CHAPTER I 

THE OBJECTIVIST/RELATIVIST DICHOTOMY:

THE HABERMASIAN ALTERNATIVE

 

          In a major work, Beyond Objectivism and Rela­tiv­ism,[i] Richard J. Bernstein examines in a charac­teristically lucid manner the vital direction of main­stream contemporary philos­ophy, which he sees, on the one hand, as consisting in a move from the fallibility of the so-called "myth of the given," charac­ter­is­tic of objectivism, and from the paradoxes of the so-called "myth of the framework," character­istic of relativism,[ii] on the other, toward "the prac­tical task of furthering the type of solidarity, par­ticipation, and mutual recognition that is found­ed in dialogical com­munities."[iii] In a word Bernstein's work reflects an at­tempt to analyze a new understand­ing of rationality that is emerg­ing in what has been la­beled "post-epistemological philosophy," a species of "post-modernist thought," which turns from a preoc­cupation with securing ultimate foun­dations for knowledge toward a con­sider­ation of practical ques­tions of a moral, social and political sort.

          The importance of Bernstein's analysis consists in putting its "finger on the vital pulse of contem­porary intellectual life"[iv] by rais­ing the question of whether there are any theoretical universals, practi­cal norms, and/or evaluative standards which the human mind may apprehend beyond purely local con­texts? Indeed, Bernstein's criticism of the classic dichotomy between objectivism and relativism and of his pro­posed alternative represents, philosophically speaking, a domi­nant orientation of the current philosophical consciousness and, as such, offers an excellent context from which to situate the work of Jürgen Habermas. What follows, then, is (A) a reconstruction of Bernstein's argu­ment, including his practical proposal with respect to the stated dichoto­my. From this context (B) the philosophy of eman­cipation, specifi­cally the theory of communicative action, of Jürgen Habermas[v] will be intro­duced as a theoretical alter­native to Bern­stein's position. This will provide a framework for clarifying (C) the projected contribu­tion of this study.

BERNSTEIN'S PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVE

          Bernstein's argument proceeds in three phases: (1) a clarifica­tion both of the terms of the dichoto­my and of the vital existential concern that lies at the root of Cartesian foundationalism; (2) a pro-posed dissolu­tion of the objec­tivist/relativist dichotomy by means of Gadamer's philo­sophi­cal hermeneutics as a successor-disci­pline to modern foundationalist epistemology, beginning with the recovery of the hermeneutical dimension in the natural and social scienc­es; and (3) Bernstein's proposed correction of certain limitations of philo­sophical hermeneu­tics by means of praxis, a mode of practical rationality signi­fied by the beyond in the expression "beyond objectivism and relativ­ism."

          The first phase of Bernstein's analysis consists in an elucidation of the terms of the dichotomy. With respect to the first term, he states,

          By "objectivism," [or the "myth of the giv­en"] I mean the basic conviction that there is or must be some permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can ulti­mately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, good­ness or rightness. . . . Objectivism is closely related to foundationalism and the search for an Archimedean point. The objectivist main­tains that unless we ground philosophy, knowledge, or language in a rigor­ous manner we cannot avoid radical skepticism.[vi]

"Objectivism," as Bernstein uses it here, covers both the traditional notion of "objectivism," viz., "the claim that there is a world of objec­tive reality that exists independent­ly of us and that has a determinate nature that we can know";[vii] and the modern notion of "foundational­ism," viz., "the conviction that the philosopher's quest is to search for an Archime­dean point upon which we can ground our knowledge."[viii]

          This object­ivist orientation, then, encompasses the dominant West­ern philosophical traditions both classical, including the meta­physical realism represented by Platonism and Aristotelianism; and modern, in­cluding the epistemolo­gical foundationalism represented by continental rationalism, British empiricism, German transcendental­ism/idealism, logical positivism, ana­lytic philosophy, and phenomeno­logy. The dichot­omy then is no longer between a version of realism and/or one or anoth­er version of foundatio­nalism, say between Aristo­telianism and logical positivism, but, rather, between any objectivist position, following Berns­tein's usage, that claims-‑with some degree of certainty‑-to comprehend what-is sub ratio­ne aeternitatus and rela­tivism itself.[ix]

          With respect to the second term, Bernstein clarifies,

          In its strongest form, relativism [or the "myth of the frame­work"] is the basic conviction that when we turn to the examination of those concepts that philosophers have taken to be the most fundamental-‑whether it is the con­cept of rationality, truth, reality, right, the good, or norms‑-we are forced to recognize that in the final analy­sis all such con­cepts must be understood as relative to a specific conceptu­al scheme, theoreti­cal framework, para­digm, form of life, a society, or culture. Since the relati­vist believes that there is (or can be) a nonreducible plurality of such concep­tual schemes, he or she challeng­es the claim that these concepts can have a determinate and univocal significance.[x]

