In order to appreciate the place which Aquinas sees for evil in a purposeful universe it is necessary to follow his more general treatment of the good as a transcendental perfection of being itself, correlative to natural appetite. This approach in regard to the good will afford a starting point for the discussion of the good as a principle of order, which in turn provides the context for an appreciation of the privative character of evil.

THE TRANSCENDENTAL NOTION OF THE GOOD

Aristotle had defined the transcendental as " . . . that which is common to the many" and which is "the most universal of all predicates."⁽¹⁾ It accompanies being at its every turn, and therefore is convertible with it. In the words of one author, it is that "which is above all species of being and yet goes through all kinds of being, extending as far as being itself."⁽²⁾ Thomas is in substantial agreement with all of this and draws forth its implications in his classical treatment of the transcendentals in the Quaestiones disputatae de veritate (Disputed Questions on Truth).⁽³⁾ Therein he points out that as demonstrative reasoning demands irreducible principles upon which it is based, so in our knowledge of being there must be certain concepts or notions to which all others can be reduced and which themselves are irreducible. These are applicable to all being. He then proceeds to educe the six traditional transcendental properties of being. Viewing being in itself he arrives at the transcendentals: being, thing, and the one. Considering being in relation to other realities he regards it both as divided from all other beings, affording the transcendentals something; and as suitable to other beings, affording the transcendentals `true' and `good'.

It is with these latter that primarily we are concerned. Thomas argues that the terms of such a relation must be universal enough to agree with all beings, that is, to have some transcendental relation to all beings. This can be so only in terms of a being which possesses powers by which all other beings can be related to it, which in fact is the soul itself. Following Aristotle, he points out that the intellectual soul in a sense can become all things.⁽⁴⁾ The soul and its faculties being immaterial are able to receive the form of other beings and thereby become in an accidental way those other beings. This is effected cognitively through the reception of the intentional species and appetitively in the consequent complacency in the appetite, whereby the latter is rendered attuned to the apprehended suitable good and moved by a desire for its possession.

Thomas further develops the relation of the good to the appetite when he notes elsewhere:

The good denotes that towards which the appetite tends . . . according as desirer tends toward the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely good, is in the object desirable . . . the good exists in a thing so far as that thing is related to the appetite--and hence the aspect of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, insofar as the appetite is called good if its object is good.⁽⁵⁾

Consequently, although the good and being are in reality identical, they do allow of a distinction in the order of intention. The good adds to the notion of being the formality of appetibility.⁽⁶⁾ This formality necessarily implies the conceptual order. Thomas further insists that it is posterior in the mind to the notion of being itself. Such is the transcendental expression of the goodness of being as related to the appetite. It will be seen that, as desirable, being is good in relation to every natural appetite. But in its perfect character this is only as related to a rational appetite, for such an appetite can desire the perfection under the precise formality of the good as an end to be attained or a means thereto.

Should the statement that "the good is that toward which the appetite tends" be joined with it another, namely, that "every being is good, insofar as it is a being," it readily can be concluded that "every being is desirable," since every being insofar as it is in act or exists possesses perfection or goodness which other beings find desirable or perfective of their own being. Thus, we note a twofold aspect of goodness: on the one hand, a being is good in itself insofar as it possesses being, while on the other hand, to the same degree it is desirable by other beings. The second is founded upon the first, although it is the second that allows for the intentional distinction between being and good.

Thomas treats this twofold aspect of the good in the following way. He notes that a "thing is said to be good inasmuch as it is perfect in its esse and operari."⁽⁷⁾ This necessarily follows upon his insistence on the convertibility of being and the good. Insofar as a thing is, to that degree it is good. Moreover, he goes on in another place to explain this goodness in beings by saying that the "goodness of a thing consists not only in its mere being, but in all things needed for its perfection."⁽⁸⁾ In other words, he wishes to extend the perfection of a being beyond its mere essential constitution or substantial mode of being to the realm of its accidental perfection. He brings this out explicitly in the De Veritate (On Truth) where he distinguishes between the essential principles by which a thing is said to subsist and the accidental qualities, which he views as completing the being in its total perfection.⁽⁹⁾

As has been suggested, this complexus of perfection, as correlative with a thing's being, is the very foundation for its relation with an appetite as a desirable good. For Thomas "goodness presents the aspect of desirableness";⁽¹⁰⁾ and it is this very desirability that gives the ontological perfection, be it substantial or accidental, the character of being good. In so relating a being's perfection to appetite, as a desirable good perfective of the being of the other at least on the finite level, Thomas lays the foundation for his metaphysics of an ordered universe. Therein one being is perfective of another and intended by the Ultimate Good who leads all things through their intrinsic desirability to himself, the Transcendent Good and, consequently, the supremely desirable being.

