This chapter will examine some ethical implications of Cusa's understanding of unity. To this end it is divided into five sections. The first section will discuss the link between the concept of unity and ethical thought. Specifically, it will examine the implications of Cusa's distinct understanding of unity for understanding human relationships. The second section will discuss the role the human plays within the natural world. In the third section the relationships between humans will be discussed, focusing upon the interaction between individuality and social cohesion. The fourth section will then move on to discuss the related issue of determining the proper limits of freedom and compulsion. The fifth section will examine the status of evil within Cusa's metaphysics. Once again the principles of individuality and community play fundamental roles in understanding the nature of relationships within reality. The principle of individuality differentiates one being from another and allows each to have its own particular value and autonomy. The principle of community unites these individuals into an order which assigns each its proper place in relation to all other entities. The relationship of the principles of individuality and community in reference to their ethical implications for Cusa's thought are sketched in the accompanying diagram.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF UNITY AND ETHICS

One's metaphysical understanding of the concept of unity has a profound effect upon one's understanding of both human nature and society. This section will discuss the concept of unity from the relativist, idealist and Aristotelian perspectives, and then show how this relates to their conceptions of human nature and their implications for structuring society. It will then discuss how Cusa fits into this scheme with his concept of unity as an harmonious diversity.

The Relativist Perspective

The relativist rejects the idea that there is an objective reality or that any one truth can be binding for all.¹ Hence, unity is regarded as nothing more than a chimera. It makes no sense to speak of human nature since each individual possesses a nature which is entirely that person's own with no necessary relationship with anything outside of the self. The relativist's vision of society is likely to be decidedly anarchic since it entirely ignores the principle of community and is based exclusively on the principle of individuality. Any attempt to construct even the most tenuous form of order or to restrain the individual in even the slightest way is likely to be regarded as a fascist attempt to impose conformity upon society. Anarchy, however, is not necessarily the final outcome for a relativistic society because if each has his or her own unique conception of reality which is as true as any other conception the relativist can object to no one. The law-abiding citizen, the bomb throwing anarchist, and the liberty crushing dictator are all equally correct in their actions. In short, since the principles of the relativism assert that all views must be tolerated, then it must tolerate the many intolerant views which exist.²

Being Itself

Contraction

Principle of Individuality< >Principle of Community

Each individual contraction The contraction of being

uniquely imparts to each makes each thing to be

entity an inherent value everything in a contracted

which makes it indispensable sense. This creates a

to the whole. community of being relating

all entities on an

ontological level.

Structure Individualistic: Societal:

of emphasizes individual emphasizes society

Society autonomy as an organic whole

pp. 178-189

Relationship Hierarchical: Communal:

or the human dominates the human is seen

Humanity the natural world as part of nature

to Nature

pp. 189-197

Relationship Preeminence of Community of faiths:

of a single faith: all religions seen

Faiths one religion seen as trying to express

pp. 197-210 as completely true the truth of the

Absolute to the

greatest possible

extent

Social Freedom: Order:

Relationship allows the individual regulates actions of

pp. 210-215 to follow his or her constituent members

own wishes

Status Particular Evil: Transcendent Good:

of Those privations apparent evil

Evil which inhere in contributes to the

pp. 215-223 individual beings nature of the whole,

which is wholly

good

The doctrine of relativism can end only in a society epitomized by Hobbes state of nature where the only law is that of the jungle and justice is the advantage of the stronger. The individual becomes engaged in a war of each against all with no prospect of any sort of social development. The only respite from this struggle is for some individual to become strong enough to impose order through sheer force, which will last only as long as the strong person can maintain his or her position. Furthermore, the order imposed by the strong person is no true order since it is dependent on the whim of a single person or group and will collapse the moment that power is lost.

The Classical Greek Perspective

The ancient Greeks, however, saw the individual in a far less isolated manner. For the Greeks, one could not achieve anything great if one lacked self-respect. Society can, likewise, achieve nothing great so long as it fails to secure self-respect for its members. This self-respect is fostered by one's relationship with others, particularly, those whom one loves. Martha C. Nussbaum's article entitled, "Shame, Separateness and Political Unity: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato" is highly enlightening in respect to the relationship between social unity and ethics. Nussbaum points out that "it [self-respect] is, nonetheless, the sort of thing that properly belongs to each 'man who is going to live well' not to all in some collective way but to men one by one as separate choosers of their own activities."³ Thus, in The Symposium, Plato advocates an army of lovers rather than a traditional one, because such an army would have each of its members engaged in a common cause as separate individuals, and each aware of him or herself as choosing to display certain excellences. The presence of the lover serves to make the beloved more sensitive to any individual failures or deficiencies he or she might possess and inspire him or her to remedy them.⁴

According to Nussbaum's analysis, the individual is respected and respects oneself not as a part of something larger, but as oneself being the seat of something excellent and as one who has freely chosen to pursue this excellence. What matters to such an individual is not merely the general outcome of the enterprise in which one's group is involved, but what one does and is (i.e. that one acquit oneself honorably). For the Greeks, it is self-aware and independent individuals which create strong societies. Thus one can see the fundamental connection between self-respect and political unity, and the relation of both to individuality. In order to distribute the good of self-respect effectively, society cannot give it to the citizenry as a whole, but to each individual member of the society.⁵

Nussbaum points out that the way in which self-respect is distributed is part of what separates the two great giants of Greek Philosophy, Plato and Aristotle. These two men have such divergent views in reference to self-respect because of their different conceptions of unity. Aristotle asserts that the social unity of Plato is neither feasible nor desirable. He claims that the Platonic contention, that the more unity a society possesses the better it is, is erroneous. This is because, as Aristotle points out, a society is by its very nature a plurality and, therefore, an excess of unity is inevitably destructive to it.⁶

The Platonic View. Nussbaum asserts that Plato's ideas on social unity are grounded upon a rather unesteemable view of human nature and the physical realm in general. From the Platonic perspective, the vast majority of men are hopelessly enslaved to the whims of the appetitive part of their soul. Thus, such a person can live in accordance with the divine reason only by being enslaved to one of the few men who are capable of restraining the appetitive part of their souls with their reason.⁷ This can be done only by suppressing the individual wills and individuality of those who cannot control their own appetitive natures. From this perspective there is no room for democracy and individual rights; even the distinction between the public and the private is erased.⁸ For Plato, the principle of community is emphasized, but only at the expense of the principle of individuality.

