The problem of religious conflict is historically familiar, having been expressed in a variety of catastrophic ways including torture, execution and religious wars. In De Pace Fidei Cusa himself speaks of these religious wars and how people have been forced either to reject their faith or to lose their lives.¹ Furthermore, one need not look long to find contemporary examples of this sort of conflict. Though the aforementioned examples might be the most dramatic and tragic consequences of a misconception of religious unity, they are by no means the only ones. In fact one might argue that it was the very horrors of such religious conflict, where religious unity was conceived in terms of a universal adherence to one particular faith, which led so many to embrace an alternative view which henceforth will be referred to as religious consolidationism. From this perspective the great variety of religious faiths can be accounted for on the basis of the existence of irrelevant differences in the methods in which they choose to express themselves. Thus all faiths are seen as marginally different attempts to express the same reality. The idea that these faiths are articulating unique visions of the very nature of that reality is rejected.

This chapter will begin by showing how a Cusan perspective can give new insight regarding the nature of religious unity which can enable one to avoid the twin pitfalls of religious antagonism and religious indifference. One can then draw upon this concept of religious unity in order more productively to interpret the great diversity of religious faiths and to understand how they relate one to another. The relationship between the principles of individuality and community play a key role in one's understanding of religious unity and this has far-reaching consequences for such fundamental contemporary questions as one's approach to ecumenism and evangelization. In short, properly to understand the relationships between the faiths, and the desire to propagate a particular faith, there is need first for an understanding of the very nature of religious unity itself.

A Cusan perspective will reveal that ecumenism and evangelization are not antithetical, but complementary concepts. In fact, authentic ecumenism will recognize the importance of authentic evangelization and vice versa. The second section will focus upon the implications of this understanding of religious unity for ecumenism. It will seek to show how a Cusan understanding of unity could help to resolve many of the tensions of the modern ecumenical movement and allow it to realize its full potential.

The third section will seek to do the same with regard to evangelization and thereby reveal it to be not some form of low intensity religious conflict or the product of an intolerant attitude, but a healthy expression of a vibrant religious faith. The following diagram outlines the basic structure of this chapter.

INTERPRETING THE DIVERSITY OF RELIGIOUS FAITHS

Six Responses to Religious Diversity

In an article entitled "God, Commitment and Other Faiths", Joseph Runzo outlines six possible ways of responding to the diversity of faiths in the world.² This outline provides a framework in which one can gain a clearer insight into the relative strengths and weaknesses of the various options as well as the positive possibilities of a Cusan perspective. The first response is atheism which asserts that all religions are false. This position is epitomized by the work of Ludwig Feuerbach who regarded God as nothing more than a projection of the human mind. Feuerbach argues that `Divine Being' is nothing else than the nature of Man, i.e., human nature purified, freed from the imperfections of the human individual,

Supremacism Coalitionism Consolidationism Emphasizes Integrates Emphasizes prinprinciple principlesciple of community of individ- of individ- at the expense of uality at uality and the principle of the expense community. individuality. of community.

Relationship Atheism Inter- Subjectivism

Between Exclusivism actionism Pluralism

Faiths Relativism

pp. 233-249

Ecumenism One faith Each faith Ignores differences

pp. 249-253 is true and must study between faiths

all others others to making all an

are false see its equally valid

and must relation- means to the same

come to ship to end and reducing the

admit this. them and differences between

deepen its faiths to irrele-

under- vance.

standing

of those

faiths and

through

them its

under-

standing

of itself

as well.

EvangelizationValid only It is the At best superfluous

pp. 253-257 for propo- duty of and at worst harmful.

nents of each faith

the one to engage

true in religious

faith. dialogue.

projected into the outside, and therefore viewed

and revered as a different and distinct being

with a nature of its own.³

The second response is religious exclusivism which asserts that one religion is true while all of the others are false. Runzo associates this position with Karl Barth's defense of Christianity as the uniquely true faith. In his work entitled Church Dogmatics Barth writes that "the Christian religion is true, because it has pleased God, who alone can be the judge in this matter, to affirm it to be the true religion. What is truth, if not this divine affirmation."⁴ Once this perspective is embraced any attempt to integrate a diverse variety of religious faiths into a harmonious community quickly encounters a unique and exceedingly complex difficulty. Immediately one must confront the fact that from an exclusivist perspective religious faith requires an absolute commitment from its adherents which is unlike any other personal commitment. This is because this commitment is founded upon the inherent nature of what it means to be human, which gives it a character which is both ultimate and universal.

