Social ethics raises important methodological questions for moral theology or Christian ethics. This paper will consider three such questions: 1) What is the source, or what are the sources, of ethical wisdom for the Christian ethicist? 2) How does the moral theologian use the Scriptures? 3) What questions does social ethics raise for the so-called traditional natural law theory in Catholic moral theology?

SOURCES OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS

The question of the source or sources of ethical wisdom for the Christian ethicist has generally been phrased in this way: Is there a source of ethical wisdom existing apart from the explicit revelation of God in Christ in the Scriptures? Catholic moral theology has answered the question in the affirmative with its teaching on natural law. However, the distinction between nature and supernature as found in most Catholic theological manuals appears today to be woefully inadequate. Nature and supernature are not two layers that can be totally separated one from another. The inadequacy and misleading character of this distinction between nature and supernature calls for a theological recasting of the natural law theory. In this work of recasting it should be kept in mind that the natural law theory did have the merit of recognizing the existence of ethical wisdom apart from the explicit revelation of God in the Scriptures. Some forms of Protestant ethics have denied the existence of ethical wisdom and knowledge apart from the Scriptures, in fact, traditionally the emphasis in Protestant theology has been in that direction. The sola Scriptura notion, if pushed to an extreme, denies the existence of ethical wisdom apart from the Scriptures. Stress on sin and the corruption of sin leaves little or no room for a source of ethical wisdom existing outside the Scriptures. Without the saving intervention of God in Christ, man is totally under the corrupting force of sin. The Protestant emphasis on justification by faith alone also tends to play down the activity and the work of man.¹

These and other themes have lead to such ethical teachings as the distinction between law and gospel, and the two realms or two kingdoms theory. Law has the primary function of revealing to man his own sinful state; it also has the function of trying to keep sin in check. The corruption of sin is ever present and law serves as a dike trying by coercion to keep sinful man in check. But law or justice in no way points out how the Christian is to act in his daily life.² The two realms or the two kingdoms theory separates man's inner relationship with God from all other political and social relationships in which he is involved. Man's relationship with God is a question of Gospel under the Church. All other social relationships are governed by the law and have no relationship to the gospel and God. The two realm theory thus separates man's daily life in the world from the gospel and from man's relationship to God in Christ.³

Reinhold Niebuhr has sharply criticized such an ethical approach. "By thus transposing an `inner' ethic into a private one and making the `outer' or `earthly' ethic authoritative for government, Luther achieves a curiously perverse social morality. . . . He demands that the state maintain order, without too scrupulous a regard for justice; yet he asks suffering and nonresistant love of the individual, without allowing him to participate in the claims and counter-claims which constitute the stuff of social justice."⁴

Today the older Protestant positions are being abandoned, and there seems to be a growing consensus favoring the existence of what John C. Bennett has called "common ground morality."⁵ Both practical and theoretical reasons arising from social ethics have shown the need for a common ground morality existing apart from the explicit revelation of God in the Scriptures. In a pluralistic society, Christians must act with others for the good of society and of the entire human race, even though these others do not share the Christian beliefs. The race and the peace movements in the United States have shown that Christians and nonChristians share very similar viewpoints on many important social questions. The very fact that Christians constitute a minority of the world's population implies the need for cooperation with others if conditions in our modern world are to be changed. Christians share with many non-Christians identical views on the need to overcome world poverty, the elimination of discrimination, and the protection of the rights of individuals. Life in a pluralistic society shows both the need and the possibility of a source of ethical wisdom existing outside the explicit revelation of the Scriptures.

Theoretical reasons for the existence of a source of ethical wisdom outside the explicit revelation of God in the Scriptures stem from the insufficiencies of the Scriptures, the realization that Christianity must have positive meaning for man and the world, and the very complexity of modern social problems. The Scriptures themselves are limited in many ways. The historical and cultural circumstances reflected in the Scriptures differ considerably from contemporary circumstances. Occasionally, the Scriptural teaching is now seen to be merely the incorporation of a very culturally determined concept, e.g., the inferiority of women. The prohibitions of oath taking and of interest taking, and the relationship of master to slave all raise important questions about the understanding of these things in our contemporary society. The moral teaching of the scriptures frequently is seen primarily in the light of individual relationships.

