, one would not be able to appreciate the
complexity and strength of Cusa's thought since reality would lose the unique sense
of unity as a harmonious diversity which is so distinctively Cusan.
The Nature of Creation
For Cusa, all things emanate from the Absolute in a manner which is
consistent with creation ex nihilo. Before creation the particular entities of finite
reality existed in God qua God without distinction.1 In De Possest, Cusa asserts that
it is the Absolute which gives being to all things.2 In a work entitled The Gift:
Creation, Kenneth L. Schmitz outlines a view of divine creativity which can greatly
enhance one's understanding of Cusa's philosophy.
Being Itself
Contraction
Principle of Individuality< >Principle of Community
Each individual contraction The contraction of being
uniquely imparts to each makes each thing to be
entity an inherent value everything in a contracted which makes it indispensable sense. This creates a
to the whole. community of being relating all entities on an
ontological level.
Emanation Movement of being Relates all being in
of from the Absolute that each unique
Being which creates entity is a
pp. 126-150 unique individual contraction of the
entities. whole.
Return Each entity as a The community of
of contraction of the diverse beings of
Being whole attempts to reality image the
to the image that whole to Divine more
One the greatest extent completely than any
pp. 151-164 possible for its other single being.
limited nature.
Diversity's The limited nature The diversity of the
Proclamation of each individual various beings of the
of the entity restricts the community can more
Divine way in which that accurately proclaim the
pp. 164-176 being can proclaim Absolute than any
the Absolute making entity.
each individual
proclamation unique.
Schmitz asserts that it is impossible for one to give to oneself, since to receive what is within one's power is not to receive a gift in any true sense of the term.3 It is also necessary, according to Schmitz, that a gift be received in the spirit in which it is given. Schmitz writes that, "It [a gift] is a free endowment upon another who received it freely; so that the first mark of a gift is its gratuity."4 He further goes on to point out that reciprocity on the part of the receiver, though not obliged, is certainly appropriate. This reciprocity is not, however, the return of another gift but the completion of the gift which has been given. This completion is achieved by the gift's proper reception. What is called for, according to Schmitz's analysis, is not a passive reception along the lines of the reception of an imprint by wax, which is characteristic of the reception of form by matter. Schmitz asserts that what is called for is attentive receptivity.5
This attentive receptivity entails a free acknowledgment of gratuity and the free appropriation of the gift as gratuitous on the part of the receiver. Thus, Schmitz correctly claims that "Endowment, then, does not alone realize the gift; gratitude is also called for."6 He also points out that for various reasons straightforward reciprocal relations are impossible.7 One of the reasons why such straightforward reciprocity is impossible is because of a difference in the ontological status of the giver and the recipient. For example, a son cannot reciprocate his father's love with patriarchal love. The son can only respond with a filial love for the giver, but he may someday reciprocate with patriarchal love for his own son.8
One can clearly see that for Schmitz a gift binds the giver and the receiver together.9 By giving the giver is able to impart what is his, and in doing so commends himself. Schmitz writes that, "The thing given, then, is not simply a detachable item, an independent thing in its own right; nor is it to be understood as an external substitute for the giver. It is a token of him, that is, it is not only his: it is he."10
It is along these lines that one must interpret Cusa's assertion in De Dato
Patris Luminum, that the relationship between the Absolute and finite being as one
in which the Absolute is both the giver and the gift, making every creature in an
extremely limited way the Absolute. This is because the absolutely unified nature of
the Divine makes it impossible for Him to give anything but the absolute maximum
which is Himself. "Thus it seems to be that God and creation are the same thing . . .
. Accordingly there would [seem to] be only one thing and it would receive different
names in accordance with different modes."11 Though Cusa freely admits that this
manner of speaking lacks precision, some commentators have used this and other
passages like it to support their claim that limited beings have no essence other than
the Absolute.
The Problem of Pantheism
As Jasper Hopkins points out, to understand Nicholas of Cusa's ideas on the emanation of finite reality from the Divine one must reconcile two propositions. The first is that God gives Himself to creation in a pure and undiminished capacity and in some sense is always present within it. The second proposition is that the Divine is unity, eternity, and truth in an absolute sense, while finite reality is multiple, temporal, and a likeness.12
Hopkins also sketches out a common way in which scholars have attempted to reconcile these two propositions. According to this view, God is in one sense identical with the created world, yet, in another sense different from it. Thus reality has a unitary existence which possesses both finite and infinite aspects. These two aspects are related because the infinite is said to serve as the Essence of all finite reality making the created world, and each individual thing it contains, a contraction of the Absolute. If the Divine serves as the Essence of each thing then these things contain no essence of their own, only that of the Absolute. Hence, finite entities would have no positive being of their own and would, therefore, be distinguished from each other in a purely accidental manner. In this scheme creatures become theophanies or manifestations of the Absolute in its finite mode of existence. To put it most succinctly "Considered contractedly, God is the world; considered absolutely the world is God."13
From this perspective God becomes present in all things and conversely all things are present in God. The difference is that in God there is nothing but the Divine devoid of all distinction, while with respect to finite being the Divine is whatever that particular thing is. Thus, all things are present in each thing since God as the divine essence of all things is wholly and immediately present in each thing. This interpretation, however, brings Cusa to the very threshold of pantheism. The reason for this is that though no particular finite entity is itself identified with the infinite divine, if one could in someway remove all of the finite determinations of some particular thing, one would then arrive at the absolute essence of being (i.e. God).14
This view seems to be identical with Vincent Martin's interpretation of Cusa's
philosophy expressed in his article entitled "The Dialectical Process in the
Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa." Martin claims that Cusa confuses the Absolute
being of God with the formally universal idea of being.15 He asserts that for Cusa
the Divine is the real limit of finite beings and, therefore, it would have to possess
the same nature as these creatures. Thus God has His being degraded from absolute
being to become equivalent to the being of the ultimate creature, or what Martin
calls an "infinitized creature."16 According to Martin, Cusa asserts that "the very
being of God is the intrinsic being of the creature."17 Martin writes that
To conceive of God as the ultimate limit towards which all things
converge . . . and to hold that the divine essence is essentially the
fulfilled limit of creation, even when it is held to be such from all
eternity, is a recondite way of asserting the reality of the impossible
and of denying the absolute transcendence of God.18
He claims that for Cusa the difference between the Divine and His creation is the result not of differences in essence, but merely of the manner in which this essence is received.19 Martin's criticisms of conceiving God as an infinitized creature are in themselves entirely accurate and well-founded. However, his claim that Cusa does this is mistaken. Cusa constantly asserts that there is no proportion between the finite and the infinite. Never does he assert that finite reality is nothing more than a modification of the Absolute.
Martin claims that Cusa sees finite being as a mere privation of the Absolute and, therefore, that there is no positive difference between the Absolute and limited being. For Martin, the distinction which Cusa draws between the Absolute and finite reality is quantitative rather than qualitative. This makes it possible to reach the Absolute by simply expanding the limits of finite being.20 Hopkins is quite correct in asserting that Martin's interpretation of Cusa's thought brings Cusa to the very threshold of pantheism.21 This is because Martin clearly sets up a proportion between the finite and the Absolute, which is quite clearly contrary to the entire spirit of Cusa's philosophy. For Martin, Cusa sees an individual entity as being nothing other than a contracted species, just as a species is a contraction of genus, genus a contraction of the universe, and the universe a contraction of the Absolute.22 Because Martin sees Cusa as equating the universe's contraction of the Absolute with the individual's contraction of its species, he sees the Absolute being reduced to something very like a creature, though it is permitted the distinction of being the highest creature from which all other creatures derive their existence.
