CHAPTER V

  HABERMAS'S PHILOSOPHY OF EMANCIPATION

AND METAPHYSICS

          Thus far this study has concentrated on criti­cally develop­ing the vari­ous components of Habermas's philosophy of emancipa­tion. Accord­ingly, the second chapter argued for the dignity of the human person as oriented toward the full realization of its constitutive nature in function of an emancipatory interest with autonomy and responsibil­ity. The emancipatory interest emerged as setting in motion the human concern for articulating, promoting and appropriating a mode of exis­tence in function of justice. The third chapter explicated Habermas's theory of univer­sal pragmatics as properly representing the method­ological frame­work wherein he specifies in function of the ideal speech situation the conditions of communication aimed at adju­dicat­ing truth claims pursued within the context of a logic of theoreti­cal discourse. In examining Habermas's ethical proposal, viz., his dis­course ethics, the crucial ques­tion, considered in the fourth chapter, centered on determining the ade­quacy of the purely formal conditions for adjudication of problematicized normative claims with a view to the dissolu­tion of hypostatized disequilibria. In considering this ques­tion, it became increasingly plain that the formalism of Habermas's principle of univer­salization ultimately terminates in an intra- and intercultural pluralism that effectively undermines its integrity as a moral rule. Moreover, Haber­mas's appropriation and commendation of a materialist interpreta­tion of society would undoubtedly supplant the formalism which his ethical theory fosters with a worldview that would serve to orient practi­cal judgment in one direction rather than another.

          Chapters II-IV endeavored to examine Habermas's opus within the confines of his own horizons. The present chapter will venture to move beyond the parameters of Habermas's proposals in an effort to develop the latent metaphysical themes permeating his eman­cipatory/ communicative model. It will review this from an optic which can be developed today with resources from the classical existential meta­physical tradition when catalyzed by the contemporary issue discussed in the foregoing chapters. Indeed, this chapter will endeavor to consid­er the mutually enriching, complementary nature of the Habermasian communicative model and the metaphysical model as mediated in terms of a philosophical appropriation of the Christian vision. This objective will be pursued in three sections. The first will strive (A) to clarify the intention animating Habermas's commendation of a materi­alist interpretation of society by noting certain parallelisms that relate this to Kant's move toward a teleological worldview. This will pro­vide an occasion for arguing in hermeneutical fashion in favor of the Christian horizon/vision as a worldview that both equips philo­sophical reflection with critical resources that serve as a response to the post­modern challenge against metaphysical principles, and that furnishes a non-materialist context for Habermas's formalistic commu­nicative model. In this sense, this chapter essentially consists in an examina­tion of the two philosophical models operative in the Christian world­view. The second or middle section (B) will articulate a method­ology for elevating proposed notions to metaphysical status such that they may be suitable for employment within the context of metaphysi­cal discourse. Such methodological schemata will be applied to the funda­mental categories of Habermas's model, viz., his notion of the emanci­patory interest and communication in function of the ideal speech situation. Finally, the third section will endeavor (C) to indi­cate the sense in which the categories of Habermas's emancipatory/ communi­cative proposal enrich the traditional transcendental properties of being in metaphysics, as well as the manner in which Habermas's proposal is itself enriched when understood from the metaphysical point of view.

THE CHRISTIAN HERMENEUTICAL HORIZON AND THE

SENSUS PLENIOR OF HABERMAS'S PHILOSOPHY OF

EMANCIPATION

          This section will examine in hermeneutic fashion the impli­ca­tions of the philosophical resources of the Christian horizon for meta­physical reflection. The aim will be to relate Habermas's commu­nica­tive model with metaphysics. It will argue (1) that the relevance of Habermas's move to a materialist framework finds its parallel in Kant's move toward a teleological conception of the universe; (2) that the hermeneutical mode of philosophizing--rather than deductive/ rationalist or inductive/empiricist procedures--favors a philosophical appropriation of the Christian tradition; (3) that a hermeneutical ap­propriation of the Christian horizon provides philosophical reflection with the resources with which to mitigate the postmodernist challenge against metaphysical principles; and (4) that such resources derived from doing philosophy from a Christian perspective, in turn, provide Habermas's formalist model with a context that is realist (although non-materialist), metaphysical and communicative.

           Habermas's acceptance of a materialist worldview may be un­derstood as a consequence of his concep­tion of reality as encom­pass­ing two distinct domains. On the one hand, there is the realm of phys­ical nature, whose fundamental charac­teristic consists precisely in its subjection to invariant laws as studied by nomological science. On the other, there is the realm of human nature, whose principal feature consists precisely in its emancipatory poten­tial as studied by the criti­cal sciences. Faced with the problem of relating necessity and free­dom, Habermas proposes a worldview in which the concrete--versus purely notional--exercise of freedom can take place within his commu­nicative model of communicating subjects.