In such a universe every imperfect being seeks to perfect itself through an actualization of its potencies or capabilities. This very universal seeking for more being and consequently more perfection bespeaks created being's radical imperfection and contingency. It seeks perfection, but this can be accomplished only through the acquisition of new being. All contingent being then is ordered to other being for its total perfection. Imperfect in itself, contingent being must seek fulfillment in another. This appetite for more being, for more goodness and perfection, springs from its very nature as creature, and hence can be called a natural inclination implanted therein by its cause. It is, in fine, a directive toward an end rooted in its very being.⁽¹¹⁾

Thus Thomas can write: "Since goodness is that which all things desire, and since this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies the aspect of an end."⁽¹²⁾ On the finite level such a formality presupposes a received form, which, as the Philosopher remarks, renders the being capable of producing a likeness to itself in operation and thus exhibiting the perfection of its being, which perfection becomes in turn the object of appetition for other beings.⁽¹³⁾ When applied to the Infinite Good, it is important to note that God loves Himself as an end, but not as an end to be attained, but rather as an end possessed and to be enjoyed. Moreover, in exhibiting itself as an object to be attained by created beings the Infinite God in no wise orders them to Himself as means to an end, which would bring Him any added perfection or happiness, but orders them to Himself only as their last end, and in the case of intellectual creatures, as an end to be enjoyed.⁽¹⁴⁾

Finally, a thing can be said to tend toward that which is suitable to it according to its form and this, according to Thomas, pertains to "weight" and order.⁽¹⁵⁾ Thus one notes a progressive association in his mind regarding the notions of form, inclination, and end with the notion of goodness considered in its appetible aspect. Moreover, each power of the form shares in this natural inclination to an object as an end, and thus, all being is seen as naturally tending toward self-perfection.⁽¹⁶⁾ The formal understanding of good, therefore, in the philosophy of Thomas is derived from the relation of being to its proper goal. Everything desires good as it desires its own perfection and this by a natural appetite.⁽¹⁷⁾ Such an interpretation of the goodness of being naturally gives way to a philosophy of natural appetency.

THE THEORY OF NATURAL APPETENCY

In his work on natural appetency G. Gustafson remarks that "Thomas' philosophy of natural appetency is his philosophy of the good."⁽¹⁸⁾ It is this relation of appetency to the good, as the perfective end of being, which gives Thomistic philosophy its dynamic character of being in motion, a universe on the move toward its goal. It is against such a background that evil will be seen in its truly destructive character. Moreover, its accidental intelligibility by reason of its being rooted in being itself will become more evident. To understand this dynamism it is necessary to investigate at length Aquinas's notion of natural appetite, which directs each being ontologically toward a suitable good which alone can satisfy its natural potentialities.

Thomas notes that "all things in their own way are inclined by appetite toward good."⁽¹⁹⁾ As has been observed above, the roots of this appetition on a finite level are to be found in the potential or imperfect character of being itself, wherein each finite being has so much perfection and no more, and yet is capable of more. In seeking to actualize their potencies beings find themselves naturally attracted to other beings in which they seek fulfillment. It is this seeking for more goodness that scholastics call "appetition." The word "appetite" is derived etymologically from the Latin words ad-petere--to seek after. Thomas remarks: "Appetere is nothing else than to seek something, as if to tend toward that to which it has been ordered."⁽²⁰⁾ This appetition, as has been shown, is in terms of acquiring some new perfection, some new form, either substantial or accidental. However, it presupposes some inclination which inclines it to its own good in its own way.⁽²¹⁾

Any consideration of appetition necessarily presupposes a corresponding appreciation of knowledge, since the former only follows upon some type of knowledge possessed of the subject to be sought. This knowledge can be either in the being itself formally as an apprehension, sensitive or intellectual, or it can be in the being virtually by reason of the natural form and its consequent inclinations. These latter are implanted therein by the author of the nature. As regards this type of knowledge, the formal apprehension of the good to be attained is had only by the intellect of the maker of the nature. But insofar as there is implanted in the non-cognitive being a form with natural inclinations, it can be said that such beings seek their perfections by their natural activities or appetitions. At any rate, it must be insisted that any appetition, as understood in Thomas' metaphysics, necessitates an intelligent direction; it implies and demands knowledge in the form either of natural inclination or of formal apprehension.

Although beings devoid of knowledge are limited in their appetition by the very determination of their natures, beings capable of knowledge, either sensitive or intellectual, can desire or incline towards beings beyond themselves, by which they can become in a sense another and find therein their completion and perfection. They are, so to speak, liberated from the limitations of their own beings to the degree that they can become another. Thomas analyzes the various types of appetition in light of the above when he writes:

Since every inclination results from a form, the natural appetite results from a form existing in the nature of things: while the sensitive appetite, as also the intellective or rational appetite, which we call will, follows from an apprehended form . . . so the animal or voluntary appetite tends to a good which is apprehended.⁽²²⁾

Thus, it might be noted that the natural appetite is determined by nature to a particular object to be obtained in a particular way. It operates from necessity and without apprehending the good which it seeks. However, it must not be thought that there is no intelligence whatsoever operative here, since every agent acts for an end and demands therefore intelligent direction. In such cases the intelligent agent is not the being itself, but the cause of the being.