The Platonic scheme ignores the importance of individuality and rejects the democratic notion that a person's self-respect is derived from one's own individual action. The rule of reason is imposed upon the ruled from without. One's entire value is derived from one's link to this external source; only in relation to something outside of oneself does one receive one's alleged self-respect. This line of thought is derived from Plato's soul-based theory of individual identity. The body is reduced to a mere appearance within which resides the true man struggling for control. Therefore, providing a man whose reason is weak with external assistance does not necessarily violate his individuality and personal integrity.⁹ Since most men have no control over their appetitive natures, they must be placed under the control of those who can give them some aid in order to fulfill their own nature.¹⁰ Thus, only in terms of the community is the individual capable of achieving any value and all sense of individual uniqueness is lost.

Plato's ideas of social unity clearly are derived from his metaphysics, in which emphasis is placed upon the forms. Hence, Plato places importance upon the form of human nature rather than upon the particular individuals that represent that form. It is not surprising then that Plato has no qualms about making self-respect something which the community, as a whole, can maintain only by restraining nearly all of the individual members of that society from pursuing their own particular ends. For Plato, individuals can achieve self-respect only by following the dictates of the community, just as individual entities can achieve reality only by participating in the form. In both cases, the particular individuals are of secondary importance, while the nature in which they participate is emphasized.

The Aristotelian View. Aristotle, however, took a somewhat different view, as Nussbaum points out. For Aristotle, human living requires political associations which respect individual autonomy. This is because it is impossible for man to have self-respect unless he is ruled by human practical reason. However, even this is not enough for Aristotle. One not only must be free from coercion but also must have a full share of political rights in governing his society.¹¹ For Aristotle all practical matters are by their very nature indefinite, and thus, when inquiring into them one should not seek to follow the vision of a single expert, but the reflective consensus of all the wise. Hence, he regards Plato's ideas of social unity not merely as impossible, but also as undesirable. Plato emphasizes control and order, while Aristotle is willing to tolerate some disorder for the sake of individual autonomy. The individual in Aristotle possesses a much greater importance than had been the case for Plato. This is because for Aristotle the form can exist only by inhering in an individual and not in some separated realm. For Aristotle the individual is not merely a shadow of being but itself is truly a being. Therefore, Aristotle regards all human beings as possessing a natural capacity for reason and this capacity must have the opportunity to be exercised. Any circumstances which frustrate the development of this capacity do not allow for true human fulfillment. Plato, on the other hand, claims that one requires the rule of reason in order to get his soul into a state of harmony. However, how this ruling is done, or more specifically who does the ruling, is of little consequence since Plato sees the individual as far less important than the whole.¹² Thus, whether a man rules himself or is ruled by another makes little difference to Plato.

The Cusan Perspective

It is clear that Cusa's concept of society is founded more upon the Aristotelian view than the Platonic and is an unambiguous rejection of relativism. Cusa believes that in the finite realm diversity is not only possible, in that it is not destructive to unity, but is required to reflect more accurately the being of the Absolute. Hence, he is respectful of both the individual and individual freedom. However, because diversity is oriented toward reflecting the being of the Absolute (i.e. absolute unity) it does not become a goal in itself. Thus, Cusa's concern for the individual does not exaggerate to the point where social cohesion is destroyed, while relativism flourishes. Thus, Cusa's understanding of unity requires that social cohesion be preserved, and to this extent, personal freedom must be integrated within the needs of society as a whole. For Cusa freedom is a condition for the good society, but not its goal.

The essential concept of Cusa's philosophy is that of unity and his distinctive insight into unity is that diversity is not inimical to it, but an expression of it. This is based upon the relationship between the principle of community and that of individuality. As previously stated, the principle of community asserts that each existing being is a contraction of the whole of being, while the principle of individuality asserts that each contraction is itself unique. These two necessary component principles of being result in relating each entity to every other in accord with the principle of community. Yet, each being is indispensable to the whole due to its uniqueness, in accord with the principle of individuality. Thus, for Cusa the being of the individual is integrated into the structure of the whole of being. It is both inherently reflective of this whole and indispensable to it. For this reason, Cusa does not see diversity as destructive of unity but as testament to its greatness.

This metaphysical insight is what conditions all of Cusa's thinking on the relationship between the individual and the whole in which it exists and upon which it depends. Thus, for Cusa human nature serves as a microcosm of the universe and is reflective of the diversity of the various types of being within the universe. Likewise, a particular person reflects the diversity of human nature, though this nature is contracted here in an entirely unique way. The ethical implications of this relationship are outlined in De Pace Fidei where Cusa encourages diversity, but recognizes that without the existence of an overarching unity no diversity would be possible. In short, for there to be a number of variations on a theme, one must first establish a single unified theme.

The ethical implications of Cusa's concept of unity do not apply only to one's relation with one's fellows. The idea that a diversity of individual beings proclaims the unity of the Absolute applies to all finite reality. Thus, for Cusa, the human person must respect the nature of each finite thing. This does not mean that one is forbidden from tampering with finite being, in fact, it is quite the contrary. One's nature is to utilize one's gifts to study nature in order to unlock its secrets and create inventions which can assist one in interacting with it. By interacting with the rest of finite reality, one can proclaim more accurately the Divine and even go so far as to create symbols which approximate the Divine. Nature is not something which one may dispose of in any way one chooses but, along with the human person it is one of the components which make up the unity of the universe. By properly relating to it, one may more accurately approximate the Divine. This issue will be more closely examined in the next section.

THE HUMAN PERSON AND THE NATURAL WORLD

This section will examine one's relationship to the natural world. It will focus upon the way in which, as a microcosm of the universe and the most perfect image of the Divine, one relates to the natural world which is an unfolding from the Divine. It will enable one to see the way in which one fits into the scheme of physical reality both as a unique individual and as a part of the whole.

As has been shown in the previous chapters, Nicholas of Cusa's understanding of the universe is considerably different from that of his medieval predecessors. It is not yet, however, the infinite universe of modern thought, but a world-view animated by the spirit of the Renaissance.¹³ As such, although he retains the basic hierarchical structure of the medieval cosmos it is far more dynamic than could be expected of the Middle Ages. Likewise, Cusa's universe lacks many of the most fundamental concepts of modernity, such as naturalism and the idea of the universe as a true infinity. As Henry Bett points out, Christian philosophy is constantly faced with the dilemma of emphasizing divine transcendence at the expense of divine immanence or immanence at the expense of transcendence.¹⁴ Cusa resolves this apparent conflict by his understanding of the unfolding of finite reality from the Divine. By unfolding the Divine reproduces Itself not just as It is in Itself, but merely as a finite image. Thus, the Divine is immanent in creation in that every finite thing is only an image of the Divine and, therefore, can exist only in a fashion which reflects the nature of the Divine and can in no way contradict it. At the same time, however, the Divine is absolute and, therefore, all finite images inevitably must fall short of their absolute exemplar.