          In this respect Habermas shares certain affinities with the situa­tion in which Kant found himself at the end of his second cri­tique and which led him to his third critique in function of which the first two were to be reread. This move to the third critique, i.e., to an aesthetic view of the world, has often been neglected in favor of an almost exclusivise reading of the first critique in function of the Car­tesian rationalist influence (or bias). However, the first critique or Critique of Pure Reason was limited by a consideration of the ques­tion con­cerning the epistemic conditions of the physical sciences. This rejected intelligible objects or metaphysical notions which implied no potenti­ality or materiality. This ". . . rejection of metaphysics as a science was warmly greeted in empiricist, positivist and, then materi­alist circles as a dispensation from any search beyond the phenomenal, i.e., what is inherently spatio and/or temporal."[i]

          Yet, in contrast to the first critique's transcendental deduc­tion of the categories of cognition by which the intel­ligibility of the phe­nomenal world could be secured, Kant's Foundations of the Meta­phys­ics of Morals and his second critique, the Critique of Practical Rea­son, explicitly concerned a realm distinct from the purely physical, i.e., with the moral realm. In elucidating the constitutive elements of this distinct sphere of reality, Kant's analysis ". . . pushes forcefully beyond utilitarian goals, inner instincts and rational scientific relation­ships . . . None of these recog­nizes that which is distinctive of the human person, namely, one's freedom. To be moral an act must be based upon the will of the person; it must be autonomous, not heter­onomous."[ii]

          Once Kant had articulated the dimension of freedom rooted in practical reason in contradistinction to the necessity and universali­ty of pure reason, "his entire Critique of the Faculty of Judgment will be written to provide a context which will enable the previous two cri­tiques to be read in a way that protects this notion of human free­dom."[iii] This is to say that Kant rejected any strain of reductionism that would attempt to undermine human freedom in terms of a deter­ministic model. Indeed, Kant's repudiation of any reductionist tenden­cies leads him ". . . to affirm and provide the justification for his affirmation of the teleological character of nature as the context of scientific necessity. . . . if science is to contribute to the exercise of human freedom, then that realm too must be directed toward a goal and hence be manifestive throughout of intent within which free hu­man purpose can be integrated."[iv]

          Notwithstanding Kant's inability to ascribe metaphysical reality to the teleological nature of reality in virtue of the critical limits which his epistemology imposes on human cognition, "we must pro­ceed 'as if' it is so precisely because of the undeniable reality of human freedom in this ordered universe."[v] For Kant, within the con­text of a teleological universe, aesthetic judgments register reflections concerning the degree of harmony or disharmony, of the level of beauty or ugliness. This has consequences for the concrete exercise of freedom as it endeavors to realize the universal realm of ends-in-them­selves. In this respect, Habermas's proposal of a certain worldview can be understood as an attempt to move beyond a critical impasse between scientific necessity and human freedom which parallels Kant's turn in the direction of a teleological worldview.[vi]

          Indeed, the tendency to reason in the light of a certain context has characterized the philosophical enterprise since antiquity, given that its varied conceptions have typically never proceeded by means of the operation of "pure reason" in separation from some orienting framework. Thus, "Russell developed certain of his philo­sophical views from insights disclosed by mathematics; Quine took experimen­tal science as his paradigm; others have taken law or art or music or social interaction."[vii] Habermas, in his stead, employs the model of social communication understood within a materialist con­ception of society as his own orienting framework for doing philoso­phy. Yet, it would appear that within the contempo­rary philosophical thrust for openness, dialogue and conver­sation, proposals can be put forward as at the very least constituting recommendations worthy of consider­ation. The view here is that a move to focus on Habermas's contribu­tions from an optic other than the one Habermas provides is indeed congruent with his own view of philosophy as "stand-in and interpret­er" that "cannot and should not try to play the role of ush­er."[viii] Speak­ing of Kant, Habermas states,

          In championing the idea of a cognition before cogni­tion, Kantian philosophy sets up a domain between itself and the sciences, arrogating au­thority to itself. It wants to clarify the founda­tions of the sciences once and for all, defining the limits of what can and cannot be experi­enced. This is tanta­mount to an act of show­ing the sci­ences their proper place. I think phi­loso­phy cannot and should not try to play the role of usher.[ix]

          The openness, then, implicit in Habermas's view of philoso­phy as "interpreter" provides a space for considering his proposals from an alternative perspective. The question, however, becomes one of deter­mining in function of what worldview Habermas's communica­tive model should be considered. The suggestion of this study is that Habermas's philosophy of emancipation be examined within the hori­zon of the Christian worldview, i.e., one that "follows out lines of inquiry suggested by Christian experience."[x] If the claim that all philosophy departs from some definite starting point, rooted in a prior understanding, is true of its historical contributions, then a Christian philosophy "is shaped in important ways by Christian faith, life and action."[xi] However, the incorporation of the Christian worldview should be understood here as safeguarding the distinction between philosophy and theological investigation. This means that insight may be derived from the resources of the Christian worldview for doing philosophy while that which is appropriated philosophically must itself conform to the canons of reasoned evidence and argument.[xii] In short, a Christian philosophy as understood here is one that "seeks to appro­priate by rational and properly philosophical means certain insights first disclosed by Christian revelation."[xiii]