Social ethics raises vexing problems of a very complicated nature which require more than general admonitions. The Scriptures give little concrete help for the contemporary problems of sharing the wealth of creation in a more equitable manner, creating a community of nations, controlling populations, providing adequate medical care for all men, evaluating the right of man to make genetic mutations, etc. The insufficiencies of the Scriptures in the area of social ethics are apparent. The Christian ethicist finds a theological basis for such ethical wisdom existing apart from the Scriptures, especially in the notions of creation and incarnation.

That there is a source of ethical wisdom which is shared by all men has important ramifications for methodology in moral theology. On the one hand, there are a plurality of ways into the ethical problem; on the other hand, not all of Christian morality can be reduced to merely a specifically Christian concept. In the terminology employed by William Frankena and followed by Paul Ramsey any form of mere agapism is not sufficient,⁶ that is, agape or whatever is chosen as the distinctive aspect of Christian ethics is not the only source of ethical wisdom for the Christian. Mixed agapism realizes the existence of ways into the ethical problem for the Christian which are other than the distinctively Christian aspects found in the Scriptures and referred to as agape or koinonia. Social ethics points up this insufficiency of any love monism, and underlines the fact that one cannot reduce all moral theology to one distinctively Christian aspect.

The complexity of problems in social ethics not only calls for a source of ethical wisdom apart from the revelation of the Scriptures, but also argues for the need of different starting points in ethics. In this context James Gustafson has pointed out the danger in speaking of principles vs. context, since Christian ethics embraces four different approaches: perceptive analysis of the social situation, theological affirmations, moral principles, and a conception of Christian existence. Although different approaches to Christian ethics will emphasize one of these aspects more than the others, all four approaches need to be present in any adequate Christian ethical methodology.⁷

Today, the statement of the question is significantly shifting. Especially within the context of Protestant theology the question had been: Is there a source of ethical wisdom existing apart from the explicit revelation of the Scriptures? Now the emphasis is more on the secular and the human. Contemporary students of moral theology more often propose the following question: What distinctive element does Christian ethics bring to bear on the social problems facing contemporary man? The question becomes even more acute when one realizes from history that the Roman Catholic Church, for instance, has often seemed to impede true human development and growth.

Christians find themselves frequently agreeing with many non-Christians and disagreeing with fellow Christians on many of the major issues of the day. On particular issues and problems there may be no appreciably different Christian approach. The distinctively Christian aspect above all appears to be a viewpoint or horizon in relation to which the Christian views reality. Creation, sin, redemption, and resurrection destiny made proleptically present in the resurrection of Jesus characterize the Christian view of reality. Human history is viewed in some relationship with the reign of God in Christ. Human history derives its ultimate meaning from such a relationship.

The Christian vision sees present reality and the social structures of society in the light of the reality both of human sinfulness and of the resurrection destiny accomplished first in Christ Jesus. Contemporary theology again stresses eschatology, and realizes that the Christian is now striving to cooperate in the building of the new heaven and the new earth which is ultimately the gift of the Lord of history at the end of time. In the past, Christian theology has used eschatology and its view of the future in such a manner as to deserve the charge of "eschatological irresponsibility" inasmuch as, in the light of future existence, little or no attention was given to the present. However, the reign of God in terms of his eschatological activity is already operative in human existence and going forward to its final stage at the end of time.

A proper understanding of eschatology serves as a criterion by which the Christian realizes the insufficiencies and shortcomings of every human and social structure. Sin and lack of fullness will always mar any human structure. Thus, the Christian vision makes the Christian sensitive to the shortcomings and sinfulness of the present structures and urges him to change those structures. The Christian can never be content with the present, for it always manifests the sinfulness and the limitations of the times in between the two comings of Christ. Thus the Christian is constantly conscious of the need for social reform; he is never willing to absolutize any structure or institution existing in the present. The "eschaton" is here now and pressing forward to the new heaven and new earth, which is God's gift fully to be realized at the end of history.

Emphasis on eschatology has been accompanied by an emphasis on hope and a stress on the future. The God of Israel and the God of the Christians is an Advent God, that is, one who comes. The Christian God is the God of presence and promise. The Christian lives sustained by the hope and the promise of the resurrection. Christians involved in the struggle for social justice and the shaping of a better world will experience

suffering, frustration, and perhaps even death itself, but Christ's resurrection is their hope. The Christian commitment to the world is sustained and carried forward by the hope that despite sin, suffering, and death itself, God will bring to completion the work of building the new heaven and the new earth.