Martin fails to take into account the true nature of the distinction that separates the finite from the infinite within Cusa's thought. For Cusa it is clear that the difference between the finite and the Absolute is one not merely of quantity, but of kind. The restricted natures of finite beings inherently limit the perfections and potentialities of which they are capable; because of this, finite being cannot possibly be compared to the unlimited and unrestricted perfection of the Absolute. For Cusa it is inherently impossible to restrict the being of the Absolute to some limited entity. Likewise, it is impossible to expand the limits of some finite being to the point where ultimately it could equal the Absolute any more than one can increase the number one to equal the color yellow.
In order to achieve such an equality, at least one of the entities involved would have to alter the very nature of its being so drastically that it would become something other than what it actually is. Removing the limits of finite being would result not in revealing the Absolute but only in reducing that being to nothingness by eliminating that which makes its existence possible. On the other hand, to impose limits upon the Absolute would destroy the infinite nature of its being, reducing it to just another finite entity. The Absolute is much more than a mere expansion, regardless of the magnitude of the limitations of the universe in the sense that the universe is an expansion of genera. It is possible for one to add up the number of genera until one reaches the total number which are included in the universe. One cannot, however, multiply the universe or potential universes, even if such a thing were possible, to the point where one can place it in proportion to the Absolute. The universe is not a contraction of the Absolute in the sense that a teaspoon of sea water is a contraction of the ocean, but in the sense of a mirror's reflection being a contraction of a face. The distinction here is that the teaspoon of sea water is part of the ocean and is a minute diminution of the ocean's being, while the reflection in no way is part of the face and, therefore, in no way diminishes the face's being. When Cusa refers to finite being as a contraction of the Absolute he does not mean the being of the Absolute is restricted into a particular being, but rather that this particular being is a disproportionate image in that one cannot multiply the perfections of this being to equal the total perfection of the Absolute. What is contracted is not the being of the Absolute, but the expression of that reality which finite being reflects. The Absolute and the finite, even as represented in the universe, are two fundamentally different orders of reality. Though diametrically opposed due to the very nature of their respective being, nonetheless, they are related in that the latter is derived from the former. Each, however, can be only itself and can never become the other.
Hopkins is quite correct in his assertion that all interpretations which see Cusa as equating Absolute being with finite being are fundamentally flawed. He claims correctly that for Cusa the Absolute in no sense is ever identified with the finite. Each individual entity has its own being and is, therefore, essentially rather than accidentally differentiated from all other things. Although the Absolute remains present for all things this is not an actual presence or even a partial actual presence. The Divine does not serve as the essence of each finite thing. This is because finite entities can possess only contracted essences whereas the Absolute itself cannot be contracted. Thus, the world cannot be regarded as the Divine in a limited and finite state. The finite and the infinite are not two sides of one reality, but two different realities, though the second is entirely dependent upon the first. The world is nothing more than a reflection of Divine being. As a reflection, it cannot be equated with the essence of its source regardless of whether or not this essence is contracted. The Absolute never becomes mingled with the finite, but remains always its simple and restricted self.23 Thus, the Absolute nature of the Divine enables Cusa to repudiate both those who would depict God as the ultimate creature and those who would depict finite reality as the Absolute.
In De Docta Ignorantia, Cusa clearly draws a distinction between finite and
Absolute being. He writes that,
No distinction can be made between the absolute quiddity of the sun
and the moon, for it is God Himself Who is the absolute entity and
quiddity of all. But the restricted quiddity of the sun is distinct from
the restricted quiddity of the moon, because the restricted quiddity of
a thing is the thing itself, whereas the absolute quiddity is God not the
thing itself.24
One can see that for Cusa each finite thing has a form which is entirely its own, and makes it distinct not only from all other finite things, but also from the Absolute as well. Thus, the Absolute cannot be described accurately as the proper form of any existing finite thing; which, in respect to its own individual form, no finite thing is the Absolute.25
The Relationship Between the Finite and the Infinite
This, however, by no means implies that finite being is independent of, or unrelated to, Absolute being. In fact, only through participation in the Absolute is finite being capable of possessing its own respective form; apart from this participation, it would have no existence at all. In a manner of speaking, it is possible to say that Absolute being is the only being in the sense that everything else is dependent upon the Absolute for its original and continued existence. However, just as God being the cause of all things does not preclude the existence of secondary causes, so, likewise, if the Absolute is the Essence of all things this does not preclude the possibility of secondary essences.26 This is especially relevant when one bears in mind the fact that Cusa himself refers to the Absolute as the form of all forms.27
For Cusa, the Absolute clearly is the cause which brings finite being into
existence and, although such being undoubtedly is contingent it remains,
nonetheless, the individual creature's own contingent being. Cusa would not agree
that the sun and a tree are both merely modifications of the same being, but would
assert that they are two different entities with two different potencies, both of
which, however, remain entirely dependent on the Absolute. In the Apologia, Cusa
writes that,
For no one was ever so foolish as to maintain that God, who forms all
things, is anything other than that than which a greater cannot be
conceived. Accordingly, God is not this or that -- not the sky or the
earth. Rather, He is the Bestower of being upon all things -- so that He
is, properly speaking, the Form of every form. And any given form --
since it is not God -- is not, properly speaking, form; for it is formed
by the uncontracted and absolute Form. Therefore, no being can be
absent from the most absolute, the most perfect, and most simple
Form, since this Form bestows all being. And since all being is from
this Form and cannot be outside it, all being is in this Form. However,
in this Form all being can be nothing other than this Form.28
Clearly, Cusa sees God as the Absolute and can, therefore, be no particular
finite thing. Rather, the Absolute is the source of all being and gives each entity its
own individual form. Hence, all entities are present to the Absolute and their very
being is dependent upon and derived from this presence. However, since the
Absolute can be no finite thing this presence is not an actual one, but is based upon
the Absolute as the source of all being. Thus, the reality of the finite is present in
the Absolute not as their differentiated selves, but as the Absolute Itself. Because of
this Cusa writes,
Clearly, then, God ought in no respect to be conceived to have being
in the manner in which something singular -- which is different and
distinct -- is conceived to be. Nor [ought He to be conceived to have
being] in the manner in which a universal or genus or a species is
conceived to be. Rather [He ought to be thought to exist], beyond the
coincidence of the singular and the universal, as the most absolute
Form of all things generic, specific, and singular, and of all forms
which can be conceived and spoken of.29
It is important to note that when Cusa asserts that God is all possible things he means "that God is actually everything which anything can possibly be."30 He does not mean that God is everything that can be expressed by completing the phrase "It is possible that . . . ." Hence the Divine is not the possibility that it will rain tomorrow afternoon, but it is everything which any individual entity is possibly able to be.31 The Divine, however, remains distinct from the entity in the sense that it is everything which can possibly be, whereas finite entities have possibilities which have never been, and will never be, actualized.32 Thus, Cusa writes in De Possest that "as enfolded-in-God [complicatio] all these things [of the finite world] are God: similarly, as-unfolded-in-the-created-world [explicatio] they are the world."33 In short, the finite entities which men encounter in their everyday experience are nothing other than those existences which are unfolded from the Absolute. However, as enfolded in the Absolute these entities can be nothing but the Absolute. As such they are devoid of finite distinctions and, therefore, are all that they can possibly be and all that can be.