          However, at this point an issue that needs to be addressed is what "properly philosophical means" or, more specifically, what philo­sophical methodology--from among a number of possibilities--is best suited for disclosing the philosophically-significant insights of Chris­tian revelation. Three possible methodological candidates that may be considered include the deductive/rationalist, the inductive/ empiricist and the hermeneutical approaches to philosophiz­ing. The inappropri­ateness of the deductive method stems from the fact that it invariably endeavors to apply self-evident axioms to definitions from which more geometrico propositions follow so as to establish a system of proposi­tions whose fundamental characteristic consists precisely in the neces­sary relations that obtain from one proposition to the other. Such a procedure supposes a Spinozian-like conception of reality where God and nature are interchangeable (Deus sive Natura). Such a system acknowledges the existence of the one infinite substance, i.e., the primary axiom, from which all other possible attributes, i.e., the prop­ositions, are derived by necessity. This not only denies the dis­tinction between God and nature, but also reduces the notion of free­dom to necessity, both of which are entirely foreign to the Christian world­view.

          With respect to the inductive or, more specifically, the construc­tive methodology typical of positivist forms of empiricism, the strict delimitation of knowledge to the order of experience artifi­cially cir­cumscribes the intellect to an identification, arrangement and collec­tion of individual sensible objects (matters of fact). As such, these can never be transcended, so that, at best, metaphysical notions are rele­gated exclusively to the extra-philosophical domain of faith. Such a reductive methodology excluding metaphysical discourse and reducing the human intellect to one more sense faculty is foreign also to the Christian worldview.

          A third approach, i.e., the hermeneutical methodology, will be adopted in this study, given its emphasis in delving into a tradi­tion, in this case the Christian tradition, for resources that may illumi­nate new challenges.

          The reason for considering in hermeneutical fashion the Chris­tian horizon as the context for interpreting Habermas's communi­cative proposal is better appreciated by probing the manner in which such a worldview may be understood as emancipatory when examined as a response to the deconstructionist critique against metaphysical princi­ples. A consideration of the deconstructionist position consists not only in bringing out the emancipatory dimension of the Christian worldview, but also in indicating one contemporary approach which may be advanced in response to the acute challenge that deconstruc­tion represents. Today the "post-modern condition" or the "mark of post-modernity" mounts a relentless criticism of the basic modes of rationality typical of the Western tradition and leads to a "loss of credibility in all metanarratives."[xiv]

          An important article, "From Anarchy to Principles: Decons­truc­tion and the Resources of Christian Philosophy,"[xv] indicates the sense in which the Christian horizon is not subject to various critical themes emerging from the deconstructionist denunciation of "metanar­ratives." Kenneth L. Schmitz both presents a weakness in the decons­truction program when considered in light of the Christian worldview and brings out the emancipatory dimension rooted in this religious tradi­tion. For Schmitz the postmodernist position consists specifically in a repudiation of the principles by which reason "has sought a better understanding of what is true and good."[xvi]  The bulk of the post­modernist critique is directed against the notion of principle (princi­pium in Latin; arché in Greek) as the source of being, thought and action. Instead, deconstructionists favor anarchy, understood in its more original meaning as signifying "to live, think and act without principles," rather than in its more modern sense as referring "primari­ly to violence and disrespect for the law."[xvii] Schmitz advises against taking this challenge lightly: "It may be that, when reading Richard Rorty's latest sigh of despair, we are merely seeing yet another of the recurrent descents into skepticism that have come and gone at various periods in our intellectual history. And yet there are signs that there may be deeper movement afoot."[xviii]  Given the seriousness, compre­hen­siveness and uncompromising nature of the deconstructionist cri­tique, a reconstruction of the master lines of Schmitz's analysis fol­lows in two parts: (a) the nature of the deconstructionist critique of Western culture as advanced by Heidegger and Horkheimer-Adorno, and (b) a response to this critique from the viewpoint of the Christian horizon.

          Schmitz employs an interpretive study on Heidegger by Reiner Schürmann[xix] as a focal point for the deconstructionist discus­sion con­cerning the notion of principles. According to Schürmann's study, Heidegger envisions Western culture as consisting in four ep­ochs: the pre-metaphysical epoch, consisting of the age of Greek poets, drama­tists, and early philosophers; the classical metaphysical epoch, span­ning from Greek philosophy to contemporary scientific technology; and the post-metaphysical epoch, which emerges with Nietzsche. In­deed, the metaphysical epoch itself is further subdivided into four subcategories or economies, with each economy distinguished from the other in function of a single principle or foundational notion determin­ing a fixed order or worldview. In this respect, the Greek economy or order revolves around the notion of essence or substance (ousia); the medieval order proceeds in function of the notion of God (Theos, Deus, Gubernator mundi); the modern order revolves around the no­tion of man (humanism); and the contemporary order proceeds in terms of the notion of scientific technology (technik).[xx] Of these four epochs the metaphysical one has for over two and a half milennia clearly dominated the intellectual formation and orientation of Western culture. It is this supremacy which has become the target of the de­constructionist critique.