Thus the exclusivist perspective has a tendency to produce religious tensions between different religious communities. These tensions are the result not merely of historical accidents or human stupidity, but of a particular vision of the nature of religious commitment. It should also be noted, however, that though the modern day ecumenist is likely to take a particularly dim view of religious exclusivism, the inherent cohesiveness and vitality of the faith it fosters should not be dismissed.

Both atheism and religious exclusivism may be described as supremacist positions since they claim that only one view is true while all others must be false. The supremacist perspective exaggerates the principle of individuality and in so doing neglects the principle of community. From this perspective the truth is embodied in a single view, while all other views by virtue of their differences are considered false. All shared elements between that faith and any other are seen to be irrelevant. Supremacism regards one view as possessing singular truth, and is not likely to be willing to relate that view to any other within the community of faiths, which it tends to view as a corrupting influence.

The third type of response which Runzo articulates is that of religious inclusivism, he cites Karl Rahner's notion of the anonymous Christian as representative of this view.⁵ Rahner states that those who have not yet received the gospel through no fault of their own may still attain eternal salvation.⁶ Anonymous Christians are those who can be called Christian in a meaningful sense, though they cannot and/or would not describe themselves as such.⁷

Religious inclusivism asserts that one religion is fully true while other religions only partially reveal some element of this truth. This approach will be referred to as coalitionism since it sees all faiths as being related, yet preserves the distinctions between them. The coalitionist position attempts to integrate the principles of individuality and community. It does this by recognizing the validity of the attempts made by those who possess differing views to articulate the truth as they see it. Therefore, it is willing to place each faith in dialogue with all those with which it does not agree, so that all may mutually benefit from rational discourse.

This preserves the principle of community in that it establishes a community in which the various faiths can interact. At the same time, coalitionism does not abandon the unique value of each individual faith, but, in fact, offers a deeper understanding of, and appreciation for, these faiths and thus also preserves the principle of individuality.

The fourth way to view the great diversity of religious faiths is referred to as religious subjectivism. This sees each religion as correct insofar as it is best for the individual who adheres to it. Here religious truth is as varied as the individuals who profess it.⁸ Religion thus becomes a matter of purely personal perspective. This perspective is not frequently encountered among serious theoreticians, but it should be mentioned for the sake of completeness. It should also be noted, however, that this perspective often is sincerely expressed by many students and seems to possess considerable popular appeal.

Religious pluralism is the fifth perspective Runzo offers to account for the variety of religious viewpoints. This view sees all religions as true in that each offers a different, but valid path to salvation. Each gives a partial perspective upon ultimate reality, but one is no better than any other. Because the differences between religious faiths are essentially inconsequential, the value of belonging to a particular religious community is lessened considerably. Runzo cites John Hick's theories as being representative of this tendency.⁹ Hick writes

Pluralism . . . is the view that the transformation of human existence from self-centeredness to reality-centeredness is taking place in different ways within the context of all the great religious traditions. There is not merely one way, but a plurality of ways of salvation or liberation.¹⁰

The final perspective which Runzo identifies and which he himself embraces as being the most representative of reality is that of religious relativism. This view asserts that every religion is true in relation to its own community of adherents.

Collectively these last views of religious unity may be described as consolidationism since they see the distinctions between faiths as irrelevant. The tendencies of the consolidationist perspective are considerably different from those of the supremacist perspective. It emphasizes the principle of community, but does so at the expense of the principle of individuality. All religious faiths are seen as equally valid, but, because of this, the unique value of any particular view is lost. This perspective links all religious views together in that each attains the end which all of them seek. Unfortunately, because the distinctiveness of each view is lost, there is no reason to prefer one to another.

