The preceding chapter has attempted to detail the notion of the good as a principle of order. The chief reason for such an approach was the desire to avoid the error of attempting to define the nature and to probe the mystery of evil without having first set forth a metaphysics of the good. This is not the method of Aquinas who wrote in the Summa Contra Gentiles: "It is the peculiar nature of evil to be unintelligible except in terms of its opposite."⁽⁹⁵⁾ For him it is only the good that gives meaning to evil in an ordered universe; without this correlative, the mystery of evil becomes indeed a contradiction. Thus, the previous insights into the good, both as the perfection possessed at a particular instant by a being on its journey towards its ultimate good and as perfective of other beings, manifests the teleological character of being and of the universe itself. By so relating the good to end in terms of perfection the foundations have been laid for a metaphysical inquiry into the nature of evil, specifically of moral evil, insofar as it is destructive of this finality of being.

EVIL: NEITHER A NATURE NOR A FORM

In all his writings on the question of evil Thomas consistently begins his treatment with the inquiry as to whether or not evil can be considered a "nature" or a thing of any kind.⁽⁹⁶⁾ The importance of this question cannot be underestimated, and certainly its answer cannot be passed over in any cursory manner. What Aquinas is probing is whether evil is some kind of hypostasis, a being contrary to the good, whose ultimate source might be some supreme evil. Or, on the contrary, is evil a mere nothing, a negation, in the order of reality? Is it a figment of man's imagination? Is it a mere being of reason with only a foundation in reality, which allows the mind to fashion some mental construct? If it were such, men and women would, in a sense, be the dupes of their own crude inventions, and thus the manifold sufferings of life and the perversity of man would be so many chimeras. On the other hand, by positing evil as an actual being, a cause would be demanded to account for it; following Thomas' usual reasoning, such would necessitate the existence of some supreme cause of evil. Thomas adopts neither of these solutions, but finds a middle ground which salvages the reality of evil without asserting its positive existence. His answer to this fundamental and primary question as regards the nature of evil is categorical: "It cannot be that evil signifies being, or any form or nature."⁽⁹⁷⁾

Thomas' arguments to support his contention that evil is not a "something," nor a form utilize the basic principles of his metaphysics, namely, that every being is good insofar as it is appetible by another being; every being acts to the degree that it is in act; every being acts for an end; and every being seeks the good. These various arguments might be reduced to three general categories, as found in the De Malo,⁽⁹⁸⁾ along with a few supplementary notions in other works. The first of these arguments deals with evil in regard to its cause. A cause acts only insofar as it is in act, which by convertibility is to say insofar as it is good. It thus produces an effect similar to itself, that is, another good. Evil cannot be said to exist, since it could have no cause, otherwise, it would not be evil but good. Thomas states this argument in the following manner:

Whatever is among the things that are must have its origin from the first and universal good. But what originates from the first and universal good cannot be other than a particular good, just as what originates from the first and universal cause of being is a particular being. Everything then that is numbered among the things that are must be a particular good. Hence it cannot according as it is a particular being be opposed to good.⁽⁹⁹⁾

A second argument is offered in terms of the end or appetible character of all being. Insofar as such being has a natural inclination or appetite for a suitable good and as all beings seek the good, there is no place in existence for any being which is by nature evil. Thomas argues in the following fashion:

Whatever is numbered among the things that are has an inclination and desire for something befitting itself. But whatever has the nature of desirable has the nature of good. Therefore whatever is numbered among the things that are has an affinity with some good.⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

Hence, evil cannot be something in the nature of things since by definition it has no suitability with the good, but rather is opposed to it. In fact, Thomas adds in this regard that if evil were some thing, it would seek nothing, and would in turn be sought by nothing, and consequently would have no action or motion, since every being moves for an end, which would necessarily be a suitable good.⁽¹⁰¹⁾

Finally, Thomas' third major argument for the non-existence of evil as a nature concerns the very nature of being itself. He argues from the fact that the very notion of being is correlative with the notion of the good. In his own words the argument runs as follows:

Being itself especially has the nature of desirable; hence we see that each thing naturally desires to preserve its being, and not only flees from things destructive of its being but resists them with all its might; so accordingly, being itself, inasmuch as it is desirable, is good. Therefore evil, which is universally opposed to good, must be opposed also to being itself. But what is opposed to being cannot be something.⁽¹⁰²⁾

Besides these basic arguments one finds others in the writing of Thomas which corroborate the thesis that evil as such is not a nature. These latter arguments seem to make explicit what was already implied in the more general presentation. In the Summa Contra Gentes⁽¹⁰³⁾ Thomas shows that evil cannot be an agent since a thing acts only insofar as it is existing and is perfect, whereas evil by definition is a privation of due being and perfection. Such non-activity argues to the non-being of evil. This same reasoning is employed in his Commentary on the Divine Names⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ where he argues that it belongs to the good to produce and to save beings, whereas it is proper to evil to corrupt and to destroy them. From this it follows, according to Thomas, that only the good can cause existent things and evil is not the cause of any existing thing, which implies that no evil exists, since the good produces only good.