          The deconstructionist understand their own program as consist­ing in "comprehending and overcoming" such metaphysical reliance on principles. Here, in function of the categorical nature of its principles, metaphysics comes to be understood as a limiting framework that precludes rather than advances thought. Clearly, the term metaphysics, as used by Schürmann, does not only refer to its more technical use in Western philosophy as signifying the science of the real. It refers more broadly to an ordering of worldviews in terms of principles. It is precisely the viability of such conceptual orderings that postmoder­nists endeavor to deconstruct.

          Metaphysics is the long-standing thought-con­struction which has been produced by means of priniciples; and it can be brought to truth only through the task of decons­truction, the task of comprehending and overcoming (Verwindung) the way in which principles has sealed our thought in upon itself and away from the true disclosure of being.[xxi]

          In this respect, for Heidegger, metaphysical principles nulli­fy further thought by fostering a notion of origin as domination. In func­tion of this all things within the cosmos are reduced to a uniform unity and in terms of which all thought and action are subject to the closure brought about by the origin.[xxii] Heidegger understands the vari­ous senses of the term principle, as elaborated by Aristotle,[xxiii] as pre­cisely signifying such a domineering, reductionistic and limiting no­tion of origin.[xxiv] As Schürmann argues, "Aristotle defines arché as that out of which something is or becomes or is known. The term therefore designates a source of being, becoming and knowledge be­yond which it is useless to try to investigate: the source is ultimate in that it both begins and commands."[xxv] 

          Thus, as Schmitz elaborates, the principles constitutive of each of the four metaphysical periods reflect three features character­istic of an epoch/economy, viz., closure, necessity and certitude.

          For what marks each of these "epochs" or "econ­omies" is that their order rests upon a single primary principle; and this foundation provides--for those who live, think and act in terms of its order--first, a selective determination of open possibilities, in a word: closure; secondly, stabil­ity or regularity, in a word: necessity; and third­ly, credi­bility through repetitive confirmation, in a word: certi­tude.[xxvi]

Accordingly, metaphysical principles generative of epochs (1) estab­lish an order that fixes the relations between the entities comprising that order as well as the relations that such entities may have to the order itself; (2) furnish an explanation for the occurrence of phenome­na; (3) provide a purposeful reason for action; and (4) ban "inappro­priate action by pre-empting more radical choice."[xxvii]

          Schmitz also introduces the work of Max Horkheimer and Theo­dor W. Adorno,[xxviii] representatives of the Frankfurt School, who, like Heidegger, notwithstanding different orientations, comprehend the history of Western thought in terms of a conception of origin under­stood as domination with its ensuing closure. In the case of Horkhei­mer and Adorno, however, they find this notion operative in the West's "technological determination to master nature."[xxix]  This mas­tery proceeds in function of instrumental reason, i.e., in terms of a means-end rationality limited in its employment via impersonal tech­niques to the inception and attainment of varied objectives, while itself remaining incapable of determining the good or ratio finalis of human existence. The end result of instrumental reason at the service of technological advancements is understood as involving a process of reification that leads to the dehumanization of the subject via greater calculability, bureaucratic efficiency, administrative and economic control. Hence, the technological machine becomes an exploitative mechanism subjecting the human person to dehumanizing relationships that negate authentic individuality.

          Interestingly enough, Schmitz's response to the deconstruct­ionist critique of metaphysical principles does not consist in a blanket de­fense of such principles. Instead he limits his response to indicating in what sense metaphysical principles in function of the Christian hori­zon are less susceptible to the postmodernist attack.[xxx] He first ques­tions whether the concept of principle as involving a notion of origin must be conceived as indicating domination or whether it may not be possible to retain a "conception of principle as that which establishes a certain arrangement of consequences, but deny that the arrangement must be one of domination."[xxxi]  Speaking of Christian philosophers, Schmitz adds that they were concerned with the very being of things in a manner that raises the question

          Why anything at all, why not rather nothing?  This ques­tion arose out of a freshly charged wonder, prompted no doubt by the Christian disclosure of the generosity of a Creator who sent his only Son to redeem a fallen human­ity. So that a Christian philosophy is prompted to look for the primary form of power (and the ultimate meaning and worth of the term) not in domination, but in caring presence.[xxxii]

This understanding of God as love permeates Christian scriptures as evidenced in the following passage where Christ states,

          For this is how God loved the world:

          he gave his only Son,

          so that everyone who believes in him may not perish

          but may have eternal life.