Sensitive appetite, on the other hand, tends toward some appetible object apprehended as a particular good, but it does so in a determined way. It is determined by this or that particular apprehended good, if the latter at any particular moment satisfies its present appetites or needs. In so acting the sensitive appetite, or more correctly the sensitive being through its sensitive appetite, seeks good without knowing it as good. Not having any universal norm of goodness with which to compare this particular good, it finds therein a necessary fulfillment of a particular desire. It is in no way free to reject the apprehended good if the latter corresponds to its present needs. Thus, the hungry beast cannot refuse the juicy prey which appears before it. As Thomas states it:

sense appetite does not lie under any necessity in regard to any particular thing before it is apprehended under the aspect of the pleasurable or the useful, but of necessity goes out to it once it is apprehended as pleasurable (for a brute animal is unable, while looking at something pleasurable, not to desire it).⁽²³⁾

Finally there is the rational or voluntary appetite. This is rooted in the intellectual nature and seeks a particular good under the guidance of intellect, which knows the nature of the good itself. Thus, it is said to operate freely. Thomas says that such things are most perfectly inclined to the good as if inclined toward the universal good itself.⁽²⁴⁾ In this latter type of appetition no particular finite good can necessitate the appetite. In no lesser good than the universal good itself, which in fact is the divine goodness, can it find perfect satisfaction or complete fulfillment of its unlimited desire. Furthermore, it is this lack of determination to a particular good that affords reason a control over sensitive nature as well.⁽²⁵⁾ However, in emphasizing the lack of determination found in voluntary appetition one should not overlook the fact that it is fundamentally a natural appetite, a natural inclination to the good.

There is then a danger to be noted here. Using the term "natural appetite" might lead one to think that it refers only to creatures without knowledge. Nothing could be further from the truth as far as Thomas is concerned. For him every potency possesses a natural appetite for its proper object. " . . . to crave with natural appetite belongs to every power, for every power of the soul is a nature and naturally inclines to something."⁽²⁶⁾ It must be remembered, however, that this natural appetite inclines a being according to the mode of the particular nature, and thus, a rational being will operate under the direction of the intellect which perceives the nature of the good as such. Hence, it must be maintained that the necessity imposed by natural inclination or appetite is in no way opposed to self-determination.⁽²⁷⁾

In summary one might say that the natural appetite is inclined toward its correlative good according to the various modes of being in which it is found, insofar as these have a particular type of knowledge of the end to be sought. In the case of natural beings devoid of formal knowledge they seek by necessity objects suitable to their natural inclinations, guided only by the inclinations implanted in them by their author. On the other hand, sensitive creatures, capable of apprehending particular forms, seek these goods with a certain spontaneity, insofar as they know the good they seek, but do not know it under the formality of a good. The reason for this is that they possess no universal notion of goodness since such a knowledge presupposes an immaterial faculty of apprehension, which by supposition these creatures do not possess. Finally, the rational creature seeks particular goods under the formality of goodness through a comparison of any particular good to be sought with its universal appreciation of goodness. Moreover, in this life, when not confronted with its proper and adequate object, goodness itself in the concrete, the will still can exercise its autonomy in choosing not to consider happiness at all or to refrain from action.

Thomas sometimes refers to this natural appetency by the word "love." Obviously, he is using the term in a broader sense than it is customary. In fact, he equates natural inclination, appetite, and love.⁽²⁸⁾ He describes the latter as "the name . . . given to the principle of movement towards the end loved."⁽²⁹⁾ He remarks that such natural love is always proper, since it has been implanted in the being by the Author of nature.⁽³⁰⁾ However, in identifying appetite and love Aquinas necessarily implies a relation of the appetite with the term of appetition, the object loved. One might ask then whence comes this love or complacency in the good sought. The answer lies in the fact that the appetible object produces a likeness in the appetite, which renders the appetite attuned, so to speak, to the apprehended good. The source of this mutual correlation is ultimately the object's goodness or perfection rooted in the being's existing form, which is found as a suitable good by the appetite. From this correspondence between appetite and object follows the motion towards the object, which is called desire.

However, the notion of love as understood by Thomas can be more exactly described as the first change produced in the appetizing subject, the principle of the movement toward the appetible good. Thus, the appetite finds its complacency in the good apprehended, and through this complacency there is realized a certain affective union between the subject and the object, which is to be understood as the mode of becoming proper to the appetitive faculty.

Having demonstrated that the good receives its primary intelligibility by reason of being related to an appetite as a desirable object to be attained, we are in a position to appreciate Thomas' notion of affective union, whereby the object loved is said to become one with the lover. For Aquinas this appetitive process is circular in nature. He writes: " . . . the appetible object moves the appetite, introducing itself, as it were, into its intention; while the appetite moves towards the realization of the appetible object, so that the movement ends where it began."⁽³¹⁾ What Thomas refers to is the fact that there are two aspects to the notion of love. It is both the sense of the end's being attained and it is at the same time the effect of the end itself. As elicited by the appetite, on the one hand, love is the effect of the end, since it is by reason of the end that the will operates initially in seeking the good. On the other hand, the love of the end holds itself toward the appetible object as a "co-natural" subject. In the words of John of St. Thomas such a love "is received by the will as the weight of its own inclination being changed toward a complacency."⁽³²⁾ Thus love is seen as the "aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good,"⁽³³⁾ as "common to every nature to have some inclination,"⁽³⁴⁾ or as that which is "the principle of movement towards the end loved."⁽³⁵⁾ In all of this, love must be viewed in its dual aspect as a type of mutual suitability effected by the object in the appetite from which follows an inclination of the appetite toward the appetible good.