For Cusa all actually existing finite entities are present in the Divine and the Divine is present in all actually existing finite things.34 Each reality, however, is not present in itself, but only as the entity in which it inheres.35 Thus, in the raindrop the Divine is not its Absolute self while in the Divine the raindrop is not its finite self. Within the Divine, creatures are identical with the Absolute in which they are enfolded, rather than their unfolded finite existences.36 Finite being which of itself is actualized and unfolds from the Absolute cannot be equated with the Divine.37 William Hay points out that for Cusa the world is the unfolding of the Divine, just as number is the unfolding of unity. Hay writes that "just as number arises from our mind, because we understand many things one by one, concerning one common thing; so the plurality of things arises from the divine mind, in which are many things without plurality because they are the enfolding unity."38 In this fashion plurality unfolds from unity without destroying that unity, since they are separate beings.
Hence, Cusa sees the Divine as being not the Essence of all things but rather as the Essence of the essence of each thing. For example, the Divine is not the contracted essence of the raindrop, but that which the raindrops essence is derived from, participates in and is modeled upon. The existence of the raindrop is entirely dependent upon the Divine, but is equivalent neither to the Divine nor to a part of the Divine. Thus, although God may be said to be the Essence of a raindrop this ultimate Essence cannot in any way be equated with the finite essence with which man is in some sense acquainted. In this way, the Divine is present to all things only in the sense that an original object is present in its mirror image. However, just as the original itself is not actually present in its mirror image, the Divine is not itself present in the individual finite things which are its images.39
In the Apologia, Cusa makes clear this relationship between the Divine and its finite creation. Cusa flatly denies that finite reality is equivalent to the Divine or that it is nothing at all.40 Cusa affirms the existence of all individual finite things each through its own form. He writes that, "He [God] gives being even though the form of earth gives being to earth, and the form of fire [gives being] to fire. Yet, the Form which gives being is God, who forms every form."41 The Absolute imparts being to all finite reality, however, their individual forms, which also are derived from the Absolute, give them their particular natures. Finite being is entirely dependent upon Absolute being; however, it can never be reduced to a mere pantheistic modification of the Absolute. Cusa reiterates this dependence of the finite upon the Divine in De Pace Fidei where he writes that "For He from whom come all things embraces all things and is all in all, because He is the former of all; Therefore He is form of forms. The form of forms has within Himself all formable forms."42 Also De Li Non Aluid, which quotes quite extensively from Pseudo-Dionysius, supports this position with various citations from the Areopagite. For instance Cusa approvingly quotes The Divine Names where Dionysius says "He [God] is not in any existing thing nor is He any of these things."43 Thus, Cusa cannot be charged with ignoring the distinction between finite and absolute reality.
Peter Kampits asserts that the movement from the Absolute to finite reality in respect to creation is not emanation in the classic Neo-Platonic sense. Kampits describes the unfolding from the Absolute as an evolution based on acquisition. The original unity of the Absolute develops a multiplicity without losing its own unity. The distinctions which emerge due to the explication of the Divine are not a contradiction of the absolute unity.44 Kampits' claim, however, requires some explanation. To begin with the term evolution implies that the multiplicity of the finite world is not merely derivative of the Absolute, but in some sense an improvement upon it. The process of unfolding may be depicted more accurately as a process by which an original produces more or less accurate copies of itself in a manner which neither increases nor diminishes the original entity. Furthermore, Kampits' assertion that the process of unfolding is based upon acquisition also must be rather carefully qualified. The unfolding of the Divine does not add anything to its own reality. However, by unfolding, the Divine does create more beings. These beings are not divine beings nor even semi-divine beings but finite non-divine beings which only reflect the Divine as a mirror reflects a face. Strictly speaking, multiplicity is not so much a development of the Divine as it is a development from the Divine. The Divine serves as the source of this development and thereby governs the manner in which it takes place, but Itself is unaltered by this development.
Cusa's writings confirm such an interpretation in many places. In De Docta
Ignorantia, Cusa again cites with approval Pseudo- Dionysius' characterization of
the Divine as "the one complete cause of all, unable to be limited in any form; He is
so infinitely above all and independent of all that the suppression of all things
would leave His preeminence unaffected."45 Cusa also plainly states that a
contraction of the maximum cannot be the Divine since God's absolute nature
requires that He be unlimited.46 Further he states that the maximum cannot mingle
with matter nor inform it. In short for man to attribute to the Divine anything which
is limited is merely an exercise in self-deception.47 In De Li Non Aluid this position
is also confirmed when Cusa asserts that God is all things even though He Himself
is none of these things. He writes that "God though unnameable, names all things;
though infinite, defines all things; though limitless, delimits all things."48 In De
Visione Dei, on the distinction between the finite and the Absolute, Cusa writes that
otherness in reference to the Absolute cannot have any existence, nor can it make
one creature differ from another even though one being is not another. The reason
for this is that otherness is not a positive principle but derives its meaning from
non-being.49 The reason, however, that one being is not another is that particular
beings are not infinite and so cannot encompass all of the possibilities of reality
with their limited potentialities. Cusa uses Socrates as an example to make this
point. He writes that
The being of Socrates is the individual unity of all those things that
are in Socrates, in such a way that in that one being [Socrates] is
enfolded the being of all those things which are in Socrates. . . . But in
that same single being all things which have the Socratic being exist
and are unfolded and outside it they neither exist nor can exist.50
Likewise, finite being is unfolded from the Absolute and, just as Socrates' hand is not equivalent to Socratic being, so finite reality is not equivalent to the Divine. Cusa recognizes that finite being is entirely contingent upon the Divine, but the Divine is not itself diminished by any diminution in finite being. He writes, "I am because Thou [God] dost look at me, and if Thou didst turn thy glance from me I should cease to be."51 The Divine Itself, however, would in no way be affected since finite being is not synonymous with Divine being.
In the Apologia, Cusa confirms this view: "from the fact that all things are in God as things caused are in their cause, it does not follow that the caused is the cause - although in the cause they are only the cause."52 Cusa then cites St. Thomas Aquinas' Summa Contra Gentiles where Aquinas claims that based on the words of Pseudo-Dionysius, some were led to believe that God is all things.53 Cusa feels compelled to clarify this misunderstanding of Dionysius' work and asserts that for Dionysius "God is the Being of all things in such a way that He is not any of these things, since what is caused can never be raised unto equality with its cause."54 For both, Cusa and Dionysius the Divine is omnipresent, but only in a non-spatial way, just as He is at every time in a non-temporal way and is, likewise, every existent thing non-existentially.55 This is because the Absolute nature of the Divine does not allow it to be separated in a finite fashion.
As has been shown, Cusa sees finite being as unfolded from the Absolute and enfolded into the Absolute. In De Possest, Cusa writes that "He [the Divine] creates not from any other but from Himself; For He is everything which is possible to be."56 This is why Cusa asserts that understanding finite things can provide one with an approximate understanding of the invisible truths of the Divine. For Cusa the created world is eternally present in the Divine's creative power from which it emanated; every creatable thing must exist within that creative power.57 Thus, as Germain Heron points out, while Cusa rejects the idea that forms possess an existence independent of the individuals in which they inhere, he does assert that the material existence of a thing is ontologically inferior and logically posterior to these forms. This makes the Divine, which is the Form of all forms, the primary reality of the existence of an individual thing.58 Cusa sees the Divine as the Absolute entity and ultimate quiddity of all reality. Finite things are contracted quiddities of the Absolute but by their contraction they are clearly distinct from the Absolute. Nonetheless, finite being can possess nothing which is not derived from the Absolute.59
Finite being can exist only through the unfolding of the Absolute. Again, however, this does not mean that finite being is a mere modification of the Absolute. Though the Absolute cannot give any sort of being other than absolute being, once given this can exist only in a limited manner. Cusa writes that "since such a receiving falls short of the One who is imparting Himself [the Absolute], it turns toward a likeness and an image, so that it is not the truth of the Giver but a likeness of the Giver."60 In short, within finite reality the Absolute is not actually present and cannot exist as it did in itself. Finite reality does, however, mimic the Absolute to the fullest extent that its limited potentiality allows. In De Possest, Cusa points out that "as enfolded-in-God all these things [finite entities] are God; similarly as-unfolded-in-the-created-world they are the world."61 Thus, one can see that, though there is a clear and undeniable distinction between the finite and the Absolute this distinction is not divisive.