          For God sent his Son into the world

          not to judge the world,

          but so that through him the world might be saved.[xxxiii]

In another passage Christ--though God--does not cling to his own divinity, but surrenders all for love of humankind; he

          Who, being in the form of God,

          did not count equality with God

          something to be grasped.

           But he emptied himself,

          taking the form of a slave,

          becoming as human beings are;

          and being in every way like a human being,

          he was humbler yet,

          even to accepting death, death on a cross.[xxxiv]

Indeed within the Christian horizon, God as the all-encompassing first principle does not lord over his subjects as objects of domination, but rather elevates humanity to a state of filiation in which the human person is dignified with the title of "son":

          God sent his Son, born of a woman, born a subject of the Law, to redeem the subjects of the law, so that we could receive adoption as sons. As you are sons, God has sent into our hearts the Spirit of his Son crying, 'Abba, Father'; and so you are no longer a slave, but a son; and if a son, then an heir, by God's own act.[xxxv]

This view of God as Father, Brother and Friend, who loves and emp­ties himself in order to elevate humankind to a new state of filiation is precisely the conception of first principle that is understood within the Christian horizon and pursued, for instance, by Thomas Aquinas, who understands the creation, according to Schmitz, as a communica­tion‑‑a giving, a sharing--of being.[xxxvi] The Christian conception of a first principle is not understood as a principle of domination whose aim is to subordinate its subjects for the sake of dehumanizing control or influence.

          To the charge that metaphysical principles reduce all reality to a single unity, philosophy pursued within the Christian horizon, one may counter that, to the contrary, the first principle in referring to the Trinity is understood as a unity permeated with abundance. Schmitz argues,

          The charge that a metaphysics of principles is a means of domination is strengthened by the reductionism of the many to a sheer, univocal unity. But, if the first principle is one, yet not hostile to inner distinction (as theological­ly and in respect of the Trinity, we speak of the distinct persons and their different processions and mis­sions), then the charge of closure must be re­opened for discus­sion.[xxxvii]

Yet, within the Christian experience, not only is the first principle open to inner distinction, as Schmitz rightly suggests, it also incorpo­rates humanity as part of its inner life, as powerfully expressed in the priestly prayer of Christ:

          May they all be one,

          just as, Father, you are in me and I am in you,

          so that they also may be in us,

          so that the world may believe it was you who sent me.

          I have given them the glory you gave to me,

          that they may be one as we are one.

          With me in them and you in me,

          that they be so perfected in unity . . .[xxxviii]

          Finally, where the deconstructionists claim that the first princi­ple brings about closure insofar as future possibilities for thought and action is concerned, it should be noted that the ad intra constitution of the first principle within itself consists in a "plurifica­tion" of per­sons. Even in terms of its ad extra manifestation the "infi­nite abun­dance of the first principle will give more room for all possi­bilities within creation--even, it must be remarked, for the possibilities of evil."[xxxix]  Indeed, within the Christian worldview, far from a first prin­ciple as limiting future possibilities, there is the promise that the believer will perform and even surpass the works of its founder, as Christ himself states,

          In all truth I tell you,

          whoever believes in me

          will perform the same works as I do myself,

          and will perform even greater works,

          because I am going to the Father.

          Whatever you ask for in my name I will do,

          so that the Father may be glorified in the Son.[xl]

          The philosophically relevant implications of the Christian per­spective seems then to contrast the deconstructionist critique of first principles. How then would such a worldview open, sensitize and shape thinking and living in relation to Habermas's proposal. The answer to this question reflects the sense in which the Christian worldview may be understood as providing a sensus plenior to Haber­mas's own formalistic model.

          One distinct contribution that may be derived hermeneuti­cally from a consideration of the Christian worldview is its eminently real­ist outlook. It views the foundation of the universe, the human person, its past, present and future, as inexorably related to a God who not only is origin and destiny of all that is, but for love of hu­manity enters, with his Divinty, human history in order to effect a dramatic redemption. Such a realist orientation provides Habermas's formalistic notion of ethical discourse with a framework, a transcen­dent ground for human life, diametrically different from a materialist one.

          A second contribution that may be derived from a Christian worldview consists in that it does not merely insist on the reality of God as Trinity, the universe and the transcendent dimension of the human person, including the latter's redemption in function of a his­torical intervention of a divine person. It also endeavors to give its body of beliefs metaphysical articulation. Indeed the Christian world­view embodies an eminently metaphysical outlook that dynamically moves beyond a purely physical and even anthropological understand­ing in the direction of a metaphysical penetration of reality. Said another way, Christian reflection endeavors to move beyond the con­traries consisting in this or that form to a notion of life experienced or possessed more fully in function of its transcendent nature. For Aquinas, accordingly, the ratio finalis of humanity individually and as mystical body consists not in imaging physical movement, i.e., in realizing this or that motion or change; nor in pursuing anthropologi­cal accomplishments, i.e., in achieving this or that theoretical or prac­tical, artistic, or technical perfection; but, rather, in imaging divine being itself, i.e., in conforming one's life at the level of one's onto­logical constitution in accordance to the revelation--the emancipatory communication--of the Christian Trinity. In this respect, the Christian horizon moves beyond the strictures of Habermas's emancipatory ethical/political discourse to metaphysical discourse as representing the speculative completion of thought and action.