The Christian should view the present social structures of society with an uneasy conscience and realize the need to work to reform them. In hope he commits himself to this task with all the problems inherent in it. Does the Christian vision exhaust itself in this form of negative criticism and in supplying a firm commitment to the work of renewal of social structures? Does Christian ethics have any uniquely positive contribution to make in the constant reform of social structures? I believe that Christian ethics can in a positive way add to the content of social ethics. A Christian formulates social goals which differ from approaches of those who have a mechanistic view of man. Similarly, the Christian vision stresses certain fundamental dispositions which should characterize the person himself. Different norms and directives for action could result from such a different view of man and his goals in society. However, theory and practice indicate that very often the non-Christian and the Christian will come to the same ethical conclusions in questions of social morality. The Christian finds the basis of this similarity in his understanding of creation and the incarnation.

The realization that the Christian shares a great deal of ethical wisdom with all men raises questions not only for the methodology of Christian ethics but also for the approaches of Christian Churches to problems of social ethics. If the Christian Church merely adheres to the Biblical message, it can say nothing meaningful and relevant to a particular moral problem of great import. On the other hand, if the Christian Churches become too specific, too doctrinaire or authoritative on a particular approach to a moral question, they risk separating a member from the Christian community because of reasons that are not peculiarly Christian.⁸

It would seem then that the Christian Churches must speak out on particular moral problems facing society, but with the realization that a detailed approach is but one Christian approach to the question, and this appears to be the solution most in keeping with the contemporary understanding of the Christian message. The Christian Churches thus have a two-fold mission: to preach the basic moral message of change of heart and also to advocate those changes of structure in society which enable men to live a more human life in this world. In tension-filled times there is a danger that the Christian Church might forget one of the two functions that it should serve today. The central moral message of conversion embraces not only the need to change men's hearts, but also the need to change the structures of society.

MORAL THEOLOGY AND THE SCRIPTURES

Social ethics also raises for moral theology the methodological question of the role and function of the Scriptures. In general, Catholic theology has been criticized justly for not sufficiently emphasizing the Scriptural aspect in its moral theology. The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World tries to give a specifically Christian approach to the various questions treated and constantly emphasizes cosmic redemption as well as creation. William Lazareth is grateful for such an attempt, but still faults the Pastoral Constitution for not always employing such an approach.⁹ However, the question is far from solved by merely saying that Catholic moral theology must be more biblically oriented.

One of the major theological problems today is the question of biblical hermeneutics.¹⁰ How does the Word of God in the Scriptures become meaningful and directive for contemporary man living in such diverse historical and cultural circumstances? In addition to the general hermeneutical problem, there is a specific hermeneutical problem in moral theology. How does the Christian ethicist look at the moral teaching of the Scriptures? In general, I believe that the ethical theory employed by the ethicist definitely colors his view of the moral teaching of the Scriptures.

Philosophical ethics has frequently been divided into the two categories of teleological and deontological ethics. H. Richard Niebuhr has employed the two symbols of man the maker and man the citizen which coincide somewhat with the more technical philosophical distinctions.¹¹ The image of man the maker stresses the goal or the end which man strives to achieve by his actions. Man the maker discovers what is the good and then acts to achieve it. Some philosophers reject such an image precisely because man does not really have this control or the ability to dispose of the ends and means as he sees fit. Thus the political image of man the citizen is more accurate in their estimation than the technical image of man the artisan. The primary question for man is: To what laws should I assent and against which laws should I rebel? The image of man the maker emphasizes the good and what man must do to obtain it. The image of man the citizen emphasizes obedience, law, and duty, for the good is subordinate to the right.

Both models of ethical methodology have been used by Christian ethicians in their approach to the Scriptures. The model of man the maker tends to see in the Scriptures the plan of God for man and the world, and how man is to act in achieving his goal and destiny. The Sermon on the Mount, for example, becomes the plan that points out the good for the Christian who strives to incorporate the ethical directives of the Sermon into his daily life. The Social Gospel School employed such an approach; the same general theme is present in the Biblical ethic proposed by Reinhold Niebuhr.

