Stephen K. White, in a significant publication,[i] defines Habermas's practical "discourse," i.e., dialogical, "discur­sive," or "com­municative" ethics, as

         . . . a formalistic ethics "that consistently works out the independent logic [Eigensinn] of normative questions:" that is, "that works out the idea of jus­tice."  Such an ethics sharply distinguishes "moral questions which, under the aspect of universaliza­tion or justice, can in principle be decided rational­ly, from evaluative questions . . . which present themsel­ves under their most general aspect as ques­tions of the good life, and which are accessible to a rational discussion only within the horizon of a historically concrete life form or individual life history."[ii]

In this respect, discourse ethics endeavors to justify actions in terms of valid norms and to warrant such norms in function of principles worthy of recognition.[iii] This definition presents then the critical fea­tures of discourse ethics, viz.: (a) that such an ethics is deontological insofar as it conceives the rightness of regulative speech acts, i.e., of norms and commands, in a manner analogous with the truth of an assertoric state­ment;[iv] (b) that it is cognitivist in that it "must answer the question of how to justify normative state­ments";[v] (c) that it is formalist in that it employs "a principle of justification that tests the validity and invalidity of norms in terms of their universalizability";[vi] and (d) that it is univer­salist in that such an ethics "alleges that this principle (or a similar) moral principle, far from reflecting the intu­itions of a particular culture or epoch, is valid universally."[vii]  To understand such an ethics it is im­perative that one be clear in what is involved in "working out the idea of justice."[viii]

               Insofar as Habermas proposes a for­malistic concep­tion of ethics, it merits comparison with the classic expression of formal­istic ethics, viz., Kantian deontological ethics. First, Habermas opposes Kant's un­bridgeable dichotomy between the noumenal and phenomenal realm, for Habermas's rational reconstructions involve a certain inter­play between cognition and experience. Second, though both Kant's and Habermas's ethics are dedicated to the proposition that valid normative claims proceed from the application of a formal principle of fairness or impartiality, they differ with respect to its formulation and the manner of its applicability. Hence, where Kant's ethical principle, the "categorical imper­ative," involves a formal test pursued within a monological framework; for Habermas the principle of universalization involves a formal test pursued within a dialogical framework. Kant's normative maxims of action are derived from an autonomous will in abstraction from the moral relationships of communicating individuals, wherein a singular moral agent considers a possible act by inquiring as to whether it could be proposed as a univer­sal law. Habermas's principle of universalization, however, argues that regulative norms cannot be settled monologically, but must be understood as the prod­uct of practical discourse. In this all subjects potentially affected by the proposed norm determine its fairness and impartiality for the satis­faction of needs and interests.[ix] Another difference is that whereas Kantian ethics excludes all motives except rational will when consid­ering the universal validity of a proposed norm, discourse ethics con­siders precisely the universality of particular desires, needs and incli­nations which nonetheless can make a claim to normative legiti­macy only insofar as they are capable of meeting the test of generalizability of interests as demanded by the principle of universalization.[x]

               Habermas articulates the principle of universalization in the fol­lowing terms:

         All affected can accept the consequences and the side ef­fects its general observance can be anticipat­ed to have for the satisfaction of everyone's inter­ests (and these conse­quences are preferred to those of known alternative possi­bilities for regulation).[xi]

Habermas often refers to this formal rule as a "bridging principle" inso­far as it can be understood to serve the analogous function of a canon of induction that spans the gap in theoretical discourse between particular observations and general hypotheses.[xii] In practical dis­course the princi­ple of universalization proposes to regulate argumen­ta­tion "among the plurality of participants" while suggesting "the perspective of real-life argumentation"[xiii] in a manner that categorical­ly excludes as invalid those norms that fail to attain "the unqualified assent of all who are or might be affected by it."[xiv]  Accordingly, the principle of universaliza­tion provides a certain guarantee that the norms that emerge as valid within the context of practical discourse will be only those that express a gener­al will.[xv] As a bridging princi­ple it endeavors to make consen­sus possi­ble amid a pluralism of views. On the other hand, the principle needs to be understood as radically distinguishing evalua­tive from norma­tive questions.