Another approach to the non-actuality of evil is presented by Thomas in terms of the division of all being into potency and act. Act is a good; in fact, a thing is perfect to the degree that it is in act. Moreover, potency is also a good, insofar as it tends toward act. It is proportionate to act and is not contrary to it, as is evil. Moreover, it can be said that potency belongs to the genus of act, unlike evil which belongs to any genus only accidentally. Thus, Aquinas concludes that every being, both actual and potential, is good, and hence, evil which is by definition opposed to the good, is neither an actual nor a potential being.⁽¹⁰⁵⁾

The Summa Contra Gentes also asserts the non-being of evil in terms of the nature of form.⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ Thomas argues that whatever possesses an essence is either a form or has a form. In fact, every being is placed in its proper genus by reason of such a form. However, form has the essential character of being good, inasmuch as it is the principle of act, and a thing is in act only insofar as it exists. Moreover, the end toward which a being's action tends must also share in this same goodness, as does the very action by which the being tends toward its end and by which the being is perfected. Thus, Thomas concludes that everything which has a form must be said to be a good and not an evil.

A final argument offered by Aquinas is based on a consideration of the natural character of all that pertains to being. He says that every essence belongs to some definite genus in nature, either as a substance, insofar as it is the very nature of the being, or as an accident, inasmuch as it is caused by the principles of the subject. As such accidents also are said to be natural to the being. However, evil in itself cannot be natural to anything, since it is by definition a privation of what is natural and what is due to a being. He concludes that whatever is present in a thing naturally is good, and what is present therein as a privation is called evil. Evil, therefore, is neither to be considered a nature, nor something, nor a form.⁽¹⁰⁷⁾

EVIL: AN ABSENCE OF DUE GOOD

Evil on the contrary signifies a certain absence, and a being is said to be evil to the degree that it neither exists nor is good.⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ In fact, since being, insofar as it is, is good, evil can be considered the removal of both, i.e., of both existence and goodness. Thomas, however, is quick to note that this absence is not a mere negation of being or of goodness. Apart from the unreasonable consequences which would result from such a view discussed above, it would likewise follow that all except the Infinite would be evil, insofar as all finite being lacks being and goodness in an infinite degree. Rather, the absence referred to by Aquinas is the defect of good "which one is born to have and should have."⁽¹⁰⁹⁾

He arrives at this precision by distinguishing three types of non-being: simple negation, which exists in no way whatsoever; matter as prime matter, which is a pure passive potency, and in itself is no way in act; and finally, privation, which is said to exist in some subject wherein the privation is found.⁽¹¹⁰⁾ Simple negation obviously cannot be considered as evil for any particular being. Nor can prime matter be considered evil, since it too has the formality of good, insofar as it is in potency to act. In the words of Thomas: "every subject insofar as it is in potency to some perfection, even prime matter, from the very fact that is in potency, has the formality of the good."⁽¹¹¹⁾

Privation, on the other hand, is an absence of form naturally due to a being and without which the being is less perfect. As Thomas says: "privation means the absence of what something ought to have; in which sense, privation implies an imperfection."⁽¹¹²⁾ It is in this precise formality of the absence of a due good that Thomas Aquinas will ground the reality of evil, and yet at the same time safeguard it from being understood as an actual being. Through this notion of privation evil is seen to be a negation existing in a subject as a privation of form due to that subject, and, although it does not assert anything positively, it implies or determines the subject in which it inheres. Thomas summarizes this in the following manner:

Evil is not some existing thing which by its own essence is evil, nor again is evil a thing totally non-existent; but evil is a thing which is partly good, and by that part it exists, and it is called evil because it falls short of (or lacks) some being.⁽¹¹³⁾

EVIL AS A PRIVATION

Having followed the lead of Aquinas in founding the formality of evil in the notion of privation, it is important to appreciate more fully his philosophy of privation. There are two kinds of privations according to Thomas: pure privation, that is, one which removes the whole perfection in question, for example, blindness and death; and partial privation, which is often referred to as a "privation in via or in fieri," since it places obstacles to the actualization of the power of some being, while leaving some of the perfection in tact, for instance, nearsightedness or illness.⁽¹¹⁴⁾

These privations stand as contraries to the forms which they oppose. When the one is present, the other is necessarily absent. Therefore, Thomas concludes that they share the same subject, since the latter is in potency to both its perfective forms and their contrary privations. He identifies this common subject as the "being in potency."⁽¹¹⁵⁾ However, such a potency is only a relative one, that is, one rooted or subjected in actual being and not an absolute potency, which is a good ordered to some further act.⁽¹¹⁶⁾ Thus, the potency referred to is not to be identified with prime matter. Moreover, the prerequisite subject, that is the being in potency, is good, and therefore Thomas concludes that evil is in the good as in a subject.⁽¹¹⁷⁾

Soemthing further to be noted concerning the subject of the privation is that its presence in the being in potency is not to be confused with accidental being, which is a definite kind of being in its own right. The latter perfects the subject in which it inheres in an accidental way, whereas privation implies imperfection in the subject in which it resides. Moreover, the subject of an accident, which is also the being in potency, is said to cause the being of the accident, whereas evil as such has no cause properly so-called.⁽¹¹⁸⁾

In regard to privation, which constitutes the key to an understanding of Thomas' position on the nature of evil and which has been seen to reside in the being in potency, there are three prerequisites according to Aquinas. These latter correspond to the three modes of goodness found in every finite being: substantial, accidental, and potential. They are respectively: the subject, the contrary habit, and the aptitude of the subject for the reception of habit.⁽¹¹⁹⁾ The first of these, namely, the subject of the privation, has already been discussed in the above paragraphs and has been identified with the being in potency, which stands as a potential subject to both good and evil. It must be noted, however, in this connection that the good of the subject as such cannot be diminished or destroyed by any evil infesting it. This follows necessarily from the fact that the form cannot suffer any diminution or change without ceasing to be itself. Any privation that would alter the goodness of the substantial subject would violate the very principle of identity whereby the being is itself and not another.