The model of man the citizen adopts a more prescriptive form of ethics with emphasis on duty, right, and obligation. Existentialist ethics with an emphasis on decision furnishes a good example of an act-deontological theory.¹² The ethics of Rudolf Bultmann well illustrate the model of man the citizen or the deontological approach. Bultmann sees the Scriptures as calling the Christian to make a decision in radical obedience to God.¹³ Some of the neo-Orthodox approaches to ethics with their stress on the transcendence of God also emphasize man's obligation to obey the Divine imperative.¹⁴ However, the approach of some neo-Orthodox theologians also shows the presence of a different ethical model.

H. Richard Niebuhr argues for a third ethical model with emphasis on responsibility. Man the responder, man in dialogue with other men, with his environment, and with his world, corresponds to a more modern view of man as constantly in interaction with others and the world.¹⁵ This position has had a great impact upon Christian ethics in the United States.¹⁶ Niebuhr adopted the image of man the responder for philosophical reasons, but there are other reasons for adopting such an approach in interpreting the ethical teaching of the Scriptures.

The neo-Orthodox approach to the Scriptures contains important elements that favor the ethical image of man the responder. Karl Barth reacted against religion as a creation of man's own needs and desires. Christianity begins not from man's thoughts about God but rather from the revelation of God in the Scriptures. The Scriptures do not reveal a morality, but rather speak about the activity of God in Christ. The Scriptures are not a source book of moral propositions and rules, but the revelation of the activity of the living God. Thus the moral life of man is his response to the person of Jesus, and to the activity of the living God.¹⁷

Perhaps Paul Lehmann best illustrates the approach to the Scriptures in terms of the ethical model of man the responder. Lehmann begins his work by realizing the problem created by the hermeneutical question; he cannot accept a concept of the good as the starting point of Christian ethical reflection. "To put it somewhat too sharply: Christian ethics is not concerned with the good, but with what I as a believer in Jesus Christ and as a member of his Church, am to do. Christian ethics, in other words, is oriented toward revelation and not toward morality."¹⁸ The author of Ethics in a Christian Context also rejects the will of God as the starting point of Christian ethics. "In short, what God requires is meaningless apart from the dynamics of the divine activity, and the dynamics of the divine activity define the context within which `all this commandment' is to `be righteousness for us', indeed, is to be carefully done."¹⁹ The Scriptures tell us what God is doing in the world to make and keep human life more human. The primary question is not: "What does God command?" but, "What does God do?" Again, Christian ethics is concerned with revelation rather than morality; it considers the indicative and not the imperative. In a Christological ethics of messianism it is in the koinonia, the fellowship of the Church, that the individual learns what God is doing to make and keep human life more human. Thus, Lehmann never develops a Biblical ethic as such.

How should moral theology approach the Scriptures? The model of man the responder does seem to be a more congenial approach. The complexity of social ethics argues against the seemingly more simplistic approach to man the maker or man the citizen. Since the cultural and historical circumstances of the Scriptures differ so much from the contemporary situation, it is difficult to see in the light of the Scriptures the good which man should strive for in contemporary social ethics, and how he can best achieve his goals today. The same complexity argues against the use of the model of man the citizen. In addition, a deontological approach tends to play down the creativity and initiative of man which is so characteristic of our ageric society.

There is a danger, however, in insisting upon the model of man the responder to the exclusion of many valuable insights contained in the other models. It seems to me that Paul Lehmann is guilty of such an exclusive emphasis. Man the responder tries to do what is fitting, but such an approach must also see the good and the right in terms of the fitting. Christian ethics is concerned with the imperative as well as the indicative, with morality as well as maturity. Perhaps in the past Christian ethicians did speak too easily and quickly about the good or the right as it was found in the Scriptures, but, on the other hand, ethical discourse cannot continue speaking always and only in the indicative. The Christian is under the imperative to continue in time and space the creating, redeeming, and reconciling activity of God in Christ. What is more, the Scriptures do point out the general characteristics that mark the response of man in all the evolving moments of history. The ethical thrusts of the Scriptural descriptions of the Christian life must be incorporated in any Christian ethic. The Christian ethician seems justified in approaching the Scriptures in terms of the model of man the responder, provided he does not entirely neglect the elements present in the models of man the maker and man the citizen.