According to Thomas then it should be concluded that every agent acts by reason of love. Thus, we have added as a further precision to our understanding of natural appetency its aspect of love. John of St. Thomas in regard to the affective character of appetition writes: "For neither is finalizing goodness diffused really, that is, through a propagation of itself and the production of another, but through an affection of itself and an ordination toward the good itself."⁽³⁶⁾ Thus does the good diffuse itself by drawing other beings to itself and ultimately to goodness itself through the operation of love, causing them to find in the good the perfection of their natures and potencies.

One might further develop this notion in terms of the kind of activity consequent upon the suitability effected by the appetible object. Something can be said to tend toward its end by its own action in a twofold manner; first, man is said to tend thereto as "moving himself"; secondly, nonrational creatures are "moved by another" due to some natural inclination, and not by themselves, since they do not know the formality of the end. Therefore, Thomas concludes that irrational creatures "cannot ordain anything to an end, but can be ordained to an end only by another."⁽³⁷⁾ Thus, man, although naturally inclined toward the good as end, can direct himself thereto by the choice of particular means suitable to that end. This direction toward the end will be accomplished by man's free acts, which afford him a share in the intelligent ordering of all things toward the ultimate end, the universal good.

To complete his exposition of the notion of natural appetency, Thomas contrasts it with the question of violence in regard to the will. It would be well to consider this contrast briefly in view of future observations relative to free choice. To begin with, violence had been defined by Aristotle as that "of which the moving principle is outside, being a principle in which nothing is contributed by the person who is acting or feeling the passion."⁽³⁸⁾ This can happen in two ways; in one way in regard to a being's natural end, and in another way, relative to the mode of attaining its end.⁽³⁹⁾ Thomas, however, maintains that in neither way can things be said to suffer violence as regards their natural appetencies, since " . . . having within themselves some principle of their inclination in virtue of which that inclination is natural, so that in a way they go themselves and are not merely led to their due ends."⁽⁴⁰⁾ Things subject to violence are said to be led, in that they contributed nothing to the principle moving them, which then is wholly exterior to them. However, when it is a question of natural appetencies, through the latter beings, as it were, cooperate in directing themselves toward the end.⁽⁴¹⁾ Thus, what a nature does by reason of a natural inclination, be this in terms of natural endowments or acquired (or in the case of the supernatural, infused) habits, cannot be said to be at variance with itself, and hence cannot suffer violence properly so-called.⁽⁴²⁾

NATURAL APPETENCY AND FREE WILL

Since the concern of this study is the will's free choice of evil, it would be helpful to develop further the question of the natural inclination of voluntary appetite and its relation to human freedom. As has already been noted, the attainment of the end through natural appetition is found in creatures according to their various modes of being. Although the rational being can direct itself in its voluntary actions in the choice of means to its end, nevertheless, basically it is directed to the end through its form and consequent rational powers, which are to be considered natural appetites. This fundamental and radical direction to the end of the rational creature is to be understood in terms of the creature's ultimate end, which is grasped intellectually in the present state under the aspect of the good. Other particular ends are freely chosen as ends in themselves. However, they remain subordinated to the ultimate end in the sense that they are chosen, at least implicitly, under the formality of the good, which constitutes the radical and formal orientation of the rational will, as will or natural appetite.⁽⁴³⁾ The rational form and its consequent faculties are basically "natures," and as such are directed toward the ultimate good. Such a determination of the rational appetite, as nature, in no way opposes freedom.⁽⁴⁴⁾ In fact, it is by reason of this radical determination to the good that the human will is radically unconstrained. The reason for this is that the will, being determined to seek the good by its formal orientation as appetite, can thus exercise its free choice of the particular goods that are presented to it by the intellect as means to an end.⁽⁴⁵⁾

Since Thomas considers identification with, and possession of, a being's ultimate end to be its highest perfection, this radical determination, whereby the end is initially attained can in no way militate against human freedom. All other appetition, as has been suggested above, becomes meaningful only in terms of this formal determination to the end, and only due to it do other beings become suitable objects of rational appetition as means thereto. Aquinas teaches this explicitly:

Just as there is an ordination of nature to the will, there is, moreover, a parallel ordination of the things which the will naturally wills to those in regard to which it is determined of itself and not by nature. Thus, just as nature is the foundation of will, similarly the object of natural appetite is the principle and foundation of the other objects of appetite.⁽⁴⁶⁾

From the above quotation it is evident that not all necessitation is opposed to freedom, but only that which would concern things not properly a being's last end. Any necessitation in their regard would imply an absence of freedom subordinating the being to something less than its proper end. Therefore, as regards the necessity relative to the free will's ultimate end, Thomas refuses to view it as a type of violence forcing the will from without. He specifically states this: "Although the will wills the last end by a certain necessary inclination, it is nevertheless in no way to be granted that it is forced to will it."⁽⁴⁷⁾ The notion of coercion, as has been mentioned above, would involve the will's being forced against its own volition. This is obviously an impossible situation. The will always wills that which it wills, and does so freely, except, of course, in the case of an actual confrontation with the ultimate good itself. Even in this latter case, the will cannot be said to be forced to will this Good, since toward this end it is radically determined.

