CONCLUSION
In retrospect, this study has been concerned with assessing the varied
investigations of Jürgen Habermas in favor of a philosophy
of emancipation with the end in view of developing its latent metaphysical
themes. Habermas, as interpreted in this study, in attempting to articulate
a framework for the concrete exercise of the human
emancipatory potential opens a space which points beyond the further reaches
of his own philosophical compass in the direction of metaphysical
reflection, in a manner that notably amplifies and enriches traditional
metaphysical notions, specifically the notion of being as
esse.
With this aim in view the first chapter endeavored to situate
Habermas's own proposals within the topology of the postmodern landscape
located in that region characterized by Bernstein as beyond
objectivism and
relativism. Here Habermas's contribution emerged as neither espousing an
objectivist/foundationalist position nor as renouncing
philosophy's "aim of clarifying the presuppositions of rationality of
processes of reaching understanding" within the context of reconstructive
methodology. Such a clarification purports to provide a critical framework for
adjudicating theoretical and normative claims so as to distinguish between the
true from the false, the just from the unjust. Once the parameters of
Habermas's investigations were sufficiently articulated, this study
proposed to consider what his project may signify, specifically his notion of
an emancipatory interest and communication in function of the ideal situation,
when considered in terms of the classical model of existential metaphysics.
The second chapter traced the rationale informing Habermas's theory
of
cognitive interests with the object of showing the manner in which the
emancipatory interest emerges as a distinctive property of the human person.
This task afforded an opportunity for considering Habermas's critique of
positivism and his argument in favor of an extension of
knowledge so as to include both the
natural and the
human sciences, while identifying their distinctive object, methodology and
constitutive interest. In this respect the
nomological sciences were understood as securing via the hypothetico-deductive
methodology an ever-increasing mastery of nature in function of a
technical interest rooted in the physiological-biological dimension of the
human organism. The
human sciences were understood as advancing via hermeneutical analysis human
communication in function of a practical
interest rooted in the social dimension of the human
person, i.e., an interest in the coordination of human activity via communicative
processes. Further, the
critical sciences were understood as remediating via
critical reflection forms of hypostatized disequilibria in function of an
emancipatory interest rooted in the nature of the human
person.
Yet, given that the theory of
cognitive interests limited itself with a description of the constitutive
interests and the sciences to which they give rise, Habermas developed a
model of undistorted consciousness/communication in his theory of universal
pragmatics as the methodological framework for effecting the dissolution of
interest-oriented perspectives. The third chapter examined this theory in
terms of a
reconstruction of consensual and discursive speech, while limiting itself
to an analysis of the question of the adequacy of Habermas's discourse
theory of truth in terms of the conditions of the
ideal speech situation within the context of a logic of
theoretical discourse. Though this study viewed as adequate Habermas's
theory of truth as it relates to the adjudication of truth claims, it was
the application of this formal scheme to normative questions that was of
primary concern.
Accordingly the fourth chapter proceeded to first articulate the master
lines of Habermas's discourse
ethics and then to address the question concerning the adequacy of his
principle of
universalization in function of the formal conditions of the
ideal speech situation within the context of a logic of
practical discourse. Insofar as normative claims are concerned, it was
maintained that the purely formal nature of Habermas's principle of
universalization presents itself as an inadequate instrument for testing the
validity of existing or proposed norms given that such a principle is better
understood as a framework for mediating compromises amid variable interpretations
than as a guide for moral/ethical orientation. Moreover, Habermas's appeal for
a materialistic conception of society led to considering whether there might
not be an alternate reading of his proposals capable of incorporating the
insights of his proposal while avoiding the
formalism of his ethical theory and his choice of worldview.
The fifth chapter attempted to understand Habermas's overall project as
a concern with the concrete exercise of human
freedom in a manner analogous to
Kant's intentions who also sought to articulate a framework within the context
of his third critique wherein the
necessity/universality of theoretical
reason could be harmonized with the
freedom/autonomy of practical reason. This movement toward a unified
conception of cognition in function of a certain worldview provided an
occasion for proposing that a hermeneutical appropriation of the Christian
horizon furnished the resources for equiping Habermas's formalistic model with
a context that is realist, metaphysical and communicative, i.e., communicative
in a sense broader than that envisioned by Habermas's own philosophical
proposal.
From here it was discovered that although the communicative dimension
of reality is explicitly celebrated within the Christian worldview, an
equally developed sense of communicative reality was found wanting if
one refers to the existential metaphysics of Thomas
Aquinas, a system which endeavors to provide
Christianity with a philosophical basis. The move was then made to consider
whether Habermas's philosophy of emancipation may not represent a new optic
for considering the notion of
esse. In this respect, following the criteria of transcendentality,
it was determined that the Habermasian notions of emancipatory interest and
communication in function of the
ideal speech situation could indeed be elevated as metaphysical versus
purely anthropological notions given that they imply no materiality and may
thereby be predicated analogously of
Unlimited Being and limited intelligent beings.
The last section of this chapter concerned itself with explicating the
complementary relations between Habermas's emancipatory/communicative model
and Aquinas's existential metaphysics. This was accomplished by integrating
the transcendental property of goodness with the Habermasian notion of
emancipation and the property of truth with other Habermasian notion of ideal
communication. This led to a consideration of the problem that arises when
comparing the transcendental property of unity in function of Aquinas's
monological framework and Habermas's dialogical framework. Within this
perspective it was suggested that Habermas's model of communication in terms
of the ideal speech situation provided critical parameters for determining
the conception of transcendent ground that metaphysical reflection should
embrace, i.e., a notion of Transcendent Being as personal, dialogical,
communitary, communicative, emancipative and complementary.
Such a communicative divinity was further understood as better representing
the Christian notion of
Trinity than the traditional monological notion as found in classical
metaphysics. Finally, it was indicated that the Trinity as the paradigm of
unconstrained discourse constitutes the ultimate source and end of the human
quest for perfect
liberty, truth and justice.