The Scriptures cannot be used as proof texts to show that a particular action is always to be done. The complexity of social ethics militates against such a simplistic approach. If the Scriptures and man's understanding of contemporary reality do sensitize him to what God is doing in the world and what response man should make, there still remains the question of how the contemporary Christian knows precisely what God is doing in the world today.

Lehmann emphasizes koinonia as the context in which the Christian comes to know what God is doing in the world. However, Lehmann does not seem to show adequately how the Christian determines what response is fitting in this situation. Perhaps his promised second volume treating of specific issues will shed light on this problem. Another possible approach might be to develop the traditional notion of the discernment of spirits. How does the Christian know what the Spirit is calling him to do in a given situation? Perhaps a fruitful ecumenical dialogue could be held on how the Christian discerns the call of the Spirit in moral judgments.

The model of responsibility and of man the responder also seems to emphasize properly the fact that Christian ethics is a religious ethic. Man acts in response to and through the loving kindness of God in Christ. In the other ethical models there is a danger of forgetting that Christian ethics is ultimately a religious ethic, rather than a mere pelagian effort at self improvement. However, the model of man the responder in interpreting the Biblical ethic will be insufficient if it does not also consider the good and the right. Within the horizon of man as responding to the creative, redeeming, and recreating activity of God in Christ, the Christian tries to understand the good and the right, he tries to be more sensitized in his experience to the action of God in the world in the many complex ways in which such action takes place.

What are the criteria by which the Christian should judge his proper response in building the new heaven and the new earth? In establishing such criteria the ethicist needs the help of common ground morality and philosophical understandings of man and his world. This paper has already pointed out the impossibility of any love monism or of reducing the whole of the ethical question for the Christian to its distinctively Christian aspect. The Scriptures retain a primary place for the Christian ethicist, but the Scriptures without other human wisdom remain inadequate for construing an adequate methodological approach to Christian ethics or moral theology.

INDUCTION, RELATIVITY AND NATURAL LAW

Social ethics also forces the Catholic theologian to re-think the natural law approach of the manuals of theology. The natural law approach rightly emphasizes the goodness of all God's creation, and the existence of moral wisdom apart from the explicit revelation of the Scriptures, but its unreal distinction between nature and supernature cannot be maintained today.

Perhaps the most important point to recall is the fact that there has never been a coherent philosophical theory with an agreed-upon body of content called the natural law which was accepted by the majority of philosophers. It is a gross oversimplification to refer to the natural law as a coherent philosophical system acknowledged by most thinkers, for although many philosophers have employed the term natural law, they do not mean the same thing by the term. There exists a common ground morality which is shared by many men, but no one philosophical system upon whose ethical content most agreed. In general many could agree with the basic tenet of Thomistic natural law which identifies natural law with right reason. However, many would disagree with the philosophical development of that basic insight, and with the ethical conclusions reached by some proponents of Thomistic morality.²⁰

Christian social ethics does raise important methodological questions for the system of natural law as espoused in the manuals of Catholic theology. Perhaps the greatest criticism against natural law theory as proposed by Catholic theologians has centered on the absolute character of such a theory. Today there is a definite tendency to recognize a more relative character to what has been proposed in the name of natural law theory.

The first important aspect contributing to a realization of the more relative character of natural law is the emphasis on history rather than on nature. Nature tends to emphasize the static and unchanging. History emphasizes the dynamic, changing, and evolving. From a philosophical viewpoint, more attention is given to relationships and less to immutable essences. Catholic theology now realizes that many of its conclusions were historically and culturally conditioned realities, not abstract philosophical ideals valid for all times and in all circumstances. The changed approach to religious liberty and Church-State relations indicates this recognition of the historical and the changing. The older theory of Church and State was proposed as an abstract ideal which should be present in all circumstances. The separation of Church and State could be tolerated only in some circumstances. Today, however, Catholic theologians admit that the older teaching on Church and State was not an abstract and absolute philosophical ideal, but a very relative and historically conditioned conclusion. Once the concept of State changed with the modern constitutional governments, the older theory of Church and State was no longer true.²¹ Some Catholic apologetes argue that the prohibition of interest taking was tied to a concept of money which was historically limited and later changed.²² The relativities of history must receive more attention than they do in the manuals of Catholic theology.