However, in its present state the will retains its freedom of exercise even in regard to goodness itself or happiness insofar as it need not consider them or put forth any act whatsoever. Moreover, since "coercion" refers to the order of exercise directly, in which order the formality of freedom is to be found, it must be in this order that the will is immune from coercion or force. This is obvious, if one would recall that Thomas insists that only God, the First Cause, can move the will efficiently, which point will be established later in this study. As one author summarizes it: "In spite of its necessary, natural inclination, the will always remains, even as a nature, a `potentia libera'. It is `libera voluntas' precisely because its necessary inclination is always immune from coaction from without."⁽⁴⁸⁾

The specific application of the above matter as regards the question of the will's choice of moral evil will be seen in terms of the radical defectibility of the rational appetite through its non-identification with its ultimate end. It provides the basis for appreciating the precarious condition of human freedom in relation to the choice of suitable means or goods toward its ultimate end. More generally, it serves to emphasize the necessity for a proper subordination of means to end inasmuch as the basis of freedom lies in the formal determination of the rational appetite to the universal good.⁽⁴⁹⁾

To gain an even deeper insight into this most fundamental relation of necessity and freedom one might consider briefly freedom as it is verified in the divine. God wills His own goodness as a quasi-end.⁽⁵⁰⁾ Of course, such a willing of Himself, as end, is from necessity. It is necessary, however, to understand this word properly in such a context. It at first suggests constraint, whereas we know that in God there is only spontaneity.⁽⁵¹⁾ One must recall that in Thomas' mind such necessitation is not at variance with liberty. In fact, it is only in the being which is identified completely with itself as end that there can be perfect freedom, subsistent freedom. Thus it contrasts to finite being, which is not completely identified with its end and which, therefore, must seek that end through a choice of means suitable to its end.⁽⁵²⁾ Such terms as necessity and freedom must be employed with great caution, especially when referring them to God in whom they are most perfectly verified. It is said that God wills Himself by necessity and wills creatures freely. Necessity here, however, is not contrasted with freedom or liberty in its essential meaning, but only as regards its secondary manifestation as freedom of choice. Even this latter when applied to God, in whom it certainly exists, must be purified of any of its limited characteristics as found in creatures.⁽⁵³⁾

In contingent beings, freedom of choice as regards the means to an end bespeaks their imperfection. Not yet in possession of their end, they must employ other creatures in its pursuit. Such a dependence on other beings can in no way be applicable to the notion of choice in God. His free choice is exercised in quite a different way from that of created choosing, and yet in it one finds the essential elements of free choice. Since God's love is causative, in freely choosing to create finite beings He directs them to Himself, not as means to attain anything for Himself, as a creature necessarily would do, but for their own benefit and perfection. Thomas notes this when he remarks: "The divine goodness is not an end of the kind which is produced by the means to the end, but rather one by which the things which are directed to it are produced and perfected."⁽⁵⁴⁾ In so willing creatures He wills them according to their contingent nature, since the will tends towards objects as they exist in themselves. Thus, toward the necessary being the will is drawn by necessity, whereas it wills contingent beings freely. In other words, the contingency of God's will act is not rooted in any potential element in itself, but rather in the contingent character of the object willed. This is an ultimate precision in the notion of free choice as related to the end and should afford one with a means to appreciate better the relation of natural appetency to freedom of choice in the rational creature.⁽⁵⁵⁾

The notion of natural appetency in the metaphysics of Thomas provides, therefore, a deeper understanding of the voluntary appetite, which will be pivotal in the further development of this study. By means of this doctrine any elements in the consideration of human freedom which would be mere limitations of freedom and not essential to the notion itself have been sifted out and prescinded from. Moreover, it furnishes the necessary background against which one can understand better the defectible character of human freedom as rooted in the imperfect realization of free choice found in the created will. This precise point is a further prerequisite for understanding the bases for the will's defection in evil.