         If we define practical issues as issues of the good life, which invariably deal with the totality of a particular form of life or the totality of an in­dividu­al life history, then ethical formalism is incisive in the literal sense. The uni­versalization principle acts like a knife that makes razor-sharp cuts between evaluative statements and strictly nor­mative ones, between the good and the just.[xvi]

In this sense, "Practical discourse is a procedure for testing the validi­ty of hypothetical norms, not for producing justified norms"[xvii] such that rational will-formation can be realized independently of dogmatic creeds and ultimate foundations.

               Hans Albert, however, issues a serious objection against all at­tempts to provide justification for moral principles that claim univer­sal validity. He argues that such moves involve the cognitivist in a Münchhausen trilemma, consisting of three equally unacceptable alter­natives, viz.: (a) putting up with an infinite regress, (b) arbitrarily breaking off the chain of deduction, and (c) making a circular argument.[xviii] Habermas's defense consists in arguing for a distinction between a deductive concept of justification wherein the relationship between deductive statements proceeds in function of logical inference and principles of univer­salization that serve to link the logical space in nondeduc­tive relations. Habermas states,

         The status of this trilemma, however, is problemat­ic. It arises only if one presupposes a semantic concept of justification that is oriented to a deduc­tive relationship between statements and based solely on the concept of logical inference. This deductive concept of justification is obviously too narrow for the exposition of the pragmatic relations between argumentative speech acts. Principles of induction and universalization are introduced as rules of argumenta­tion for the sole purpose of bridging the logical gap in nondeductive relations. Accordingly, these bridging principles are not sus­ceptible to deductive justification, which is the only form of justification allowed by the Münchhausen trilemma.[xix]

               Habermas credits Karl-Otto Apel with developing a metacri­tique to fallibilism and a refutation to the challenge of the Münchhau­sen trilemma by reviving a transcendental mode of justification that supports a nondeductive basis of practical discourse. The performative contradiction is a crucial component of Apel's mode of argumentation, which "occurs when a constative speech act R(p) rests on non­contingent presuppositions whose pressuppositional content contradicts the asserted proposition p."[xx]  The effectiveness of this contradiction consists in its response to a consistent fallibilist who in his opposition to any attempt to ground moral principles makes use of any one or all three of the equally unacceptable alternatives of the Münchhausen trilemma. The performative contradiction counters that the opponent, indeed, assumes, at the very least, the validity of that minimal set of logical rules that are essential for establishing his argument as a refu­tation against the proponent's attempt to justify ethical principles. The contradiction then consists in that in the very act of engaging in argu­mentative, rational exchange the fallibilist commits himself to a mini­mal number of necessary rules of criticism that turn out to be incom­patible with the principle of fallibilism. Habermas indicates: 

         The proponent asserts the universal validity of the principle of universalization. He is contradicted by an opponent relying on the Münchhausen trilemma. On the basis of this trilemma the opponent con­cludes that attempts to ground the universal validity of prin­ciples are meaningless. This the opponent calls the principle of fallibilism. But the opponent will have involved himself in a performative contra­diction if the proponent can show that in making his argument, he has to make assumptions that are inevitable in any argument game aiming at critical examination and that the propositional content of those assumptions contradicts the principle of falli­bilism.[xxi]

               The question, however, which may be raised for discourse ethics, indeed for any formalistic ethics, pertains to the sufficiency of its formal principle for the adjudication of norms whose application nonetheless aims at addressing particular circumstances. As a species of postconventional ethics, Habermas's discourse ethics purports to provide, notwith­standing its formalistic orientation, "a form of con­strained inde­terminateness"[xxii] which endeavors to counter the charge that such an ethics is without substantial principles for the determina­tion of just/right/proper versus unjust/wrong/improper human action in concrete situations. In support of the principle of universalization, Habermas develops the notion of constrained indeterminateness in terms of a two­fold argument:  the first stage concerns itself with drawing out the implica­tions of the obligations of reciprocity found in speech acts; and the second stage concentrates on the formal condi­tions of discur­sive argu­mentation, i.e., the ideal speech situation. What follows consists in a consideration of each of these stages with the object of better assessing the nature of the con­straints offered by Habermas in defense of the principle of universalization and in oppo­sition to the charge of normative vacuity.