Another source of relativity not often considered by natural law theoreticians is the aspect of sin. The sinfulness of man might account for some things which otherwise would not be present. For example, some Catholics have tended to absolutize the notion of private property, but Thomas Aquinas maintained the necessity of private property primarily because of the existence of sin in the world. If there were no private property, then there would be constant unrest in society caused by people struggling to control the better things for themselves.²³ Although Protestant theology has frequently over-emphasized the corruption of sin, Catholic moral theology has generally forgotten human sinfulness. At times some accommodation has to be made because of sin. There is a two-fold danger in forgetting the aspect of sin. Either what was originally proposed as a necessary accommodation because of human sinfulness becomes an absolute in itself and stifles further growth or development as in the case of private property; or one fails to see the necessity for some accommodation here and now because of human sinfulness.

Elsewhere, I have developed the notion of compromise precisely because of the existence of sin in the human situation. This notion of compromise is most important in the area of social ethics.²⁴ Too often today there are no clear-cut alternatives between all good and all evil. Many times the Christian will be forced by circumstances to give his allegiance to movements and programs with which he does not entirely agree. Such compromise or accommodation is most important in our complex society. The Christian cannot afford the luxury of remaining aloof from the struggle precisely because he disagrees with some aspects of a particular program or movement. To be effective in many areas today, one must go along with approaches which seem somewhat deficient but with the hope of influencing and changing the movement or the program from within. To remain aloof and wait for a plan with which one perfectly agrees will only tend to keep the status quo. To change social structures, some accommodation and compromise is necessary. This is especially true in the area of racial inequality, poverty, peace, and inadequate cultural or societal structures.

A third source of relativity in any natural law theory is the Christian understanding of history. There is a connection between the reign of God in Christ and human history. Man is called upon to cooperate in the work of bringing about the new heaven and the new earth. There is some dispute among Christian theologians today about the part of man in bringing about the new heaven and the new earth, but the emphasis is increasingly on the side of man's active participation in building it. Any stage of historical growth is always relativized and transcended by the future destiny. Not only the philosophical emphasis on the importance of history, but the theological understanding of Jesus as the Lord of History, introduce a relativizing factor into natural law theory. The theological doctrines of redemption and resurrection destiny relativize whatever exists at the present moment. Some extreme forms of secular theology have fallen into the same error as the natural law theory of the theology manuals by failing to realize the relativities of the present moment in the light of the full Christian message.

The importance of history also calls for a more inductive methodological approach to ethical questions. Gaudium et Spes, the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, employs a more inductive methodology than any of the previous documents of the hierarchical magisterium on social ethics. The document usually begins its different sections with an analysis of the "signs of the times". Such an approach differs considerably from the textbook approach that generally began with a definition and then deduced conclusions from such an understanding. The more inductive approach calls for a careful analysis of the historical situation before theology can begin to draw any conclusions.

This approach also illustrates the dialogical character of man's search for truth. Vatican II has issued a call for dialogue with many other groups in an attempt to arrive at a better understanding of truth. However, almost all previous statements of the hierarchical magisterium are deficient in this matter. If such statements do not follow the epistemological methodology proposed in some of the documents of Vatican II, then one can more easily question and even object to their conclusions. Too often in the past hierarchical documents have been guilty of most often citing their own predecessors. It would be naive to deny any value at all to past statements and teaching, but in evolving historical conditions a greater attention must be paid to the signs of the times. Progressio Populorum of Paul VI is the first time, to my knowledge, that a Papal encyclical makes specific references to experts writing in their respective fields of competency. Obviously even greater dialogue and exchange will be needed in the future. The theologian will have to be in greater contact with all the human and social sciences.

The more inductive methodology also results in a changed understanding of certitude. In a deductive approach the conclusion is just as certain as the premises, provided the logic is correct. An inductive approach tends to be more tentative and probing. The methodology of Christian ethics cannot be exclusively deductive; in the future, more emphasis must be given to the inductive. No ethical theory in general can ever again claim the great degree of certitude claimed by natural law theory in the past. The emphasis on an inductive approach is more in keeping with the historical and relational understanding of reality.

