CHAPTER V

  HABERMAS'S PHILOSOPHY OF EMANCIPATION

AND METAPHYSICS

          Thus far this study has concentrated on criti­cally develop­ing the vari­ous components of Habermas's philosophy of emancipa­tion. Accord­ingly, the second chapter argued for the dignity of the human person as oriented toward the full realization of its constitutive nature in function of an emancipatory interest with autonomy and responsibil­ity. The emancipatory interest emerged as setting in motion the human concern for articulating, promoting and appropriating a mode of exis­tence in function of justice. The third chapter explicated Habermas's theory of univer­sal pragmatics as properly representing the method­ological frame­work wherein he specifies in function of the ideal speech situation the conditions of communication aimed at adju­dicat­ing truth claims pursued within the context of a logic of theoreti­cal discourse. In examining Habermas's ethical proposal, viz., his dis­course ethics, the crucial ques­tion, considered in the fourth chapter, centered on determining the ade­quacy of the purely formal conditions for adjudication of problematicized normative claims with a view to the dissolu­tion of hypostatized disequilibria. In considering this ques­tion, it became increasingly plain that the formalism of Habermas's principle of univer­salization ultimately terminates in an intra- and intercultural pluralism that effectively undermines its integrity as a moral rule. Moreover, Haber­mas's appropriation and commendation of a materialist interpreta­tion of society would undoubtedly supplant the formalism which his ethical theory fosters with a worldview that would serve to orient practi­cal judgment in one direction rather than another.

          Chapters II-IV endeavored to examine Habermas's opus within the confines of his own horizons. The present chapter will venture to move beyond the parameters of Habermas's proposals in an effort to develop the latent metaphysical themes permeating his eman­cipatory/ communicative model. It will review this from an optic which can be developed today with resources from the classical existential meta­physical tradition when catalyzed by the contemporary issue discussed in the foregoing chapters. Indeed, this chapter will endeavor to consid­er the mutually enriching, complementary nature of the Habermasian communicative model and the metaphysical model as mediated in terms of a philosophical appropriation of the Christian vision. This objective will be pursued in three sections. The first will strive (A) to clarify the intention animating Habermas's commendation of a materi­alist interpretation of society by noting certain parallelisms that relate this to Kant's move toward a teleological worldview. This will pro­vide an occasion for arguing in hermeneutical fashion in favor of the Christian horizon/vision as a worldview that both equips philo­sophical reflection with critical resources that serve as a response to the post­modern challenge against metaphysical principles, and that furnishes a non-materialist context for Habermas's formalistic commu­nicative model. In this sense, this chapter essentially consists in an examina­tion of the two philosophical models operative in the Christian world­view. The second or middle section (B) will articulate a method­ology for elevating proposed notions to metaphysical status such that they may be suitable for employment within the context of metaphysi­cal discourse. Such methodological schemata will be applied to the funda­mental categories of Habermas's model, viz., his notion of the emanci­patory interest and communication in function of the ideal speech situation. Finally, the third section will endeavor (C) to indi­cate the sense in which the categories of Habermas's emancipatory/ communi­cative proposal enrich the traditional transcendental properties of being in metaphysics, as well as the manner in which Habermas's proposal is itself enriched when understood from the metaphysical point of view.

THE CHRISTIAN HERMENEUTICAL HORIZON AND THE

SENSUS PLENIOR OF HABERMAS'S PHILOSOPHY OF

EMANCIPATION

          This section will examine in hermeneutic fashion the impli­ca­tions of the philosophical resources of the Christian horizon for meta­physical reflection. The aim will be to relate Habermas's commu­nica­tive model with metaphysics. It will argue (1) that the relevance of Habermas's move to a materialist framework finds its parallel in Kant's move toward a teleological conception of the universe; (2) that the hermeneutical mode of philosophizing--rather than deductive/ rationalist or inductive/empiricist procedures--favors a philosophical appropriation of the Christian tradition; (3) that a hermeneutical ap­propriation of the Christian horizon provides philosophical reflection with the resources with which to mitigate the postmodernist challenge against metaphysical principles; and (4) that such resources derived from doing philosophy from a Christian perspective, in turn, provide Habermas's formalist model with a context that is realist (although non-materialist), metaphysical and communicative.

           Habermas's acceptance of a materialist worldview may be un­derstood as a consequence of his concep­tion of reality as encom­pass­ing two distinct domains. On the one hand, there is the realm of phys­ical nature, whose fundamental charac­teristic consists precisely in its subjection to invariant laws as studied by nomological science. On the other, there is the realm of human nature, whose principal feature consists precisely in its emancipatory poten­tial as studied by the criti­cal sciences. Faced with the problem of relating necessity and free­dom, Habermas proposes a worldview in which the concrete--versus purely notional--exercise of freedom can take place within his commu­nicative model of communicating subjects.

          In this respect Habermas shares certain affinities with the situa­tion in which Kant found himself at the end of his second cri­tique and which led him to his third critique in function of which the first two were to be reread. This move to the third critique, i.e., to an aesthetic view of the world, has often been neglected in favor of an almost exclusivise reading of the first critique in function of the Car­tesian rationalist influence (or bias). However, the first critique or Critique of Pure Reason was limited by a consideration of the ques­tion con­cerning the epistemic conditions of the physical sciences. This rejected intelligible objects or metaphysical notions which implied no potenti­ality or materiality. This ". . . rejection of metaphysics as a science was warmly greeted in empiricist, positivist and, then materi­alist circles as a dispensation from any search beyond the phenomenal, i.e., what is inherently spatio and/or temporal."[i]

          Yet, in contrast to the first critique's transcendental deduc­tion of the categories of cognition by which the intel­ligibility of the phe­nomenal world could be secured, Kant's Foundations of the Meta­phys­ics of Morals and his second critique, the Critique of Practical Rea­son, explicitly concerned a realm distinct from the purely physical, i.e., with the moral realm. In elucidating the constitutive elements of this distinct sphere of reality, Kant's analysis ". . . pushes forcefully beyond utilitarian goals, inner instincts and rational scientific relation­ships . . . None of these recog­nizes that which is distinctive of the human person, namely, one's freedom. To be moral an act must be based upon the will of the person; it must be autonomous, not heter­onomous."[ii]

          Once Kant had articulated the dimension of freedom rooted in practical reason in contradistinction to the necessity and universali­ty of pure reason, "his entire Critique of the Faculty of Judgment will be written to provide a context which will enable the previous two cri­tiques to be read in a way that protects this notion of human free­dom."[iii] This is to say that Kant rejected any strain of reductionism that would attempt to undermine human freedom in terms of a deter­ministic model. Indeed, Kant's repudiation of any reductionist tenden­cies leads him ". . . to affirm and provide the justification for his affirmation of the teleological character of nature as the context of scientific necessity. . . . if science is to contribute to the exercise of human freedom, then that realm too must be directed toward a goal and hence be manifestive throughout of intent within which free hu­man purpose can be integrated."[iv]

          Notwithstanding Kant's inability to ascribe metaphysical reality to the teleological nature of reality in virtue of the critical limits which his epistemology imposes on human cognition, "we must pro­ceed 'as if' it is so precisely because of the undeniable reality of human freedom in this ordered universe."[v] For Kant, within the con­text of a teleological universe, aesthetic judgments register reflections concerning the degree of harmony or disharmony, of the level of beauty or ugliness. This has consequences for the concrete exercise of freedom as it endeavors to realize the universal realm of ends-in-them­selves. In this respect, Habermas's proposal of a certain worldview can be understood as an attempt to move beyond a critical impasse between scientific necessity and human freedom which parallels Kant's turn in the direction of a teleological worldview.[vi]

          Indeed, the tendency to reason in the light of a certain context has characterized the philosophical enterprise since antiquity, given that its varied conceptions have typically never proceeded by means of the operation of "pure reason" in separation from some orienting framework. Thus, "Russell developed certain of his philo­sophical views from insights disclosed by mathematics; Quine took experimen­tal science as his paradigm; others have taken law or art or music or social interaction."[vii] Habermas, in his stead, employs the model of social communication understood within a materialist con­ception of society as his own orienting framework for doing philoso­phy. Yet, it would appear that within the contempo­rary philosophical thrust for openness, dialogue and conver­sation, proposals can be put forward as at the very least constituting recommendations worthy of consider­ation. The view here is that a move to focus on Habermas's contribu­tions from an optic other than the one Habermas provides is indeed congruent with his own view of philosophy as "stand-in and interpret­er" that "cannot and should not try to play the role of ush­er."[viii] Speak­ing of Kant, Habermas states,

          In championing the idea of a cognition before cogni­tion, Kantian philosophy sets up a domain between itself and the sciences, arrogating au­thority to itself. It wants to clarify the founda­tions of the sciences once and for all, defining the limits of what can and cannot be experi­enced. This is tanta­mount to an act of show­ing the sci­ences their proper place. I think phi­loso­phy cannot and should not try to play the role of usher.[ix]

          The openness, then, implicit in Habermas's view of philoso­phy as "interpreter" provides a space for considering his proposals from an alternative perspective. The question, however, becomes one of deter­mining in function of what worldview Habermas's communica­tive model should be considered. The suggestion of this study is that Habermas's philosophy of emancipation be examined within the hori­zon of the Christian worldview, i.e., one that "follows out lines of inquiry suggested by Christian experience."[x] If the claim that all philosophy departs from some definite starting point, rooted in a prior understanding, is true of its historical contributions, then a Christian philosophy "is shaped in important ways by Christian faith, life and action."[xi] However, the incorporation of the Christian worldview should be understood here as safeguarding the distinction between philosophy and theological investigation. This means that insight may be derived from the resources of the Christian worldview for doing philosophy while that which is appropriated philosophically must itself conform to the canons of reasoned evidence and argument.[xii] In short, a Christian philosophy as understood here is one that "seeks to appro­priate by rational and properly philosophical means certain insights first disclosed by Christian revelation."[xiii]

          However, at this point an issue that needs to be addressed is what "properly philosophical means" or, more specifically, what philo­sophical methodology--from among a number of possibilities--is best suited for disclosing the philosophically-significant insights of Chris­tian revelation. Three possible methodological candidates that may be considered include the deductive/rationalist, the inductive/ empiricist and the hermeneutical approaches to philosophiz­ing. The inappropri­ateness of the deductive method stems from the fact that it invariably endeavors to apply self-evident axioms to definitions from which more geometrico propositions follow so as to establish a system of proposi­tions whose fundamental characteristic consists precisely in the neces­sary relations that obtain from one proposition to the other. Such a procedure supposes a Spinozian-like conception of reality where God and nature are interchangeable (Deus sive Natura). Such a system acknowledges the existence of the one infinite substance, i.e., the primary axiom, from which all other possible attributes, i.e., the prop­ositions, are derived by necessity. This not only denies the dis­tinction between God and nature, but also reduces the notion of free­dom to necessity, both of which are entirely foreign to the Christian world­view.