Regarding the contrary habits, however, the distinction between the pure and partial privations must be recalled. Evil can and does diminish qualitatively its contrary habit with the result that the being is totally or partially deprived of some due perfection. Finally, it is the position of Aquinas that the aptitude or dispositions of the subject, which stand between the subject and its action as potencies of the being, can neither be wholly destroyed nor infinitely diminished as regards their relation to their subject. However, insofar as they are related to action, they can be diminished by the addition or intensification of the contrary dispositions which weaken or impede the potentiality of the subject for action.⁽¹²⁰⁾

From the above it is obvious that Thomas has grounded his philosophy of evil in the potential being or the potential good, as depriving that being of some due perfection. In this way he salvages the reality of evil without, however, designating it as some existing thing. Possibly the best explanation of this dual character of evil in the thought of Thomas is afforded by Cajetan and will serve as a helpful summary of Aquinas's notion of evil as a privation rather than a mere negation, a reality although not an actuality.

In his Commentarium in Summam Theologicam⁽¹²¹⁾ Cajetan distinguishes between a formality that might be said to place something in things and one that might be regarded as "removing something therefrom, namely, a due good from the being as in the case of evil." He characterizes this latter type of reality as a privation, which is "the formal removal of a thing,"⁽¹²²⁾ and offers it as an explanation of the type of reality proper to evil. He argues that it is not in things as a being of some sort, but as a corruption of the being in actu exercito. It is the absence of the good which formally constitutes evil not by positively placing something in the being, but rather by removing something formally from the same. Therefore, evil is found in things formally as evil insofar as the absence of the good is experienced by the being, whereas it is in the mind through its act of composition and division. He concludes that evil exists as a being only in the mind, but it does formally exist also in reality as a remotion of due perfection and being.⁽¹²³⁾

Thus, evil is not viewed by Thomas as some existing nature, but as a concrete deprivation of a due perfection in some being. Its total formality consists in its privative character, in other words, not in the mere fact that it is the absence of some being or goodness, but rather in the fact that the absence is conspicuous, since the absent perfection ought to be in the being. It is then this character of being due that constitutes the very formality of evil as a privation. As an example of this, one might inquire into the difference between the hole that is found encircled by the gold band of a diamond ring and that which might be found in the middle of a Rembrandt painting. Materially, both are absences and as such are mere negations of being. However, formally there is a great difference between the two in that one is considered an evil and one is not. What formally constitutes the hole in the Rembrandt as evil for this masterpiece is that it has deprived a being of its due perfection. It is, in the words of Cajetan, a "formal removing" of a due perfection; it is precisely this aspect of the absent good that renders evil something more than mere non-being. As one author put it well: "has definite malevolent ties with reality, it is the absence that is conspicuous."⁽¹²⁴⁾

DIVISIONS OF EVIL

It must be pointed out that the concern of this study with divisions of evil is primarily in terms of placing moral evil in its proper perspective relative to the other types of evil. In order to accomplish this it has been thought necessary to detail two presentations of the matter afforded us by Aquinas. The first taken from his earlier writings treats of every type of evil and offers a comprehensive and somewhat involved division. The other centers upon evil as found in beings of an intellectual nature and therefore pertains more directly to the matter of the present study. The schema to be followed then will be a presentation of the divisions of evil in general with special emphasis on the place of moral evil along with a more detailed analysis of evil as found in the intellectual nature.

In his Commentary on the Sentences, Thomas divides evil into two major categories: absolute and relative.⁽¹²⁵⁾ The former considers evil in itself as the "very privation of a perfection." Aquinas admits that some call this "evil abstractly taken," that is, the very formality of evil as such. Two types of privation are possible in this regard: one type is a privation of a necessary perfection and, as such, is evil to all beings within a given category. For instance, a hand or a foot in the case of animals. A second type is a privation of some secondary perfection, for example, the science of geometry. Obviously, this latter privation is evil only to one who ought to have such a habit. The second major division, that is, accidental or relative evil, concerns evil as concretely realized in some subject and applies in turn both to the subject of a particular privation and to that which causes such a privation in another. As regards the subject of the privation, Thomas says that this subject can refer to four different categories of being: action, habit, passion, and substance.

Action is said to be the subject of evil, that is, a relative evil, if it be deprived of a due end and due circumstances. Moral evil will fall into this category of evil as evil action, although the term is applicable to any type of action which defects from its due end, for example, the stroke of a painter on a canvas. With regard to moral evil, such action is defective insofar as its end and circumstances are related to the moral order, that is, to reason and law as rules of human action. This matter, of course, will be discussed at length in the fifth chapter of the study. It need only be noted at present that Thomas had perceived the relation of evil action to the other types of evil in the earliest of his philosophical writings and even then had pointed out that such evil action "shall have the formality of fault" when found in an intellectual nature.