The Unfolding of the Divine and the Creative Capacity of Human Rationality

The idea of the world as an unfolding of the Divine has profound implications for the development of Cusa's metaphysics. This is particularly the case because, as Cusa makes abundantly clear, the human person is the most accurate image of the Divine inasmuch as one's intellect allows one to create a notional world as well as comprehend the physical one. Thus, it is through knowledge of the images of the physical world that one can gain insight into their divine exemplar. Because of this, the study of nature does not result in a preoccupation with the concerns of this world, causing one to ignore the Divine. In fact, the study of nature receives enhanced importance because only thereby can one gain insight into the Divine. This has its greatest effect, not upon Cusa himself, but upon his successors and contributes greatly to the development of modern science.¹⁵ Nonetheless, as Ivor Leclerc points out, "It says a great deal for the philosophical perspicacity and power of Cusanus' mind that he elaborated some implications many generations before they begin to dawn upon others."¹⁶ This is particularly the case for Cusa's assertions in reference to the mathematical structure of the universe. One must bear in mind, however, that Cusa's claims are based upon metaphysical and epistemological considerations, rather than upon a strictly scientific mathematics.¹⁷

F. Edward Cranz claims that in Cusa's metaphysics dualism is overcome and Christian optimism triumphs over Christian pessimism. Cusa achieves this feat by stepping beyond the limits of strict Platonism which places all truth in the forms and denigrates the status of the natural world.¹⁸ For the dualist the natural world is seen as being in conflict with, and in some sense even contradicting, the Absolute. For Cusa, however, finite reality is an expression of the Divine. The difference between these two perspectives is as clear as it is important. The dualist sees the infinite as light and the finite as darkness. Cusa, however, sees the Absolute as light and the finite as a limited reflection of the absolute light. This considerably enhances the status of the finite world. In fact, the study of the natural world becomes not merely permissible, but desirable for, as Cranz points out, "The more he [the Christian] knows about the course of the stars, the more Christian he will become, for God created the world that He might reveal Himself through it."¹⁹

Nature came to be regarded in the Renaissance as an almost infinite collection of phenomena which, due to the limitations of human knowledge, could never be decoded by any single person, as Aristotle had done for previous generations. This goal could only be achieved through the collaborative effort of many individual researchers.²⁰ During the Renaissance study of the natural world becomes more rational and empirical. The idea that the study of nature should be done in an independent manner as free as possible from any metaphysical presupposition begins to emerge only as the Renaissance develops.²¹ Even for a figure as modern as Galileo, scientific discovery converged with revelation and scientific truth was seen as an expression of the divine will.²² Cusa's thought suggests many of these characteristically Renaissance concerns. In regard to the limits of the universe, Cusa describes the universe as a relative infinity. As far as man's ability to know the universe is concerned he believes that because of its inherent limitations the human mind is incapable of possessing complete knowledge. In De Pace Fidei, Cusa argues that a diverse variety of opinions can more closely approximate the truth than any single opinion. On the other hand, he has no desire to separate science from a metaphysical context.

Cusa asserts that the human person is a microcosm of the universe because human nature comprises all the different levels of reality. Therefore, the human serves as the central link of reality which binds together the highest order of being and the lowest. Thus, humanity unites the intellectual with the sensible world. One's intellectual capacity endows one with the ability to create a rational world and because of this the person may be described as a "human" or a "second god." For Cusa, just as the creative capacity of the Divine brings forth the existing entities and natural forms of the created world, the human mind, in imaging the divine mind, can bring forth rational entities and artificial forms (i.e. tools, mathematical concepts, and most importantly, symbols which explicate the Divine). The difference is that whereas the Divine can actually bring forth that which it understands, the human can only understand what the Divine has already brought forth. In short, one's mind cannot create physical entities ex nihilo as does God's, but can only represent and appropriate for oneself those things which God already has created.²³ Thus, Cassirer's assertion that without human nature there would be no value, since there would then be no principle for evaluating greater or lesser degrees of perfection, must be interpreted rather carefully. As far as Cusa is concerned, God is unequivocally the principle by which the degrees of perfection are evaluated since He is the source of all value. Cassirer fails to emphasize this when he writes that "God is, of course the Master who strikes the coins; but the human mind determines how much they are worth."²⁴ It would be more accurate to say that, for Cusa, God strikes the coins and, in doing so, determines their value, while the human is merely the inquirer who seeks to evaluate this currency properly and determine the worth which the Absolute has imparted to them. In short, the human is not the principle for evaluating degrees of perfection, but merely the agent who does the evaluating.²⁵

Creativity and Responsibility. One should not, however, assume that Cusa sees the human role as nothing more than that of a spectator. For Cusa one must study nature and utilize it as a resource in order to fulfill the divinely appointed end for which one was created. By using one's mind in such a fashion, one is capable of imaging the Divine more accurately than any other finite creature. However, one should not conclude that the natural world is nothing but a mass of raw material upon which the human mind is to work. For Cusa, all finite being is unfolded from the Divine and is, therefore, also an image of the Divine. Though none of these things are as accurate an image of the Divine as is the human being, they are, nonetheless, worthy of respect in themselves and should never be regarded in a manner which disregards their own unique individual natures. With this in mind one should point out that when one carves a tree into a statue one is not distorting the tree's nature, but is fulfilling some of the latent potential with which the Divine has endowed it. Each one will, due to one's own individual nature, create a being which no other being is capable of realizing. The process of carving does not terminate the object's participation in the Divine, nor stop it from imaging the Divine. One has altered merely the way in which this imaging takes place and in doing so further contributed to the diversity of being which proclaims the Divine. Thereby, one enhances that proclamation by adding to it a heretofore unarticulated expression of the Absolute. In fact, one may even go so far as to say that each particular expression is one which no other person is capable of realizing, since it reflects the unique perspective of its maker's being.

The human's relationship to the physical world is not that of a master to a slave, where the latter exists solely to fulfill the former's whim. It is more analogous to that of gardeners to their gardens. Gardeners do not seek so much to impose their will upon their gardens without regard to the good of that for which they care. Rather they seek to make what has been entrusted to them fulfill its greatest potentialities and in doing so fulfill their own. Furthermore, each individual gardener will create a garden which reflects his or her own unique nature. In fact, each individual plant in each garden will reflect the unique relationship between itself and its gardener. Thus, the garden not only fulfills the individual nature of its gardener, but the nature of each of the individual plants. The natural world is for Cusa an image of the Divine and, in order for one properly to orient oneself toward it, one must recognize and respect this. Nevertheless, one must never idolize nature and make it an end in itself.