Diversity and Tolerance

Consoliditionism tends to hold that the virtue of tolerance requires that all religious propositions be seen as of equal truth-value. This view is not only mistaken, but, as Jay Newman points out in his article, "The Idea of Religious Tolerance," it is somewhat insulting to the adherents of all religious faiths.¹¹ This is because it asserts that the teachings of these faiths are not nearly as important as their adherents believe them to be. In fact, if differences between religious beliefs are insignificant, can the vitality of those beliefs long endure.

As Newman points out, "Every act of tolerance involves an underlying wish that things were different."¹² In short, one can only tolerate those things which one finds disagreeable. When the atheist tolerates the Christian's belief in the Incarnation he in no way alters his belief that the Incarnation is false. Tolerance involves not a half hearted acceptance of any particular belief, but a willingness to respect those individuals who hold that belief.¹³

As has been shown already Cusa's views are essentially in accord with the coalitionist perspective. This perspective allows Cusa to assert the value and superiority of the Roman Catholic Faith, and yet consider it open to dialogue with every other faith. Cusa's thought was revolutionary in its day and only recently has come to be embraced by his Church. However, it is possible to use the fundamental principles operative in Cusa's thought to arrive at conclusions which Cusa did not and--bearing in mind the historical and social circumstances of his day--could not himself have articulated. This will have important consequences for the many problems of religious diversity which arise repeatedly in our day.

Within the Cusan framework the principle of individuality allows for the preservation of the distinctiveness of each particular religion; in other words, its unique value must be recognized. At the same time, the principle of community demands that the great variety of faiths recognize what in fact they share and enter into relationships with each other. Because the supremacist perspective relies upon the principle of individuality it seeks to subjugate all other faiths to some particular one. Conversely, the consoliditionist approach is grounded in the principle of community and so sacrifices the unique identity of each in order to establish a community. A Cusan response, however, would be that the separation between each particular faith and the community of faiths be overcome so that no faith can be conceived of apart from the overall community: likewise, the community itself must recognize each faith as it actually exists. Thus the loving response of the person of faith acknowledges each faith's vision of itself; only through such an acknowledgement can one's own faith reach its full realization.

A Cusan Approach to Diversity

This analysis will begin by applying Cusa's ideas on the principle of community to the diversity of faiths. In doing this one gains a new perspective on the nature of the community of faiths which will open up new possibilities for understanding the relationships between members of that community. In short, all faiths will be seen as attempts to express the truth about the ultimate nature of reality as fully as they can.

With respect to the principle of individuality, one must admit the uniqueness of particular religions based upon the genuine differences between them. This is especially the case if one is to take ecumenism seriously. To have faith is to believe that one's own beliefs are true. However, one might conclude that by the iron laws of logic any beliefs which contradict them are not true. Each religion would have its own understanding of ultimate reality; if any is right this might be seen as necessarily entailing that others are to some extent wrong. This could lead one to conclude that Cusa sees all other religions as more or less failed attempts to arrive at the truth of Christianity. Such an interpretation, however, does not give due respect to other religions, nor does it give the principle of individuality the full consideration it deserves. It would be analogous to regarding the created world as nothing more than incomplete human beings with no value inherent in being what they themselves are.

A far better way to view the diversity of faiths, and one which is much more consistent with the Cusan principle of individuality, is to conceive of this diversity along the same lines as Cusa conceives of the diversity of the created world. This position will henceforth be referred to as religious interactionism. This perspective uses Cusa's insights into the nature of reality to take the inclusivist position one step further. While inclusivism recognizes the value of other religions as being partially true and thus places all of them in dialogue with each other, interactionism goes beyond this to claim that each faith can only have its true meaning revealed in light of an accurate understanding of the other faiths. The uniqueness of each faith is not only preserved, but becomes an indispensable element through which one can gain access to the deepest meaning of one's own faith. Though inclusivism opens up the possibility of dialogue, interactionism makes it a mandatory component for discerning the nature of one's own faith. Also the participants in the dialogue are bound by ties of mutual concern in that all contribute to each others well-being in a conscious manner.