          In addition to its realist and metaphysical orientation, a third contribution stemming from the Christian worldview is its thor­oughgo­ing communicative dimension. The Christian worldview is in function of a God conceived within and outside its own divinity as communica­tion par excellence. Indeed the Christian understanding of God as consisting in the undivided unity of a trinity of persons pos­sesses ad intra a communicative character that stems from the very relational exigencies of the processions that each divine person has with respect to the other. The Father communicates his paternity to the Son, the Son communicates his filiation to the Father, the Father and the Son communicate their relation to the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit communicates his love to the Father and the Son. This communicative makeup of the divinity is reflected in its ad extra operations such that all reality, particularly as manifested in the case of the human person, is in some sense to a lesser or greater degree communicative. Indeed, the central claim of the Christian message is that the Son, the Logos, the Verb, of the Father became man and dwelt among men in order to communicate and thereby share the Trinitarian life with humankind. Accordingly, the Christian under­standing of communication purports to extend profoundly the dialogi­cal character of Habermas's communi­cative model such that such a discourse is no longer limited to indi­vidual persons but is compre­hended as a discourse open to the testa­ment of the divine Logos.

          Now, although the view of this study is that the Christian hori­zon does present a context for anchoring Habermas's formalistic mod­el, yet when one turns to a more philosophical appropriation of the Christian horizon, it is clear that being as emancipative and com­muni­cative remains an entirely undeveloped notion. In view of the endeav­or to provide a philosophical framework for Christian revela­tion, the object of the next section will be to consider the manner in which the Habermasian proposal may be incorporated within a meta­physical context, particularly as it relates to the theory of the tran­scendental properties of being. This will be accomplished by articulat­ing a meth­od for critically examining philosophical notions in terms of his exis­tential metaphysics.

APPLICATION OF THE METHODOLOGY OF METAPHYSICS TO HABERMASIAN CATEGORIES

          The aim of the foregoing section was to consider the man­ner in which the Christian horizon, hermeneutically understood, pro­vides a pointed response to the deconstructionist critique of principle by argu­ing that this notion is not comprehended in Christianity as signifying domination, reductionism and closure toward future possi­bilities, but rather as involving life-giving generosity, plurality within unity, and openness toward future prospects. The importance of con­sidering the notion of principle within the Christian horizon consisted not only in providing an occasion for stating the eminently communi­cative dimen­sion of this religious tradition, but also for suggesting that such a worldview represents a sensus plenior of Habermas's com­municative model. It was further suggested that although the commu­nicative di­mension of reality is explicitly celebrated within the Chris­tian context, if one turns to the metaphysical system of Thomas Aqui­nas, which endeavors to provide Christianity with a philosophical justification, there does not appear to be an equally developed sense of being as emancipative and communicative. This middle section will attempt to answer the question of whether the Habermasian contribu­tion may represent a further development of the notion of being as esse (as existing) in terms of his communicative model. Said another way, the aim here will be to determine whether one may view Haber­mas's emancipatory/communicative model as not merely expressing a certain view of human nature within the purview of a philosophical anthropol­ogy, but rather as indicating an understanding of the human person that may signify a clarification and extension of the notion of esse. This will involve (1) a propadeutic explication of basic meta­physical themes, including (a) the epistemological basis for metaphysi­cal know­ledge, (b) the metaphysical/intellectual method proper to metaphysics, (c) a clarification of the subject of metaphysics, (d) a discussion of "conceivable being," and (e) the role of analogical predi­cation within this framework. This will be followed (2) by an articula­tion of the criteria of transcendentality, i.e., the metaphysical basis for ascertain­ing which notions may or may not be metaphysically predi­cated as properties of esse,[xli] including an illustration of the criteria using fundamental metaphysical predicates. Once this is accomplished, the final section will end (3) by applying the criteria of transcenden­tality to two central Habermasian categories: the emancipatory interest and communication in function of the ideal speech situation.

Basic Metaphysical Themes

          The basis, number and scope of the philosophical sciences, including metaphysics and its method, can be understood in function of the relation of the various cognitive capabilities of the knowing subject with their proper objects. Accordingly, the division of the sciences is grounded in terms of two distinct acts of the mind, the first of which‑‑simple apprehension‑‑is responsible for two modes or degrees of knowledge and the second‑‑negative (existential) judgment of separation‑‑for a third degree in light of which the epistemic sub­ject apprehends reality.[xlii] Classically, scientific knowledge begins in the experience of the concrete sensible singular, a division of the sciences, their cognitive acts and proper objects, can be ascertained in terms of their respective degree of independence from sensible matter and change. The first degree/mode of simple apprehension‑‑abstraction of the whole‑‑provides natural philosophy with its subject matter, i.e., the apprehension of common sensible matter from particular sensible matter, expressed in terms of generic concepts and universals, denot­ing the what, the essence or nature of a material body. Natural philos­ophy thus expresses a concern with attaining universal and necessary knowledge of the nature of a particular thing. The second degree/mode of simple apprehension‑‑abstraction of a form‑‑provides mathematics with its subject matter, i.e., the apprehension of common intelligible matter, expressed in terms of generic concepts and universals, denot­ing purely formal objects such as number and spatial configurations, their structure and measurement.