According to Thomas, habit is an extenuation of evil action in that it is effected through the repetition of such actions. Repeated evil actions cause tendencies or inclinations toward evil in the powers, which occasion both frequent and easily performed acts devoid of due end and due circumstances. When found in the intellectual nature, they too share in the "formality of fault." Passion, on the other hand, is considered a subject of evil insofar as "something is corrupted in the patient." Thomas identifies this as the "evil of punishment" in the intellectual creature and merely as a "defect of nature" in the creature "not capable of fault or punishment." Finally, the substance itself is said to be the subject of evil in the sense that all accidental imperfections or privations are reducible to the subject. Thomas puts it in the following manner:

No accident can be the subject of anything, which is said (of the being) privatively or positively, except by reason of the substance, which is its subject; therefore, it must be, that the subject of this privation, which is as such evil, be ultimately understood as the substance, according to which a man is said to be evil.⁽¹²⁶⁾

It must be noted, however, that it is not the substance or form of the being itself which is subject to evil, but rather some accident of the being. This will be explained presently when brief consideration is given to the further notions of the goodness of being and its correlative corruptions.

Finally, under the division of relative evil is found the subdivision of that which causes evil in another. Such a division is quite extrinsic to an appreciation of the nature of evil itself, but does afford a completion of the various ways by which something can be designated as evil. Certainly, that which inflicts evil on other beings is called evil, even in ordinary speech, and hence, it must be assigned a place within the general framework of evil. It, in turn, is subdivided into two aspects by Thomas, namely, as it regards matter or agent. The former is said to be an accidental evil, in that it is "indisposed to receive the power of the agent," for example, the malformed animal. As regards the second type of causal evil, Thomas says that the evil can be effected by an agent which has an immediate or "conjoined" relation to the other being insofar as it is contrary to the very perfection of the being, for example, fire as contrary to ice.

On the other hand, the agent may not be "conjoined" to the other being thus acted upon, but merely impedes, in an indirect way, the influence of the perfecting cause as, for instance, when clouds impede the light of the sun. If one were to consider this latter effect as evil for animals or plants, the clouds themselves would have only an indirectly evil character about them, insofar as they deprived life on earth of the sunlight.

Thomas further relates these two types of efficient causes of evil to the intellectual order by maintaining that the evil effected by a "conjoined" agent is called "punishment of the sense" in beings capable of fault and punishment, while that effected by the "non-conjoined" agent is called "punishment of loss" in beings capable of punishment. The reason offered for "punishment of loss" is that, although the evil is not sensed by reason of the withdrawal of a perfection, still it is sensed in another way, that is, by reason of some other evil effect.

In the above analysis by Thomas evil has been seen as absolute, which is an abstraction affording us the very formality of evil, and as relative, which is evil as concretized in a particular subject. As regards the latter, evil immediately affects the potencies, actions, and habits of the being, all of which are reducible to the being in potency. It is this being in potency that has already been identified as the subject of evil. Finally, there is relative evil seen as the cause of evil in another, viewed either materially or efficiently. Thomas concludes by relating each of these to one another: "the first is evil absolutely, the second is ordered to the first, and the third is ordered to the second."⁽¹²⁷⁾ In other words, the cause of evil is ordered to the subject in which the privation as such is realized. As Aquinas writes:

The order is such that that which is absolute is spoken of first, and all others by relation to it. . . . Accidental evil, which is the subject of evil and which is called evil by reason of the fact that it has a privation, which is absolute evil, constitutes the second grade. . . . In the third grade is . . . accidental as a cause inducing evil. . . . This does not necessarily have in itself a privation, but causes some other thing to have a privation.⁽¹²⁸⁾

Although in the above considerations Thomas indicated the application of his divisions of evil to the area of intellectual nature, still in this division he did not limit his thought to its domain. In a parallel treatment of the divisions of evil, however, in the De Malo Aquinas does divide the subject of evil as it relates to the rational or intellectual nature.⁽¹²⁹⁾ He remarks:

A rational or intellectual nature in comparison with other creatures is related in a special way to good and evil because every other creature is naturally ordered to some particular good, but only an intellectual nature, by means of the intellect, grasps the universal nature of good and is moved to good universally by the appetite of the will.⁽¹³⁰⁾

He concludes that the evil of the rational creature is divided by the special division in terms of fault and punishment.

Unlike the former division, which founded its divisions of evil according to the abstract and concrete aspects of the subject, this division contrasts evil with its contrary good, as found "in the agent" and "in the deficient act." Such a consideration of being takes into account both its first and second act, that is, the total actuality of the being, and affords a simple and all embracing basis for distinguishing the various kinds of evil as pertinent to the rational nature. Through his emphasis on the "action" of being as the expression of its being and goodness, Thomas highlights that subject of evil, spoken of in the previous section. It is there that the fullest realization of evil is to be found, namely, evil action as it proceeds from a deficient will.