It is this element of defectibility, the possibility of a creature's choosing improper means to a self-established end, that above all else will indicate the imperfect nature of created freedom. If ontological separation of the creature from its end implies its radical imperfection, and if the necessity of seeking that end through the help of other creatures used as means further bespeaks its contingency, what must be said of the fact that created freedom is inherently defectible, that is, that it can and in some cases does defect from the end toward which it is naturally inclined. Thomas in fact insists that it is impossible for the creature to have natural impeccability or indefectibility, and the reason given is "its being made out of nothing."⁽⁵⁶⁾ In other words, since a creature's being is not necessary and is not identified with its end, its freedom is likewise contingent and defectible. In this is rooted created freedom's radical contingency, manifest in its ability to posit an evil end, although under the aspect of a good, and to choose totally improper means thereto. As we shall see in a later chapter, the primary task incumbent upon the created will is to render the actualization of this radical defectibility less probable to occur and thereby gain a "liberty of autonomy" even in this present life.⁽⁵⁷⁾

ORDER AND LAW--ITS NORM

Thus far it has been shown how Thomas' teleological approach to the universe is expressed in terms of the natural appetites for the good as found in all beings. In this way, each individual being has been considered as realizing its total goodness, that is, its individual perfection through the appetition of further being, either in terms of conserving its own being or form, or through the acquisition of new form. Moreover, this appetition for more being and more goodness has been related to the attainment of the being's end, and in the thought of Thomas the two have been identified: "Inasmuch as one being by reason of its act of existing is such as to perfect and complete another, it stands to that other as an end. And hence it is that all who rightly define good put in its notion something about its status as an end."⁽⁵⁸⁾ Now one must consider an even more important aspect of finality in the philosophy of Aquinas, which looks beyond the individual perfection of beings to the relation of all such appetition to the totality of being, the universe itself. It is precisely here that the notion of appetition implies a philosophy of natural law. If beings, through their individual appetitions toward their own particular ends, are to act in an orderly fashion and in concert with one another, there must be law to govern them according to the diversity of their natures. Thus, the present section considers this universal order as it is achieved through law.

As has always been the teaching of Christian philosophy, beings exist primarily to manifest the goodness of God by sharing and participating in varying degrees in His goodness. In this way, they objectively reflect the infinite perfection. However, it must be noted here that Thomas does not see this reflection primarily in terms of the individual being's goodness, but rather by reason of the order of the whole universe. It is this total finality wherein each individual part contributes through its own perfection to the perfection of the whole that affords the most perfect reflection of the divine. For this reason, Thomas never considers individual beings in an isolated state, since only together as a totality do beings constitute an adequate representation of divine goodness.⁽⁵⁹⁾ In fact, according to Aquinas: "among all the things that are ordered to one another their order to one another is for the sake of their order to something one."⁽⁶⁰⁾ Thus, the good of the individual is willed in view of the good of the whole as more consonant with God's infinite perfection. Thomas remarks in the Summa Contra Gentiles:

It was His prerogative, therefore, to induce His likeness into created things most perfectly, to a degree consonant with the nature of created being. But created things cannot attain to a perfect likeness to God according to only one species of creature . . . the presence of multiplicity and variety among created things was therefore necessary.⁽⁶¹⁾

Although this fundamental order is effected through being in first act, that is, in terms of their very natures and natural power, Thomas further insists that the order of creation is evidenced in their second act, namely, their operations. He remarks that it is not enough that they exist, but by their actions they should contribute to the order of the universe.⁽⁶²⁾ As has been seen, this community of action is effected through the dynamism of natural appetite in pursuit of its own good.

Creatures are so inclined that it can be said that they are more strongly inclined thereto than to themselves.⁽⁶³⁾ They love their particular good on account of the common good of the whole universe, which is God. In fact the simple complacency of any creature is first inclined toward the sovereign good, and by consequence toward its own good.⁽⁶⁴⁾ Although a part is said to love the good of the whole as something suitable to itself, still it does this not by referring the good to itself, but by referring itself to the good of the whole.⁽⁶⁵⁾ However, for a perfectly ordered universe it is necessary that rational appetition be present as the perfect likeness of God's own ordering of things to their end.⁽⁶⁶⁾ Following Thomas' thought it is to be noted that the attainment of the ultimate end of the universe can be had in two ways: first, by what might be called the way of assimilation, that is, by the mere reflection of the divine perfection through the goodness found in beings' first and second acts; secondly, by way of attaining to the divine goodness itself, which attainment obviously is possible only to rational or intellectual creatures. Only they can attain God through their operations of knowledge and love.⁽⁶⁷⁾ It is through their free activity that such beings attain beatitude, and in so doing glorify in the most perfect way the divine goodness.⁽⁶⁸⁾

So lofty is this dignity enjoyed by rational creation in the actual attainment of the end that Thomas makes it the very principle of the good of the universe.⁽⁶⁹⁾ In other words, for him everything in the universe is ordered to the rational nature and has its place in the divine plan accordingly. John Wright remarks in this regard:

The good of the universe is a good of order . . . and the principle of an order is that which determines the inherent structure and intelligibility. Hence, the rational nature, as the proper subject of beatitude, is what determines the divine plan of the universe.⁽⁷⁰⁾

The reader might object that there appears to be some contradiction between the previous assertion that the primary end of creation is the order of the entire universe, and the present notion that the intellectual creature is the principle and center of this order as the primary concern of divine providence. This indeed has proved a formidable difficulty in the interpretation of Thomas. However, before maintaining a striking inconsistency in his thought, let us see if he can preserve and unite both aspects of the problem.⁽⁷¹⁾