          However, in the case of the second act of the mind, the object of metaphysics is derived not by a process of simple apprehen­sion but in accordance to the negative judgment of separation, wherein the mind determines that sensible beings may be considered not mere­ly in terms of their matter and motion but in function of their act of exis­tence. Given that the transcendentals ultimately represent deeper in­sights into the act of to be, i.e., into the notion of being as esse, and that the aim of the present section revolves around the question of whether Habermas's emancipatory/communicative model might not itself represent a further insight into the act of existence as emancipa­tive and communicative, it is crucial that the intellectual method from which the notion of being as esse is derived be carefully examined.

          Of the two stages of this method for ascertaining the sub­ject of metaphysics, the first concentrates on "the role of judgments of impli­citation as materially prior to the negative judgment of separa­tion."[xliii]  In the first act of the mind, a conceptualization of a thing is grasped, i.e., what a thing is, such as in the case of the concepts 'horse' and 'unicorn'. In regard to the second act, the mind is no longer intent merely on knowing the essence/nature of a thing, but with the distinct judgment concerning whether the thing itself exists, so as to conclude "The horse is" but "The unicorn is not."  The in­sight here is that to know what something is is not the same as know­ing whether it is. It is then from this initial judgment directed toward the determination of the question of the existence of sensible things that the mind, as it were, experiences a multiplicity of particular con­crete existential judgments such as "John is," "Mary is," "The nightin­gale is," "The rose is," "The lake is," "The sun is," "John is not Mary," "The rose is not the nightingale," "The sun is not the ocean," . . . From the explicit particularity and singularity of such judgments the mind gradually moves toward a realization of their existential implications in a more common judgment, i.e., the judgment of impli­citation: something is, wherein 'something' is not understood as refer­ring to an abstract universal but to a particular with an indefinite reference to singu­lars.[xliv] Notwithstanding its proximity to the genuine metaphysical judgment of existence, the common judgment remains circumscribed within the realm of sensible things and thereby has not yet attained the Thomistic metaphysical notion of being as esse.[xlv]

          In the second stage, the negative judgment of separation signi­fies that beyond the judgment of implicitation, noted above, the mind "negates that to be is necessarily linked with matter and motion, the truth that to be is not necessarily to be this-or-that, that to be is not limited of itself but by a principle of limitation ([essence as] the potential existence)."[xlvi]  Here the mind attains a comprehension that there is an intelligible separation from the question of what the es­sence of a sensible thing is and the question of what it means for something to be.[xlvii] Herein lies the crucial distinction between the particular sciences and metaphysics. The former are concerned with knowing in terms of the formal and intelligible nature of the part of reality to which they are directed‑‑the nature of the existence of which is merely assumed and never itself investigated. The science of meta­physics, in contrast, is concerned not with an analysis of this or that existent but, rather, with things from the formal perspective of their act of to be.[xlviii]

          Indeed, a clarification of the notion of being as esse ex­pressed in and by this judgment makes explicit the viewpoint proper to meta­physics. This is to say that metaphysics considers being in function of its act of to be, such that in the formula being as esse, the term 'be­ing' represents any and all actually existing entities and the term 'esse' designates the formality in function of which the actually exist­ing entities are to be considered, viz., that of their existence.[xlix] The esse here is strictly understood as denoting solely the act of to be derived from the negative judgment of separation, wherein an act of intellection recognizes the distinction between what a sensible entity is and its act of to be. The notion of esse as comprehended here then is restricted by the particular natures in which it is received, i.e., existents receive or participate in the act of to be to the degree al­lowed by their natures. Esse as the subject of metaphysics ultimately rests upon the concrete existential judgments from which one ap­proaches the metaphysical judgment properly speaking.[l]