Interactionism enables one to realize that each faith possesses an inherent value and contributes to the greatness of the whole. In De Docta Ignorantia, Cusa asserts that "no individual of a given species can be so completely perfect as to make any higher perfection impossible, nor so utterly imperfect as to exclude the possibility of further imperfections."¹⁴ When this concept is applied to individual religions, one can see that no religion should be regarded as being entirely without value, and similarly no religion can be regarded as being so complete that it could not be made still more complete. After all, in a sense the diverse religious perspectives one encounters represent attempts by finite minds to articulate the nature of reality. Even if these views are regarded as being the product of divine revelation one must still admit that this revelation is received and interpreted by human beings.

In the end, though one faith may be superior to the others these others still possess an inherent and unique value of their own. Just as Cusa believes that the more one knows about the stars the better one will understand God, likewise the more one knows about other religions the more one will know also about one's own religion and God as well.

This is not necessarily because one might originally hold a false position and through dialogue discover that error. Even if Christianity were the maximal faith (which Cusa in fact believes)¹⁵ the Christian would still deepen his or her own understanding of that faith through religious dialogue. For example, by studying the way in which Islam, Judaism and Buddhism all deal with the issue of transcendence one may not only come to know what makes the Christian position distinctive, but will have an enriched understanding of what that position entails.

Thus Cusa's own mission to Constantinople and his discussions with the leaders of the Orthodox Church led him to the insights of De Docta Ignorantia. Likewise, the study of Islam can illuminate one's understanding of Christianity, and this holds true for all religions. Also such an exchange of ideas would allow all, even the adherents of the maximal faith, the opportunity to achieve an ever greater perfection. Cusa believes there is no faith which does not have some truth to speak and no faith which does not have some truth which it is in need of hearing. In De Pace Fidei, he has St. Peter say that, "no man is, according to human nature, so wise that he cannot be wiser, for between received wisdom, that is human wisdom, and wisdom-per-se, which is divine and the greatest and infinite, there is always infinite distance."¹⁶

It is worthwhile to recount here Cusa's version of how it is that such a great diversity of faiths came to exist. He claims that God sent a variety of prophets into the world in order to reveal Himself to humanity. To achieve this goal these prophets created a variety of cults, the customs of which have, over time, come to be regarded as immutable truths founded not by prophets, but by God.¹⁷

Since the human person has free will, and because over time opinions, languages and interpretations undergo change, humanity needs a number of visitations to eliminate the religious errors which inevitably develop.¹⁸ In this manner Cusa gives such figures as Buddha and even Mohammed a similar status to that of prophets of the God of Israel whose teachings over time have been distorted.

For Cusa every free mind can see that all religions can be reduced to a single orthodox faith.¹⁹ Even polytheists, Cusa asserts, presuppose the existence of a divinity in which other gods participate.²⁰ If properly informed, Cusa believes that the polytheist would recognize this divinity as the true God and also realize what he or she had previously regarded as gods were, in fact, something akin to interceding saints.²¹ In short, there is but one religion, but a diversity of religious rites.²²

Because of this Cusa does not think that religious diversity need be a source of conflict.

If, perchance, this diversity cannot be done away with, or its reduction would not be advisable, since in many cases a particular religion would actually be more vigilant in guarding what it considers to be the noblest way of manifesting its devotion to you as its king, at least just as you are God alone, so also let there be in the same manner one religion and one cult of divine worship.²³

For Cusa, since the diversity of rites are merely different ways of articulating the same underlying truth, there is no real basis for mutual attacks over these differences.

Cusa goes still further when he suggests that "No one really wants as his way of worship something that is common practice for all. To want what everyone else wants is imitation."²⁴ Since such imitation is not true religious worship one may, therefore, conclude that he believes the elimination of diversity would not necessarily be a change for the better.