Moreover, Thomas proceeds to contrast in three ways the two types of evils proper to the rational nature, evil of fault and punishment. First, fault is found in evil action, whereas punishment is evil inflicted by the agent. He further observes in this regard:

These two evils are ordered differently in natural operations and in voluntary operations. For in natural operations the evil of the action follows from the evil of the effective cause, for example limping follows from a crippled leg; but in voluntary operations the reverse is true, the evil of the agent, i.e., punishment, divine providence regulating fault by punishment, follows from the evil of the action, i.e., the fault.⁽¹³¹⁾

In other words, it is the natural defect in the agent that gives rise to the evil action as regards natural beings, whereas the contrary is true insofar as voluntary beings are concerned. The evil proceeding from the agent in the form of punishment is due to the culpably evil action, which does not proceed from any natural defect in the agent, but rather from its voluntary non-action, as will be seen in the following chapter on the causality involved in voluntarily evil action.

The second difference between these two types of evil proper to the intellectual being is due to the fact that fault is according to the will whereas punishment is always against the will, at least insofar as the patient is concerned. Finally, there is a third difference, namely, that fault is in the agent, whereas punishment is in the patient. Thomas quotes Saint Augustine in this regard: "He calls fault the evil we do, but punishment the evil we suffer."⁽¹³²⁾

It must be noted that the above divisions of evil as found in the Commentary on the Sentences and the Disputed Questions are in perfect harmony, but the latter attempts to integrate the whole question of the evil of nature into the more relevant perspective of evil as it is found in beings of an intellectual nature. In the latter, evil was, in a sense, not intended by Divine Providence, and hence evil of nature is viewed as a punishment consequent upon the commission of evil action by the free agent. Thomas summarizes his more restricted consideration of evil as affecting the intellectual creature in the following words:

A person is blamed and rendered culpable inasmuch as he voluntarily does a disordered act. . . . And thus every evil of the rational creature is contained under either fault or punishment.⁽¹³³⁾

Closely associated with the above classifications of evil are two further considerations presented by Aquinas. One division centers around evil as a privation of the good of being as regards mode, species, and order, while the second division contrasts evil with the good of nature, natural inclination, and virtue. Both of these divisions can be correlated with the various subjects of evil as presented in the Commentary on the Sentences.⁽¹³⁴⁾

Since Thomas frequently defines evil as a deprivation of mode, species, and order, it would be well to consider these terms briefly. By species he means obviously the form of the being, either substantial or accidental.⁽¹³⁵⁾ This formal cause of the being's goodness involves both its form and its potencies. It corresponds to the substantial and potential aspects spoken of above, and consequently to the subject and respective potencies of evil, as outlined in Thomas' first major division of evil. Mode signifies the determination of the principles of the being. He calls this the "commensuration" of the being, that is, those things required by the form as necessary consequents and as ordered to activity. Such constitute both the material and efficient principles of the being. They exist and operate according to the "measure" of the form.⁽¹³⁶⁾ Finally, order is the being's natural inclination to its end or to action leading thereto. Thomas notes in this regard that it is by reason of a being's form that it is ordered to, and tends toward, another.⁽¹³⁷⁾

Both the mode and order referred to in this consideration of a being's goodness, and contrariwise the evil which might deprive a being of its due mode and order, parallel the earlier divisions of the accidental perfections according to a being and the actions flowing therefrom. These latter actions necessarily will be measured by the material around which its operations center as well as by the limitations of the active powers of the agent operating. What has been said above concerning these particular aspects of a being as a subject of evil might be applied here.⁽¹³⁸⁾

Paralleling this consideration of the good of being consisting in species, mode, and order, is Thomas' treatment of the good of nature, of natural inclination, and of virtue, and of their respective corruptions or evils. He writes that the good of man consists in the very principles of nature, from which nature is constituted, as well as in the properties caused from these principles, namely, the powers of the soul.⁽¹³⁹⁾ Secondly, its good consists in the inclination to virtue resulting from man's nature.⁽¹⁴⁰⁾ Finally, there is the good of virtue itself.⁽¹⁴¹⁾ Evil will necessarily involve a diminution or even destruction of certain of these goods.

Aquinas maintains that the good of nature itself cannot be diminished or destroyed by evil.⁽¹⁴²⁾ This corresponds to his denial that the species in which good essentially consists, or the substance itself with its radical potencies, can be corrupted by evil: although the good of natural inclination can be diminished, it cannot be destroyed by evil. This impossibility of total corruption by evil results from the fact that the natural inclinations of a being are rooted in its very nature. Thus, Thomas concludes in this regard: "From the very fact that a thing becomes inclined to one of two contraries, its inclination to the other contrary must needs be diminished."⁽¹⁴³⁾

As regards the good of virtue itself, Aquinas obviously would say that it can be both diminished and even entirely destroyed by evil, which is its contrary. In a parallel passage in the Summa Theologica he summarizes the entire matter in the following words:

Evil cannot wholly consume good. To prove this we must consider that good is threefold. One kind of good is wholly destroyed by evil, and this is the good opposed to the evil. . . . Another kind of good is neither wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil, and that is the good which is the subject of evil. . . . And there is also a kind of good which is diminished by evil, but is not wholly taken away; and this good is the aptitude of a subject to some actuality.⁽¹⁴⁴⁾

MORAL EVIL

Having discussed the nature and division of evil in general we are now in position to appreciate the exact nature and malice of moral evil as viewed from a teleological metaphysics. In the remaining pages of this chapter the nature of moral evil, or what Thomas calls "evil of fault," will be explained and in so doing the way for the consideration of the causality involved therein will have been immediately paved.