The relationship which Cusa sees between humanity and the natural world is an expression of the principles of individuality and community. In accord with the principle of individuality the person, due to the rational aspect of human nature, is placed above all other creatures of the natural world and given dominion over it. However, just as the person is a contraction of the whole, so is the natural world. Hence, one must integrate oneself into the natural world, which is how the principle of community comes into play. Thus, one is not to impose one's will upon the natural world as if it had no value or nature of its own, nor is one to regard nature as equal to the human. The principle of individuality allows for humanity to be placed at the top of the hierarchy of created beings and so ensures human superiority over nature. However, following the principle of community, one is not merely superior to it but, due to this superiority in combination with the inherent relationship between humans and nature, one is also responsible for it. Thus, one must act in a way which is both reflective of one's superiority to the natural world as well as his or her commonality with it. The human person is the pinnacle of the natural world in that he or she completes it. Therefore, one must treat the natural world as a setting or home in which one is to conducts one's life.

INDIVIDUALITY AND SOCIAL COHESION

The preceding section discussed the person's relationship to the physical world, this section will discuss one's relationship to one's social world. It will do this by examining the way in which one can integrate the apparently irreconcilable differences between the competing demands of respecting individuality and protecting social cohesion through proper understanding of the relationship between the principles of individuality and community. It will, therefore, attempt to integrate Cusa's ideas of human nature, which were discussed previously with his ideas on the nature of society.

The Advantages of Diversity

The beneficial effects of social diversity can be seen in Cusa's opinions on the subject which is closest to his heart: that is, religious unity. His views on this in relation to religious unity are most clearly expressed in a work entitled De Pace Fidei. Cusa wrote this work as a response to the atrocities which occurred after the fall of Constantinople which he saw as stemming from a difference in religious rites. He wrote this work in bitter remembrance of the time which he spent in the region, where after much prayer and weeping he claims to have received a vision resolving the problem of religious pluralism.²⁶ Cusa asserts that religious differences arise inevitably due to the great multitude of men. These differences are exaggerated by the fact that such a great percentage of people live a life of misery and servility and so have not the opportunity to seek out the Divine themselves.²⁷ Because of this, God has appointed certain persons to act as His vicars and legates. These people formulate laws and cults and instruct the uneducated in their meaning and practice. Unfortunately, these regulations come to be regarded as directly from God, rather than from His spokesmen. With the passage of time people place their belief in their own particular customs, rather than in the Divine which these customs were meant to express.

Cusa goes on to inform his readers of the price of eliminating all this diversity. He writes that "No one really wants as his way of worship something that is common practice for all. To want what everyone else wants is imitation."²⁸ Thus, Cusa recognizes that enforcing religious uniformity will not benefit religious worship, but further divert attention from the object of worship to the form which it takes. Furthermore, to force people to adopt practices in which they do not believe will not enhance their faith, but merely cause them to engage in the performance of rites in which they do not believe. This would be to abandon true worship in favor of meaningless mimicry.

Cusa, however, goes further to insist that not only would religious uniformity have its costs, but that diversity in itself has its positive aspects. One of the positive aspects of diversity is that the distinctiveness of each particular religion is likely to make its adherents pay more careful attention to what they regard to be the best way of worshiping the Divine.²⁹ Therefore, stifling diversity will only result in a less vibrant religious life for which people will have less concern. Cusa reiterates this point at the end of the work where he has St. Paul claim that religious diversity brings about an increase of devotion. This is because it fosters a spirit of competition among the various groups and each endeavors to make its own practice the most splendid.³⁰

It should be noted here that Cusa is no modern day ecumenist, and when he speaks of religious diversity it is not in a Twentieth Century context. For Cusa, the truth is one and every free mind is capable of understanding it. Therefore, the vast plurality of religions can be reduced to a single orthodox faith.³¹ It is this single faith which all other religions presuppose. There can be no doubt that for Cusa this faith is most perfectly revealed in the person of Jesus Christ as interpreted by the Roman Catholic Church.³² What Cusa means by religious diversity is allowing a variety of rites so long as they do not compromise the eternal salvation of the faithful. Cusa, however, urges that a great deal of latitude be granted since "Any endeavor to impose exact conformity in everything is bound to disturb the peace." He recommends that "Church authorities should be governed by expediency in complying with local conditions. Provided that the faith is preserved, a diversity of rites will not mitigate against a common law."³³ Cusa has no objection to diversity in the way in which one might choose to express the faith so long as they do not alter the substance of what they are expressing.³⁴ Thus when St. Paul praises religious diversity it is with the proviso that the peace and the faith are preserved.³⁵

The Nature of Tolerance in Cusa's Thought

Cusa's idea of religious tolerance may seem rather narrow to the modern reader, but for the Fifteenth Century it was very broad-minded indeed. Ernst Cassirer asserts that as far as Cusa is concerned the opponents of the faith do not need to fear violence, but will be converted peacefully through dialogue. Failing that, however, they will be amiably tolerated. This is because for Cusa all religions, each in its own limited way, worship the Divine. Cusa emphasizes the fact that God is worshipped and places far less importance on the manner in which this worship takes place.³⁶

It should be pointed out here that Cassirer's assertion that peace is Cusa's prime concern is something of an overstatement. Cusa constantly links peace to retaining the integrity of the faith, and as a Renaissance man of profound religious convictions, it is likely that Cusa would, if no other option was viable, choose the faith over peace if no reconciliation of the two were possible. However, since Cusa describes the difference between the Turkish Muslims and the Greek Orthodox Christians as a difference in religious rites, it is likely that his definition of the faith is broad enough to accommodate most religious perspectives. He sees religion to be as unified as human nature in that it is a common possession which all share and is as natural to humanity as sensation or reason. Religion for Cusa is a common and universal endeavor sharing a common and universal object (i.e. the Divine). Thus, whatever form particular religions adopt all are in pursuit of the same goal the world over.³⁷

The concordance which Cusa sees as existing between all religious perspectives is indicated by the fact that in De Pace Fidei Cusa describes several men representing a multitude of religious perspectives as coming to an agreement with startling ease. There can be no doubt that this was in direct contrast with Cusa's rather extensive personal experience in these matters. Cusa is not simply naive here. In De Pace Fidei, Cusa points out that Jews often accept death rather than abandon their faith.³⁸ He also makes a similar assertion in the Apologia, where he claims that custom places a strong grip upon the human mind and that many would prefer to surrender their lives rather than their traditions.³⁹ The fact that Cusa has the participants of the discussion in De Pace Fidei reach such an easy agreement reflects the fundamental unity which Cusa perceived in all religions.⁴⁰ For Cusa this single universal truth is synonymous with Christian doctrine as expressed by the Roman Catholic Church and is accessible to all men who seek it with an open mind. The ease with which men of differing religious backgrounds reach agreement about the truth of Christianity is ample testimony to the fact that it is "utterly convincing in its rational simplicity."⁴¹ Thus, the characters which Cusa creates in De Pace Fidei being both wise men and free from prejudice are quickly brought around to his way of thinking.