          Before moving to a dissolution of the perennial dichoto­my, Berns­tein acknowledges that the dichotomy is itself grounded and animated, particularly as formulated in moder­nity, by the Cartesian quest for ulti­mate foundations. Far from consisting in a trivial pur­suit, it under­scores a vital existential concern expressed in a radical "Ei­ther/ Or­"­:  "Either there is some support for our being, a fixed foun­dation for our knowledge, or we cannot escape the forces of darkness that envelop us with madness, with intellectual and moral chaos."[xi]  However, given the critique of this dichotomy by philosoph­ical herme­neutics, Bernstein argues against its viability, contending that: "We need to exorcize the Cartesian Anxiety and liberate our­selves from its seduc­tive appeal."[xii]

         The second phase of the argument turns to certain developments in the philosophies of science and of the social sciences, both of which raise, though independently, serious ques­tions concerning the efficacy of the rationality model inherent in Carte­sian foundationalism, while recovering a hermeneutical understanding of these sciences that, purportedly, render a more accurate description of the actual practice of natural and social scientists.[xiii] In this respect Bernstein examines stud­ies in the philosophy of science by authors such as Thomas Kuhn[xiv] in order to show how his The Structure of Scientific Revolu­tions[xv] may be read as a work that implicitly makes use of her­me­neu­tic themes. They are employed in order to understand the nature of the rationality that unfolds de facto in the dis­putes between propo­nents of rival paradigms when normal science under­goes a revolution­ary crisis leading to the adoption of a new paradigm.[xvi] The point here is that against the foundationalist claims of positivism or logical empiricism the resolution of rival para­digm theories cannot be derived by an appeal to a single canonical fram­ework of deductive logic or proof, nor by an appeal to observation, verification, confirmation, or falsifi­cation. The nature of scientific inqui­ry, as it is actually prac­ticed, argues against the view that the appropria­tion of a new para­digm follows from the application of fixed, a priori, logical or eviden­tial criteria that can be invoked in order to adjudicate between rival para­digms. Actual practice argues, instead, for the view that the appropria­tion of a novel paradigm involves, on the part of the inquir­er, a "ges­talt" experience, i.e., a "conversion" experience wherein one comes to see the world dif­ferently. It is crucial, however, to empha­size that though Kuhn here is arguing against fixed objectivist posi­tions, he is equally against irration­alism in scientific inquiry; his intent is to show a more open, flexible, and historically oriented un­derstanding of scien­tific inquiry as a rational activity.[xvii] He is not suggesting that there is no scientific progress but that "we need to transform both our under­standing of scientific inquiry and our concept of rationality."[xviii]

            With respect to the philosophy of the social sci­ences, there has been a break with the view that the only scientific proce­dure produc­tive of true knowledge is that pursued by natural science, such that if the social sciences intend to be scientific, they must conform to the method­ologi­cal canons of natural science. Together with this liber­a­tion from the strictures of scientism, social philosophers have sought the best way to understand non-Western, alien cultures.[xix] Peter Winch, in The Idea of a Social Science,[xx] maintains that social life is a form of rule following activity with its own internal rationality such that it would be mistaken to project one evaluative standard, say a West­ern one, when examining the practices, customs, rituals, myths and be­liefs of a non-Western culture.[xxi] Though, initially Winch may appear to be simply questioning the validity of Western rationality as it is typi­cally practiced, his concern is deeper. Indeed, at the core of Winch's inves­ti­gations is the problem of "the best way to understand and inter­pret different cultures and societies so that we can learn from them."[xxii]  Winch thus pursues a mode of practical rationality, a form of wisdom, whereby social scientists may come to grasp the significa­tion of alien practices and institutions in a manner that sensitizes them to the use­ful­ness and/or pointlessness of Western practices, norms and institu­tions.[xxiii]

            Three crucial similarities, then, obtain between Kuhn and Winch: (a) their common repudiation of overarching metalanguages whose func­tion consist in imposing worldviews instead of being open to them; (b) their contention that the lack of an overarching conceptu­al scheme does not entail the view that no comparison may be made between different conceptual schemes, frameworks, paradigms, forms of life; and (c) their common concern in articulating a non-foundation­alist mode of rationality that, respecting pluralism and not terminating in relativism, would be best suited to the task of initiating, sustaining and perpetuating open dialogue in view of broadening horizons when encountering different conceptual schemes, paradigms or forms of life.       Bernstein understands the philosophical or ontological herme­neu­tics of Hans-Georg Gadamer as developed in his Truth and Meth­od[xxiv] as most closely reflecting the mode of post-Cartesian rationality emerging in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of the social sciences, as evident in the work of authors such as Kuhn and Winch. Ontological her­meneutics here is understood to consist in three inter­nally related moments: understanding (subtilitas intelligendi), interpre­tation (subtilitas explicandi), and application (subtilitas applicandi).[xxv] The first two ele­ments serve as a critique of the Cartesian dichotomy. The third element more clearly develops the mode of post-Cartesian rationality in question.