Cusa sees a variety of ways in which differing religious groups can relate peacefully to each other. One possible option is to have all of the groups abdicate their own faith and together adopt the faith of one particular group. A second option is one of interchange in which unity is established by each faith abandoning some of its own practices and adopting those of other groups, with the understanding that each of these other groups will abandon some of their practices and adopt its rites. Cusa acknowledges that these options create considerable practical difficulties. Therefore he proposes a third option which he feels will be the most viable. He asserts that "It will suffice that there be unanimity in the matter of belief and the law of charity, and that toleration in the matter of ritual be allowed."²⁵

In respect to the key issues of dynamism and diversity the consequences of the supremacist, coalitionist, and consolidationist positions are quite clear. The supremacist perspective tends to recognize diversity (though it regards this as negative) and sees dynamic interaction as a source of contamination and something to be avoided. However, in being isolated from its natural community a faith sacrifices the means through which it can discover its own unique identity, as well as the vitality such a sense of identity can foster. The consolidationist position, on the other hand, tends to see diversity as being merely superficial and therefore the need for interaction becomes somewhat superfluous. By concentrating upon those elements which bind the community of faiths together, to the exclusion of the distinctive elements of its constituent members, that community diminishes its own resources in failing to nourish the full potential of the individuals which comprise it. Thus any approach which acknowledges either the principle of individuality or that of community alone and in isolation inevitably results in a failure to properly articulate the true nature of reality in which both principles are interrelated in a complementary fashion. Hence such an approach will necessarily be inadequate. The coalitionist perspective, however, preserves the value of both diversity and dynamism. Diversity is preserved through the affirmation of the unique value of every individual faith, while dynamism is preserved by stressing the interrelationships between the faiths and the indispensable importance of exploring these interrelationships. In this fashion, individuals are integrated into a vital and developing community which will nourish their full potential and to which they can contribute actively.

RELIGIOUS UNITY AND ECUMENISM

It is time now to examine ecumenism from each of these perspectives (supremacist, coalitionist and consolidationist) in order to show how each approaches the ecumenical movement in a way which is conditioned by their respective expressions of the relationship between the principles of individuality and community.

Possible Approaches to Ecumenism

The importance of one's view of religious unity for ecumenism is clear. All too often ecumenical policies reflect one of two extreme positions depending upon whether they are conceived in accordance with either supremacist or consolidationist tendencies. A consolidationist perspective would tend to view all religions as merely different ways to articulate the same truth, all of which are equally valid. The real differences among religious views are dismissed as insignificant. The fact that the Buddhist and the Christian have radically different conceptions of the nature of ultimate reality would be disregarded; both would be interpreted in a manner which neither would regard as accurate.

The supremacist position advocates that other religions admit the error of their ways and make what amounts to an unconditional surrender to what is seen as the one true faith. This brand of ecumenism requires the Buddhist, for example, to admit that it is the Christian whose faith is, in fact, true, while his or her's is not. In effect the Buddhist must cease being a Buddhist.

The Cusan approach represents the coalitionist perspective and provides the best foundation upon which to base any genuine ecumenical movement. This is so because it allows individuals to retain the distinctiveness of their own faith as well as the vitality associated with that distinctiveness. On the other hand, dialogue between these faiths is not only possible but, in fact, required in order for each faith to come to a full understanding of itself.

As has been shown in the previous section, Cusa's principles can be used to extend the notion of religious inclusivism to one of religious interactionism where all religions are seen as shedding light upon each other and each plays an indispensable role in illuminating the Divine. Religious interactionism not only allows each faith to assert its unique understanding of reality, but points out that this can be understood properly only when viewed in relation to all other faiths. Thus, these other faiths are not seen as paths which mislead their true believers. Rather they are seen as sign posts which, if properly interpreted, can lead one to a richer understanding of one's own faith. In this view faiths stand in relation to one another not as enemies, but as valued friends, each contributing to the other's well-being. In fact, even though Cusa sees Christianity as the maximal faith it is by no means complete in its understanding of the Absolute. Just as no individual thing is so perfect that it cannot be improved upon, the same can be said of individual religious views. Thus, even Christianity can profit through interaction with other faiths in that a deeper discernment of the meaning of that faith is made possible.