          With respect to the inductive or, more specifically, the construc­tive methodology typical of positivist forms of empiricism, the strict delimitation of knowledge to the order of experience artifi­cially cir­cumscribes the intellect to an identification, arrangement and collec­tion of individual sensible objects (matters of fact). As such, these can never be transcended, so that, at best, metaphysical notions are rele­gated exclusively to the extra-philosophical domain of faith. Such a reductive methodology excluding metaphysical discourse and reducing the human intellect to one more sense faculty is foreign also to the Christian worldview.

          A third approach, i.e., the hermeneutical methodology, will be adopted in this study, given its emphasis in delving into a tradi­tion, in this case the Christian tradition, for resources that may illumi­nate new challenges.

          The reason for considering in hermeneutical fashion the Chris­tian horizon as the context for interpreting Habermas's communi­cative proposal is better appreciated by probing the manner in which such a worldview may be understood as emancipatory when examined as a response to the deconstructionist critique against metaphysical princi­ples. A consideration of the deconstructionist position consists not only in bringing out the emancipatory dimension of the Christian worldview, but also in indicating one contemporary approach which may be advanced in response to the acute challenge that deconstruc­tion represents. Today the "post-modern condition" or the "mark of post-modernity" mounts a relentless criticism of the basic modes of rationality typical of the Western tradition and leads to a "loss of credibility in all metanarratives."[xiv]

          An important article, "From Anarchy to Principles: Decons­truc­tion and the Resources of Christian Philosophy,"[xv] indicates the sense in which the Christian horizon is not subject to various critical themes emerging from the deconstructionist denunciation of "metanar­ratives." Kenneth L. Schmitz both presents a weakness in the decons­truction program when considered in light of the Christian worldview and brings out the emancipatory dimension rooted in this religious tradi­tion. For Schmitz the postmodernist position consists specifically in a repudiation of the principles by which reason "has sought a better understanding of what is true and good."[xvi]  The bulk of the post­modernist critique is directed against the notion of principle (princi­pium in Latin; arché in Greek) as the source of being, thought and action. Instead, deconstructionists favor anarchy, understood in its more original meaning as signifying "to live, think and act without principles," rather than in its more modern sense as referring "primari­ly to violence and disrespect for the law."[xvii] Schmitz advises against taking this challenge lightly: "It may be that, when reading Richard Rorty's latest sigh of despair, we are merely seeing yet another of the recurrent descents into skepticism that have come and gone at various periods in our intellectual history. And yet there are signs that there may be deeper movement afoot."[xviii]  Given the seriousness, compre­hen­siveness and uncompromising nature of the deconstructionist cri­tique, a reconstruction of the master lines of Schmitz's analysis fol­lows in two parts: (a) the nature of the deconstructionist critique of Western culture as advanced by Heidegger and Horkheimer-Adorno, and (b) a response to this critique from the viewpoint of the Christian horizon.

          Schmitz employs an interpretive study on Heidegger by Reiner Schürmann[xix] as a focal point for the deconstructionist discus­sion con­cerning the notion of principles. According to Schürmann's study, Heidegger envisions Western culture as consisting in four ep­ochs: the pre-metaphysical epoch, consisting of the age of Greek poets, drama­tists, and early philosophers; the classical metaphysical epoch, span­ning from Greek philosophy to contemporary scientific technology; and the post-metaphysical epoch, which emerges with Nietzsche. In­deed, the metaphysical epoch itself is further subdivided into four subcategories or economies, with each economy distinguished from the other in function of a single principle or foundational notion determin­ing a fixed order or worldview. In this respect, the Greek economy or order revolves around the notion of essence or substance (ousia); the medieval order proceeds in function of the notion of God (Theos, Deus, Gubernator mundi); the modern order revolves around the no­tion of man (humanism); and the contemporary order proceeds in terms of the notion of scientific technology (technik).[xx] Of these four epochs the metaphysical one has for over two and a half milennia clearly dominated the intellectual formation and orientation of Western culture. It is this supremacy which has become the target of the de­constructionist critique.

          The deconstructionist understand their own program as consist­ing in "comprehending and overcoming" such metaphysical reliance on principles. Here, in function of the categorical nature of its principles, metaphysics comes to be understood as a limiting framework that precludes rather than advances thought. Clearly, the term metaphysics, as used by Schürmann, does not only refer to its more technical use in Western philosophy as signifying the science of the real. It refers more broadly to an ordering of worldviews in terms of principles. It is precisely the viability of such conceptual orderings that postmoder­nists endeavor to deconstruct.

          Metaphysics is the long-standing thought-con­struction which has been produced by means of priniciples; and it can be brought to truth only through the task of decons­truction, the task of comprehending and overcoming (Verwindung) the way in which principles has sealed our thought in upon itself and away from the true disclosure of being.[xxi]

          In this respect, for Heidegger, metaphysical principles nulli­fy further thought by fostering a notion of origin as domination. In func­tion of this all things within the cosmos are reduced to a uniform unity and in terms of which all thought and action are subject to the closure brought about by the origin.[xxii] Heidegger understands the vari­ous senses of the term principle, as elaborated by Aristotle,[xxiii] as pre­cisely signifying such a domineering, reductionistic and limiting no­tion of origin.[xxiv] As Schürmann argues, "Aristotle defines arché as that out of which something is or becomes or is known. The term therefore designates a source of being, becoming and knowledge be­yond which it is useless to try to investigate: the source is ultimate in that it both begins and commands."[xxv] 

          Thus, as Schmitz elaborates, the principles constitutive of each of the four metaphysical periods reflect three features character­istic of an epoch/economy, viz., closure, necessity and certitude.

          For what marks each of these "epochs" or "econ­omies" is that their order rests upon a single primary principle; and this foundation provides--for those who live, think and act in terms of its order--first, a selective determination of open possibilities, in a word: closure; secondly, stabil­ity or regularity, in a word: necessity; and third­ly, credi­bility through repetitive confirmation, in a word: certi­tude.[xxvi]

Accordingly, metaphysical principles generative of epochs (1) estab­lish an order that fixes the relations between the entities comprising that order as well as the relations that such entities may have to the order itself; (2) furnish an explanation for the occurrence of phenome­na; (3) provide a purposeful reason for action; and (4) ban "inappro­priate action by pre-empting more radical choice."[xxvii]

          Schmitz also introduces the work of Max Horkheimer and Theo­dor W. Adorno,[xxviii] representatives of the Frankfurt School, who, like Heidegger, notwithstanding different orientations, comprehend the history of Western thought in terms of a conception of origin under­stood as domination with its ensuing closure. In the case of Horkhei­mer and Adorno, however, they find this notion operative in the West's "technological determination to master nature."[xxix]  This mas­tery proceeds in function of instrumental reason, i.e., in terms of a means-end rationality limited in its employment via impersonal tech­niques to the inception and attainment of varied objectives, while itself remaining incapable of determining the good or ratio finalis of human existence. The end result of instrumental reason at the service of technological advancements is understood as involving a process of reification that leads to the dehumanization of the subject via greater calculability, bureaucratic efficiency, administrative and economic control. Hence, the technological machine becomes an exploitative mechanism subjecting the human person to dehumanizing relationships that negate authentic individuality.

          Interestingly enough, Schmitz's response to the deconstruct­ionist critique of metaphysical principles does not consist in a blanket de­fense of such principles. Instead he limits his response to indicating in what sense metaphysical principles in function of the Christian hori­zon are less susceptible to the postmodernist attack.[xxx] He first ques­tions whether the concept of principle as involving a notion of origin must be conceived as indicating domination or whether it may not be possible to retain a "conception of principle as that which establishes a certain arrangement of consequences, but deny that the arrangement must be one of domination."[xxxi]  Speaking of Christian philosophers, Schmitz adds that they were concerned with the very being of things in a manner that raises the question

          Why anything at all, why not rather nothing?  This ques­tion arose out of a freshly charged wonder, prompted no doubt by the Christian disclosure of the generosity of a Creator who sent his only Son to redeem a fallen human­ity. So that a Christian philosophy is prompted to look for the primary form of power (and the ultimate meaning and worth of the term) not in domination, but in caring presence.[xxxii]

This understanding of God as love permeates Christian scriptures as evidenced in the following passage where Christ states,

          For this is how God loved the world:

          he gave his only Son,

          so that everyone who believes in him may not perish

          but may have eternal life.

          For God sent his Son into the world

          not to judge the world,

          but so that through him the world might be saved.[xxxiii]

In another passage Christ--though God--does not cling to his own divinity, but surrenders all for love of humankind; he

          Who, being in the form of God,

          did not count equality with God

          something to be grasped.

           But he emptied himself,

          taking the form of a slave,

          becoming as human beings are;

          and being in every way like a human being,

          he was humbler yet,

          even to accepting death, death on a cross.[xxxiv]

Indeed within the Christian horizon, God as the all-encompassing first principle does not lord over his subjects as objects of domination, but rather elevates humanity to a state of filiation in which the human person is dignified with the title of "son":

          God sent his Son, born of a woman, born a subject of the Law, to redeem the subjects of the law, so that we could receive adoption as sons. As you are sons, God has sent into our hearts the Spirit of his Son crying, 'Abba, Father'; and so you are no longer a slave, but a son; and if a son, then an heir, by God's own act.[xxxv]

This view of God as Father, Brother and Friend, who loves and emp­ties himself in order to elevate humankind to a new state of filiation is precisely the conception of first principle that is understood within the Christian horizon and pursued, for instance, by Thomas Aquinas, who understands the creation, according to Schmitz, as a communica­tion‑‑a giving, a sharing--of being.[xxxvi] The Christian conception of a first principle is not understood as a principle of domination whose aim is to subordinate its subjects for the sake of dehumanizing control or influence.

          To the charge that metaphysical principles reduce all reality to a single unity, philosophy pursued within the Christian horizon, one may counter that, to the contrary, the first principle in referring to the Trinity is understood as a unity permeated with abundance. Schmitz argues,

          The charge that a metaphysics of principles is a means of domination is strengthened by the reductionism of the many to a sheer, univocal unity. But, if the first principle is one, yet not hostile to inner distinction (as theological­ly and in respect of the Trinity, we speak of the distinct persons and their different processions and mis­sions), then the charge of closure must be re­opened for discus­sion.[xxxvii]

Yet, within the Christian experience, not only is the first principle open to inner distinction, as Schmitz rightly suggests, it also incorpo­rates humanity as part of its inner life, as powerfully expressed in the priestly prayer of Christ:

          May they all be one,

          just as, Father, you are in me and I am in you,

          so that they also may be in us,

          so that the world may believe it was you who sent me.

          I have given them the glory you gave to me,

          that they may be one as we are one.

          With me in them and you in me,

          that they be so perfected in unity . . .[xxxviii]

          Finally, where the deconstructionists claim that the first princi­ple brings about closure insofar as future possibilities for thought and action is concerned, it should be noted that the ad intra constitution of the first principle within itself consists in a "plurifica­tion" of per­sons. Even in terms of its ad extra manifestation the "infi­nite abun­dance of the first principle will give more room for all possi­bilities within creation--even, it must be remarked, for the possibilities of evil."[xxxix]  Indeed, within the Christian worldview, far from a first prin­ciple as limiting future possibilities, there is the promise that the believer will perform and even surpass the works of its founder, as Christ himself states,

          In all truth I tell you,

          whoever believes in me

          will perform the same works as I do myself,

          and will perform even greater works,

          because I am going to the Father.