Aquinas begins to define the precise nature of moral evil by distinguishing evil, sin, and fault.⁽¹⁴⁵⁾ First, the difference between these three notions and that of defect or simple negation should be recalled.⁽¹⁴⁶⁾ This notion of mere defect or simple negation has been adequately treated in the first section of this chapter; here there need be noted only the importance of this in relation to further consideration of the defective causality involved in a morally evil act. Secondly, he proceeds to redefine evil as a particular negation of a requisite perfection in a subject, the absence of a good due to a particular object. Finally, sin in general is the absence of a due good or due proportion in action. The latter more precisely is seen to fall in its achieving its due end by reason of the absence of species, mode, and order.

Since the term "sin" includes any inordinate action, it may refer to works of nature. Thus one can speak of a "sin of nature," for example, a deformed animal, which results from a deviation from the rule or measure of natural things, namely, their natural inclinations as proceeding according to measure from their form. There is also the "sin" proper to works of art wherein the rule or measure is the intention of the maker or artist; thus, a poorly effected statue is a "sin of art." Finally, "sin" is applied in its most common signification to the actions of moral agents wherein the rule is the reason of the rational being and deviations from that rule in act are called moral evils. It would be well to quote Aquinas's summary of this matter in view of its relevance to a more exhaustive consideration of sin as action unregulated by its proper rule.

It is therefore intrinsically (per se) of the nature of fault, whether in nature or in art or in morals, that it is opposed to a rule of action. But since a rule of action establishes a mean between too much and too little, it is necessary that one rule forbid and another prescribe.⁽¹⁴⁷⁾

Moreover, although sin connotes in an action both deviation from a rule and measure and departure from its proper end, it can be said that Thomas recognizes that "it is more of the nature of sin to pass over the rule of action than ever to fall short of the end of the act."⁽¹⁴⁸⁾ He thereby lays the foundation for his later consideration of the exact nature of moral evil, which will be an action with a defect of the non-consideration of the rule of reason.

It might be objected that the deficient action of the artist or craftsman should be considered a voluntary action and, therefore, a sin of moral action. However, we must distinguish such an action insofar as it deviates from the intention of the maker as an artist and insofar as it would deviate from the rule of reason and law. In the first instance it is a sin of art, whereas that same action viewed according to the dictates of reason and law might be morally evil as well. It is only insofar as an action is voluntary, that is, one proceeding from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end, which means the relation between a free act and its ultimate end according to the measure of human nature, that an action can be said to be a moral evil. Such a consideration brings out the relative character of such an act. Thomas gives this peculiar type of action, the name of "fault" (culpa). Thus moral evil, fault, and sin as voluntary action all mean the same thing in general, although each connotes a particular aspect of evil.⁽¹⁴⁹⁾ In the study they will be used indiscriminately, as with Thomas who remarked in passing: "In such like actions (human actions), evil, sin, and guilt are one and the same thing."⁽¹⁵⁰⁾

A few final remarks must be made with regard to the notion of sin insofar as it pertains to a natural ethics, that is, inasmuch as the action is to be used in a philosophical approach to the problem of moral evil. Thomas remarks that "the theologian considers sin chiefly as an offense against God, while the moral philosopher (considers sin) as something contrary to reason."⁽¹⁵¹⁾ Obviously, it is in this latter manner that sin will be treated in the present study, and more precisely from the aspect of an action performed without consideration of its rule or measure. The divine law, insofar as this philosophical study is concerned, is proximately reflected in the practical reason of the rational being, that is, in its conscience interpreting human nature in its essential and integral parts and ontological relationships in view of its ultimate end.

Thus, the expression "the divine law" is to be understood as the eternal law guiding reason through the work of natural reason and what is called "the natural law." In no sense does it refer in the present study to the supernaturally revealed positive law, except insofar as the latter is known also by reason. It is not a matter of denying the existence of such a law, but of prescinding from its consideration. In so doing one not only remains true to his philosophical method of inquiry, which is, namely, by the light of reason alone, but indirectly vindicates the rational basis for the supernatural law by establishing the natural law from reason unaided by faith. Theologically, the question as to whether man can commit a sin purely against reason in the present economy and not against the supernatural order would be answered in the negative.⁽¹⁵²⁾

The chief purpose of the following considerations concerning the nature of moral evil is to determine that precise formality in the sinful act which has the will as its deficient cause. As shall presently be seen, that precise formality will be the privation infecting human action, insofar as this action is morally deprived of its due order and end. However, this privation cannot be considered in a totally abstract way; it must be seen as concretized in the voluntary act. In the words of Cajetan cited above, it must be seen as a "formal removal" of that perfection which the act ought to have, insofar as it proceeds from a voluntary principle with a knowledge of the end. Moreover, it must be viewed concretely in its physical context of a will tending toward some particular good, and yet not regulated by the rule of reason and law in its appetition. Finally, the ultimate root of the privative character of the act must be provided by law, so that the privation concretely realized in the act itself will be seen as the result of nonaction in the first moment of the will's causality.

In order to accomplish the above, the following points might be respectively considered: the formal and material elements in every sinful action; the specification of the human act as an evil act; the moral specification of the human act in terms of the rule of reason and law; and, finally, the specific consideration of the aversive and conversive elements in every sin. Each of these aspects of the morally evil action contributes to a richer understanding of the nature of moral evil in the synthesis of Thomas and prepares the way for an application of his metaphysics of causality to the same.