Furthermore, although it is impossible to predicate anything of Absolute
being, which is applicable to finite being, given the proper understanding of the
relationship between these two orders of reality, one can receive a glimpse of the
Absolute by careful examination of its finite image. Cusa writes that all finite
beauty bears
only a certain disproportionate likeness to that Beauty [of the
Absolute] (1) which is actually the possibility of the existence of all
beauty and (2) which is not able to exist otherwise than it does, since
it is what it is able to be.62
This is, however, in reference not just to beauty, but for all qualities of being.
The reason that the Absolute functions as the source of being is because
every finite being derives its existence from It. Cusa describes the Absolute as the
Form of forms and that which enfolds all forms. He writes that,
unless Being itself were to impart forming being to all forms, forms
would not at all have forming being. Therefore, Divine Being, which
is Absolute Being itself is present in all things, giving to all of them
such being as they have.63
The Absolute is the source of finite reality, at least in part, by being its archetype. Cusa makes this point most clearly when he asserts that the Absolute is all things which may possibly be and consequently its the truest formal cause of finite reality. "It is necessary that the Creator have within Himself the Concept and Rational Ground of all formable things."64
Cusa's heavy emphasis upon the formal aspect of finite realities unfolding from the Absolute betrays his fundamentally Neo-Platonic orientation. However, it would be a mistake to assume that formal causality is in and of itself sufficient to account for the Divine unfolding. As has been shown, finite beings for Cusa are not merely forms but forms which must inhere in matter in order to exist. Though Cusa sees matter as being fundamentally inferior to form he is no Manichean and does not see matter as being anti-thetical to the Divine. The Absolute not merely imposes forms upon matter but creates beings which are a unity of form and matter; therefore, He is not simply the formal cause of reality, but the efficient cause as well. The Absolute is responsible for unfolding not merely the forms of finite reality, but also the material potentialities in which those forms must inhere. This is because the Absolute is not pure act, but an entity which, in being all that can be, exists beyond the distinction between actuality and potentiality.
The emanation of being is the process which establishes the principles of
individuality and community. By emanation the Absolute creates the individual
entities of finite reality in contracting itself in a unique fashion for each individual
being. In this manner, Cusa provides the basis for the principle of individuality.
However, since each individual is a contraction of the same whole and therefore
reflects the whole, each individual is inherently related to every other one on an
ontological basis. This inherent ontological relationship which unites all being by
giving it a common archetype and source is the foundation upon which the principle
of community rests.
THE ORIENTATION OF BEING TOWARD THE DIVINE
Having discussed the way in which finite being is unfolded from, while remaining distinct from, Absolute being, we can now discuss the manner in which finite being is directed toward the Divine and how each individual being tends toward a common goal. This section is imperative for understanding the inherently dynamic character Cusa gives reality.
Because the Absolute is the archetype from which all finite reality derives its being, it is not surprising that Cusa seeks to have finite being return to the Absolute. In De Docta Ignorantia, Cusa writes that "the visible universe is a faithful reflection of the invisible, and that from creatures we can rise to a knowledge of the creator."65 This attempt to rise toward the Divine is not confined to rational creatures, though they come closest to it. For Cusa, "God has implanted in all things a natural desire to exist with the fullest measure of existence that is compatible with their particular nature."66 To this end the Absolute has endowed them with suitable faculties and activities to reach its fulfillment.67 Thus, for Cusa, the Absolute is not only the source of reality, but also the goal toward which reality moves.
Once the Absolute bestows being upon the finite the finite itself becomes active and strives to preserve and develop those perfections it now possesses.68 Thus, as Peter Kampits points out, individual beings imitate in a finite manner not merely external exemplars, but the Absolute Itself.69 This brings individual beings into a direct and immediate relationship to the Absolute. This is a very strong proclamation of the dynamic nature of reality for it means not only a dynamic Absolute, but a dynamic Absolute who creates something which itself is active and continually strives to mirror its creator.
The dynamic activity of being is closely linked to the unity of reality. Because all finite reality is unfolded from the Absolute, then as enfolded in the Absolute all finite beings are united within it. Furthermore, since finite being is both derived from, and seeks to return to, the Absolute, the real distinctions which exist within the universe are to some degree mitigated. The concept that all reality is in some sense within the Absolute and conversely that the Absolute is in all things relating each being to every other is not uncommon particularly in medieval Christianity. It is Cusa's articulation of this principle, however, which is distinctive. In De Docta Ignorantia he describes the unity of reality as analogous to the unity between a face and its images as reflected in a number of varying mirrors. The face is present in each image since all of the mirrors reflect the same face. Each image is uniquely reflective of the same original object, therefore, placing these unique images within a basic unity. This does not mean, however, that the Absolute is in any way limited to its finite expressions since that would be tantamount to saying that the face is nothing other than its reflected images. Though the mirrors can reproduce many more or less accurate images of the face it can never hope to produce the full and original reality of the face in an undiminished manner. Because the Absolute is both the source of all finite beings and a simple unity entirely devoid of otherness, in a very particular and limited sense the Absolute may be described as the ultimate essence of all things.70
Because of this, finite entities are in a certain sense transcendental by virtue
of their relation to absolute being. The universe becomes a place where "the essence
of everything [God] is immediately present to all things,"71 though never identical to
them. This is because, though all things are enfolded in the Absolute, precisely as
unfolded from the Absolute and brought into existence they are themselves rather
than the Absolute.
The Universe's Return to the Divine
Just as the infinite contains the entirety of the universe in a unified way, the unity of the universe contains the various entities which make it up. This is pointed out by Armand Maurer who claims further that just as absolute unity reconciles all opposition, the universe with its unity reconciles the opposition which exists within it.72 This, however, is not entirely accurate, since it ignores the fundamental difference between the Absolute and the universe which, though it is the totality of all limited beings, is, nonetheless, itself a limited entity. Because absolute unity is that from which limited being derives its existence, it cannot fail completely to reconcile all the opposition of finite beings since that is the very definition of absolute unity. The universe, however, is a limited unity. This means that, strictly speaking, the universe is incapable of reconciling the opposition within it, but can merely contain it. Within absolute unity there is only oneness and all distinctions and oppositions are annihilated; within the limited unity of the universe, however, the existence of opposition remains in effect though it is confined to the various component parts of the universe and not extended to the universe as a whole.