With Cusa, religious diversity is reduced to different approaches to the Divine. Dorothy Koenigsberger points out that Cusa sees no religion as being entirely removed from the Divine. All of them contain at least some insight into the truth of the Absolute, though none of them are as complete as that of Roman Catholicism: for Cusa, Catholicism embraces all of the partial truths of other religions. Because of this, other religions should not be depicted as essentially evil or as adversaries, but merely partial views which are in need of completion.⁴² In this manner Cusa brings all other religions into relation with Christianity and opens up at least the possibility of dialogue between them. Thus, although Cusa's ideas on religious tolerance are not exactly the product of open-minded objectivity, neither are they condescending. Muslim and Christian have mutually exclusive ideas regarding the Incarnation which reflect radically different conceptions of the Divine. Cusa takes these other religions seriously enough to know that they are not asserting Catholic Doctrines with different words. Yet, he does admit that they are also doing their best to discover the Divine and will accept the true faith once it is properly explained to them.

In De Pace Fidei, Cusa claims that the Jews do not accept the Trinity because they think it is a plurality of gods, but once they properly understand it they will certainly accept its truth.⁴³ Of all religions, Cusa claims that Judaism presents the greatest challenge because, despite the fact that their scriptures contain all the necessary relevant information regarding the Incarnation, they refuse to look beyond its letter and, therefore, reject Christ.⁴⁴ Cusa does not embrace religious diversity out of any spirit of indifference. The multiplicity of religious perspectives is not merely tolerated as an empirical fact, but is speculatively demanded. For Cusa, all religious institutions and customs serve as sensible signs of the truth and, while these signs are subject to change, that which they signify is not.⁴⁵

Thus plurality, whether in respect to religious or physical reality, is the product of an unfolding of unity. Furthermore, this plurality is something which comes to proclaim the Divine. For the objective realities of the finite world this is because they are limited reflections of the Absolute from which they are derived. Therefore, a multiplicity of diverse realities is required, each highlighting the Absolute in a different manner. By so doing they make the whole a more accurate reflection of the Divine than any singular entity. For religions, however, Cusa sees each one as directing man toward the Absolute; their distinctiveness inspires each religion to perfect itself as much as possible. Thus, where finite objects are limited unfoldings of the Absolute the various religions represent partial views of it. The one exception to this is the Roman Catholic faith which is based upon God's own revelation through the Incarnation and, therefore, is as complete a view of the Absolute as is possible.

According to many scholars De Pace Fidei is the finest expression of religious tolerance in the Fifteenth Century. Spiritual unity was a major concern for Renaissance humanists, but tolerance meant nothing more than a reduction of religious differences by reconciliation.⁴⁶ Some scholars such as Ernst Cassirer see Cusa as heralding a new religious age of syncretism where all religions and philosophies contain some element of truth. Others argue that Cusa's outlook is more medieval. They point out that the concept of tolerance as such does not become important until after the disintegration of Christendom in the Sixteenth Century at the time of the Protestant Reformation.⁴⁷

One should point out, however, that although Cusa did not experience the Reformation he is quite aware of the serious nature of the conflicts which can be caused by religious differences. Cusa writes De Pace Fidei in response to the capture of Christian Constantinople by the Islamic Turks, which profoundly shocked all of Europe. He also saw the beginning of the break-up of the Holy Roman Empire into separate nation states, which also had a religious element. Cusa also had direct experience of the Counciliar movement which had its ultimate origins in the Great Schism of 1378, and the chaos it caused.⁴⁸ Thus, Cusa was exceedingly aware of the acrimony, disorder, and violence which religious conflicts could engender. In De Pace Fidei Cusa warns against the breakdown of social order because he is no doubt aware of the disastrous consequences that inevitably would follow. However, Cusa also points out that if in the pursuit of order the authorities attempt to impose strict uniformity it shall, likewise, result in disaster.

Morimichi Watanabe points out, that though Cusa's writing on the surface seems to be rather friendly and open-minded, upon closer examination it is revealed to be somewhat different. When Cusa speaks of a variety of forms of worship being permitted it is only as long as they do not violate the integrity of the faith and, thereby, break the very religious unity which Cusa sought to maintain.⁴⁹ Watanabe asserts that Cusa values tolerance not so much as a principle in itself, but as a means of preserving unity.⁵⁰

Cusa never places other religions on an equal footing with Christianity.⁵¹ Toleration for Cusa is directed at rites rather than belief, and even this diversity of rites is permissible only so long as the public peace is maintained and the faith is not endangered.⁵² Therese-Anne Druart correctly points out that "True respect for each other [diverse religions] will require acknowledging the truth of our differences as well as trying to understand them."⁵³ Cusa sees quite clearly the distinctions between religions, but he seeks to understand them only to the extent that this is required in order to fulfill them by bringing them around to Christianity. Cusa realizes that religions differ profoundly on fundamental issues, but despite these differences all point toward the one truth of Christianity and are, therefore, naturally reconcilable to it.

The Social Implications of Cusa's Understanding of Tolerance. The ideas Cusa expresses in De Pace Fidei are not confined merely to the Church but can be expanded to the whole of the social order. In the Fifteenth Century there was no sharp separation between Church and State. Also, as Watanabe points out, De Pace Fidei sought to maintain unity not only for the Church, but for the whole of the Christian commonwealth.⁵⁴ Cusa is fully aware of the intimate link between the individual and society. In De Docta Ignorantia, Cusa writes that "humanity has no real existence except in the limited existence in the individual."⁵⁵ For Cusa, man as the most perfect image of the Absolute achieves reality only within the individual. Therefore, one cannot trample down the individual in order to improve the lot of an abstract and non-existential humanity.

Nevertheless, Cusa does not give the individual unrestricted freedom. He knows quite well that the number of men make conflict inevitable. He also knows that the individual can achieve his full potential only among other men, thus making a society necessary. Furthermore, the diversity of a multitude of men can more approximately image the Divine then could any individual possibly. For Cusa, each thing within the finite realm is influenced by every other thing, and this principle applies also to humankind.⁵⁶ Each individual person is at least partially indebted to one's fellows for being shaped by them.

While for Cusa the individual requires a society in which to flourish, as he makes clear in De Pace Fidei this society must be well-ordered. This ordering of society is not merely a matter of balancing competing claims which result in compromising both the nature of the individual and society. What is called for is a successful integration of the two which allows both to fulfill their true potential. Should society begin to compromise the individual and seek to impose uniformity upon its members it will succeed only in frustrating its diversity. As a result not only will society impoverish itself, but quite likely it will end up provoking the very disorder it sought to prevent. On the other hand, if one ignores one's duties and obligations to society, one weakens that by which one is nourished and, which facilitates the development of one's own particular strengths. Society can no more prosper by inflicting injury upon its own members than can the individual prosper by weakening the society on which one depends. Cusa suggests that the two be integrated by allowing each individual to maximize one's own unique potential within a well-ordered society. In so doing, the society strengthens itself by not limiting the potentials of those who comprise it, and the individual is rewarded in that, by not being forced into a narrow mold, one is free to pursue those endeavors to which one finds oneself most suited. Outside of society each one would be forced to procure all the necessities of life oneself. Thus, one's opportunity to pursue other interests or self-perfection would be decidedly limited, and human diversity would be lessened. One also would be deprived of the company of other men as well as of their influence, and this would limit one's potential.