          Whatever you ask for in my name I will do,

          so that the Father may be glorified in the Son.[xl]

          The philosophically relevant implications of the Christian per­spective seems then to contrast the deconstructionist critique of first principles. How then would such a worldview open, sensitize and shape thinking and living in relation to Habermas's proposal. The answer to this question reflects the sense in which the Christian worldview may be understood as providing a sensus plenior to Haber­mas's own formalistic model.

          One distinct contribution that may be derived hermeneuti­cally from a consideration of the Christian worldview is its eminently real­ist outlook. It views the foundation of the universe, the human person, its past, present and future, as inexorably related to a God who not only is origin and destiny of all that is, but for love of hu­manity enters, with his Divinty, human history in order to effect a dramatic redemption. Such a realist orientation provides Habermas's formalistic notion of ethical discourse with a framework, a transcen­dent ground for human life, diametrically different from a materialist one.

          A second contribution that may be derived from a Christian worldview consists in that it does not merely insist on the reality of God as Trinity, the universe and the transcendent dimension of the human person, including the latter's redemption in function of a his­torical intervention of a divine person. It also endeavors to give its body of beliefs metaphysical articulation. Indeed the Christian world­view embodies an eminently metaphysical outlook that dynamically moves beyond a purely physical and even anthropological understand­ing in the direction of a metaphysical penetration of reality. Said another way, Christian reflection endeavors to move beyond the con­traries consisting in this or that form to a notion of life experienced or possessed more fully in function of its transcendent nature. For Aquinas, accordingly, the ratio finalis of humanity individually and as mystical body consists not in imaging physical movement, i.e., in realizing this or that motion or change; nor in pursuing anthropologi­cal accomplishments, i.e., in achieving this or that theoretical or prac­tical, artistic, or technical perfection; but, rather, in imaging divine being itself, i.e., in conforming one's life at the level of one's onto­logical constitution in accordance to the revelation--the emancipatory communication--of the Christian Trinity. In this respect, the Christian horizon moves beyond the strictures of Habermas's emancipatory ethical/political discourse to metaphysical discourse as representing the speculative completion of thought and action.

          In addition to its realist and metaphysical orientation, a third contribution stemming from the Christian worldview is its thor­oughgo­ing communicative dimension. The Christian worldview is in function of a God conceived within and outside its own divinity as communica­tion par excellence. Indeed the Christian understanding of God as consisting in the undivided unity of a trinity of persons pos­sesses ad intra a communicative character that stems from the very relational exigencies of the processions that each divine person has with respect to the other. The Father communicates his paternity to the Son, the Son communicates his filiation to the Father, the Father and the Son communicate their relation to the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit communicates his love to the Father and the Son. This communicative makeup of the divinity is reflected in its ad extra operations such that all reality, particularly as manifested in the case of the human person, is in some sense to a lesser or greater degree communicative. Indeed, the central claim of the Christian message is that the Son, the Logos, the Verb, of the Father became man and dwelt among men in order to communicate and thereby share the Trinitarian life with humankind. Accordingly, the Christian under­standing of communication purports to extend profoundly the dialogi­cal character of Habermas's communi­cative model such that such a discourse is no longer limited to indi­vidual persons but is compre­hended as a discourse open to the testa­ment of the divine Logos.

          Now, although the view of this study is that the Christian hori­zon does present a context for anchoring Habermas's formalistic mod­el, yet when one turns to a more philosophical appropriation of the Christian horizon, it is clear that being as emancipative and com­muni­cative remains an entirely undeveloped notion. In view of the endeav­or to provide a philosophical framework for Christian revela­tion, the object of the next section will be to consider the manner in which the Habermasian proposal may be incorporated within a meta­physical context, particularly as it relates to the theory of the tran­scendental properties of being. This will be accomplished by articulat­ing a meth­od for critically examining philosophical notions in terms of his exis­tential metaphysics.

APPLICATION OF THE METHODOLOGY OF METAPHYSICS TO HABERMASIAN CATEGORIES

          The aim of the foregoing section was to consider the man­ner in which the Christian horizon, hermeneutically understood, pro­vides a pointed response to the deconstructionist critique of principle by argu­ing that this notion is not comprehended in Christianity as signifying domination, reductionism and closure toward future possi­bilities, but rather as involving life-giving generosity, plurality within unity, and openness toward future prospects. The importance of con­sidering the notion of principle within the Christian horizon consisted not only in providing an occasion for stating the eminently communi­cative dimen­sion of this religious tradition, but also for suggesting that such a worldview represents a sensus plenior of Habermas's com­municative model. It was further suggested that although the commu­nicative di­mension of reality is explicitly celebrated within the Chris­tian context, if one turns to the metaphysical system of Thomas Aqui­nas, which endeavors to provide Christianity with a philosophical justification, there does not appear to be an equally developed sense of being as emancipative and communicative. This middle section will attempt to answer the question of whether the Habermasian contribu­tion may represent a further development of the notion of being as esse (as existing) in terms of his communicative model. Said another way, the aim here will be to determine whether one may view Haber­mas's emancipatory/communicative model as not merely expressing a certain view of human nature within the purview of a philosophical anthropol­ogy, but rather as indicating an understanding of the human person that may signify a clarification and extension of the notion of esse. This will involve (1) a propadeutic explication of basic meta­physical themes, including (a) the epistemological basis for metaphysi­cal know­ledge, (b) the metaphysical/intellectual method proper to metaphysics, (c) a clarification of the subject of metaphysics, (d) a discussion of "conceivable being," and (e) the role of analogical predi­cation within this framework. This will be followed (2) by an articula­tion of the criteria of transcendentality, i.e., the metaphysical basis for ascertain­ing which notions may or may not be metaphysically predi­cated as properties of esse,[xli] including an illustration of the criteria using fundamental metaphysical predicates. Once this is accomplished, the final section will end (3) by applying the criteria of transcenden­tality to two central Habermasian categories: the emancipatory interest and communication in function of the ideal speech situation.

Basic Metaphysical Themes

          The basis, number and scope of the philosophical sciences, including metaphysics and its method, can be understood in function of the relation of the various cognitive capabilities of the knowing subject with their proper objects. Accordingly, the division of the sciences is grounded in terms of two distinct acts of the mind, the first of which‑‑simple apprehension‑‑is responsible for two modes or degrees of knowledge and the second‑‑negative (existential) judgment of separation‑‑for a third degree in light of which the epistemic sub­ject apprehends reality.[xlii] Classically, scientific knowledge begins in the experience of the concrete sensible singular, a division of the sciences, their cognitive acts and proper objects, can be ascertained in terms of their respective degree of independence from sensible matter and change. The first degree/mode of simple apprehension‑‑abstraction of the whole‑‑provides natural philosophy with its subject matter, i.e., the apprehension of common sensible matter from particular sensible matter, expressed in terms of generic concepts and universals, denot­ing the what, the essence or nature of a material body. Natural philos­ophy thus expresses a concern with attaining universal and necessary knowledge of the nature of a particular thing. The second degree/mode of simple apprehension‑‑abstraction of a form‑‑provides mathematics with its subject matter, i.e., the apprehension of common intelligible matter, expressed in terms of generic concepts and universals, denot­ing purely formal objects such as number and spatial configurations, their structure and measurement.

          However, in the case of the second act of the mind, the object of metaphysics is derived not by a process of simple apprehen­sion but in accordance to the negative judgment of separation, wherein the mind determines that sensible beings may be considered not mere­ly in terms of their matter and motion but in function of their act of exis­tence. Given that the transcendentals ultimately represent deeper in­sights into the act of to be, i.e., into the notion of being as esse, and that the aim of the present section revolves around the question of whether Habermas's emancipatory/communicative model might not itself represent a further insight into the act of existence as emancipa­tive and communicative, it is crucial that the intellectual method from which the notion of being as esse is derived be carefully examined.

          Of the two stages of this method for ascertaining the sub­ject of metaphysics, the first concentrates on "the role of judgments of impli­citation as materially prior to the negative judgment of separa­tion."[xliii]  In the first act of the mind, a conceptualization of a thing is grasped, i.e., what a thing is, such as in the case of the concepts 'horse' and 'unicorn'. In regard to the second act, the mind is no longer intent merely on knowing the essence/nature of a thing, but with the distinct judgment concerning whether the thing itself exists, so as to conclude "The horse is" but "The unicorn is not."  The in­sight here is that to know what something is is not the same as know­ing whether it is. It is then from this initial judgment directed toward the determination of the question of the existence of sensible things that the mind, as it were, experiences a multiplicity of particular con­crete existential judgments such as "John is," "Mary is," "The nightin­gale is," "The rose is," "The lake is," "The sun is," "John is not Mary," "The rose is not the nightingale," "The sun is not the ocean," . . . From the explicit particularity and singularity of such judgments the mind gradually moves toward a realization of their existential implications in a more common judgment, i.e., the judgment of impli­citation: something is, wherein 'something' is not understood as refer­ring to an abstract universal but to a particular with an indefinite reference to singu­lars.[xliv] Notwithstanding its proximity to the genuine metaphysical judgment of existence, the common judgment remains circumscribed within the realm of sensible things and thereby has not yet attained the Thomistic metaphysical notion of being as esse.[xlv]

          In the second stage, the negative judgment of separation signi­fies that beyond the judgment of implicitation, noted above, the mind "negates that to be is necessarily linked with matter and motion, the truth that to be is not necessarily to be this-or-that, that to be is not limited of itself but by a principle of limitation ([essence as] the potential existence)."[xlvi]  Here the mind attains a comprehension that there is an intelligible separation from the question of what the es­sence of a sensible thing is and the question of what it means for something to be.[xlvii] Herein lies the crucial distinction between the particular sciences and metaphysics. The former are concerned with knowing in terms of the formal and intelligible nature of the part of reality to which they are directed‑‑the nature of the existence of which is merely assumed and never itself investigated. The science of meta­physics, in contrast, is concerned not with an analysis of this or that existent but, rather, with things from the formal perspective of their act of to be.[xlviii]

          Indeed, a clarification of the notion of being as esse ex­pressed in and by this judgment makes explicit the viewpoint proper to meta­physics. This is to say that metaphysics considers being in function of its act of to be, such that in the formula being as esse, the term 'be­ing' represents any and all actually existing entities and the term 'esse' designates the formality in function of which the actually exist­ing entities are to be considered, viz., that of their existence.[xlix] The esse here is strictly understood as denoting solely the act of to be derived from the negative judgment of separation, wherein an act of intellection recognizes the distinction between what a sensible entity is and its act of to be. The notion of esse as comprehended here then is restricted by the particular natures in which it is received, i.e., existents receive or participate in the act of to be to the degree al­lowed by their natures. Esse as the subject of metaphysics ultimately rests upon the concrete existential judgments from which one ap­proaches the metaphysical judgment properly speaking.[l]

          Further, the intellectual intuition achieved in and by this judg­ment presents a view of being as signifying a notion rather than a univocal concept, universal or idea. This involves the distinction be­tween the act of reasoning proper of the particular sciences that pro­ceed from a consideration of the many to a simple cognition of them, and the act of intellection proper to metaphysics which, in pondering the signification of esse understands the whole multitude in terms of their act of to be.[li] Univocal terms as generic concepts are conse­quently predicated of diverse things according to a same intention. Maintaining the widest extension it admits the least comprehension insofar as the inferiors potentially included under their purview are concerned. For instance, the univocal term, "animal" is said both of horse and cow and signifies in each case the same intention, viz., an animated sensible substance.[lii] However, the notion of esse is not a univocal term since its intention is not predicated of its inferiors in the same way but, rather, in an analogous way. It expresses similari­ties and differences admiting internal adjustment for both the widest possible extension‑‑since it can be said of all things‑‑and the fullest implicit comprehension‑‑since any real being exists not potentially but actually. The notion of esse then is not an idea and it cannot be de­rived from the analysis of an idea; rather it denotes an act. Moreover, ". . . although esse is the most formal among all things, nevertheless it is also the most communicable, although it is not communicated to its inferiors and superiors in the same way."[liii]  Indeed, the act of to be, esse, possesses in and of itself all possible perfections, since as distinct from matter and motion, it does not in and of itself express any relation to potency and is thereby limited only in sensible things by the specific nature in which it is found, a nature, that participates to a greater or lesser degree in the plenitude of existence.