In De Docta Ignorantia Cusa supports this view when he describes the universe as a privative infinity. This is because matter lacks the power to extend beyond itself, and since matter is incapable of infinite extension the universe can be greater only if the Absolute ordained it to be so. Thus, though the universe is infinite in the sense that it is all that it can be, this infinity is a privative one in that, though it does include all finite being, it does not contain the Absolute and therefore is not all that can be. In short, the universe remains a limited entity which owes its existence to the Absolute.73 The universe is a particular individual entity and not merely a collection of all entities. Therefore, it has in itself an immediate contact with the Absolute apart from the individual entities which constitute it. Nonetheless, it can only contain rather than reconcile the opposition of finite being because, apart from the Absolute, all things must necessarily differ from one another.74
Jasper Hopkins outlines the implications of this,
The universe, then, is a oneness of many substances, each of which
has its own essence, or quiddity. This oneness-in-plurality is such that
the oneness precedes the plurality, though the way in which the
universe precedes its parts is different from the way in which God
precedes the universe, for the universe is not undifferentiated being
itself.75
In De Docta Ignorantia, Cusa writes that,
All the beings which form parts of the universe must have come into
being together with the universe, for without them it would be
impossible for the universe in its limited nature to be one. . . . In the
artist's mind, the whole is conceived before the part, for example the
house, before a wall; and so it was with the mind of God to Whose
will all things owe their being. First, then, to be produced was the
universe and, as a consequence, all that the existence of the universe
and its perfection necessarily demanded.76
Thus, one can see that for Cusa, God created all of the parts of the universe simultaneously so that the universe does not temporally precede its constituent parts nor does any one part precede any other. However, just as God ontologically precedes the universe, the universe ontologically precedes its constituent parts. This is because the universe is the product of God's design and in this sense may be considered ontologically to precede its constituent parts just as the architect's plans for an entire house precede the various parts of that house.77
Cusa elaborates the nature of these constituent parts of the universe in De
Dato Patris Luminum. "Every creature is a disclosing of the Father and participates
diversely and contractually in the Son's disclosing [of Him]. Some creatures
disclose Him more dimly, others more clearly in accordance with a diversity of
theophanies or manifestations of God."78 As previously shown, Cusa ranks these
manifestations according to the degree in which each requires matter in order to
exist. He asserts in the Idiota de Mente that "creatures without mind are unfoldings
of the divine simplicity rather than its images even though in unfolding they share
in different ways in the image, in accord with the way the image of mind is
reflected."79
Man as Microcosm
Due to their rational nature, humans occupy the preeminent place in the hierarchy of finite beings. Because Cusa asserts that unity is essentially synonymous with being his ranking of man as the highest of all finite beings has important implications for his understanding of the meaning of unity. One can see clearly that the term unity does not refer to a simple uniformity when applied to finite being. Inanimate corporeal being which Cusa describes as an unfolding of divine simplicity not only fails to achieve primacy within the hierarchy of being, but is placed at the very lowest level. Thus, unity for Cusa is epitomized by the harmonious diversity which human nature represents. Because of its singular nature, corporeal nature exists in opposition to every other nature.
Human nature, however, embraces the entire spectrum of finite nature, from
the rational to the corporeal. It possesses an even greater unity than that of the
universe, not because of what it unifies, but rather because of the way in which this
unity exists. Humanity does not simply contain diverse types of being as does the
universe, but it more adequately reconciles their distinctions into a single cohesive
nature. The human unity is no more inclusive than the unity of the universe, but its
distinctions are far less pronounced. Whereas the different natures within the
universe exist in a somewhat divided manner, this is not the case for humans. Their
rational nature brings them into proximity with the Absolute because their minds
enable them to study God's creation and, thereby, to gain a glimpse of God's nature.
Rational human nature also approximates the creative power of the Divine in that it
can create a notional world in a somewhat similar manner to the real world created
by the Absolute. Just as the Absolute unfolds to create a finite world, the human
mind unfolds to create a world of ideas containing geometrical theorems, symbols,
metaphors, et cetera. The existence of these ideas is dependent entirely upon
rational human nature. The unfolding of this nature is limited to rational entities, but
this is hardly insignificant. For Cusa, entities whose being is not dependent upon
corporeal matter are superior to those which do. In short, the human ability to create
rational entities is far superior to the ability to produce beings of corporeal matter.
Humanity for Cusa represents a microcosm of the universe because of which the
Incarnation plays a fundamental role in Cusa's metaphysics.
The Role of the Incarnation
Through the Incarnation the Absolute becomes finite in the person of Jesus Christ. This process gives Christ a dual though unified nature which is both wholly Divine and wholly human. In Christ, human nature reaches its ultimate perfection in that it is united with the Absolute. In this fashion humanity loses its limitedness and the Absolute is revealed in its concreteness, simultaneously with the absoluteness of the concrete.80 Therefore, one can see that, strictly speaking, Christ should not really be viewed as a mediator shuttling back and forth between the Absolute and the limited but genuinely belonging to neither. More accurately Christ is the union of the Absolute and finite reality binding them together by belonging quite properly to both.81
For Cusa, Christ enjoys a sort of metaphysical dual citizenship making Him entirely at home with either the Absolute or the finite in a manner possible for no other being. Thus, Christ should be viewed not as the bridge between the finite and absolute realms, but as the perfect microcosm who, "In his human nature is the supreme limit of the active tendency of the species to its perfection and in his divine nature he is the perfect image of the Father."82 Christ is the union of God and man but this "is not a union of opposites nor a union of what was before separate, nor a union of parts into a whole, for the nature of God has no parts, it is God as Creator and creature without confusion and without composition."83
Since, as has already been pointed out, humanity serves as a microcosm for the entire universe it can be said that Christ's redemption of mankind in a certain limited sense redeems the rest of creation through human nature.84 This is why Cusa describes Christ as the culmination of creation who fulfilled all things and whose coming all creation has awaited from the beginning.85 Thus, Cusa stresses Christ as being "ever present and individual in each person as well as in the universe rather than an historical fact accomplished once and for all, Cusa impresses the personal reality of Christianity as a vital and organic force through all ages."86
In the light of Cusa's teaching on the Incarnation one can interpret his statement in De Docta Ignorantia that "human nature it is that is raised above all works of God and made a little lower than the angels."87 This is by no means to assert that angels are uncreated, yet, if they are superior to mankind, which he describes as God's greatest creation, how can they also be a work of God? For Cusa, angels are indeed finite created entities completely dependent on the Absolute. Humanity is exceeded by angelic nature because humanity requires physical matter in order to exist, which, for Cusa, is a mark of inferiority. This would seem to have serious implications for the concept of finite unity as an harmonious diversity since the simplicity of the angels seems to be superior to the diverse nature of humans.
The Incarnation, however, changes all of this. Because the human is a microcosm of the universe conjoining both the physical and rational aspects of reality he or she is peculiarly suited for unification with the Absolute.88 The angelic nature, however, is of a purely rational nature and would fail to unite the Absolute with the corporeal were it the subject of the Incarnation. Thus, though created ontologically inferior to the angels, humanity is by virtue of the Incarnation raised beyond the angels and united to the Absolute.89 Because human nature is united with the Absolute due to its diverse, though ontologically inferior, nature, while angelic nature is excluded from this singular honor on the grounds of its simplicity the preeminence of the harmonious diversity of finite unity is preserved.
It is important to remember that though Christ was a particular man who lived at a particular historical time, the unification He represents, and all of its far reaching implications are, nonetheless, eternal and necessarily so due to the nature of the Absolute. Christ's unification of humanity with the Absolute makes it impossible for human nature, and through it the rest of reality, to perfect itself apart from the Divine.
Though Cusa firmly believes in the dignity of man based upon this relation to the Absolute, at no point does his thought run the risk of deifying humankind. The human remains a finite creature with thoroughly limited capacities. One's sense knowledge is particular and, therefore, temporal and corrupt. One's intellectual knowledge, though able to transcend the particular and because of this most capable of approximating the Absolute, remains ever incapable of comprehending the Absolute as It is in Itself.90 While the human intellect is potentially all things, the absolute intellect is actually so.