The happiness, as such, of the rational creature is subordinate to the universal order, since the latter alone, according to the mind of Thomas, adequately manifests the Divine Goodness. However, that beatitude, considered precisely as the union of the rational creature with its Divine End through knowledge and love, transcends even the universal order in both dignity and value. Thus, as relating to God, the person transcends every created good, but in this very act of transcendence it establishes in the highest way possible the total order of creation and formally refers it to its ultimate end.⁽⁷²⁾ An analogy might be drawn in terms of the body. Vision admittedly is the noblest sense and as such can be said to transcend the body itself. However, in the context of the body as being the most perfect reflection of unity and order, the eye is subordinate in character; yet it is through this very subordination of this noblest of senses that the body is rendered so completely manifestive of this unity.

Thus, Thomas views the universe as ordered, integrating each particular into the pattern of the finished masterpiece. He comments that nature is "the plan of a divine artist, introduced into things, whereby they move to a determined end."⁽⁷³⁾ There is no question of strife here. In the very effort to attain their particular ends all strive to attain God. The result is a marvelous unity, and thus in the words of one writer: "The universe becomes possessed of one aim, one activity, one order."⁽⁷⁴⁾

If one considers the rational creature in the above context, that is, as directing itself toward its end by a choice of means and yet as radically defectible in this choice, one can easily see the role played by law in the metaphysics of order. For, if free defectible creatures are to attain their end, there must be some guiding principle or norm which directs their actions along proper lines and which is not a necessitating rule. Thomas insists that free choice must be made only of means toward the end which observe the due order to that end. He remarks that "it belongs to the perfection of its liberty for the free-will to be able to choose between opposite things, keeping the order of the end in view; but it comes of the defect of liberty for it to choose anything by turning away from the order of the end."⁽⁷⁵⁾ In other words, not just any human action attains the determined end and thus leads the rational being to its perfection, but only that which is properly directed thereto. However, with so many things in life militating against this preservation of ordered activity, it becomes absolutely necessary that there be some obvious rule in pursuing this goal. Such a rule or norm is what is meant by law. The liberty to choose means towards happiness is thus inseparable from the dictates of law in any teleological approach to human activity.

As we noted above, Thomas places the intrinsic cause of universal order in the natural appetite of all being for its proper and determined end. At times, however, Aquinas treats of this natural appetite and the uniformity of activity effected by it in terms of law, speaking of the law of nature even in reference to the irrational world.⁽⁷⁶⁾ Such an application of the notion of law can only be by way of analogy since, strictly speaking, law concerns the human sphere alone,⁽⁷⁷⁾ although it is paralleled in the natural order by what is usually called the physical law. The genuine law of nature, nevertheless, is the moral law which by natural reason is dictated. It is in the reason that God places the responsibility for interpreting this law and for directing human action accordingly toward its ultimate end. Ethicians refer to this "law of nature" as the "proximate norm of morality."

Thomas in his classical definition of the natural law as "the rational creature's participation in the eternal law,"⁽⁷⁸⁾ sees it as natural law, insofar as it is promulgated to man through his rational nature. Since a law consists of ideas and judgments, the natural law is obtained through the use of reason in drawing conclusions about human nature. The human person is equipped by nature with a specific faculty, namely, human reason, for forming such judgments and for guiding his free acts to their proper and ultimate end. One can reflect on him- or herself as regards the various needs of one's own nature and the suitability of specific deeds to these needs. One can, in other words, compare one's conduct with one's nature and understand the conformity or non-conformity between them.

The very nature of law demands that it be promulgated through reason, since law is an ordinance of reason. However, the natural law is manifest to reason not by any external sign, but simply by a rationally conducted examination of human nature with all its parts and relations. Such an examination by reason must regard the whole man. Thus, if an action is suitable to one aspect of human nature but harmful to another, that action is not simply and without qualification good for one. Human nature must be taken here with all its parts, essential and integral, and with all its relations to the divine, society, and the goods of the earth which serve him. This hierarchy is to be understood according to the intrinsic worth and excellence of the two chief parts of man and of these three orders of relation.⁽⁷⁹⁾

To know what man must do then to attain his end it is essential that one know what man is, that is, his nature, potencies, and natural inclinations. However, as can be seen from the above the complexity of his nature often renders this function of reason quite difficult. Such a hierarchical evaluation of faculties and objects is theoretically valid. In theory it can be said that God has effected this subordination of appetencies in the human composite; in man's very constitution as primordially willed by God he participates by nature in the eternal law.⁽⁸⁰⁾ In fact Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that we are naturally adapted to be recipients of virtue.⁽⁸¹⁾ However, whatever human nature might have been in a state of natural integrity, a lack of ordination is found in it now, a truth which experience daily confirms. Natural appetites do not always function according their proper subordinations. Form is not always in control of matter, and although natural appetency, as an habitual inclination to proper ends and acts, constitutes the natural law in first act, in practical application it demands a careful and mature exercise of reason.⁽⁸²⁾