          It must be said that this which I call esse is the most perfect of all things . . . this which I call esse is the actualizing of all acts and on account of this it is the perfection of all perfections.[liv]

Hence, unlike univocal terms whose intentional unity is perfectly one, the notion of esse admits only of a proportional, relative, analogical unity, in which its inferiors are included actually although implicitly. In this sense, the notion of esse as an analogical term possess what may be described as a confused character given that differences in degree of predication in function of the nature in which it is received are not made explicit.

          At this juncture it is crucial to point out that the notion of esse "can be termed 'transcendental' not only because it is non-univo­cal but because it leaves the way open for man to investigate the area of the conceivable which is beyond his immediate experience."[lv]  This is to say that the subject of metaphysics is clearly the notion of being as esse grasped in the negative judgment of separation and predicated analogously of limited being. At the point in which the mind under­stands the act of to be as separated from matter and motion and as thus not implying any limitation, there emerges an additional intuition concerning the possibility of a unique being in whom esse is predicat­ed in an unlimited way, i.e., a being whose essence connotes no po­tency (matter or motion) and is synonymous with its unrestricted possession of existence as Ipsum Esse Subsistens, the Self-Existing Being.[lvi] The rationale here is that although the act of to be is initial­ly found within the context of the concrete finite/limited singulars, not implying of itself limitation, it is nonetheless understood as endowing as much actual existence as a given nature in function of its principle of potency is capable of receiving. If the esse of an entity suggests no limitation then

          . . . such a notion of being effected in a positive way by and in the metaphysical judgment of existence does leave the way open both to the conceivability of a being unlim­ited by any po­tential existence and to an incresase (by way of addition to knowledge) of understanding, which increase is effectively expressed by the transcen­den­tals.[lvii]

          Yet, before considering how this notion of being "leaves the way open . . . to an increase of understanding" via the transcen­den­tals, there remains the task of clarifying, in light of the foregoing treatment of the conceivability of Unlimited Being, that mode of anal­ogous predication that would be proper of limited beings and Unlimit­ed Being. In other words, if, in addition to the subject of metaphy­sics‑‑initially understood as referring to the esse of limited beings‑‑ there now appears not only the feasibility but also the relevance and appropriateness of acknowledging Unlimited Being, then the question becomes one of determining the nature of the analogous predication suitable for such an extension of being. Two modes of metaphysical predication will be considered, viz.: the analogy of proper proportion­ality and the analogy of intrinsic attribution.

          The analogy of proper proportionality consists in a recogni­tion that though beings are diverse in kind and number, they nonethe­less all participate in the perfections of existence. That is, each es­sence is related to its own act of existing in a manner proportionately similar to that of another essence to its act of existence. The formula here is expressed as existence : essence :: existence : essence.  For example: Michael's essence is to Michael's existence as Patricia's essence is to Patricia's existence as the moon's essence is to the moon's existence. Further, although two distinct beings may not exist in the same way, they nonetheless both participate in the excellence of existence in a manner congruent with their nature. For some critics, however, the fact that the analogy of proper proportionality expresses a distinction between essence and existence renders it a form of meta­physical pred­ication proper only of limited being in which such a distinction is found, but inappropriate for Unlimited Being in which no such distinc­tion is to be found.[lviii] This is to say that

          (1) the analogy of proper proportionality is a comparison of real intrinsic relations from the standpoint of similari­ty in the sense that some­thing (to be) in the being is shared, which shar­ing admits of a greater-or-less degree (on the basis of the essence, the potential existence, a principle of limitation, bespeaking more-or-less) and is a comparison of relations that are really distinct; (2) but it is conceivable that there can be a being whose essense is its act of to be, i.e., where there is no intrinsic really distinct rela­tion; (3) if such is the formal nature of the anal­ogy of proper proportionality it will not enable the metaphysician to arrive at the most proper object of metaphysics: God, and it will not pro­vide the rational justification for a natural theol­ogy because it will be unable to declare how this conceivable being is similar to beings of a rela­tive character. Therefore while the analo­gy of proper proportionality suffices in the range of finite being, it is not the only metaphysical analogy.[lix]

          A second mode of predication that does propose to express the notion of the unity of being in its diversity while encompassing the entire range of being, i.e., limited beings and Unlimited Being, is the analogy of intrinsic attribution. This analogy is founded in the inabili­ty of limited being as composed of the act of be and a finite nature to serve as a sufficient explanation for its own existence. Since Unlimit­ed Being emerges as the unique being whose essence implies no rela­tion to potency, then such a being would be capable of serving as a sufficient explanation for its own existence as well as that of all limit­ed beings. The relation between Unlimited Being as the source of existence and limited being as that to which existence is communicat­ed is that of cause and effect: the relation of cause, i.e., Unlimited Being as primary analogate, and effect, i.e., limited beings as second­ary analogates. To say that limited beings share in existence or have being by attribution is to say that they have been given existence by Unlimited Being as their cause. Though limited beings intrinsically possess esse, the degree of this attribution is not univocal but in ac­cordance to the existent's nature. The analogy of intrinsic attribution means that whatever metaphysical notions are said of limited beings as effects are said of Unlimited Being as cause and as exemplar of such a predicate. The need for the analogy of intrinsic attribution may also be understood as representing an overt attempt to safeguard the science from a type of agnosticism with respect to the claim that one cannot have knowledge of Unlimited Being and thereby protect being from a deficient understanding of its full range and transcendentali­ty.[lx] Hence,

          . . . in accordance with the Summa Theologiae, I, 13, 5 and 6, it would seem that Thomas Aqui­nas himself point­ed to the respective role of an analogy of intrinsic attri­bution which (1) is based not upon being as a relation but upon the consequences of the relation, the consequen­ces of the relative character of being: the causal relation (effect to cause) and (2) which stresses the comparison of things not in terms of forms of existence (analogy of extrinsic attribution) but in terms of existence itself, since the analogon (being, esse) actually exists in (in­strinsic) all the analogates though in different degrees and even without any degree whatsoever; and which (3) helps the metaphysician to find out in what this being in which essence and existence are not really distinct is like the beings of his immediate experience.[lxi]

Criteria of Transcendentality

          Now that the essential themes of metaphysics have been ren­dered more explicit, this study will now consider the criteria of trans­cendentality,[lxii] as the test that may be employed in determining which terms may be predicated of being as esse. "The role of the transcendentals as predicates of this judgment"[lxiii] is derived from the density of signification of esse insofar as it cannot be expressed ade­quately by any one term. Further scrutiny is thereby needed in order to explicate the intelligible values and implications of the predicates of esse, "each of which 'is the being itself apprehended under a par­ticular aspect'."[lxiv]  Transcendentals reflect predicates of a metaphysi­cal judgment in which the subject of the same is esse while the predi­cate names represent further penetrations into the character of the act of to be. Thus the transcendentals, one, true, and good, follow from the act of to be as immediate implications of the notion of esse (unum, verum, bonum sequitur esse); they do not add to esse but serve to increase our comprehension of the act of to be.[lxv]

          This said, the criteria of transcendentality require that pro­posed transcendental notions give affirmative responses to two crucial ques­tions:

          (1) Is this notion "speculable": metaphysical or analogical being such, as Thomas Aquinas says, that it "does not depend upon matter for its to be, because it can exist without matter or never exist in matter at all . . . . [In de Trinitate, V, 1 c]; in other words: it is not essential to this notion that it be limited to the beings of man's im­mediate experience' it could be predicated of other be­ings [In de Trinitate, V, 4 c]. (2) Is this notion fully transcendental, i.e., predicable ana­logically of both Infi­nite and finite being.[lxvi]

The first aspect of the critierion concerns the question of whether the proposed notion is analogical; here the intellectual method can be utilized: "in arriving at and evaluating other notions, notions that of themselves do not imply limitation to matter and motion, notions that are higher than a generic concept, notions that are fundamentally analogical, notions which 'simply transcend' the generic order, notions that are simply transcendental . . . . [such as] 'substance', 'power', 'act'. . ."[lxvii]  The negative judgment of separation serves then to indi­cate those notions that can exist apart from or that never have existed in matter. The second criterion, however, demands not only that the proposed notion be analogical but that it may be predicated analogous­ly of both limited beings and Unlimited Being.

          The second criteria demands that metaphysical notions be predi­cated of both limited beings and Unlimited Being. This can be done by considering the problem of convertibility, i.e, whether tran­scenden­tal predicates have to be analogously said of each and every being without exception. If a proposed predicate meets both aspects of the criteria stated above, viz., that it be analogical and predicable of both limited and Unlimited Being, then it merits recognition as a transcen­dental property. This means that although all genuinely tran­scendental predicates must be said of Unlimited Being as their source, there may nonetheless be transcendental predicates that may be said of each and every limited being insofar as it participates in the act of to be and other predicates that may be said solely of some‑‑not all‑‑limi­ted being. "If a notion could be predicated analogously of Infinite-Unlim­ited Being and some limited beings, the notion would be ade­quately transcendental."[lxviii]  This is the basis for the distinction of abso­lute from relative transcendentals. The former, which include transcen­den­tals such as one, true, good, are wholly convertible with the notion of being as esse.[lxix] The latter, which include such transcendentals as intellect, will, and justice, are not convertible with the whole range of being and may be predicated only of beings capable of cognition, i.e., intelligent being.[lxx]

          Now although the foregoing resolves the question of the exten­sionality of transcendental predicates, a parallel clarification of the nature of the intentionality of such predicates is needed. The issue here is one of rendering more explicit the character of the intention that is predicated according to an analogy of intrinsic attribution with the distinct end in view of averting the charge of anthropomorphism. This is accomplished via the intellectual method "by which the res significata of some thing is seen to be distinguished from the modus significando."[lxxi]  The res significata is another way of saying that which is signified by a genuinely transcendental predicate, i.e., a notion that not implying any relation to potency, is such that it desig­nates a perfection absolutely and simply. Given that only such inten­tional significations may be affirmed of Unlimited Being, the predi­cates refer to those that would especially be said according to an analogy of intrinsic attribution, wherein the perfections are said on the basis of a relation of likeness between limited beings as effects and Unlimited Being as cause. Accordingly, what is called wisdom or goodness in limited intellectual beings preexists in Unlimited Being in an eminent way.