The complexity of social ethics and the rapidly changing sociological circumstances argue against the emphasis on order that characterizes natural law theory in the manuals of theology. Even the word law itself means above all an ordering. Such natural law theory betrays its Hellenistic roots. The Greek emphasis was on order, stability, and harmony. Today the emphasis is more on change, growth, and development. An emphasis on order frequently tends to perpetuate the status quo and argues against any type of change. The presumption always appears to be in favor of the present order, and there is a danger that such an ethical theory will tend to be reactionary. Order, stability, and harmony cannot become absolutes. In changing situations one may not be sure what precisely will follow, but one cannot wait for absolute certitude about what new order will be brought into existence.

In conclusion, Catholic theologians must acknowledge that there is no monolithic philosophical system called the natural law which is recognized by the majority of philosophers. The very term natural law tends to be misleading, and I would prefer dropping the term itself. Catholic theology can never be tied to any one philosophical understanding of man and his world. A vital Catholic theology will require a plurality of philosophical approaches in the future. This section has pointed out the most important criticisms against the concept of natural law found in the manuals of theology and some statements of the hierarchical magisterium which deal primarily with questions of social ethics. No mention has been made here of the criticisms of natural law thinking as applied in the area of more individual and personal morality, e.g., the identification of a moral action with its external, physical structure. Future approaches to social ethics will have to take cognizance of these criticisms.

The Catholic University of America

Washington, D.C.

l. For a critique of such themes by a Protestant ethician, see James Sellers, Theological Ethics (New York: Macmillan 1968).

2. Martin J. Heinecken, "Law and Gospel," Dictionary of Christian Ethics, ed. John Macquarrie (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1967), pp. 193-195.

3. Roger Mehl, "The Basis of Christian Social Ethics," in Christian Social Ethics in a Changing World, ed. John C. Bennett (New York: Association Press, 1966), pp. 47-50.

4. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, II (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964) , 194-195.

5. John C. Bennett, "Issues for the Ecumenical Dialogue," Christian Social Ethics in a Changing World, p. 337.

6. Paul Ramsey, Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), pp. 117-120. Ramsey maintains that natural law ethics or an ethics based on the orders of creation are the usual examples of mixed agapism although there may be other forms of mixed agapism in which some other type of revealed wisdom is joined with agape.

7. James M. Gustafson, "Context versus Principles: A Misplaced Debate in Christian Ethics," Harvard Theological Review, LVIII (1965), 171-202.

8. Paul Ramsey considers this problem confronting the Churches and their social teachings in: Who Speaks for the Church? (New York and Nashville: Abingdon, 1967).

9. John Reuman and William Lazareth, Righteousness and Society: Ecumenical Dialog in a Revolutionary Age (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967), p. 196.

l0. For a fine summary of the debate in the present century on the hermeneutical problem, see Carl E. Braaten, History and Hermeneutics, New Directions in Theology Today, Vol. II (Philadelphia : Westminster, 1966).

11. H. Richard Niebuhr, The Responsible Self (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 47-56.

12. William K. Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 21.

13. Thomas C. Oden, Radical Obedience: The Ethics of Rudolf Bultmann (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1964).

14. Emil Brunner, The Divine Imperative (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1947).

15. Niebuhr, The Responsible Self, pp. 55ff.

16. See Faith and Ethics: The Theology of H. Richard Niebuhr, ed. Paul Ramsey (New York: Harper and Row, 1957).

17. In the exposition of such an approach to the Scriptures, I am following closely the excellent study of James M. Gustafson, "Christian Ethics," in Religion, ed. Paul Ramsey (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 309-320. However, the criticisms mentioned in the following paragraphs are my own.

18. Paul L. Lehmann, Ethics in a Christian Context (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 45.

19. Ibid., p. 78.

20. This paragraph summarizes conclusions reached in my article, "Absolute Norms in Moral Theology," in Norm and Content in Christian Ethics, ed. Paul Ramsey and Gene Outka (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), pp. 139-173.

21. John Courtney Murray, S.J., "The Declaration on Religious Freedom," Concilium: Moral Theology, V (1966), 3-10.

22. This argument is not entirely accurate according to the findings of an unpublished doctoral dissertation (Catholic University of America) on the origin and early development of the Christian teaching on usury by Robert Maloney, C.M. See also John T. Noonan, Jr., The Scholastic Analysis of Usury (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).

23. Summa Theologiae, IIa IIae, q. 66, a. 2.

24. "Dialogue with Joseph Fletcher," Homiletic and Pastoral Review, LXVII (1967), 827-829.