          With respect to the critique of Cartesian rationality, Gadamer views the Cartesian antithesis between objectivism and relativism as an ontological distortion of the signification of Dasein as "being-in-the-world."[xxvi]  The radical nature of Cartesian subjectivity effects an artifi­cial split between the integration that naturally occurs between the self from its dynamic interaction with objects. Gadamer sees this as an ontological misunderstanding of the nature of being-in-the-world and as responsible for the notion of a Cartesian transhistorical ratio­nality, in­cluding: (a) its emphasis on bracketing prejudice/judgment so as to achieve pure self-transparency, (b) its claim that human error depends solely on the misuse of the cognitive/volitional faculties, (c) its stress on following predetermined rules and method so as to in­crease knowledge, and (d) its claim that reason alone justifies knowl­edge claims (while skeptically regarding avowals based on an appeal to the senses or on former opin­ions, prejudices, tradition and authori­ty).

           Employing the hermeneutical elements of understanding and inter­pretation, Gadamer counters that reason is histori­cally situated such that one is undeniably possessed, as it were, as a condition of human finitu­de, by language and tradition before these are possessed by one. Yet what is distinctive in Gadamer is that the historical and fallible character of reason does not entail relativism; much the con­trary, he argues that it is precisely by means of one's language and traditions that the herme­neutical insight‑‑understanding, interpretation, application‑-is realized. Accordingly, against the Cartesian notion of a self rooted in radical subjectivity, Gadamer argues that the notion of play, "the clue to onto­logical explanation,"[xxvii] represents the crucial interplay, the to- and fro movement, a type of participation, a dynamic interaction between sub­jects and objects, where the players are not so much the subjects of the play but, rather, are themselves absorbed and drawn by the dynamics of the play wherein hermeneutical understand­ing is achieved.[xxviii] Gadamer characterizes this dynamic interaction that draws and absorbs as the "law of the subject matter," meaning that it is in the very nature of a topic about which one reflects or discusses to provide, in a manner of speak­ing, guidance.[xxix] Secondly, against the notion of bracketing, Gadamer denies that one can or should sus­pend one's pre­judices,[xxx] given that the happening of under­stand­ing[xxxi] occurs precisely by means of the experi­ence of dialogical en­counter. In such engagements the participants play off one another, risking and testing their prejudices, whether personal or as derived from institutions of authority and tradition,[xxxii] against the "things them­­selves," i.e., that about which they intend to come to an understand­ing. By such reciprocal testing, what is initially alien has the effect of making claims on the participants such that resultant from the interac­tion between prejudices against the "things themselves" one comes to distinguish those interpretations that are enabling, i.e., justi­fied, from those that are blind, i.e., unjustified.[xxxiii] Thirdly, against the notion of self-trans­parency, Gadamer denies that there is some meaning in itself that can be separated from our prejudices such that "'und­erstanding must be conceived as part of the process of the com­ing into being of mean­ing'. Meaning is always coming into being through the 'happen­ing' of understanding."[xxxiv]  Fourthly, against the Cartesian stress on method, Gadamer rather emphasizes the "to and fro," the constant movement toward self-consciousness, given that the process of under­standing consti­tutes the fundamental motion of being-in-the-world; though final closure is never achieved, nothing is in prin­ciple beyond the scope of under­stan­ding.[xxxv]

          The notion of application, the third hermeneutical element, is crucially significant given that the manner in which Gadamer under­stands this term provides the key for Bernstein's clarification of the nature of the emerging post-Cartesian mode of rationality. By means of the no­tion of application, Gadamer connects his ontological herme­neutics with the classical tradition of practical philosophy, par­ticularly as developed by Aristotle in his notion of praxis and phronésis. Un­derstanding is a form of phronésis,[xxxvi] i.e., a form of practical wis­dom, consisting in a mode of reasoning involving a distinctive media­tion between the univer­sal and the particular, where the mediation is not achieved by the application of a fixed set of rules or method. Said another way, phronésis is an intellectual virtue generative of ethical knowledge in which the universal and the particular are co-deter­mined. The crucial point for Gadamer is that the choice and the delib­eration charac­teristic of phronésis is not merely limited to ethical discourse. In fact, this mode of rationali­ty obtains in all forms of reasoning concerned with de­ciding between variable situations and differ­ing opinions‑‑­as occurs when confronted with differing para­digms or forms of life‑-where no one algo­rithm or set of rules may be invoked as final arbitrator. The adjudica­tion of such cases requires the mode of thought characteristic of phroné­sis-‑practical rationality, judgment, wisd­om‑-consisting in the ability to render an interpretation and specification of universals that are appropri­ate to the particular situation. In this sense the rationality characteristic of theory-choice between differing paradigms and the eval­uation of differing forms of life may be conceived in terms of a judg­mental activity, wherein reasons may be proffered in support, but never as decisive proof, of one or another interpretation. Typically, for in­stance, in the natural sciences, the determination between conflicting paradigms emerges as a result of further scien­tific inquiry, where greater support accumu­lates in favor of one of the conceptual schemes.