          Such names are predicated analogously of God and crea­tures (by an analogy of instrinsic attri­bution) because they are said on the basis of the relation of the creature to God as effect is relat­ed to the cause, in which cause all the perfec­tions of things exist excellenter.[lxxii]

The modus significando, on the other hand, refers to the mode of signifying predicates which transpires within the context of non-meta­physical predication, i.e., an eminently univocal mode of predicating as would occur before the significance of metaphysical analogy, espe­cially intrinsic attribution, is countenanced. Non-analogical predicates univocally predicated of limited being would be entirely unsuitable for metaphysical predication of limited beings and Unlimited Being.[lxxiii]

          God has in Himself all the perfections of crea­tures and whatever is predicated of Him is predi­cated per essentiam while it is predicated of the creature per participationem. The creature is like its creator in so far as it has some perfection; it is creatively thought by Him, but still rep­resents him deficiently [Summa Theologiae, I, 13, 2 c]. Whatever name is said of God, e.g., good, wise, etc., the meaning is not: God is the cause of goodness or wisdom, or: God is not evil or un­wise, but: what is called good­ness or wisdom in creatures, pre-exists in God but ac­cording to a modum excellens, altiorem or eminentem.[lxxiv]

          The two-fold criteria of transcendentality will now be ap­plied to certain proposed notions in order to determine whether they are both analogous and predicable of limited beings and Unlimited Being. With respect to the predicate of substance (substantia), it ap­pears that ac­cording to the modus significando "man's actual experi­ence is limited to substances as modes of finite existence" yet this "does not mean that it may not also be a transcendent aspect of be­ing."[lxxv]  Indeed, if one views the term from a predicamental sense, then substance under­stood as one of the ten Aristotelian categories would be comprehended as signifying a "support of accidents," a notion that as such can only be predicated of finite modes of exis­tence.[lxxvi] However, such a restric­tion of the term is not warranted if one instead considers the term as signifying that to which esse is due in itself and not in another or, similarly, as "not to be in another and [not to be] of this particular kind," i.e, limited, such that "on account of a diverse mode of predi­cating, substance is not said of God and creatures univocally but analogically."[lxxvii]  What Aquinas is suggesting here is a view of sub­stance that amounts to an alternate way of look­ing at undivided being, i.e., the transcendental unum. If substance can be understood via the negative judgment of separation as synonymous with esse insofar as it of itself does not imply any relation to potency, and if the notion once grasped can be predicated by an analogy of instrinsic attribution to both limited beings and Unlimited Being, then the notion meets the requirements of transcendentality with an abso­lute extension.[lxxviii]

          It is noteworthy to indicate here that in the example of sub­stance it is possible to see the manner in which a notion initially understood within the purview of an anthropomorphism, more specifi­cally from the standpoint of a philosophical anthropology, may disen­gage itself as understood in metaphysics via the intellectual method from all connotation of finitude so as to serve as an analogous term which may be predicated of both limited beings and Unlimited Being. This said, a few other proposed notions will be briefly reviewed as further illustrations of this method.

          A second notion, understanding (intellectus) refers to the ability of mind to know being as intelligible, i.e., esse is knowable. With respect to the modus significando of this term, it implies a knowledge of limited forms; however, within the context of metaphys­ics, the mind possesses access to esse, the res significata of which suggests no imperfection such that Unlimited Being knows all things in terms of his own unlimited form.[lxxix] Hence, the intellect does not of itself im­ply any limitation and with relative extension may be predicated anal­ogously of limited intelligent beings and Unlimited Being.[lxxx] A third notion, will (voluntas) follows from the cognitive integrity of intelli­gent natures insofar as these are able not only to know esse but also to decide what is fitting or non-fitting in accor­dance with those pur­poses that are constitutive of their nature. Though in terms of the modus significando limited intelligent beings may not always will what is fitting, such a defect should not be confused with the res significata of what is understood by the notion itself, given that in the case of Unlimited Being his nature is perfectly in accor­dance and hence never at variance with his act of to be.[lxxxi] Thus, the will with relative extension may be predicated analogously of limited intelligent beings and Unlimited Being.[lxxxii] A fourth notion, free will (liberum arbitrium), related to the transcendental property of will, recognizes that intelligent natures to the extent that they are intellec­tual and may thus know and will their end must be free to so act. Although in terms of the modus significando, a rational agent may choose an end not in the order of esse, i.e., evil, such that finite free agents present them­selves in a state of relative attachment with respect to their natural ends, it is perfectly conceivable with respect to the res significata that Unlimited Being be entirely in union with its own nature aliter.[lxxxiii] Accordingly, free will with relative extension may also be predicated analogously of limited intelligent beings and Un­limited Being. A fifth notion, justice (iustitia) refers to an act of will that imparts to each existent its due in accordance to its nature and ordered place in reali­ty. Whereas the modus significando of this term as known within the context of limited intelligent beings implies an imperfect exercise of this attribute, the res significata of the term implies no such deficien­cy, given that the act of recognizing the good of each existent as perfected in terms of its end is indeed realized in Unlimited Being.[lxxxiv] Consequently, justice with relative extension may be predicated analo­gously of limited intelligent beings and Unlimited Being.[lxxxv]

          Indeed,

          This criterion of transcendentality which has been formu­lated ultimately in terms of the intel­lectual method proper to metaphysics is able to provide the metaphysician with the means by which he may ascertain whether or not notions or names other than the one, the true, the good and the beautiful are transcendentals.[lxxxvi]

Such an application of these criteria will constitute the aim of the final part of this middle section insofar as two central notions in Habermas's philosophy of emancipation are concerned, viz., his notion of the emancipatory interest and of communication in function of the ideal speech situation.

Metaphysical Appropriation of Habermasian Categories

          The question of the transcendentality of the emancipatory inter­est is best approached by recalling the manner in which it emerg­es within the context of Habermas's theory of cognitive interests, given that this developmental approach provides a basis for claiming that the emancipatory interest, like the other transcendentals, implies no mate­riality. The significance of Habermas's analysis of the empiri­cal-ana­lytic sciences consists in disclosing that, contrary to commonly held views, these sciences do not represent a purely formal, value-neutral enterprise, but, rather, operate in function of a technical inter­est, i.e., in terms of a value, in securing technical mastery over na­ture.[lxxxvii] Pri­or, then, to scientific theorizing, there exists a pretheoreti­cal/metatheo­retical realm of discourse which constitutes the linguistic framework which orients the course of scientific investigations in one direction rather than another. The precondition, then, to the generation of a theory involves the linguistic consensus expressed in practices and operations of a community of researchers, who are responsible for deciding the specific conceptual framework in terms of which a given query is to be investigated and in which empirical observations are to be conducted.[lxxxviii] Once Habermas manages to disengage the technical interest animating nomological science, he argues that the methodolo­gy for understanding this metatheoretical dimension of scientific prac­tice concerned with human interaction and language cannot be framed within the strictures of empirical-analytic science. The reason is that "communicative action is a system that cannot be reduced to the framework of instrumental action,"[lxxxix] given that whereas the latter is concerned with control of external conditions in terms of causally determined relations, the former is directed toward communication in terms of reaching intersubjective understanding.

          Habermas, at this point, moves to the historical-hermeneutic sciences whose object consists in elucidating the symbolically struc­tured reality of the social world. Yet, Habermas argues, the hermeneu­tical aim in understanding texts (persons, cultures, traditions), like that of nomological science, does not consist in a purely value-neutral endeavor, but discloses a practical interest in creating, maintaining and promoting effective communication on which human relations depend. This said, hermerneutics, as Habermas further points out, cannot claim a role other than that of clarifying texts by translat­ing/paraphrasing unclear meaning or determining logical consistency, etc. As such, hermeneutics is unable to distinguish between what characterizes genuine consensus from ideological distortion. At this juncture, Habermas argues for a "depth" or critical hermeneutics.

          This capacity to uncover hypostatized disequilibria embed­ded in communicative structures exhibits an impressive human tenden­cy to live "both actively and reactively, critically and creatively,"[xc] i.e., in terms of an emancipatory interest that endeavors "to restore to men and women a true awareness of their position in history?"[xci]  The role of this emancipatory tendency consists in animating critical cognition in its capacity to unveil the "the dogmatic character of both a world view and a form of life,"[xcii] i.e., to determine "when theoreti­cal state­ments grasp invariant regularities of social action as such and when they express ideologically frozen relations of dependence that can in principle be transformed."[xciii]  The aim of the emancipatory interest via critical reflection then is the attainment of a state of in­ner/social transparency as expressed in the words of the Delphic max­im imparted to Socrates: "The truth will make you free."

          The point of this summary review of Habermas's theory of cognitive interests consists in that his analysis provides a basis for a fundamental and real distinction between an order of material objects that as known in function of the hypothetico-deductive methodology of the empirical-analytic sciences are governed by invariant physical laws, and a realm of communicating subjects whose distinguishing characteristic consists precisely in their not being fixed to invariant symbolic schemata when interpreted in function of the emancipatory interest. Indeed the emancipatory interest, in function of conscious­ness, critical reflection and critical autonomy, emerges as a correction of that which may be obtained by the other two interests working independently of this third unifying interest, concerned not so much with whether needs are being met but, rather, with the more critical question of whether these are being met justly.

          Indeed, for Habermas, the thrust of the emancipatory inter­est toward a form of life in function of justice resides as a constitu­tive telos in the structure of human communication. This telos is brought out more clearly if compared with the relative transcendental proper­ties noted above, viz., intellect, will and free will. Whereas the intel­lect knows being as esse, the will decides what is fitting and non-fitting in accordance to nature, and free will, in contradistinction to intellect which knows and will that decides, refers to the ability to act in accordance to nature, the emancipatory interest relates to these as the very teleonomic thrust that present in intelligent, i.e., communicat­ing beings, propels the volitional faculty as aided by the cognitive one in the direction of the actuation of a form of life in function of jus­tice. Although the modus significando of the emancipatory interest as the vital thrust of being is understood within the purview of philo­sophical anthropology or social philosophy in terms of a continuous "developmental and formative process,"[xciv] as manifested within the context of limited communicating beings in which it is imperfectly realized, the notion of itself, related to cognition and volition, implies no such limitation. What the emancipatory interest signifies in accor­dance to its res significata is the dynamic thrust of esse toward the integration and realization of what is in accordance to nature; the plenitude of this actuation is found in Unlimited Being, whose nature is precisely the unmitigated consummation of the just life. Thus, the predicate being as emancipative with relative extension may be predi­cated analogously of limited intelligent beings and Unlimited Being.