The first two of the above considerations, namely, the formal and material elements in the sinful act and its specification involve what has proved to be a very moot question,⁽¹⁵³⁾ usually referred to as the question of the "formal constituent of a sin of commission."⁽¹⁵⁴⁾ However, for the purpose of the present investigation it seems best to isolate these two related, but distinct, elements and to consider each separately. One pressing reason for this is that much of the controversy and confusion that reigns in this matter is due to the identification and confusion of these elements. Even James Maloney in his very fine work referred to above seems to contrast at times the opinions of various authors as though in a particular instance they were discussing the same thing, when in reality it seems that one is speaking about the first of the two notions, namely, the formal and material elements of a sin, while the other is speaking about the second, that is, the specification of the sin. There results the impression that even Thomas had at one time identified the formal constituent of a sin as the privation in the sinful action, and at another time had held it to be the object toward which the will tended in its sinful appetition. As will be seen, however, Aquinas never confused these two aspects of the question of moral evil and found a place for both in defining the precise character of sinful action. The two elements of the formality constituting sin and the specification of sinful action, therefore, will be treated respectively in this study.

Thomas set forth these two aspects of the question of the formality constituting sinful action in the following terms: "Every sin, from the very fact that it is an evil consists in the corrupting or privation of some good: while insofar as it is voluntary it consists in the desire of some apparent good."⁽¹⁵⁵⁾ There is then obviously a distinction between the privative and voluntary character of the sinful action. The former consists in a privation of good, while the latter in an appetition of some particular end. The one looks to a lack of being and goodness, while the other, insofar as it is being in second act, to a specific degree of each. It might be stated that sin can be regarded as both evil action, wherein sin formally consists in the privation of due order of the act to its end, and as evil action, that is, as a voluntary act that is evil due to its contrariety to the good.

The first of these two aspects of the sinful action, namely, the evil character of the action, regards the privation or corruption as the formal element in the sinful act; the converse element, that is, the appetition of a mutable good, regards privation as the material element in that sin.⁽¹⁵⁶⁾ In other words, when one considers sin from the aspect of its being an evil, it is obviously necessary to understand the privation of the due good as that element in the action which renders it specifically an evil action. It is the emphasis on the evil nature of the act that moves Aquinas to designate the privation and corruption as that which constitutes it formally as an evil. This has been the teaching of Thomas throughout his exposition of the nature and divisions of evil in general. In this regard Aquinas follows the lead of Augustine, whom he approvingly quotes in the following words:

Augustine includes two things in the definition of sin; one, pertaining to the substance of a human act, and which is the matter, so to speak, of sin, when he says word, deed, or desire; the other, pertaining to the nature of evil, which is the form, as it were, of sin, when he says, contrary to the eternal law."⁽¹⁵⁷⁾

Thomas brings out this important distinction between the human act considered in itself and the formality of evil as found in that act. Each of these constitutes an essential aspect of the sinful act, but each must be viewed distinctly if one is to appreciate the various statements of Aquinas. In the De Malo he notes: "In sin it is necessary to consider not only the deformity itself but also the act underlying the deformity"⁽¹⁵⁸⁾ It is this deformity, however, that one must consider if one is to inquire regarding the formality which constitutes an act as evil. The privation in this instance is the formal element in sin according to Thomas. The substance of the human act itself stands as the material in which the deformity is found. By depriving the human act of its due "mode, species, and order" the privation formally constitutes that action as sinful, that is, as an evil action.⁽¹⁵⁹⁾

On the other hand, it is not enough to consider the mere formality which constitutes the "evil" of sinful action, since, in the words of Thomas, sin is not merely deformity but is also an act. He writes: The nature of fault and moral evil is completed according as the act of the will accedes to it, and thus the evil of fault is found in a complete manner in the act of the will.⁽¹⁶⁰⁾ In fact, as was seen in the consideration of evil as a privation, it is in the very subject, wherein evil inheres, that the "formal removal" is effected. Without this concrete realization of the privation in a subject, which subject is being and goodness, the privation becomes a mere abstract notion. Thus, in order to have a completed appreciation of sin it is necessary to consider the voluntary aspect of the sinful act, which involves the issue of the formal specification of sin as an evil action.

Thomas defines sin as nothing other than an evil human act and goes on to remark that it is considered a human act from the fact that it is voluntary.⁽¹⁶¹⁾ As voluntary, the sinful action can be an elicited act or one commanded by the will, but in either case as a human action it proceeds from a "deliberated will."⁽¹⁶²⁾ It is an act of desire on the part of the will for a particular good following upon the deliberation of reason. That which constitutes the sinful action to be a particular species of act will be the same reality, then, that renders any act, as an act, specific and distinct in itself. Its voluntary character will never give way to its privative character in determining the particular species of action that it is, although the privation involved in such action will be an essential element in constituting a sin, as already has been explained above. Privation, as such, however, could never establish a basis for the specification of act or the distinction among various types of actions.