          Further, the intellectual intuition achieved in and by this judg­ment presents a view of being as signifying a notion rather than a univocal concept, universal or idea. This involves the distinction be­tween the act of reasoning proper of the particular sciences that pro­ceed from a consideration of the many to a simple cognition of them, and the act of intellection proper to metaphysics which, in pondering the signification of esse understands the whole multitude in terms of their act of to be.[li] Univocal terms as generic concepts are conse­quently predicated of diverse things according to a same intention. Maintaining the widest extension it admits the least comprehension insofar as the inferiors potentially included under their purview are concerned. For instance, the univocal term, "animal" is said both of horse and cow and signifies in each case the same intention, viz., an animated sensible substance.[lii] However, the notion of esse is not a univocal term since its intention is not predicated of its inferiors in the same way but, rather, in an analogous way. It expresses similari­ties and differences admiting internal adjustment for both the widest possible extension‑‑since it can be said of all things‑‑and the fullest implicit comprehension‑‑since any real being exists not potentially but actually. The notion of esse then is not an idea and it cannot be de­rived from the analysis of an idea; rather it denotes an act. Moreover, ". . . although esse is the most formal among all things, nevertheless it is also the most communicable, although it is not communicated to its inferiors and superiors in the same way."[liii]  Indeed, the act of to be, esse, possesses in and of itself all possible perfections, since as distinct from matter and motion, it does not in and of itself express any relation to potency and is thereby limited only in sensible things by the specific nature in which it is found, a nature, that participates to a greater or lesser degree in the plenitude of existence.

          It must be said that this which I call esse is the most perfect of all things . . . this which I call esse is the actualizing of all acts and on account of this it is the perfection of all perfections.[liv]

Hence, unlike univocal terms whose intentional unity is perfectly one, the notion of esse admits only of a proportional, relative, analogical unity, in which its inferiors are included actually although implicitly. In this sense, the notion of esse as an analogical term possess what may be described as a confused character given that differences in degree of predication in function of the nature in which it is received are not made explicit.

          At this juncture it is crucial to point out that the notion of esse "can be termed 'transcendental' not only because it is non-univo­cal but because it leaves the way open for man to investigate the area of the conceivable which is beyond his immediate experience."[lv]  This is to say that the subject of metaphysics is clearly the notion of being as esse grasped in the negative judgment of separation and predicated analogously of limited being. At the point in which the mind under­stands the act of to be as separated from matter and motion and as thus not implying any limitation, there emerges an additional intuition concerning the possibility of a unique being in whom esse is predicat­ed in an unlimited way, i.e., a being whose essence connotes no po­tency (matter or motion) and is synonymous with its unrestricted possession of existence as Ipsum Esse Subsistens, the Self-Existing Being.[lvi] The rationale here is that although the act of to be is initial­ly found within the context of the concrete finite/limited singulars, not implying of itself limitation, it is nonetheless understood as endowing as much actual existence as a given nature in function of its principle of potency is capable of receiving. If the esse of an entity suggests no limitation then

          . . . such a notion of being effected in a positive way by and in the metaphysical judgment of existence does leave the way open both to the conceivability of a being unlim­ited by any po­tential existence and to an incresase (by way of addition to knowledge) of understanding, which increase is effectively expressed by the transcen­den­tals.[lvii]

          Yet, before considering how this notion of being "leaves the way open . . . to an increase of understanding" via the transcen­den­tals, there remains the task of clarifying, in light of the foregoing treatment of the conceivability of Unlimited Being, that mode of anal­ogous predication that would be proper of limited beings and Unlimit­ed Being. In other words, if, in addition to the subject of metaphy­sics‑‑initially understood as referring to the esse of limited beings‑‑ there now appears not only the feasibility but also the relevance and appropriateness of acknowledging Unlimited Being, then the question becomes one of determining the nature of the analogous predication suitable for such an extension of being. Two modes of metaphysical predication will be considered, viz.: the analogy of proper proportion­ality and the analogy of intrinsic attribution.

          The analogy of proper proportionality consists in a recogni­tion that though beings are diverse in kind and number, they nonethe­less all participate in the perfections of existence. That is, each es­sence is related to its own act of existing in a manner proportionately similar to that of another essence to its act of existence. The formula here is expressed as existence : essence :: existence : essence.  For example: Michael's essence is to Michael's existence as Patricia's essence is to Patricia's existence as the moon's essence is to the moon's existence. Further, although two distinct beings may not exist in the same way, they nonetheless both participate in the excellence of existence in a manner congruent with their nature. For some critics, however, the fact that the analogy of proper proportionality expresses a distinction between essence and existence renders it a form of meta­physical pred­ication proper only of limited being in which such a distinction is found, but inappropriate for Unlimited Being in which no such distinc­tion is to be found.[lviii] This is to say that

          (1) the analogy of proper proportionality is a comparison of real intrinsic relations from the standpoint of similari­ty in the sense that some­thing (to be) in the being is shared, which shar­ing admits of a greater-or-less degree (on the basis of the essence, the potential existence, a principle of limitation, bespeaking more-or-less) and is a comparison of relations that are really distinct; (2) but it is conceivable that there can be a being whose essense is its act of to be, i.e., where there is no intrinsic really distinct rela­tion; (3) if such is the formal nature of the anal­ogy of proper proportionality it will not enable the metaphysician to arrive at the most proper object of metaphysics: God, and it will not pro­vide the rational justification for a natural theol­ogy because it will be unable to declare how this conceivable being is similar to beings of a rela­tive character. Therefore while the analo­gy of proper