          Now, in applying the criteria to a second Habermasian notion, it should be recalled that the centrality of Habermas's theory of commu­nication in function of the ideal speech situation was devel­oped in the process of accounting for a speaker's ability to bring about an inter­personal engagement with a hearer such that "the hearer can rely on him."[xcv]  The sufficient condition capable of accounting for the bind­ing force of such communicative engagements was ground­ed in the notion of rational validity claims (comprehensibility, truth, rightness, sincerity) that although typically implicit are raised and mutually recognized in speech acts (communicatives, constatives, regulatives, avowals, respectively). Yet, as was seen in the third and fourth chap­ters, the inability to vindicate either the truth or rightness claim with­in the framework of interactive exchange required moving into the level of discourse where participants suspend all action con­straints in order to thematize and thereby question norms, values, ideologies, belief systems naively-assumed in everyday speech engage­ments.[xcvi] Moreover, for the conclusion of the discourse to represent genuine rational consensus it must be constraint-free, i.e., based on no other motive other than the unforced force of the better argument. Genuine discourse entails for Habermas the satisfaction of the ideal speech situation, which consists in meeting three criteria: open partici­pation, symmetrical opportunity to apply speech acts, and freedom from all internal and external constraints that would in any way steer the con­clusion from the goal of the unforced force of the better argu­ment. Yet, if the formal conditions of the ideal speech situation serve as a North Star orienting the vindication of discursive argumentation, in what may one ask are these conditions based?  The answer to this question will provide the basis for resolving the question concerning the transcendentality of Habermas's notion of communication in func­tion of the ideal speech situation.

          The centrality and the difficulty of situa­ting the notion of the ideal speech situation within Haber­mas's theory of communication is indicated by Thompson in the following passage, where he presents a fairly impres­sive inventory of possible "referents" for the ideal speech situation:

          It is not an existing concept in the Hegelian sense, for no historical society completely ful­fills the conditions of rational discourse. Similar­ly, the ideal speech situation is not a regulative principle in the Kantian sense, for it is necessar­ily antici­pated in every act of linguistic commu­nication. 'The ideal speech situation is', Haber­mas sub­mits, 'neither an empirical phenomena nor merely a con­struct, but rather an unavoidable reciprocal presupposition of discourse.'[xcvii]

According to Thompson the ideal speech situation does not meet the requirements of a Kantian regulative idea given that such ideas of reason serve to regulate thought and action, whereas the ideal speech situation is "anticipated in every act of linguistic communication," i.e., that speech oriented to understanding serves as the basic mode of commu­nicative action from which others, such as strategic action, are derived. Nor is the ideal speech situation a Hegelian concept given that there is no existing society that embod­ies the ideal form of life connected with the fulfillment of the formal conditions of discourse. But, neither can the ideal speech situation be identified with a mental construc­tion inferred from experi­ence, an empirical phenomena nor any arbitrary scheme. And what does it mean, then, to say that the ideal speech situa­tion consists in an unavoidable presupposition of discourse?

          McCarthy provides an answer in the following passage:

          . . . the conditions for ideal discourse are con­nected with conditions for an ideal form of life; the notion of "pure" discourse (and thus the notion of rational consensus and thus the notion of truth) cannot be conceived apart from the conditions of "pure" communicative interaction. In this sense, the requirements of the ideal speech situation, in which discourse can lead to genuine consensus, include communication-theo­retic conceptualizations of the tradi­tional ideas of freedom and justice: "the truth of state­ments is linked in the last analysis to the intention of the good and true life."[xcviii]

But what does it mean to say that rational consensus and the notion of truth depend on "pure communicative interaction," understood as un­limit­ed discourse conducted free from dis­tort­ing influences whether in the form of open domination, conscious strategic behavior or self-deception?  Pure communicative exchange is a form of interaction that requires free­dom for the actors to engage in discourse and justice so that their en­gagement will proceed humanely. In other words, the requirement for participation in pure com­municative interaction as stipulated by the ideal speech situation is a mode of being in accor­dance to the good and true life.

          Now, although the "ideal" realization of this form of life as under­stood modus significando is usually and typically counterfactual, nonethe­less it is supposed in the very act of entering into discourse with the hope of reaching rational consensus, such that a violation of any of the formal elements of discourse radically throws the rationali­ty of the con­sensus into doubt.[xcix] Morevoer, if the ideal speech situa­tion functions as a guidance model, in a somewhat Platonic sense, of undistorted commu­ni­ca­tion in terms of which claims to truth and rightness are adjudicated, and if it does not appear to be either a Kant­ian idea, Hegelian concept, a mental construct, or an empir­ical phenomena, and yet it demands a cer­tain form of ideal life in order that its application may proceed genuine­ly, it might be useful to con­sider the communicative model as consisting not in an uninstantiated formalism but as actually realized in Unlimited Being. The res signifi­cata of communication understood in terms of the ideal speech situa­tion evokes the very paradigm of undistorted conscious­ness and as such implies no materiality, although it is only imperfectly realized in human discourse. Thus, the notion of ideal communication, i.e., being as communicative with relative extension may also be predi­cated anal­ogously of intelligent limited existents and Unlimited Being.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ABSOLUTE TRANSCENDENTALS,

EMANCIPATORY INTEREST AND IDEAL COMMUNICATION

          This final section will endeavor to explicate the comple­mentary relations that may be developed between Habermas's emanci­patory/ communicative model and existential metaphysics. This task will be accomplished in three parts: (1) a statement of the three abso­lute transcendental properties of being as esse, viz., unity, truth, and good­ness; (2) the integration of the property of goodness with the Haber­masian notion of being as emancipative, and the property of truth with the Habermasian notion of being as communicative; and (3) a consid­eration of the problem that arises when comparing the tran­scendental property of unity in terms of the classical monological framework and Habermas's dialogical framework. This will be fol­lowed by some comments on the Christian horizon in terms of which this integration needs to be understood.

The Absolute Transcendentals

          According to the classical position on the transcendentals, once the subject of metaphysics is intellectually grasped via the nega­tive judgment of separation, the term‑‑being as esse‑‑does not of itself either explicate or eliminate the modes of perfection contained therein, which may be understood as the properties that immediately flow from the subject. The transcendentals that reflect these modes of perfection are not the product of either apriori/deductive or aposteriori/inductive procedures; i.e., they are neither deduced nor induced from, but, rath­er, reflect further intuitions, i.e., immediate insights, into the character of being as esse, where the intellect recognizes that essence, as signi­fying the nature of a thing, is distinct from the act of to be through which a given nature enjoys, as it were, existential integrity. With this realization are added other immediate intutitions, such that the truth and goodness of being is not its essence properly speaking, since this implies limitation, i.e., potential existence, but specifically refers to the act of existence from which other intuitions follow "common to all being."[c]  Such absolute predicates conserve the same metaphysical formality characteristic of being as esse insofar as the non-generic signification of their intention may only be predicated analogously of all limited beings and Unlimited Being. Further, the transcendentals are not to be comprehended as constituting really distinct elements constitutive of the act of to be but, instead, as logically distinct no­tional properties that afford an opportunity for deepening one's com­prehension of esse. Each succeeding transcendental, however, is under­stood as including the meaning of the one which precedes it while making explicit something additional, such that the property verum includes a comprehension of unum and that of bonum includes the signification of both unum and verum. This said, what follows will delineate the nature of these predicates in terms of "the intimate con­nection between the intellectual intuition of being, the transcendentals, and the first principles."[ci]

          For Aquinas, once the disengagement of the subject of metaphy­sics‑‑being as esse‑‑is achieved from any connotation of mate­riality or motion in terms of an explicit subject/predicate formulation where the intrinsic nature of the subject "being" is made manifest by the verb "is," the first insight that such a formulation yields is that being "is-one," est-unum, where this first absolute transcendental predicate is understood as consisting in a greater explicitation of esse. The term "one" here refers to the existential indivisibility of an exis­tent such that every being, to the extent that it exists, is one or undi­vided,[cii] meaning that every being is distinct from every other be­ing,[ciii] or, similarly, "a being is an essence exercising the act of to be."[civ]  The predicate unum, then, signifies that the actualization of an essence as representing potential existence by the act of to be confers distinctive existential integrity to that entity such that it may be understood as existentially whole, i.e., undivided, and existentially distinct, i.e., unique from any other existent. Further, to say that unum as a tran­scendental predicate of being is convertible with esse‑‑what is, is one, what is one is‑‑is not to add a really distinct element to esse, but, rather to articulate a formulation whose ratio, as a minor distinction of reason, adds to a comprehension of esse as indicating a denial of division.[cv] Indeed, for Aquinas the employment of the predi­cate unum as independent of matter and motion should not be under­stood as referring to number given that such a reference only has meaning within the framework of sensible beings.[cvi] With reference to its oppo­site, multitude, the predicate should be understood as con­tained in the definition of multitude as consisting in a collection of unities, though not vice-versa. Moreover, the formulation every being, to the extent that it exists, is one or undivided expresses an analogous relationship predicated of limited existents in accordance to the degree of its par­ticipation in esse, and of Unlimited Being, as maxima unitas, in a limitless way.[cvii] From here: "it is apparent that the to be of each and everything consists in indivision. And whence it is that each and every thing guards its own unity as it guards its own to be."[cviii]

          The foregoing considerations concerning the transcendental property unum provide, for Aquinas, the basis for the principle of identity‑‑being is‑‑understood as the principle of metaphysical whole­ness or existential integrity.[cix] To say that the oneness of being fol­lows its act of to be is

          an expressed admission that each existent which is essen­tially one reveals itself as uniquely indi­vidual, as what it is in its unique character of metaphysical identity, and, because it has one substantial act of to be forever distinct from all else, so that many can never be one in reality (a multitude of singulars, of ones) but only in an analogical notion, by a "one" that is proportion­al, predicated analo­gously of each and every being.[cx]

This principle maybe formulated in terms of the principle of non-contradiction, the first law of thought: non-being is not, where non-contradiction is understood as depending on the principle of identity in the sense that one must first know that being is what it is before it can be differentiated with what is not.