Cusa's understanding of religious tolerance is a product of his understanding of the relationship between the principles of individuality and community. In accord with the principle of community, Cusa sees all religions as related in that each attempts to articulate the nature of the Divine to the greatest degree possible. Since all religions are engaged in the same enterprise, Cusa sees them as being fundamentally related to each other,which provides the basis for his ideas on tolerance. However, the principle of individuality makes it impossible for Cusa to set up an equivalence between all religions. In this manner, religious tolerance is not transformed into mere religious indifference. For Cusa, each religion articulates the Divine in a distinctive manner, and some religions approximate the truth of the Divine more accurately than others. Cusa sees the Roman Catholic faith as the best expression of the Divine and, though he is willing to place all other religions in relation to it, none are equivalent to it. The following part will discuss the implications of Cusa's ideas of tolerance for society as a whole.

FREEDOM AND COMPULSION

The challenge of integrating the individual and society implies the determination of the limits of personal freedom. This is of fundamental importance in that it determines the manner in which a social unity will be maintained as a true community. Without its proper resolution, society will tilt toward the anarchy of excessive individualism or the repressive uniformity of totalitarian dictatorship. Cusa realizes that individual freedom can fulfill its promise only if it is properly regulated for otherwise it would end in self-destruction.

Armand Maurer correctly points out that, for Cusa, unity in the finite realm did not at all mean the elimination of all differences, nor was it a means for attaining absolutism for either the Church or the state.⁵⁷ In De Pace Fidei, Cusa asserts that unless the public peace or the integrity of the one true faith is threatened, Church authorities should not try to impose any uniformity upon its members. Cusa even asserts that diversity is in itself a positive principle in that it enables each person to choose the form of worship one finds the most appropriate. The distinctiveness of each group should foster a spirit of competition which would be beneficial in that each would strive to perfect itself to the greatest possible degree.

This principle is equally applicable for the secular realm. Just as not enforcing uniformity of religious worship would promote both the public peace and individual striving for perfection, the same can be said for the secular arena. By allowing this diversity to exist the secular authorities would reap the benefits of competition and have citizens with sincere belief in the effectiveness of what they are doing. Thus, the state is clearly better off permitting diversity than imposing uniformity which would only lessen competition and force people to adopt practices which they do not genuinely feel are the most effective.

Human Freedom

As Ernst Cassirer points out, the view of human freedom developed during the Renaissance is a far cry from that which was characteristic of the Middle Ages.⁵⁸ The medieval view as epitomized by Boethius who saw Fortune as a wheel which dragged men up by the heels and then dashed them down in accord with her own will and regardless of the individual's wishes or actions.⁵⁹ During the Renaissance Fortune came to be viewed in a far less omnipotent manner. An example characteristic of the Renaissance understanding of Fortune is in Machiavelli, who compares it to a violent river over which one can gain at least partial control by properly constructing dams and dykes.⁶⁰ The fundamental difference between these two views is that from the medieval perspective humans are essentially passive in respect to their earthly fate and can do little to alter it, whereas from a Renaissance perspective one has a degree of control over what happens to oneself in this life. It should be noted also, however, that for virtually all Christian thinkers in either the Middle Ages or the Renaissance, one retained control over what was most central to one's fate, namely, one's eternal destiny, i.e. the salvation or damnation of one's soul.

Clearly Cusa sees humans in the Renaissance context, for by the proper use of one's will and reason one can liberate oneself rather than blindly and helplessly falling prey to the forces of the universe. Hence, though one cannot control the universe since it is not subject to one's will, nevertheless one can mitigate the effect which it can have upon one.⁶¹ Reason enables one to create things which, to a limited extent, enable one to gain control over the forces of nature.⁶² Thus, reason permits one to correct one's own defects, heal illnesses, and educate both oneself and others. This last ability is the most important because it makes one capable of "driving out ignorance; . . . [one] becomes the explorer of divine things."⁶³ In short, the person's rational nature enables one to improve not only one's physical but also one's spiritual condition because by exercising one's rational nature one increases one's likeness to the Divine.

The Social Implications of Human Freedom

For Cusa, freedom for the individual, however, is imperative not only for that individual but also for society as a whole. There is no fundamental conflict between the two, since each contributes to the good of the other and neither can prosper without recognizing this fact. Because of this interrelationship individual freedom cannot be the sole priority for the just society. In fact, if such freedom were the only priority no society would be possible, since all groups must be able to regulate their members to some extent in order to maintain their existence as a group. Thus, Cusa recognizes that under certain circumstances the individual can be compelled to do something he or she otherwise would not. These two circumstances are to preserve the public peace and to protect the integrity of the faith. This is done not only for the good of society as a whole, but also, as far as Cusa is concerned, for the individual's own good. Should one use one's freedom in a manner which is destructive to the faith, in so doing, one would attain eternal damnation for one's soul and contribute to others receiving the same fate. Likewise, should the individual disturb the public peace and, in so doing, threaten the society in which one lives one brings harm to everyone else within the society as well as to oneself. Cusa believes that individual freedom is necessary for society to exist and, at times, this freedom must be protected by prohibiting those actions which would destroy it. For Cusa, laws are intended not to frustrate individual freedom, but to safeguard and complement it.

Cusa's understanding of the relationship between individual freedom and social order is also a consequence of the relationship Cusa forges between the principle of individuality and that of community. In respect to the principle of individuality, Cusa urges that every individual be given freedom to follow his or her own will and, in doing so, express one's own unique nature. Because Cusa recognizes the principle of community, as well as the principle of individuality, freedom for the individual is not the sole concern. Cusa is well aware that the actions which individuals take unavoidably impact upon others. In accordance with the principle of community, Cusa sees each individual as related to every other. Thus, Cusa sees quite clearly that individual freedom can be secured only within an ordered society. In this fashion, Cusa integrates the concerns of personal liberty with that of social order, just as the principle of individuality is integrated with the principle of community.

THE STATUS OF EVIL

Perhaps the most important question in relating Cusa's metaphysics to his ethics is that of the status of evil. Essentially, this question boils down to how evil relates to the Absolute which, as the source of all reality, transcends all finite distinctions. Some scholars feel that Cusa's metaphysics require him to jettison the traditional Thomistic-Augustinian understanding of evil as the lack of a due perfection and come up with a new alternative. The fact that Cusa refuses to do so is, they believe, a serious flaw in his thinking.