               Habermas derives two ethical constraints or basic principles of morality from the structure of communicative action, i.e., from the immanent speech-act obligation of reciprocity. The first refers to the reciprocal obliga­tion upon speakers to justify rationally, if chal­lenged, the claims implicitly or explicitly raised in their speech-act interac­tions. The coordination of social behavior and convention may be understood as occurring within the background of mutually recognized norms and values, institu­tions, rules and conventions that are naively accepted and assumed in the sense that their appropriation does not usually result from empirical testing. Typically, the pragmatic rela­tion­ship that the speaker intends to establish with another depends on wheth­er the performative component meets or fails to meet the hear­er's expec­tations. In the event that the speaker fails to meet such expectations, he can satisfy the challenge only by indicating relevant norms or by clarify­ing misunderstanding. Indeed, a fundamental fea­ture of discourse action is that dialogical agents in interaction proceed on the basis of a mutual supposition of accountabi­lity. This means that what is proposed by a speak­er to a hearer is what he authentically intends to communicate and that the speaker is prepared, if need be, to provide grounds for the problematicized claim. A speaker can there­fore rationally motivate a hearer to accept an offer because it is ex­pected that a speaker is prepared to redeem his claim if need be.

               This obligation to provide justifications operates as an ethical constraint in the sense that it may be directed against all noncogniti­vist positions. These argue that one may opt to engage in strategic versus communicative forms of action in a manner that does not oblige those so inclined to provide rational grounds for their speech proposals. Habermas counters that the noncognitivist position as con­ceived by a skeptic, such as a first-person dictator and a systematic rider, incurs in a performative contradiction. White articulates the nature of this contradiction in the passage that follows:

         A contradiction occurs because the speech act in which he announces his refusal "rests on non-con­tingent (thus in given contexts unavoidable) presup­positions whose propositional content contradicts the proposi­tional content of the speech act itself". . . . [The obligation to provide justification in dis­course action] is one which every actor has "implic­itly recognized," simply by virtue of having en­gaged in discourse action.[xxiii]

In this respect it is not possible for a noncognitivist to relinquish in communicative action with its concomitant obligation to provide grounds without "throwing his rationali­ty radically into doubt."[xxiv]

               A second constraint implied in speech acts consists in the reci­procity entailed between dialogical partners such that an agent who makes a normative proposal to another must not only be in a position to provide grounds for his offer but must also be ready and willing to extend its applicability so as to include himself. If the relationship between the speaker and hearer involves unequal roles, such as that of an employer and an employee, whatever norms the employer issues to his subordinate must be the same norms that the employer would be willing to apply to himself consistently if the roles between the two reversed. In this respect, the speech-act immanent obligation involves an implicit constraint for proponents of norms to act in accordance with the norms they advance or at least to be willing to act according­ly in the event that circumstances warrant such applicability. Thus, one who engages in discourse action must be prepared to provide justification for speech acts and, in the case of normative proposals, also be ready to apply reciprocally the norms proposed.

               After considering the reciprocity constraints involved in speech acts, the question becomes how can one distinguish between the relative defensibility of a norm as more or less meriting discursive consent. In this respect the obligation to offer reasons for normative proposals leads to a consideration of the formal instrument in function of which norms are to undergo discursive scrutiny. Thus, the ideal speech situation, signifying the unavoidable, pragmatic conditions of argumentation, serves to indicate still another constraint operative in practical discourse. In­deed, Habermas understands the ideal speech situation as the normative core of the modern idea of argumentation which makes "moral insight possible."[xxv]  Given the importance of this notion, although it has al­ready been considered in the last chap­ter,[xxvi] what follows is a restate­ment of the same with reference to the framework of practical discourse.

               The participation thesis, the first condition, requires that any subject capable of speech and action be permitted to take part in dis­courses. The aim of this condition is that all potential voices be heard so as to establish an openness in which all viewpoints have an equal chance for being represented. Indeed, the thesis of open participation endeavors to view participants as equal dialogical partners. Ideally this would set aside, for instance, an individual's name and background when such considerations would deter discourse from anything other than the force of the better argument, i.e., the root notion of argumen­tative vindication.

               The symmetry thesis, the second condition, requires that all dialogical participants have the same opportunity to initiate and sus­tain dialogue by proposing claims and counterclaims, asking questions and providing answers. Whereas the thesis of open participation incor­porates all potential voices, the thesis of symmetry provides the par­ticipants with an equality of chances to engage in discourse such that no one participant comes to overwhelm the discussion in favor of his proposal at the expense of other views.