          In the case of the second absolute transcendental predicate, the predicate term "is-true," est-verum, as a more lucid explicitation of esse, indicates that every being, to the extent that it exists, is true.[cxi] Whereas the predicate unum refers to the relation of the no­tion of being itself in reference to the existential integrity of esse, the predicate verum refers to the intellect's ability to know and represent being intentionally, an ability understood as exhibiting the intelligible character of being as esse. Truth in a primary sense refers to the notion that all limited beings to the extent that these depend on anoth­er for their existence must conform to the representation that Unlimit­ed Being has of these as their source in its intellect,[cxii] as well as to "the possibililty of conformity of being with the human intellect pro­vided that the latter has first conformed itself to being."[cxiii]  Truth, in a secondary sense, refers to logical truth or the human intellect's ability to represent the truth of reality as it is in terms of a relation of adequation between being and intellect, where a judgment is under­stood as truthful because a limited thinking being becomes, intention­ally, the object known. The emphasis, however, lies in that the predi­cate verum refers to a property of being: "Things are denominated as true . . . by the truth which is in the thing itself (which is nothing other than beingness adequated to an intellect or adequating an intel­lect to itself) as from an inherent form.[cxiv]

          Further, to say that verum as a transcendental predicate of being is convertible with esse‑‑what is, is true, what is true is‑‑is, as in the case of unum, is not to add to esse, but to articulate a formula­tion whose ratio adds to a comprehension of esse as indicating "the habi­tude of adequation to the human or divine intellect."[cxv]  By con­trast, whereas verum refers to a predicate convertible with being as esse, falsity lacks metaphysical status and may only be said as the opposite of logical truth, i.e., as a declaration of non-adequation where the intellect incorrectly judges by saying that what is is not or that what is not is.[cxvi] Moreover, the formulation every being, to the extent that it exists, is true expresses an analogous relationship predi­cated of limited existents in accordance to the degree of its participa­tion in esse, and of Unlimited Being, as maxima veritas, in a limitless way.[cxvii]

          From the transcendental predicate verum two additional princi­ples follow: the principle of intelligibility and that of efficient causali­ty. The principle of intelligibility expresses the view that reali­ty as known metaphysically is not refractory to intellect but capable of being comprehended: every being, to the extent that is exists, is true or intelligible, conformed to unlimited intellect or capable of being represented to the human intellect in which no being is wholly incom­prehensible.[cxviii] The principle of efficient causality, as a corol­lary of the intelligibility of being, expresses the view that participated beings must be efficiently caused. This is to say that the intellect in compre­hending the character of limited finite beings in function of their participation in esse immediately intuits that such participation may only be explained by an Unlimited Being, that, as ultimate source of intelligibility, confers such existence to what is understood as contin­gent.

          With respect to the third absolute transcendental, the predi­cate term "is-good," est-bonum, as a further explicitation of esse, indicates that every being, to the extent that it exists, is good. In a metaphysical sense the predicate bonum expresses a judgment concern­ing the excel­lence of esse understood as the actuality or the perfection of be­ing:[cxix] "Whence just as it is impossible that there be some be­ing which does not have a to be, so it is necessary that every being be good from this that it has a to be. . ."[cxx]  In another sense, whereas verum as the intelligible nature of being as esse denotes that partici­pated being must be caused, bonum indicates that such a generation as an act of Unlimited Being can only be fully intelligible if understood as directed toward the fulfillment of a preconceived end such that limited being has a natural appetency toward the attainment of the good which represents the realization of its nature. Unlimited Being as the plenitude of existence does not have an end other than the limit­less exercise of its esse,[cxxi] while constituting itself as the Summum Bonum of limited being, i.e., as the final reason of the dynamism of active yet finite being. Limited beings are good, then, by relation to their participation in esse and their natural tendency toward the real­ization of their natures. "When the finite changing being is studied metaphysically, it is viewed as ultimately perfected by all its actions and motions and in all its circumstances, all of which are directed to the to be in some way."[cxxii]

          Further, to say that bonum as a transcendental predicate of being is convertible with esse‑‑what is, is good, what is good is‑‑as in the case of unum and verum, does not add to esse, but articulates a formulation whose ratio adds to a comprehension of esse as indicating the tendential inclination present in being whereby it desires its own perfection.[cxxiii] "The good implies the relation to end: i.e., the perfec­tion of the being to the degree that it exists, and "all things by seek­ing their own perfections, seeks God himself, insofar as the perfect­ions of all things are certain likenesses of the divine to be."[cxxiv]  By contrast, whereas bonum refers to a predicate convertible with being as esse, evil lacks metaphysical status since it is neither a form nor a nature and may only be understood in negative terms as an absense of what is good, as a privation of what is due existence in a being; in moral terms it indicates both the absence of a good in accordance to the existent's nature and the presence of a good‑‑an apparent good‑‑ not in accordance to nature.[cxxv] Moreover, the formulation every be­ing, to the extent that it exists, is good, acts on account of an end expresses an analogous relationship predicated of limited existents in accordance to the degree of its participation in esse, and Unlimited Being, as Summum Bonum, in a limitless way.

          From the transcendental predicate bonum the principle of finali­ty emerges as an extension of the principle of intelligibility wherein the intellect in grasping the goodness of existent's participa­tion in the act of to be further penetrates that such participation in esse may only be comprehended on account of a preconceived end, such that "Every being is a love of its perfection."[cxxvi]  It is precisely this love that "re­moves the indifference on the part of being in act, so that all actions may be intelligible."[cxxvii]  In this respect, according to Aquinas, the authentic aim of limited beings cannot only be known in terms of their natural tendencies and inclinations but also by reference to the will and providence of Unlimited Being understood as a person­al God. In the case of the human subject the highest good/end, corre­sponding to its most profound and deepest longings, does not merely consist in a philosophical contemplation of reality but in the beatific vision of God.

           Now that the absolute transcendentals have been consid­ered, the segment that follows will endeavor to integrate these trans­cenden­tals with Habermas's relative transcendentals, i.e., the transcen­dental property of goodness with the notion of being as emancipative and the transcendental property of truth with the notion of being as communi­cative.

The Absolute Transcendentals and the Habermasian Relative

Transcendentals

          This study would like to suggest that the relationship that ob­tains when considering the absolute transcendental property of good­ness and Habermas's relative transcendental property of emanci­pation consists in that whereas the former, as understood particularly in reference to limited beings, articulates the universal metaphysical property whereby all limited beings are good as a result of both their participation in the act of esse and their tendential inclination toward the fulfillment of that which realizes their nature, the latter may be understood as expressing that mode of goodness as it refers specifical­ly to intellectual beings. This is to say that Habermas's notion of an emancipatory interest within the context of metaphysics encompasses the expression of the tendential notion of goodness understood as the teleonomic thrust present in intellectual beings on behalf of the fulfill­ment of the ratio essendi that is proper to their nature. Such an eman­cipatory thrust, predicated analogously, would further be understood as absolutely realized in the case of Unlimited Being and as relatively realized in the case of limited intellectual beings. In this respect the emancipatory dimension of intellectual being is such that although it is synonymous with the absolute transcendental property of goodness as tendency, nonetheless it is characterized as relative in the sense that it refers solely to that distinctive mode of teleonomic drive proper to or restricted to intellectual being.

          This provides an additional basis for clarifying the relation­ship between the emancipatory property and the other relative trans­cenden­tals treated in the second section of this chapter. Accordingly, whereas the relative properties of intellect, will and free will were treated as referring to various modes of intellectual being, the emanci­patory predicate was considered as expressing their overall teleonomic unifi­cation and orientation on behalf of the actualization of the enti­ty's nature. The signification of this perfective tendency then is syn­ony­mous with that mode of goodness appropriate to intellectual being such that by means of the notion of being as emancipative the notion of goodness as it specifically refers to intellectual being is notably clarified and amplified.

          Indeed, the cardinal import of Habermas's theory of the cogni­tive interests, as understood in this study, consists not only in provid­ing a basis for distinguishing the realm of material objects from that of communicating subjects, but also in indicating the nature of the relationship which should obtain between the the human subject in function of its emancipative potential and the realms of material ob­jects and social lifeworld. What this means is that although the human subject qua material body is related to the order of material objects in function of a technical interest in mastery of nature, this interest is itself understood in function of a practical interest that communicating subjects have in coordinating their linguistically structured lifeworld, which, in turn, is understood in function of an emancipatory interest that communicating subjects have in uncovering hypostatizations em­bedded in communicative structures. Hence, the Habermasian emanci­patory interest clarifies the teleonomic orientation of intellectual being as consisting, on the one hand, in a conscious movement away from all forms of individual or social pathology that inhibit the realization of intellectual being, and, on the other, in a dynamic drive toward the actualization of a form of life in function of justice.

          The primacy of the emancipatory interest, as regards the techni­cal and practical interest, then emerges as a concern with living life more fully. In the case of the technical interest, whereas this interest evokes a concern with mastery over natural processes, the emancipa­tory interest surfaces as a concern with procuring that such mastery proceeds within the parameters of a critical comprehension of the interdependence that exists between the material environment and the human community. George F. McLean indicates, when considering the notion of goodness from a somewhat different context, that the human subject, though a part of nature "rather than being subject thereto as a mere producer or consumer, one is a creative and trans­forming center, responsible for the protection and promotion of na­ture."[cxxviii]  In this respect, the emancipatory interest fosters a concep­tion of the material world that emphasizes "more reverence or respect­fulness,"[cxxix] i.e., the development of attitudes and institutions aimed at correcting practices responsible for various patterns of local and global conditions adverse­ly affecting the balance of nature in the form of environmental pollu­tion, species extinction, destruction of the ozone layer, including abuses such as the improper disposal of hazard­ous waste materials.

          In the case of the practical interest, whereas this interest evokes a concern with elucidating and coordinating the communicative struc­tures of the social lifeworld, the emancipatory interest emerges as a concern with whether such linguistic structures "express ideological­ly frozen relations of dependence."  Again, McLean points out the person "is by nature social and a part of society; but rather than being subject thereto as an object he is its creative center. . .[cxxx] The great­er "rever­ence and respectfulness" fostered at this level by the emanci­patory interest would manifest itself then in a profound regard for the dignity of the human person/community expressing itself in all manner of effort to relieve human suffering and to promote a more humane life­world by dealing with issues of poverty, health, homelessness, drug addiction, abortion, peace concerns, including eradication of arma­ments of mass destruction.

          Conversely, however, the notion of being as emancipative is itself deeply enriched when considered in light of the classical meta­physical model which views the very existence of limited being as an expression of the goodness of Unlimited Being. The importance of this assertion cannot be sufficiently stressed for it essentially represents a move beyond Habermas's restriction of reality to the realms of materi­al objects and that of communicating subjects in the direction of a conception of reality which openly acknowledges the foundational relevance of Transcendent Being. No longer is the emancipatory inter­est limited, once considered from the optic of metaphysics, to securing an "enlightened" sense of justice, be it economic, political and/or cultural; but, rather, it expresses a concern with an ontological form of justice in securing that end which is congruent with intellectual being. Indeed, the ratio finalis of intellectual being in function of the creative agency of Unlimited Being consists in the apprehension of the beatific vision. This is to say that whereas Habermas's emancipatory interest serves to specify the tendential character of the property of goodness as it refers to intellectual being, existential metaphysics serves to clarify notably the very end toward which the emancipatory thrust is ultimately directed, viz., the direct participation on behalf of intellectual being in the divine life of the Summum Bonum. It should therefore be clear that once the suggestion is made to extend Haber­mas's philosophical compass so as to include Transcendent Being such an admission profoundly transforms, i.e., recasts dramatically, the signification of Habermas's contribution.

          However, one issue that directly relates to the question of good­ness as a transcendental property of being is the reality of evil. In Aquinas's metaphysical model the presence of evil may be under­stood as corresponding in Habermas's communicative model to the presence of hypostatized disequilibria. As privations of the transcen­dental good, the avoidance, identification and correction of all that interferes with the promotion of the dignity of the human subject/community necessi­tates a critical instrument which endeavors to foster the conscious promotion of all that is in accord with the nature of intellectual being while deliberate­ly rectifying whatever is found to be not in accord with such a nature. Such an instrument and other impli­cations of this transcendental interpre­tation of Habermas's notion of emancipation will be progressively clari­fied in the following consider­ation of being as truth and as communica­tive.