Thomas employs various terms to bring out this function of reason. He refers to law as a "rule,"⁽⁸³⁾ a "dictate of reason,"⁽⁸⁴⁾ as something "directive of actions to their end."⁽⁸⁵⁾ He considers rational creatures as participating in a very special way in the working out of divine providence, providing for themselves and for other beings through their self-direction toward their end according to the norm of reason and law.⁽⁸⁶⁾ Therefore, in the present context law can be understood as that intended by God "to direct man toward his end in choosing the right means."⁽⁸⁷⁾ Since reason is the first principle of human acts, it is considered to be their rule; for, in each category of being, the rule is always assumed to be the first principle, that is, a norm regulative of the various functions, operations, relations of the being. On the other hand, we have noted that the rule of human acts is nothing other than law itself and hence, law can be found in reason and the latter ought to follow it.⁽⁸⁸⁾

It is in the Summa Theologica that Thomas discusses the rule or measure of action. There he notes that the law as rule can be in a subject in two ways: first, as in one ruling or measuring and thus God is the rule of all being, the eternal law; secondly, as in something ruled or measured and thus do all participate in this eternal law insofar as from its impression they have inclinations toward their proper acts and ends. However, as already has been noted, he insists that the participation is properly found only in rational creatures since only they who perceive the law can freely regulate their actions according to it.⁽⁸⁹⁾

The precepts of the natural law are to the practical reason what the first principles of reason are to the speculative reason, and in this sense they can be called habitual.⁽⁹⁰⁾ Just so the idea of being is the first notion to fall under the working of the speculative reason, as the idea of the good is that which first directs human action. Thus, the first principle of practical reason is founded upon the formality of the good, which is an aspect of being itself and can thus be said to be connatural to the will as such. The principle can be formulated in the following manner: the good is that which all beings desire. Thus, the first precept of the natural law will be: it is necessary to seek the good and to avoid evil.

It follows that, since the good has the formality of an end, and evil the contrary formality, all things which man naturally seeks are perceived as good by reason, and consequently are to be done, whereas all things perceived as contrary are to be avoided. As will be demonstrated in a later chapter, this pertains to the order of final causality or in the case of exercise to the order of efficient causality in regard to the end. In this order the will must always seek the good, if it wills at all. It is not here that sin will occur, but only in the choice of means thereto or to a mistaken end. This pertains to the order of formal causality insofar as the judgment specifies a particular good as a suitable good to be sought in view of an end to be attained.

Such an approach to the natural law implies the role of reason as the rule of human action and highlights the unreasonable character of moral evil. The mere fact that persons can judge some apparent good as really good for those here and now and as something to be sought apart from all considerations of their ultimate end indicates the depraved nature which grounds such a choice. The metaphysics of this unnatural choice resolves itself into a relation of the object of human volition to an unsuitable end. In other words, an act is not considered morally good just because it proceeds from a human agent. It must be ordered to an object consonant with natural reason. If it is not, it is to that degree defective, lacking the perfection of being which it ought to have as a moral act, namely, a due species, measure, and end. One author summarizes it thus: "That action is in accordance with reason which is ordered to the proper end because every good or evil action arises from a presupposed conformity or defect in being or in the operative powers."⁽⁹¹⁾

It might be asked further whether such a rule or measure dictating the means to be chosen for the attainment of the end does not in some way limit the freedom of man. In answer it should be noted that there is a certain "freedom of autonomy" possible to man even in this life, but never in any perfect degree, since he remains separated from his end and dependent upon creatures as means therto. However, in this life some realization of this freedom is possible by becoming, as it were, a law unto oneself. This is accomplished through the repeated choice of true means to one's end, and thus effecting a sort of second nature.⁽⁹²⁾

Contrasted with this true liberty whereby rational creatures directs their actions to their proper end according to the rule of reason and law is that state of subservience imposed upon those who make repeated acts of evil choice. These too can be said to acquire a "second nature," but it is not one of autonomy.⁽⁹³⁾ It is rather a state of servility wherein the rational creature is turned from his last end in his inordinate seeking of lower nature by means of unregulated action. Thus, the rational fulfillment of law in terms of regulated action must always be judged a perfection of personality insofar as it manifests the rational being's chief contribution to the order of the universe; it must never be thought of as an unwarranted restriction on the exercise of freedom. "The obligation of a precept is not opposed to liberty, except in one whose mind is averted from that which is prescribed . . . but the precept of love cannot be fulfilled save of one's own will."⁽⁹⁴⁾

In conclusion, law is thus seen as ensuring liberty for it is concerned with the maintenance of the harmony of order. Without the latter, liberty would be haphazard and purposeless. The function of liberty in choosing proper means to the attainment of the ultimate goal parallels closely the essential function of law which serves as a norm or rule directing reason to its end. Hence, one can easily perceive the intimate relations existing among order, liberty, and law, as having their principle or fundamental directive in the good, which renders them aspects of a dynamic universe. With such a background the inquiry into the nature of evil, and specifically moral evil, should be more meaningful.