Jasper Hopkins asserts that although Cusa believes that God could not have made this universe more perfect than it actually is, He could have made a universe more perfect than this particular one.⁶⁴ Cusa claims that all components of the universe are as perfect as they can be, apart from their being injured or damaged.⁶⁵ In De Docta Ignorantia, Cusa points out that creation can contain no defect and that inherently each individual creature approaches the maximum to the greatest degree that is possible for it.⁶⁶ However, Cusa is also quick to point out that no creature can exhaust the potential of the maximum and, therefore, no creature is so perfect that God could not have created it at a still more perfect level.⁶⁷

Cusa clearly does not see the universe as the best of all possible worlds. This is because if one were to make such an assertion it would mean that God's power and goodness were limited, since it would not be possible for Him to improve upon the universe which actually exists. Undeniably, this is contrary to the entire spirit of Cusa's philosophy which seeks to safeguard the infinite and absolute nature of divine being. For Cusa, God could have made an endless variety of universes, some better and some worse than this particular one. However, each particular universe would be as perfect as it is capable of being, since the Absolute can create nothing which is not the best that it can be.

Thus, just as a man is more perfect than a stone, it is possible for God to create a universe more perfect than this one. However, in the same way that every individual being images the Divine to the greatest degree possible for it, so each universe which God could create would, likewise, image the Divine in the most accurate way possible for it and in this sense is perfect. Also, just as no individual being can fulfill all of the potential which is open to its species, likewise, no universe could fulfill all the potential which is open to it, since this would make it equal to the Absolute. Thus, though each individual being and the universe itself image the Divine to the greatest extent that their finite natures allow, the possibility of development is always left open since no being is all that it can be. For Cusa, one clearly can see that goodness is indeed synonymous with being; yet, no finite being is so complete that it cannot be better than it is.

Thomas P. McTighe is quite correct when he points out that Cusa's view of reality is essentially optimistic. Cusa admits that undeniably humans experience evil in everyday life, but this is because the human can view the entities which make up reality only in isolation due to the finite nature of his or her mind. Once such things can be seen from a perspective which integrates them with the rest of the universal order its harmony would then be made manifest, and its beautiful and good nature would be revealed.⁶⁸ God sees the world in the manner of the omnivoyant icon Cusa described in De Visione Dei, not as do humans. The difference is, that the finite mind can comprehend only one thing at a time and, therefore, in focusing upon that which it seeks to comprehend it must ignore everything else. In contrast the absolute mind in its infinite unity is capable of embracing everything at once. Hence, what appears to be evil from a finite perspective is not so from an infinite one.⁶⁹

Cusa and the Traditional Concept of Evil

The few places where Cusa's works specifically discuss the question of evil show that there is no fundamental conflict between the traditional concept of evil, as expressed by Aquinas or Augustine, and his understanding of the nature of reality. In De Dato Patris Luminum Cusa affirms that God is not the cause of evil.⁷⁰ For Cusa evil is caused by a finite thing's inability to fulfill its own potential.⁷¹ This is essentially compatible with the Thomistic-Augustinian idea of privation which sees evil as the lack of a due perfection. Cusa writes that all things which exist are able to do so only insofar as they are true, and that which is false (i.e. lacking in truth) does not exist.⁷² Julie C. Norman points out that Cusa equates reality with goodness. He sees the essential nature of every existing thing as good because it is derived from the Absolute.⁷³ Evil then is devoid of reality and can exist only through a parasitic dependence on the good. Evil is nothing more than a privation of a due perfection which originates primarily in the self-will of the devil and secondarily in human freedom and Adam's sin.⁷⁴ De Dato Patris Luminum explicitly supports this view by attributing all sins to the presumption first of Lucifer and then humankind.⁷⁵ Thus, although evil is existentially real, it remains essentially unreal, lacking in both form and positive being.⁷⁶

Henry Bett finds Cusa's thought incompatible with the traditional concept of evil. He asks how Cusa can assert that God does not know things because they exist, but that they exist because he knows them, and then reconcile this with the idea that God is not the cause of evil.⁷⁷ This is because Cusa claims that God knows both good and evil, just as the eyes know both light and dark. Therefore, how can the Divine know something without causing it to exist? Bett also asserts that Cusa sees evil as a lapse from reality, just as multiplicity is a lapse from unity, and a curve is a lapse from straightness.⁷⁸ According to Bett, therefore, it should follow that evil is implicit in goodness.⁷⁹ For Bett, the startlingly casual ease with which Cusa adopts the traditional concept of evil reveals that the only philosophical problems are those derived from relating the Absolute to the finite, while that of moral evil is essentially inconsequential.⁸⁰ Bett claims that Cusa admits that not all things are good in themselves, though they, nonetheless, contribute to the ultimate good.⁸¹ Other commentators, however, read Cusa's assertion about the Divine as being the coincidence of opposites to mean that the Divine must itself include both good and evil.⁸²

On the whole, however, these criticisms are unfounded. Cusa refuses to incorporate evil into the Divine. He asserts that evil is a failure to seek the Absolute which is the proper end of all things. Thus, it remains a privation and a necessary consequence of God limiting Himself in creation.⁸³ Cusa believes that God can know evil, yet not be responsible for its existence because evil as a privation of being has no existence. The Divine as the source and archetype of all being, naturally, knows how individual beings fall short of their forms. Likewise, Bett's assertion that if evil is a lapse from goodness it is, therefore, implicit in goodness, seems inaccurate. Evil is not implicit in goodness because evil is a failure of a being to fulfill its potential. Only the Absolute, which is all that It can be, is entirely devoid of evil. Evil is not an approximation of goodness in the sense that a curve approximates a straight line, but is an outright contradiction of goodness and being. Hence, for Cusa, evil is implicit not in goodness, but in finitude.

Also, though Bett is correct in pointing out that Cusa's philosophy is concerned primarily with relating the finite to the Absolute it is not correct to say that Cusa adopts his position on moral evil because he feels it to be an inconsequential problem not worthy of his attention. Cusa's life as a serious reformer shows that he was quite concerned with moral evil, however, his metaphysics creates no fundamental conflicts with the traditional medieval understanding of evil. Whenever one examines the problem of evil in Cusa's thought one must always bear in mind the non-essential nature of evil. Absolute being, since It is all that It can be, can no more contain evil than It can contain any finite thing. The difference is that whereas the Divine is the source and archetype of finite being this is not the case for evil. Because evil is a privation it has neither a source nor an archetype.