          This study would further like to suggest that the relation­ship that obtains when considering the absolute transcendental proper­ty of truth and Habermas's relative property of communication con­sists in that whereas the former, as understood particularly in refer­ence to limited beings, articulates the universal metaphysical property whereby all limit­ed beings are true, as a result of both their participa­tion in the act of esse and their intelligible nature, the latter may be understood as specify­ing the constitutive openness of intellectual being toward truth in func­tion of the ideal speech situation. This is to say that while the unique relationship of intellectual being insofar as reality is concerned consists precisely in its ability to render what-is intelligi­ble, the notion of being as communicative, derived from Habermas's dialogical model and as understood in this study, specifies that intel­lectual being via discursive exchanges in function of the ideal speech situation stands as a source for the potential disclosure of knowable reality. The root insight here moves beyond an understand­ing of truth as objective fact and, rather, accentuates the notion of truth as living intelligence, as open, expressive and creative, i.e., as the dynamic focal point by which knowledge comes to consciousness. Further, such a constitutive aperture of intellectual being in relation to truth would be understood as absolutely realized in the case of Unlim­ited Being and only in a relative sense in the case of limited intellec­tual beings.

          The manner in which the notion of being as communicative enhances the notion of truth may be better grasped by considering Habermas's notion of ideal communication as the incisive criterion for engaging in discourse with a view toward adjudicating problematicized truth and normative claims. In the case of normative claims, Habermas contends that for such adjudication to represent nothing other than the unforced force of the better argument it must have been conducted within the context of a logic of practical discourse modelled on or in function of the formal conditions of the ideal speech situation. The importance of this proposal consists in signifying the posture that the participants in the discourse must assume if the outcome of their exchange is to merit rational assent, which is another way of indicat­ing that the conditions of the ideal speech situation demand that dis­course proceed constraint-free. For the dialogical participants to as­sume or, at least, to approximate this "ideal" posture furnishes the context wherein human intelligence emerges as living and creative "by conceiving new possibilities, planning new structures, and working out new paths for mankind. . ."[cxxxi]  Such "new possibilities," "new struc­tures," and "new paths," congruent with the exigencies of the ideal speech situation, would neither be understood as an uncritical, static expression of tradition for tradition sake nor as the aggressive expres­sion of novelty for novelty sake, but, instead, as a responsible exer­cise of critical cognition aimed at advancing those judgments that categorically safeguard the personal/communal dignity of the human subject.

          This said, it must be added, however, that just as it was found necessary when relating Habermas's emancipatory interest with the notion of goodness to understand the notion of emancipation in broad­er terms, i.e., in function of the constitutive end of intelligent being--the Summum Bonum--it will likewise be imperative to under­stand Habermas's communicative model in terms of the proposal of existen­tial metaphysics. The most poignant emendation that the notion of truth‑‑in function of the concept of natural appetency of being as good‑‑offers Habermas's conception of practical discourse is directed toward supplanting his ethical formalism insofar as the adjudication of questions of normative rightness is concerned with the principles of natural law that follow once the very being of reality, particularly that of the human subject, is understood in terms of Transcendent Being as its source and end. This is to say that the personal direction of one's life or the social ordination of law and policy by legislators, regard­less of organizational affiliation, must be conducted in accordance to the dictates of general constants of moral reasoning, whose founda­tional principle consists in an overt mandate in favor of the actualiza­tion of those natural ends that are in accordance to human nature and thereby expressive of the common good and against whatever propos­als conflict with this end. The natural ends congruent with the nature of the human subject may be articulated in primary precepts of reason (praecepta communissima) that, recognizing the worth and dignity of persons and society, include a concern for (a) the preservation of human life, (b) the propagation of the human species, (c) the promo­tion of harmonious social relations, and (d) the pursuit of truth. The first precept refers to all those activities that advance the physical and mental integrity and well-being of each individual; the second treats the basis of family life as involving the propagation and education of offspring; the third concerns the establishment of an ordered society in a manner that promotes the peaceful co-existence its members; and lastly, the fourth recognizes a human duty which aims at shunning ignorance.[cxxxii] From these self-evident foundational principles, other precepts that need to be observed are rendered obvious in reflection; these precepts constitute the second table of the Decalogue, i.e., to honor parents, those in authority and civil law and to obey these as long as they pose no conflict with other moral precepts; to respect the life, integrity and reputation of others which, among other things, prohibits the taking of innocent life as in the case of murder, abortion, euthanasia, and the degradation of human life via, for example, sub­stance abuse and illicit sexual activity; and to respect the property of others.

          However, the social/cultural/political implementation, speci­fica­tion or determination of these normative principles of ethical prac­tice are not evident to reason and need to be laid down by human law.[cxxxiii] For instance, though nature obligates all to contribute to public ac­cord, it is the wisdom of legislators that determines the man­ner, cir­cumstances and conditions under which such harmony is to be real­ized. In the case of setting a false fire alarm, though such an act clearly endangers public safety, the imposition of a certain fine or a certain length of imprisonment is a determination of the law that is not articulated by nature. One ethician has commented that "natural law theory is a framework for understanding morality rather than a method for making moral judgments."[cxxxiv]  In other words, as under­stood in this study, though natural law provides knowledge of certain general principles, it does not furnish particular decisions relating to individual cases. This is where Habermas's notion of practical dis­course may be understood as providing a framework for rendering such specifications of the primary precepts as necessitated by the varying conditions and circumstances of social life. Indeed, for Aqui­nas, given that limited being, i.e., the entire community of the uni­verse, is governed by Divine Reason,[cxxxv] practical discourse can be comprehended only as a dialogical framework in which the human subject endeavors to grasp and creatively apply those norms that signi­fy a progressive discovery, articulation and amplification of all that accords with‑‑and is never in violation of‑‑the dignity of the human person/community as articulated by the precepts of moral reasoning.

Unity, the Traditional Monological Framework and Habermas's

Dialogical Framework

          At this point it will be necessary to relate the absolute transcen­dental property of unity with Habermas's dialogical model. This rela­tionship, unlike in the case of goodness and truth, will be developed by first indicating what may be taken as Aquinas's contri­bution in light of what has been said of truth and goodness and then by consid­ering the problem that arises when treating unity in light of Haber­mas's dialogical paradigm.

          The property of unity may be approached as expressing the dynamic integration of the properties of truth and goodness within the context of intelligent existents. Unity here entails the exercise of the act of to be in a manner that ever approaches a form of life modelled on truth and goodness; moreover, this form of life is made available to intelligent being via discourse when one proceeds in conformity to the elementary precepts of practical reasoning. Moreover, unity, inso­far as finite beings are concerned, needs to be comprehended in light of Unlimited Being, who represents as the source and end of finite existents their maximum expression of unity. Since "all limited beings are made to be by the same unique Transcendent Being," then all finite existents are "foundationally related to Him and to manifesta­tions of His being."[cxxxvi]  Indeed, it is Transcendent Being that, as the plenitude of goodness, truth and unity, that bestows the experience of human emancipation as a gift.

          The transcendent is the key to real liberation: it frees the human spirit from limitation to the restricted field of one's own slow, halting and even partial creative activity; it grounds one's reality in the Absolute; it certifies one's right to be respected; and it evokes the creative power of one's heart.[cxxxvii]

The Christian experience, as the horizon in terms of which Aquinas authored his metaphysics, notably amplifies and enriches this meta­physical understanding of the Absolute such that whatever is said of reality "must honor and express the sacredness of beings."[cxxxviii]  Priva­tions of the good in the form of hatred and prejudice that do not express the "sacredness" of reality need to become the object of eman­cipatory critique in function of justice.

          This said, when considering the nature of Unlimited or Tran­scendent Being in terms of the traditional notion of unity as developed in classical metaphysics in function of the Aristotelian notion of Sub­stantia Separata, what emerges is a Being whose nature, as under­stood within the divine life itself, implies no communicative dimen­sion, and, as such, is comprehended in purely monological terms. In the case of the traditional model, an understanding of tran­scendent ground has been strictly derived by rejecting various forms of potenti­ality found in finite beings qua material, such that the con­ception or available knowledge of transcendent ground largely is con­ceived in terms of what results from negating, on the one hand, mate­rial predi­cates such as time, place, change, divisibility, while, affirm­ing, on the other, properties such as omnipotence, omniscience. Within such a conception of Transcendent Being, the dialogical attributes as reflected in the human person qua communicative are undeveloped. This is not to say that the various predicates derived traditionally from a negation of materiality and potentiality are not important in deriving a proper conception of Transcendent Being, but that a restric­tion to such a procedure provides a wholly insufficient notion of Transcendent Be­ing, a notion that does not take account of its dialogi­cal nature.

          The importance of Habermas's eminently dialogical para­digm consists in that it may be interpreted as providing the notion of Tran­scendent Being with the needed communicative dimension. For sure, the significance of Habermas's contribution for metaphysical reflection consists in that his model of ideal discourse points toward an actually-existing transcendent ground that realizes the critical pa­rameters of ideal discourse. Indeed, Habermas's model of ideal com­munication exacts a transcendent ground, as interpreted in this study, that is exis­tential, personal, dialogical, communitary, complementa­ry, and, at the very least, binary, i.e., consisting of two communicating subjects in perfect realization of the conditions of the ideal speech situation.

          The communicative dimension of intelligent being has the virtue of bringing to the fore the dialogical and communitary dimen­sion of Transcendent Being in a manner that renders metaphysics more ame­nable with the Christian notion of God as a Trinity of Persons. Al­though the Trinity is attaining increasing relevance in contemporary philosophical reflec­tion, Schmitz, for one, recog­nizes that the signifi­cance of the Trinity has not been sufficiently "cultivated in philosophy to the degree that it needs to be done."

          Anyone who has followed the Fathers and the Councils . . . realizes with what great difficulty a new and richer sense of unity had to be forged to retain the unity and simplicity of God, while enriching that unity and simpli­city with a 'pluri­fication' that arose from the very abun­dance of the divine life. Now, that disclosure into the inherent 'sociality' of the divine life has not yet been cultivated in philosophy to the degree that it needs to be done.[cxxxix]

          For Schmitz the human community reflects the "unity" and "diversity" of the Trinity:

          As Christians, . . ., we are led to consider the Godhead as the diversity of infinite persons in the most perfect unity of being, thought, and love. This theological capi­tal--the supreme har­mony of unity and diver­sity, of iden­tity and difference--is of philosophical interest insofar as we find intimations of that unity and diversity in human fellowship.[cxl]

It is the philosophical relevance of this "theological capital" that Habermas's emancipatory/communicative model helps to bring to the fore. It may well be that Habermas's proposal represents for classical metaphysics a new optic from which to view Transcendent Being less in terms of First Mover, Uncaused Cause, Necessary Existence, Un­limited Cause, and more in terms of predicates such as personal, dialogical, communitary, communicative, emancipative, and comple­mentary. Indeed, the Trinity as the paradigm of unconstrained dis­course emerges then as the exemplar of metaphysical emancipation, the ultimate foundation of the human quest for perfect liberty, truth and justice.