Pauline Moffitt Watts quite correctly points out that "no matter how much the human intellect reduces the element of possibility or contingency in its process of abstraction it is still unable to attain the actuality of the maximal intellect."91 One should note, however, that the difference between the finite and the absolute intellect is not merely one of degree. The human mind for Cusa is not absolute potentiality which is only partially actualized, while the divine mind is completely actualized. Man's mind is inherently limited and is capable of only partially actualizing even this limited potential since no individual being is capable of completely fulfilling its potential. The Absolute, on the other hand, is the source of all being and as such possesses unlimited potentiality which it completely actualizes.
Hence, not only are all created things derived from the Absolute, they also
are endowed with special faculties which allow them to bring themselves into closer
approximation with the Divine. This is particularly the case with respect to human
nature. Cusa clearly makes this point in De Visione Dei where he writes that
Thou [God] hast given me my being, of such a nature that it can make
itself continuously more able to receive Thy grace and goodness and
this power, which I have of Thee, wherein I possess a living image of
Thine almighty power, is freewill.92
Thus, finite reality not only is unfolded from the Divine, but is capable of utilizing its God-given abilities to approximate the Divine even more closely. The fact that the human is a microcosm of the universe brings corporeal and animate being closer in relationship to the Divine than either would have been able to achieve separately.
The return of being to the Absolute helps to reveal the ways in which the
principles of individuality and community operate within the universe. In accord
with the principle of individuality, each particular being within the finite realm
seeks to image the Divine to the greatest degree its limited nature allows. This is
possible because each individual being, as a contraction of the Absolute, is partially
reflective of the Absolute's being. The principle of community plays an even larger
role with respect to the return of being to the Absolute. This is because in
embracing a variety of individuals the community is not limited to any single
nature. Thus, the community can image the Absolute in a more accurate manner,
since it is not limited to a single expression of Its infinite nature.
THE DIVERSITY OF FINITE BEING AND ITS PROCLAMATION OF THE
DIVINE
This section will discuss the way in which finite reality reflects the Divine and how this requires a diversity of being in order to proclaim its source through the interaction of its parts. This should cast light upon both the value of the individual in itself and the way in which each is related to the whole in an harmonious manner. More importantly, however, it will reveal why the unfolding of the Absolute takes place as it does. It is imperative that this point be understood before inquiring further into the way in which each individual finite being is related to the whole in terms of the good.
Because all finite reality seeks its fulfillment in the Absolute one can see clearly how divine reality serves as the final cause of being. For Cusa, all finite reality tries to mirror the Absolute to the greatest degree allowed by its limited being. Since the Absolute is conceived by Cusa to be fundamentally dynamic, the reality produced by this dynamism must itself exist in a fundamentally dynamic manner. Thus, finite reality in itself is productive; the epitomy of this productivity of the finite is human intellectual creativity.
In the Apologia, Cusa writes that "God shines forth in creatures as truth shines forth in an image."93 For Cusa every creature is an image of God and every perfection it possesses is derived from that of which it is an image. The Divine, however, is not comprehensible on the basis of any created thing since all images necessarily fall short of their exemplar.94 Once one realizes this fact, however, one may move beyond these finite images and turn oneself "incomprehensibly to the incomprehensible truth" of the Divine.95
In a work entitled The Unity of Philosophical Experience, Etienne Gilson warns that when piety inundates philosophy the usual result is that in order to better "extol the glory of God, pious minded theologians proceed joyfully to annihilate God's own creation":96 The Creator is great and almighty, while creation is insignificant and base; God is everything but his creation is nothing.97 The careful balance in Cusa's thought between the mystical and the rational, however, prevents this from occurring. Luis Martinez-Gomez points out that Cusa differs from most other medieval mystics in that for him the finite world serves not merely as a point of departure from which one embarks upon the journey toward union with God, but as a mirror in which the Divine itself is reflected. As a man of the Renaissance, Cusa is not willing to degrade physical reality and encourages man to know it in the most accurate manner humanly possible.98 Hence, the Divine is not something to which one can move only by abandoning finite reality, but something which one must learn how to recognize through finite reality. In short, the finite world serves Cusa not merely as a point of departure, but also as the pathway through which human can approach the Divine. Hence, the Divine is not something which is alien to and removed from finite reality, but is both necessary to it and inherent in it. Finite reality is not a contradiction of the Divine, but entirely consistent with it.
Cusa has an essentially Theophanic view of finite reality which depicts individual entities as images of the Divine; only in this sense may they be said to be manifestations of the Divine. From the Divine, individual beings receive their own being which is not equivalent to the Divine. For Cusa finite being represents the Absolute as received in a limited manner rather than as given in Itself. Thus, even though God gives Himself only in an absolute manner, the finite can exist only in a limited capacity: the Absolute can be received only in a contracted fashion. Though this reception falls short of the truth of the Divine, nonetheless, it remains a likeness thereof.99
This view is most clearly expressed in De Dato Patris Luminium:
The Best [God], because it is the Best, is only a single, simple,
indivisible thing. Therefore, it can give only itself. The Best imparts
itself, though not piecemeal; for the Best can be only the Best, since it
is all that which it can be. . . . it [the Best] cannot be received as it is
given, because the receiving of the gift occurs in a descending manner.
Therefore, the infinite is received finitely; the universal, singularly;
and the absolute, contractedly. But since such a receiving falls short of
the truth of the one who is imparting Himself, it turns toward a
likeness and an image, so that it is not the truth of the Giver but a
likeness of the Giver.100
Cusa compares this relationship to that of a mirror which receives the image of a face, but is incapable of ever receiving the face as it is in itself. This is because "it will have to be received in something other [than itself] in a manner other [than as it is in itself]."101
Cusa reiterates this view in the Apologia where he flatly asserts that an image cannot coincide with its exemplar just as an effect cannot coincide with its cause. In fact, Cusa is so adamant on this point, and finds it so self-evident, he claims that any man who denies it is not merely mistaken but simply stupid.102 Cusa has even harsher words for John Wenck's assertion that for Cusa the image and the exemplar are of a single nature: "This [Wenck's assertion] is the detestable outrage of a shameless falsifier."103
Cusa sums up his position on this matter quite succinctly in the Apologia: "all things are in God as things caused are in their cause, it does not follow that the caused is the cause - although in the cause they are only the cause."104 In short, the unfolding from the Divine results in the creation of a being which is other than the Divine; as enfolded in the Divine, however, finite reality exists within the Divine but only as the Divine.