          A related theme that arises from Gadamer's analysis of phroné­sis, as it relates to the hermeneutical element of application concerns itself with the manner in which understanding itself consti­tutes the praxis of a moral agent.[xxxvii] This means that "the happen­ing of under­standing" for the human person qua ethical agent is not mere­ly a matter of theoretical interest, given that one must regularly apply universal ethical knowledge to the concrete situations of one's life. To the extent that Gadamer views understanding as signifying the pri­mordial mode of the being of Dasein, understanding becomes integral to the very being of the person insofar as it is capable of transforming what one is in the process of becoming. By means of the her­meneuti­cal atti­tude of openness, the human person is in position to undergo the expe­rience of understanding wherein one tests and either validates or invali­dates previously held prejudices, confirming and appropriating insights that in turn‑‑and this is the crucial point here‑-can serve as decisive factors in determining one's ethical outlook. The effect of having under­gone the event of adjusting and enlarg­ing one's own horizons would ideally favor responsible ethical action and foster greater human solidari­ty. Indeed, Gadamer's attempt to recover the older tradition of practical philosophy is prompted as an all-important correction of what many view as the most profound problem of the modern world, viz., the deformation of the notion of praxis so that it comes to signify the application of science to technical tasks in such a manner as to obviate the realm of moral deliberation, decision and re­sponsibility.[xxxviii]

          This said, Bernstein notes two significant shortcomings directed against both the theoretical and the practical dimension of Gadamer's ontological hermeneutics.[xxxix] With respect to the more theoretical as­pect, Gadamer incorporates features of the Hegelian and Heideggerian notion of truth, not as correspondence (adequatio intellectus et rei), but rather as that which emerges in a process of unconcealment in the dialogical encounter with tradition, in which prejudgments are distin­guished as justified or unjustified. To the extent that the reasons that are advanced in support of one's interpreta­tions are always fallible and anticipatory, the Gadamerian notion of truth comes to signify that which can be argu­menta­tively validated by a community of interpret­ers.[xl] Yet, if the em­phasis on the validation of claims involves putt­ing forth convincing arguments and reasons, the question then be­comes what criterion informs one's judgment so as to serve as the basis for distinguishing between what interpretations are warranted or unwarranted, valid or invalid, in a living tradition.[xli] Bernstein takes issue with Gadamer on this point and argues that a crucial weakness in his position consists in his lack of a form of argumentation that would serve to indicate what counts as good versus inadequate reasons insofar as the validation of truth claims is concerned. With respect to the more practical aspect, Bernstein contends that, though Gadamer maintains that the great danger for contemporary society lies in the deformation of praxis, he provides no "detailed under­standing of how power as domination (Her­rschaft) . . . operates in the modern world"; he develops no "systematic analysis of the social struc­ture and causes of the deformation of praxis."[xlii]

          Notwithstanding these limitations, in the third and final phase of his argument, Bernstein underscores the profound ramifications of Gada­mer's hermeneutical comprehen­sion of understanding as the pri­mordial mode of the being of Dasein. Firstly, he critiques both the ahist­oric notion of reason, which animates the objectivist claim, and the notion of radical incommensurability between conceptual schemes, which animates the relativist claim. Instead he argues for a concep­tion of reason that, while historic and fallible, is capable of undergo­ing the "happening of under­standing."[xliii]  Indeed Gadamer elaborates a mode of rationali­ty that clari­fies the process of weighing and medi­ating between alterna­tive conceptu­al schemes so as to promote com­munica­tion and compara­tive analyses among adherents of alien hori­zons, paradigms, forms of life, that, al­though finite, changing and ‑‑possibly‑-incommensurate, are, nonetheless accessible, open and public. This mode of thought endeavors to develop the linguistic and experiential resources that better enable one to compre­hend alien phenomena so as to understand and learn from the limita­tions and prejudices of one's own conceptual schemes without imposing distor­tive preconceptions.

          Secondly,