The differences between the various approaches to ecumenism can be traced to differences in their particular understanding of the relationship between the principles of individuality and community. Since supremacism recognizes only the principle of individuality it quite naturally sees no value in any view other than the one it regards as true. Therefore, any religious unity pursued involves the adherents of other religions converting to this faith.

Consolidationism takes an entirely different view. Recognizing only the principle of community it tends to see any efforts toward ecumenism as a matter of resolving differences which are rather superficial. Since consolidationism regards the distinctions between religions as being essentially based on modes of expression it is not likely invest ecumenism with much vitality.

Interactionism and Ecumenism. The view of religious interactionism, however, is much more complex since it seeks to retain both the principle of individuality and that of community. In accord with the principle of individuality, interactionism recognizes the real distinctions between the various religious views and their logical implications. On the other hand, with the principle of community, all religions are linked in the common enterprise of explicating the Divine. Therefore, rational dialogue between the various groups is both beneficial and necessary.

The goal of such a dialogue from the interactionist perspective is not the triumph of one particular view and the surrender of the others, as had been the case for the supremacist position. What interactionism seeks is a dialogue in which all views maintain their unique identity, but at the same time gain a richer understanding of themselves, their partners and above all of the truth which they all seek to articulate. Thus, interactionism views ecumenism in a way which reflects fundamental interest in preserving both diversity and dynamism.

The supremacist perspective clearly sees the unique value of the faith it regards as true, but tends to neglect the value of any other. Because of this no true diversity is possible, nor is any true dynamism. Consolidationism sees all faiths as being of equal validity, with each trying to articulate the same truth. Once again, all diversity and dynamism is lost. Both perspectives engender a kind of religious monism which supremacism achieves through a policy of religious imperialism, while consolidationism opts for a policy of homogenization. Only religious interactionism protects the uniqueness of every individual faith, yet places them within a community in which they are called to interact with each other.

In fact, an ecumenism which seeks to promote authentic unity must do so without subjugating one faith to another or neglecting the uniqueness of each faith. An ecumenism motivated by love must recognize that no faith can be isolated from the community of faiths without having its vitality diminished. However, if this vitality is to be maintained each faith must retain its distinctive nature. In this manner, each faith has its vitality enhanced through its interaction with other faiths. No conflict exists between genuine distinctiveness and authentic unity.

RELIGIOUS UNITY AND EVANGELIZATION

At this point it should be no surprise to discover that the differences in the way in which supremacism, coalitionism and consolidationism relate to the issue of evangelization also result from differences in their understanding of the relationship between the principles of individuality and community. In this section the term evangelization will be used to refer to rational or emotional appeals to convince people to adopt a particular religious view.

Possible Approaches to Evangelization

Supermacism is likely to regard all evangelization of its view as a religious duty, while all evangelization in favor of other views would be seen as something akin to spiritual poaching. In short, since supremacism sees one view as exclusively true and all other views as threats to that truth, it is willing to look kindly only upon the propagation of the view which it accepts. The propagation of differing views, however, is quite another matter. These, supremacism will be inclined to claim, should be actively or at least tacitly discouraged.

The view of consolidationism in respect to evangelization is somewhat different than that of supremacism. From the consolidationist perspective all attempts at evangelization, regardless of what direction they take are at best superfluous and at worst harmful. This is because consolidationism believes that each religion is geared uniquely toward the circumstances of the lives of its adherents. Therefore any alteration in that faith may well have a detrimental effect. Furthermore, since all faiths are of equal truth value, changing one's faith would bring one no closer to the truth.