For Cusa there can be no comparative relation between the Divine and its
creaturely manifestations. In the Apologia he asserts that no created thing can
possess a beauty through which the Absolute may be attained. However, from the
greatness of creation, humans can be elevated to the infinite and incomprehensible
beauty of the Divine. This occurs in the same way a work of art refers to the artist,
though the work bears no comparative relation to the artist.105 In De Li Non Aluid,
Cusa quotes Psuedo-Dionysius, which is perhaps the best way to summarize Cusa's
understanding of the relationship between the Divine and Its creation:
Theology itself says that, as something other than all things, He [God]
is unlike all things and is free from all things; and -- what is surely
more marvelous -- it denies that anything is like unto [Him]. And,
assuredly, this point is not opposed to the [doctrine of the] likeness --
to -- God. Indeed, the same things are both similar and dissimilar to
God - similar because, as much as they can they imitate Him who
cannot possibly be imitated clearly.106
Thus one can clearly understand the key distinction Jasper Hopkin's draws between participating in the Divine and signifying such a participation. Speaking in the strictest sense a finite thing cannot actually participate in the undifferentiated unity of the Divine as its actual limited self. Nonetheless, it remains possible to signify participation of the Divine. When one refers to the Divine as omnipotent one is signifying that the Divine bears some resemblance - however dim - to the finite power which one experiences through the entities of the created world. Thus, when some created thing is called powerful it signifies that this thing participates in the absolute power of the Divine (i.e. powerfulness as such). The Divine in Itself, however, cannot be equated with powerfulness as such because Its absolute nature places It beyond the distinction of the powerful and the powerless.107 It is clear that Cusa does not view the world as a modification of the Divine in the same sense that color is a modification of light. In short, though the world is unfolded from the Divine it is not the unfolding of the Divine Itself, since the existence of the Divine is in no way contingent on the existence of the universe.108 Because the Divine is the ultimate being of all things this does not mean that any given thing in its being is God. Similarly, to say that God is the ultimate essence of all things does not mean that any thing or even the sum total of all things are in their essence Divine. Since all finite reality is inherently differentiated while the Absolute is not, the Absolute can never be equated with finite being or even the sum total of finite being.109 Cusa rejects the idea that the Divine can be mingled with finite reality. Finite reality descends from the Divine but remains always it image, and as such can never be equated with the reality of the Absolute Itself.110
Clyde Lee Miller asserts that finite reality is the "immediate presence of God's infinite unity in attenuated and contingent form."111 Hence, the Divine is so directly present to finite reality that each entity within reality is an image of Divine unity. In short, the universe is a diverse and plural expression of absolute unity. Humans cannot comprehend completely even the finite things of the universe because at their unitary core these things reflect the unity of the Absolute which in even this attenuated form still transcends the approximations which man's mind can make.112 For Cusa, creatures are appearances of the Divine and, as such, possess no independent being of their own. Thus, their entire reality is dependent upon, and derived from, the Divine of which they are manifestations. Even accidents which cannot exist apart from the substance in which they inhere do confer something upon their substance. Creatures, however, contribute nothing to the Divine who already is the Absolute. In this manner, finite being may be said to possess less reality than accidents. One should bear in mind, however, that this does not mean that God does not endow creatures with positive being, only that this positive being is relative to the Absolute which it reflects. This is analogous to a variety of mirrors all of which reflect a single face, except that in the case of the Divine unfolding there are no mirrors but only the Absolute and its images. All of these reflect absolute being, but none contain that being or any part of it.113 Cusa expresses this in De Li Non Aluid with another quote from Pseudo-Dionysius: "Created things must be said to be like unto God and formed according to the image and likeness of God. However, God must not be said to be like unto created things; for not even a man is similar to his own image."114
Peter Kampits points out that Cusa's philosophy does not result in a suspension of the uniqueness of the particular in favor of the totality because the whole possesses its mode of being through the existence of the particulars.115 Julie C. Norman notes that the emanation of reality from the Divine occurs in a process of descending levels of unity. The source of all unity is, of course, the Divine whose existence is entirely devoid of any distinction. From this absolute unity comes a secondary unity of the universe as a singular entity made up of a multiplicity of finite beings. This contracted unity of the universe itself contracts into a third level of unity made up of the various genera. Each of the multiple genera contract to themselves creating the next level of unity which is constituted of various species. This emanation terminates in the contraction of the species into finite individuals.116 Here emanated reality is at last actualized into genuine existence.
Thus the universe as unfolded from the Divine is the contracted maximum. Likewise, each finite thing which makes up the universe is, through its contraction, a particularization of the entire universe. Just as humanity is not synonymous with Socrates or Plato, but is Socrates in Socrates, and Plato in Plato, the universe is not synonymous with its particular constituent elements but in each individual thing it is that particular thing.117 Hence, finite realities are not so much the contracted being of the Divine, but a contracted reflection of divine being.118 Ernst Cassirer correctly points out that more than a mere reflection of divine being, a finite reality is a book written by God's own hand.119 Cassirer is trying to point out here that finite reality is not a random by-product of the Divine, but a willed act of self-revelation. In this manner, Cusa preserves the freedom and charity of the Divine's creative act.
In order to understand the way in which finite being reflects the Divine, three points are imperative. The first is that the Absolute is the primary reality and no being whatsoever can exist that is not derived therefrom. Despite the orientation toward the Divine had by all finite being, one must constantly bear in mind that though finite being is dependent upon the Divine it is also distinct from It. Secondly, each finite being is indispensable in that it contributes something which is entirely unique to the proclamation of the Divine. Thirdly, each individual entity serves as an image of the Divine. As such each actively seeks to fulfill its limited potential and thereby to mirror the Divine to the greatest possible degree.
Finite being's attempt to mirror the Divine which makes diversity such an important element in Cusa's philosophy. For Cusa diversity as man understands it cannot exist in the Divine.120 In the finite world, however, diversity is not only possible but beneficial. In De Docta Ignorantia, Cusa claims that the universe as a whole is a restricted form of the Absolute which derives its being from the Absolute and tries to reproduce it to the most accurate possible degree.121 Each individual being which makes up the universe is itself a contraction of the universe and, likewise, tries to reproduce the Absolute to the greatest possible degree. Since all finite being possesses a limited potentiality one can easily see that a diverse plurality of such beings will more accurately depict the Absolute than could any individual finite entity. This is why Ernst Cassirer claims that no part of the universe is dispensable: each possesses its own incomparable worth.122 Maurice De Gandillac echoes this point when he asserts that each individual plays it own distinct role in the total economy of reality.123
For Cusa, finite being seeks to image the Absolute to the greatest degree allowed by its nature: "every creature, through its perfection and as closely as the condition of its nature permits may ascend unto deification."124 Although all being can flow back to the Absolute, Cusa preserves the distinction between the Absolute and the finite by asserting that these beings inevitably fall short of fulfilling even their limited specific perfection.125 Cusa himself says that the all embracing nature of the Absolute can be properly manifested only through a diversity of finite being.126 This is for the rather obvious reason that finite beings have only a limited potentiality and, therefore, only a diverse multiplicity of such limited beings could properly, though not perfectly, image the Absolute. In this manner, no individual entity is capable of achieving its end or completion apart from the Divine.
The principles of individuality and community also have important implications for the finite being's proclamation of the Divine. In accord with the principle of individuality every being is indispensable to the proclamation, since each being proclaims the Divine an entirely unique way; no other being is capable of making this proclamation. However, it can proclaim the Absolute only in a manner consistent with its own limited nature and, to this extent, it is inadequate. The principle of community manages to overcome this drawback.
It allows for the integration of the various individuals of finite reality into a whole,
so the community can proclaim the Absolute more accurately than any one of its
constituent members. This is because where the individual is capable of proclaiming
the Divine in a manner consistent only with its own nature, the community does so
in a manner consistent with a diverse variety of individuals. Hence, what one
individual lacks another will possess, and where one is silent, another shall speak.
One must bear in mind, however, that even the community, which is ultimately
finite in nature, can never completely reflect the nature of the Absolute which is
infinite.
1. Jasper Hopkins, A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Arthur J. Banning Press, l988), P. 28.
2. Nicholas of Cusa, "Trialogus de Possest" in A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa, p. 153.
3. Kenneth L. Schmitz, The Gift: Creation (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1982), p. 43.
4. Ibid., p. 44.
5. Ibid., p. 47.
6. Ibid., p. 48.
7. Ibid., p. 51.
8. Ibid., p. 55.
9. Ibid., p. 58.
10. Ibid., p. 59.
11. Nicholas of Cusa, "De Dato Patris Luminum" in Nicholas of Cusa's Metaphysic of Contraction, Jasper Hopkins, ed. (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Arthur J. Banning Press, l983), p. 117.
l2. Jasper Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa's Metaphysic of Contraction, p. 35.