               Finally, the third condition, the freedom of discussion thesis, demands that discussion advance free from all external and internal influences such that the conclusion may be viewed as proceeding from no motive other than a cooperative search for truth. Hence, not only may all potential dialogue partners engage in discourse and have an equal right to apply speech-act motions, but they are additionally expected to participate in the process free from all known internal and external forces that may somehow vitiate the outcome of the dis­course. The ideal here is that each participant in dialogue attempt to place himself in the other person's "shoes," and vice versa, for the moral insight and empathy that may thus be achieved in a collective pursuit of norms acceptable from all viewpoints.[xxvii]

               Thus as the participants enter discourse with the aim of determin­ing the validity of a proposed or problematicized normative claim, they are according to the formal conditions of the ideal speech situation ex­pected to "render inoperative all motives other than that of a cooperative readiness to come to an understanding."[xxviii]  This, in turn, involves the radicalization of the levels of argumentation which signifies separating oneself from the action context so as to shift into the context of reflec­tion.

               With respect to a logic of practical discourse the various steps or levels of dis­course/argumentation are as follows:

               Step 1: Involves moving from problematicized prescriptions and prohibitions representing an action to an affirmation in which a norma­tive validity claim is made about an object of discourse.

               Step 2: Consists in the practical justifications of the problem­aticized assertion through the assemblage of an argument.

               Step 3: Involves a meta-ethical transformation or replace­ment of the linguistic system.

               Step 4: Involves a critical evaluation of the theoretical justi­fications upon which these claims to normative rightness may be based, an evaluation that may warrant modifying a given normative framework.[xxix]

               The structure of pragmatic arguments within a logic of prac­tical discourse reflects the necessary elements that must be covered if one is to view the conclusion as genuinely expressing the better argu­ment. The elements of this logic follow: (a) the conclu-sion‑‑[C]--referring to a prescrip­tion/evaluation; (b) the controversial validity claim, in this case, the claim to normative rightness; (c) justifications for a norm, i.e., what is required from an opponent; (d) data--[D]--referring to the grounds, etc., in defense of the conclusion; (e) the warrant‑‑[W]--referring to the norms, principles, etc.; and (f) the back­ing--[B]--referring to interpreta­tions of needs, etc.[xxx]

               With respect to practical discourse the steps are the same as those of theoretical discourse except that one moves from a problem­aticized prescription or prohibition to a critical consensus. The recom­men­dations which result from practical discourse are put forth "in light of existing needs and available resources."[xxxi]  A crucial differ­ence between the con­clusion derived in practical versus theoretical discourse is that the pro­posed recommendations obtained through collec­tive will-formation may reflect a divergence from the existing status quo, thus implying a change or transformation of practices and institutions. This is to say that ". . . the results of a practical dis­course in which it is established that the validity claims of factual­ly acknowledged norms cannot be redeemed, or that norms with argu­mentatively redeemable validity claims do not exist in fact, bear a critical relation to reality (namely to the symbolic reality of socie­ty)."[xxxii]

               The logic of practical discourse then when articulated in greater detail specifies and distinguishes the nature of the formal principle of universalization from other formalist positions.[xxxiii] Haber­mas's ethical principle can be understood as incorporating the condi­tions of the ideal speech situation and the requirement for the gen­eralizability of interests:

         A. Whoever engages in argumentation must presup-pose the validity of the discourse rules; and

         B. that when that argumentation concerns normative claims‑‑this is, ones about alternative orderings for the satisfaction of interests‑‑the participants must, "on pain of performative contradiction," admit that universalization is the only rule under which norms will be taken by each to be legitimate.[xxxiv]

The importance of the first rule consists in that without such an agree­ment discourse would be open to a violation of one of the conditions/constraints of the ideal speech situation, which would, in turn, render unacceptable the alleged rationality of the consensus. The second rule expresses the generalizability of the common good where­in common interests are universalized. In this respect for Habermas justifiable norms are those that express "generalizable interests" in the sense that they satisfy the concerns of each participant in the argu­ment. For Habermas "the function of just norms is to provide some legitimate ordering of the satisfaction of interests."[xxxv]  His response then to the question of how this norm which validates all other norms may itself be justified without circularity, i.e., in a non­decisionistic manner, is con­tained in the very structure of language: "the expecta­tion of discursive redemption of normative validity claims is already contained in the struc­ture of intersubjectivity and makes specially introduced maxims of uni­versalization superfluous."[xxxvi]