Bett's assertion that Cusa affirms that some things are not good in themselves is entirely unfounded. In the Apologia, Cusa points out that when one views a poisonous animal one sees it in terms of its separate parts and, therefore, it seems to possess no beauty or goodness. However, when related to the whole their beauty and goodness are revealed. Cusa writes that "the whole which is wholly beautiful, is composed of a beautiful harmony of the parts."⁸⁴ For Cusa, what is apparently evil is actually good once it can be seen from the perspective of the universal order. Thus apparent evil in relating to being as a whole produces good effects and is transformed thereby into good. This transformation reveals the operation of Cusa's coincidence of opposites within the moral realm. Within the Absolute, the opposition between good and evil is reconciled leaving nothing but the infinite goodness of the Divine. One should not, however, assume that Cusa asserts that reality is devoid of all evil. Just as within the finite realm a line may be either straight or curved, something may also be either good or evil. Likewise, as the distinctions between the straight and the curved are transcended by the Absolute, the same can be said in reference to good and evil.

Here again one can see the effects of the principle of individuality and community. The principle of individuality is what makes some beings appear to be evil. However, once these particular beings are seen as particular contractions of the whole, and as such are expressive of its being, they may then be viewed from the perspective of the whole of being. From this perspective particular evils can be seen as partial expressions of the transcendent good of the whole. Thus, evil retains its own non-essential reality in the finite realm as it inheres in a particular individual, but in reference to the whole of being, of which each individual is a contraction, no evil is possible since the Absolute as all which It can be, lacks nothing.

1. Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes, eds., Rationality and Relativism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M. I. T. Press, 1982), p. 3.

2. Ibid., p. 182.

3. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, Essays on Aristotle's Ethics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 395.

4. Ibid., p. 396; Also see Plato, Symposium 178e.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.; Also see Aristotle, Politics 1261a 16-25.

7. Ibid., p. 408; Also see Plato, Republic 590cd.

8. Ibid., p. 409; Also see Plato, Republic Book V.

9. Ibid., p. 410; Also see Plato, Laws 739cd.

10. Ibid., p. 411; Also see Plato, Republic 590cd.

11. Ibid., p. 419; Also see Aristotle, Politics, 1317b, 1-16.

12. Ibid., p. 422.

13. Alexandre Koyre, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957), p. 23.

14. Henry Bett, Nicholas of Cusa (London: Meuthen and Co., Ltd., 1932), p. 113.

15. Ivor Leclerc, The Nature of Physical Existence (New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1972), p. 79.

16. Ibid., p. 82.

17. Ernst Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1963), p. 24.

18. F. Edward Cranz, "St. Augustine and Nicholas of Cusa in the Tradition of Western Christian Thought," Speculum, 28 (1953), 311.

19. Ibid.

20. Charles B. Schmitt and Quentin Skinner, eds., The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 244.

21. Ibid., p. 245.

22. Ibid., p. 262.

23. Ibid., p. 552

24. Ibid., p. 553.

25. Gerald Christianson and Thomas McIzbicki, eds., Nicholas of Cusa in Search of God and Wisdom (New York: E. J. Brill, 1991), p. 84.

26. Nicholas of Cusa, "De Pace Fidei" in Unity and Reform, John Patrick Dolen, ed. (South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1960), p. 195.

27. Ibid., p. 196

28. Ibid., p. 197.

29. Ibid., p. 198.

30. Ibid., p. 236.

31. Ibid., p. 199.

32. Ibid., p. 200.

33. Ibid., p. 235.

34. Ibid., p. 228.

35. Ibid., p. 236.

36. Cassirer, p. 71.

37. James E. Biechler, The Religious Language of Nicholas of Cusa (Missoula, Montana: American Academy of Religion and Scholars Press, l975), p. 87.

38. Nicholas of Cusa, p. 226.

39. Nicholas of Cusa, "Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae" in Nicholas of Cusa's Debate With John Wenck, Jasper Hopkins, ed. (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Arthur J. Banning Press, 1988), p. 46.

40. Biechler, p. 64.

41. Ibid., p. 65.

42. Dorothy Koenigsberger, Renaissance Man and Creative Thinking (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1979), p. 114.

43. Nicholas of Cusa, "De Pace Fidei" in Unity and Reform, p. 210.

44. Ibid., p. 219.

45. Cassirer, p. 30.

46. Ibid., p. 44.

47. Nicolo' Cusano Agli Inizi del Mondo Moderno, (Florence: Sansoni, 1970), p. 409.

48. Ibid., p. 410.

49. Ibid., p. 411.

50. Ibid., p. 412.

51. Ibid., p. 413.

52. Ibid., p. 415.

53. Therese-Anne Druart, "There is no God but God," New Catholic World (Nov/Dec 1987), 264.

54. Nicolo' Cusano Agli Inizi del Mondo Moderno, p. 416.

55. Dominic J. O'Meara, ed. Neo-Platonism and Christian Thought (Norfolk, Virginia: International Society for Neo-Platonic Studies, 1982), p. 181.

56. Nicholas of Cusa, Of Learned Ignorance (London: Routledge, Kegan, Paul, 1954), p. 135.

57. Ibid., p. 120.

58. Armand Maurer, Medieval Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 317.

59. Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, Richard Green, trans. (New York: Mac Millan Publishing Company, 1962), p. 22.

60. Nicolo Machiavelli, The Prince, Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., trans. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), p. 98.

61. Cassirer, p. 77.

62. Pauline Moffitt Watts, Nicholas Cusanus: A Fifteenth Century Vision of Man (Leiden, The Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1982), p. 103.

63. Ibid., p. 206.

64. Ibid., p. 211.

65. Jasper Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa's Metaphysic of Contraction (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Arthur J. Banning Press, 1986), p. 88.

66. Ibid., p. 80.

67. Nicholas of Cusa, p. 134.

68. Ibid., p. 135.

69. Thomas P. McTighe, "Nicholas of Cusa and Liebniz's Principle of Indiscernibility," Modern Schoolman, 42 (Nov 1964), 35.

70. Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predecessors (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknapp Press, (1969), p. 58.

71. Nicholas of Cusa, "De Dato Patris Luminum" in Nicholas of Cusa's Metaphysic of Contraction Jasper Hopkins, ed. (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Arthur J. Banning Press, 1986), p. 116.

72. Ibid., p. 115

73. Ibid., p. 125.

74. Julie C. Norman, "Nicholas of Cusa, Apostolate of Unity," Downside Review, 99 (1981), 69.

75. Ibid., p. 70.

76. Nicholas of Cusa, p. 116.

77. Bett, p. 152.

78. Ibid., p. 153.

79. Ibid., p. 157.

80. Ibid., p. 152.

81. Ibid., p. 156.

82. Jeffrey Burton Russell, Lucifer: The Devil in the Middle Ages (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 281.

83. Ibid.

84. Nicholas of Cusa, "Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae" in Nicholas of Cusa's Debate With John Wenck, p. 53.