13. Ibid., p. 97.
14. Ibid., p. 98.
15. Vincent Martin, "The Dialectical Process in the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa," Laval Theologique et Philosophique, 5 (1949), 239.
16. Ibid., p. 223.
17. Ibid., p. 234.
18. Ibid., p. 216.
19. Ibid., p. 266.
20. Martin, p. 257.
21. Jasper Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa's Debate With John Wenck (Minneapolis: Minnesota, Arthur J. Banning Press, 1988), p. 12.
22. Martin, p. 108.
23. Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa's Metaphysic of Contraction, p. 98.
24. Nicholas of Cusa, Of Learned Ignorance, Germain Heron, trans. (London: Routledge, Kegan, Paul, 1954), p. 81.
25. Hopkins, p. 41.
26. Ibid., p. 105.
27. Nicholas of Cusa, The Vision of God (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Company, 1960), p. 71.
28. Nicholas of Cusa, "Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae" in Nicholas of Cusa's Debate With John Wenck , p. 48.
29. Ibid.
30. Jasper Hopkins, A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa, p. 29.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., p. 27.
33. Nicholas of Cusa, "Trialogus de Possest" in A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa, p. 75.
34. Jasper Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa's Metaphysics of Contraction, p. 93.
35. Ibid., p. 94.
36. Clyde Lee Miller, "Aristotelian Nature and Nicholas of Cusa," Downside Review, 76 (l978), 156.
37. Ibid., p. 157.
38. W. H. Hay, "Nicolaus Cusanus: The Structure of His Philosophy," Philosophical Review, 61 (Jan 1952), 23.
39. Hopkins, p. 91.
40. Nicholas of Cusa, "Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae" in Nicholas of Cusa's Debate With John Wenck, p. 57.
41. Ibid., p. 59.
42. Nicholas of Cusa, "De Pace Fidei" in Unity and Reform, John Patrick Dolan, ed. (Notre Dame, Indiana; University of Notre Dame Press, 1962), p. 213.
43. Nicholas of Cusa, "De Li Non Aluid" in Nicholas of Cusa on God as Not-Other, Jasper Hopkins, ed. (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Arthur J. Banning Press, l987), p. 105.
44. Peter Kampits, "Substanz und Relation bei Nicolaus Cusanus," Zeitschrift fur Philosophische Forschung, 30 (1976), 43.
45. Nicholas of Cusa, Of Learned Ignorance, p. 35.
46. Ibid., p. 132.
47. Ibid., p. 133.
48. Nicholas of Cusa, "De Li Non Aliud" in Nicholas of Cusa on God as Not-Other, p. 51.
49. Nicholas of Cusa, The Vision of God, p. 66.
50. Ibid., p. 67.
51. Ibid., p. l6.
52. Nicholas of Cusa, "Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae" in Nicholas of Cusa's Debate With John Wenck, p. 53.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid., p. 54.
55. Ibid.
56. Nicholas of Cusa, "Trialogus de Posset" in A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa, p. 161.
57. Ibid., p. 159.
58. Germain Heron, "Forward" in Of Learned Ignorance, Nicholas of Cusa (London: Routledge, Kegan, Paul, 1954), p. XXII.
59. Ibid., p. XXIII.
60. Nicholas of Cusa, "De Dato Patris Luminum" in Nicholas of Cusa's Metaphysic of Contraction, p. 119.
61. Nicholas of Cusa, " Trialogus de Possest" in A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa, p. 71.
62. Ibid., p. 73.
63. Ibid., p. 49.
64. Ibid., p. 59.
65. Nicholas of Cusa, Of Learned Ignorance, p. 25.
66. Ibid., p. 7.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid., p. 75.
69. Peter Kampits, "Substanz und Relation bei Nicolaus Cusanus," Zeitschrift fur Philosophische Forschung, 30 (1976), 37.
70. M. L. Fuehrer, "The Principle of Contractio in Nicholas of Cusa's Philosophical View of Man," Downside Review, 93 (1975) 290.
71. Thomas P. McTighe, "Nicholas of Cusa and Liebnize' Principle of Indiscernability," Modern Schoolman, 42 (1964), 41.
72. Armand A. Maurer, Medieval Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 321.
73. Nicholas of Cusa, p. 70.
74. Ibid., p. 67.
75. Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa's Metaphysic of Contraction, p. 90.
76. Nicholas of Cusa, Of Learned Ignorance, p. 82.
77. Hopkins, p. 91.
78. Nicholas of Cusa, "De Dato Patris Luminum" in Nicholas of Cusa's Metaphysic of Contraction, p. 126.
79. Nicholas of Cusa, De Idiota de Mente: The Layman About Mind, Clyde Lee Miller, trans. (New York: Alaris Books, 1979), p. 151.
80. Hopkins, p. 38.
81. Charles B. Schmitt and Quentin Skinner, eds., The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 555.
82. Ibid., p. 556.
83. Henry Bett, Nicholas of Cusa (London: Matheson and Company, Ltd., 1932), p. 194.
84. Ernst Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1963), p. 9.
85. Nicholas of Cusa, Of Learned Ignorance, p. 138.
86. John Patrick Dolan, ed., in the Forward to "De Docta Ignorantia" in Unity and Reform, ed. (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1962), p. 56.
87. Nicholas of Cusa, p. 135.
88. Ibid., p. 134.
89. Ibid., p, 135.
90. Pauline Moffitt Watts, Nicholaus Cusanus: A Fifteenth Century Vision of Man (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1982), p. 77.
91. Ibid., p. 78.
92. Nicholas of Cusa, The Vision of God, p. l6.
93. Nicholas of Cusa, "Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae" in Nicholas of Cusa's Debate With John Wenck, p. 50.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid., p. 49.
96. Etienne Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York: Scribner's, 1937), p. 37.
97. Ibid.
98. Luis Martinez-Gomez, "From the Names of God to the Name of God: Nicholas of Cusa," International Philosophical Quarterly, 5 (1960), 99.
99. Hopkins, p. 91.
100. Nicholas of Cusa, "De Dato Patris Luminum" in Nicholas of Cusa's Metaphysic of Contraction, pp.117-119.
101. Ibid.
102. Nicholas of Cusa, "Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae" in Nicholas of Cusa's Debate With John Wenck, p. 53.
103. Ibid., p. 62.
104. Ibid., p. 53.
105. Ibid., p. 55.
106. Nicholas of Cusa, "De Li Non Aliud" in Nicholas of Cusa on God as Not-Other, p. 109.
107. Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa on God as Not-Other, p. 7.
108. Ibid., p. 8.
109. Ibid., p. 9.
110. Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa's The Metaphysics of Contraction, p. 47.
111. Miller, p. 15.
112. Ibid.
113. Maurer, p. 318.
114. Nicholas of Cusa, p. 109.
115. Kampits, p. 46.
116. Julie C. Norman, "Nicholas of Cusa, Apostolate of Unity," Downside Review, 99 (1981), 64.
117. Hopkins, A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa, p. 35.
118. Ibid., p. 37.
119. Cassirer, p. 53.
120. Nicholas of Cusa, The Vision of God, p. 13.
121. Nicholas of Cusa, Of Learned Ignorance, p. 80.
122. Ernst Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1963), p. 27.
123. Maurice De Gandillac, "Les Conjectures de Nicholas de Cusa," Revue De Metaphysique et de Morale, 77 (1972), 359.
124. Nicholas of Cusa, "De Dato Patris Luminum" in Nicholas of Cusa's Metaphysic of Contraction, p. 127.
125. Ibid., p. 115.
126. Ibid., p. 124.