               Now, before concluding this section, there are two objections that Habermas's formalistic ethics needs to address: (a) the issue that such an ethics is devoid of content, and (b) the hermeneutic objection that the discourse-ethical procedure is biased. To the first objection Habermas responds that the content to be considered in practical dis­course is pro­posed from the outside insofar as practical discourse does not consist in an instrument for generating justified norms. Rather, it consists in a procedure for testing the validity of norms that discourse participants are consider­ing for adoption. Habermas elaborates,

         Practical discourses are always related to the con­crete point of departure of a disturbed normative agreement. These antecedent descriptions determine the topics that are up for discussion. This procedure then is not formal in the sense that it abstracts from the content. Quite the contrary, in its openness, practical discourse is dependent upon contingent content being fed into it from outside. In discourse this content is subjected to a process in which par­ticular values are ultimately discarded as being not susceptible to consen­sus.[xxxvii]

               The second objection argues that though the application of rules such as the universalization principle requires practical wisdom, the required prudence, insofar as it is prior to the rules of discourse and hence not subject to them, may represent nothing more than the local con­ventions of a given hermeneutical‑‑i.e. a historically-situa-ted‑‑horizon. Habermas's responds that

         The hermeneuticist's reflective insight, however, does not undercut the claim of the principle of discourse ethics to transcend all local conventions. No participant in argumen­tation can escape this claim as long as he takes a performative attitude, confronts normative claims to validity seriously, and does not objectify norms as social facts, i.e., avoids reducing them to something that is simply found in the world . . . . The history of human rights in modern constitutional states offers a wealth of examples showing that once principles have been recognized, their application does not fluctuate wildly from one situation to the next but tends to have a stable direction.[xxxviii]

               After presenting the master lines of Habermas's dis­course ethics, it will be possible to address the question of the minimal mod­el of com­municating subjects that his analysis yields.

A MODEL OF COMMUNICATING SUBJECTS

               Before considering the question of the adequacy of Haber­mas's principle of universalization in function of the ideal speech situation, this section will consider the minimal model of the commu­nicating subjects that can be developed from Habermas's philosophy of emancipation. Hence, it will (1) consider the relationship between the theory of cognitive interests and the theory of universal prag­matics, (2) clarify the concept of freedom as tending toward an ideal form of life, and (3) analyze the qualities of communicating subjects as may be derived from Habermas's ideal speech situation.

               To begin, the theory of cognitive interests, as interpreted in this study, argues in favor of the emancipatory interest as commanding a position of primacy with respect to the technical and the practical inter­ests, given that these are susceptible to its penetrating analysis and sub­sequent substantiation, modification or rejection. In this re­spect the emancipatory interest was understood as promoting a just versus unjust application of the vital functions which the other two interests serve. This is to say that in the case of the human subject the issue is not simply whether his material needs are being satisfied or whether his cultural relations are being coordinated, but whether these interests are being fulfilled justly. The struggle of peoples throughout history‑‑today manifesting itself in dramatic ways in Eastern Europe and South Africa‑‑impels one to judge Habermas's emancipatory inter­est as consisting in something more than a mere epistemological view­point. Whereas the theory of cognitive interests identified the emanci­patory interest as ordained toward a state of freedom in function of justice, the transition to the third chapter proceeded in light of the need to develop Habermas's methodology in terms of which the notion of freedom may be realized.

               Accordingly, the theory of universal pragmatics concentrated on the notion of communicative action, i.e., the human competence to coor­dinate action by means of ordinary language. From this standpoint lan­guage facilitates understanding by simultaneously relating the hu­man subject to three "worlds" that constitute the three modes in which per­sons may come to an understanding with each other, viz.: the ob­jective world of material objects, the social world of intersubjective relations, and the subjective world of inner nature. The importance of Habermas's proposal consists in that not language not only serves to relate and coordinate modes of relations with the three realms indicat­ed, but it views valid agreement among subjects as proceeding in function of cognitively testable validity claims raised with every speech act. This means that social actors are empowered with the capacity to assess critically the rationali­ty or irrationality of proposed speech acts so as to consider the question of their validity. Problem­aticized claims that fail to be vindicated in normal exchange may be subjected to the formal conditions of discourse. At this level truth claims may emerge as warranted and normative claims may surface as justified. Indeed the ideal speech situation is intended to fulfill the function of a methodological instru­ment capable of challenging theo­retical and normative proposi­tions in an endeavor to determine wheth­er or not they are based on anything other than ideological bias of one form or another. As Habermas states, "Just as theoretical criticism of misleading everyday experiences serves to correct beliefs and expecta­tions, so moral criticism serves to alter modes of action or to correct the judgments we make of them."[xxxix]