A Cusan Approach to Evangelization

Interactionism offers a view which is a good deal different from either of these perspectives and is far more representative of the thought of Nicholas of Cusa. This perspective will be inclined to regard evangelization as a duty of men of all faiths. This is not exclusively because it is the duty of all men to propagate what they feel to be the truth, for interactionism is well aware that, to some extent, some of these propagated views must be false. The duty of evangelization for interactionism is derived rather from the obligation of the faithful to engage in religious dialogue for the mutual benefit of all concerned.

As has been stated previously the various perspectives on evangelization stem from differences in understanding the relationship between the principles of individuality and of community. For supremacism only the principle of individuality is genuinely valid. Therefore, evangelization is a beneficial endeavor only so long as it spreads the view it regards as true. The spread of any other view is seen as the spreading of falsehood and therefore succeeds only in leading people astray without providing any positive possibilities.

On the other hand, since consolidationism recognizes only the principle of community, the distinctions between the faiths are held to be irrelevant; thus all faiths already exist in as unified a state as is possible. Attempts at evangelization will result not in a healthy cross-fertilization, but only in a corruption of religious traditions since each religion is appropriate for its own adherents.

Once again one can see that neither supremacism nor consolidationism can provide any foundation for diversity or dynamism. This is because both fail to recognize the natural relationship between the principles of individuality and community, which is the key insight of Cusa's philosophy and provides the basis for the unique advantages it offers. Because the attempt to preserve only one of these principles inevitably results in the weakening of both, neither a true diversity nor a true dynamism can be established.

Evangelization is seen as not contrary to ecumenism, but in fact, as indispensable thereto. It promotes the very invigorating interaction which each faith requires and benefits the community of faiths as a whole. Evangelization is a loving response overcoming the distinctions between faiths in a manner which allows each to attain and enhance its own unique identity. Authentic Evangelization is not an attempt to subjugate other faiths, or to blur the distinctions between faiths, but an attempt by each faith to give a full and dynamic expression of its beliefs so that all faiths may benefit from its insights.

Interactionism offers an alternative which acknowledges both principles and in so doing establishes the possibility of dynamism and diversity. Taking advantage of Cusa's integration of the principles of individuality and community this perspective realizes the value of each individual view. It recognizes also that the understanding of any individual view requires an understanding of its relation to the rest of the community of faiths and that every faith can potentially learn from the others. Thus, evangelization is seen as indispensable to religious discourse. Only interactionism can preserve both diversity and dynamism in that each group is required to enter into active dialogue with every other group in which each articulates its own unique vision of reality. This interaction not only creates an atmosphere of dynamism, but increases diversity by opening up all the possibilities of cross-fertilization to develop new alternatives and enhance existing ones.

1. Nicholas of Cusa, "De Pace Fidei" in Unity and Reform, John Patrick Dolan, ed. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962), p. 196.

2. Joseph Runzo, "God Commitment & Other Faiths," Faith & Philosophy, V (Oct 1988), 346.

3. Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, E. Graham Waring and F. W. Strothmann, eds. (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing, 1957), p. 12.

4. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics; Vol. I (second half) The Doctrine of the Word of God, G. W. Bromiley and T. J. Torrance eds. (New York: Scribner's, 1956), p. 350.

5. Runzo, p. 348.

6. Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations; Vol. VI (Baltimore: Helion Press, 1969), p. 397.

7. Ibid., p. 391.

8. Runzo, p. 350.

9. Ibid., p. 354.

10. John Hick, Problems of Religious Pluralism (New York: St. Martins Press, 1985), p. 34.

11. Jay Newman, "The Idea of Religious Tolerance," American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1978), 189.

12. Ibid., p. 187.

13. Ibid., p. 189.

14. Nicholas of Cusa, Of Learned Ignorance, Germain Heron, trans. (London: Routledge, Kegan, Paul, 1954), p. 128.

15. Ibid., p. 163.

16. Nicholas of Cusa "De Pace Fidei" in Unity and Reform, p. 216.

17. Ibid., p. 197.

18. Ibid., p. 199.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., p. 204.

21. Ibid., p. 205.

22. Ibid., p. 198.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., p. 197.

25. Ibid., p. 232.