               The locus of freedom for Habermas consists then in the correction of "everyday experiences" and "modes of action" in func­tion of the principle of unconstrained dialogue rooted in the very nature of human intersubjectivity. The principle of unconstrained dialogue‑‑as reflected in the ideal speech situation‑‑aims at the deter­mination of warranted assertability in the case of truth claims and at the determination of justified assertability in the case of normative claims. The principle of unconstrained dialogue surfaces as a model of undistorted communica­tion with which to identify and eradicate dis­torted modes of communication. Herein lies the connection between the theory of cognitive interests and the theory of universal prag­matics: the emancipatory interest of the critical sciences proceeds to effect the dissolution of hypostatized struc­tures by means of the for­mal methodology grounded in human communi­cation, i.e., by means of the principle of unconstrained dialogue.

               In his more recent work Habermas tends to part with the notion that the principle of unconstrained dialogue portrays the "im­age" or the "anticipation" of an utopian society. Nonetheless, he holds on to the notion as an interpretive guide useful for pinpointing and redressing the social pathologies of modernity.[xl] In this respect, though the full realization of the ideal speech situation is yet to mate­rialize, it appears that Habermas's concern is with the possibility that a greater approximation in the direction of unconstrained dialogue may emerge given certain practical arrangements. Indeed, Habermas ac­knowledges that in the course of social evolution "institution­alizations of partial discourses specific to certain domains signify innovative achievements."  In the following passage Habermas pro­vides some illustrative ex­amples:

         . . . first, the institutionalization of discourse in which the claims to validity of mythical and reli­gious interpretations of the world could be system­atically questioned and tested; as such we under­stand the beginnings of philo­sophy in Athens during the Classi­cal period. Second, the institutionalization of discourse in which the claims to validity of techni­cally exploitable profane knowledge transmit­ted in the domains of professional ethics could be systematically questioned and tested; as such we understand this as the beginnings of the modern experimental sciences, which certainly had their precursors in antiquity and at the end of the Middle Ages. And finally, the institutionali­zation of dis­course in which the claims to validity involving practical questions and politi­cal deci­sions were intended to be continually ques­tioned and tested; first in England during the seventeenth century, later on the Continent and in the United States, with precursors in the Italian cities of the Renais­sance, a political public sphere came into being and in connection with this, representative forms of government‑‑bourgeois demo­cracy.[xli]

The institutionalization of a logic of practical discourse in function of the ideal speech situation, particularly, as it refers to civil govern­ments commands the central thrust of Habermas's theoretical edifice, whose realization he views as consisting not so much in a specula­tive but, rather, in a practical hypothesis. The institutionali­zation of such discourse represents a real potential of the human subject given its inherent com­municative and moral nature.

               An analysis of the concrete demands required of human subjects for the actualization of this potential lends insight into the model of communicating subjects that Habermas's philosophy of emancipation yields. In this respect the tendency toward the realiza­tion of freedom in function of the emancipatory interest is conceived as a community versus an individual affair. It is precisely the require­ments involved in being a member of community that unfold Haber­mas's concept of the subject. Freedom for Habermas can thus be un­derstood as the act by which the person passes into personhood, i.e., becomes a functioning and contribut­ing member of an integrated social unit. To be free for Habermas does not signify a mere sophomorish absence of external obstacles or con­straints to the satisfaction, fulfill­ment or enjoyment of just any desire.[xlii] Rather, it signifies a materi­al, moral and social state of internal indepen­dence to be a certain kind of person, i.e., one capable of participating in the realization of those projects that are congruent with the physical, psychological, social and moral well-being of individual persons and society as a whole. In this respect freedom may be distinguished from emancipatory interests. For though this interest expresses a vital orientation toward the achieve­ment of freedom, such an object need not necessarily be attained given that the demands of freedom need not be satisfied.

               Moreover, what is at the core of this view of freedom is a dynam­ic interplay between the individual that qua moral agent is capable of affecting the social unit to which he belongs and the social unit that qua collective moral agent is capable of affecting its individ­ual members. Society is thereby both the product of its members and the collective agent that fashions them.[xliii] The conception of freedom, understood in terms of the dynamic relation between individual agent and society, involves, for Habermas, a complementary dyad: the