Thus, besides the privative aspect of a sinful action which formally constitutes the act as evil, there is a positive aspect. This latter looks to the conversion of the will toward a particular good. L. Billot explains it well when he writes:

Moral evil is said to be something positive, not indeed in regard to that which formally causes the formality of evil, for this is privation. Nor even insofar as the subject holds itself merely materially to the privation, because in this way every evil, both in moral matters and in natural things, posits something positive. But, it is positive insofar as it is that with which the privation is combined, namely, insofar as it is a free choice of a particular good, which has privation of the order of justice so conjoined (to it) that it exists as being of the formality of this privation.⁽¹⁶³⁾

In this a further step has been taken in the understanding of the precise formality of the sinful action. As Billot points out, one is not treating merely of the former distinction between formal and material elements in a sin, as was the case in regard to its formally evil character. Rather it is a question of the concrete realization of that formality in the evil action as tending toward a good contrary to the rule of reason and divine law. This views the sinful action precisely as an action deprived of due order and end, an act that actually departs from its rule.

One finds the same observation in Thomas in the De Malo wherein he distinguishes a "pure" privation from a "non-pure" one.⁽¹⁶⁴⁾ The former privation leaves nothing of its contrary remaining, for example, darkness totally removes light, while the latter type of privation leaves something of its contrary. He notes that this is true in evil matters, which are the concern of the present study. Aquinas further characterizes the pure privation as corruptive of the very being wherein the contrary is completely removed. That which is positive in the remaining subject is not of the formality of privation, nor with regard to such privations does it matter from whatever cause or in whatever way they might come about.

As regards the non-pure privation, Thomas further describes it as a privation that is becoming and is on the way to corruption. It is what has been spoken of in the previous section as actual privation, which Cajetan called the "formal removal" of the due perfection; in the preceding text Billot describes this as the positive element in the privative conversion. It is not merely a privation, but includes the note of contrariety, since it retains something of the opposite habit, namely, the tendency of the act to its object. In the sin of commission, therefore, there remains something positive in the very privative aspect of the sinful action, namely, the order of reason. This latter, Thomas affirms, is not completely destroyed. For example, if one eats when one ought not to eat, he or she still might be eating where he or she ought to. In other words, the act always retains some order to reason or it would not be done at all. Aquinas concludes: "Evil, if it is complete, becomes unbearable and destroys even itself."⁽¹⁶⁵⁾

This brings us to the further consideration of the reality from which the sinful action receives its species. Thomas develops his teaching concerning the specification of sin along the following lines as found in the Summa Theologica.⁽¹⁶⁶⁾ He argues that in a sin two things are present: the voluntary act and its deordination. The latter is the recession of the will from the law of God and from reason according to which human action should be regulated. This withdrawal from the rule of human action pertains only accidentally to the wrongdoer, insofar as his will is directed not to the recession as such but rather to the particular good which he seeks. Thus, it is the actual turning toward a particular good that pertains directly to the evildoer. If this were not true, Thomas says, the will would be seeking evil as such, which is contrary to its natural inclination to the good.

However, the argument continues, each thing is said to attain its species according to that which relates to it essentially and not that which is only accidental to it. In fact, this latter is considered outside the formality of species altogether. Therefore, Aquinas concludes that sins are to be distinguished according to their voluntary character, rather than on the basis of the deordination existing in the act. Moreover, this deordination pertains to the species of the sinful act only as a consequence following upon the will's turning toward a particular good. This is not to be considered a specific difference in regard to the sinful action.

Thus, like any other action, the sinful act receives its species from the object toward which it tends. However, it is obvious that, in the case of human action, this cannot be a matter of the merely physical act, which from the viewpoint of the evil character of the act is the subject wherein the privation resides. It is necessarily the "moral object" of the act, that is, the physical object or particular physical good toward which the appetite tends in its relation to reason and law. In the words of Vermeersch it is "whatever is proposed to the will by the intellect" or "what is presented to be embraced or shunned."⁽¹⁶⁷⁾ Such an object includes both the "proximate end" and the "remote end" of the act, namely, both the physical object as such and the circumstances surrounding it, as each of these is related to the faculty proper to man, his reason. In the words of Thomas, it is "the object as it is compared to reason."⁽¹⁶⁸⁾ This relation to reason renders the object a moral object, which follows from the fact that it is the object of a voluntary appetition or deliberate will act.

One finds this teaching about the moral specification of the sinful action in the De Malo,⁽¹⁶⁹⁾ wherein Thomas says that "acts are good or evil insofar as they fall under due or undue matter." Now the matter of the act, as such, is the physical good toward which the will tends, whereas the notion of due and undue has reference to the relation of the particular object, considered both proximately and remotely, to reason.⁽¹⁷⁰⁾ The important thing in this regard is to recognize Thomas' insistence that it is the object as related to the faculty or principle of reason that determines the species of the act, morally considered. He had stated this general principle when he wrote in the body of the article:

Since an act receives its species from the object, the act compared to one active principle will be specified according to one formality of the object, whereas compared to another it will not be so specified.⁽¹⁷¹⁾

For instance, to know color and to know sound are diverse acts if referred to the senses, but are not diverse if referred to the intellect, since the latter comprehends all things under the common formalities of being, truth, and goodness. Therefore, if certain objects of human acts have differences according to something directly pertaining to reason, they will be specifically different acts. This is due to their being acts of reason. On the other hand, they will not be specifically distinct acts insofar as they are the acts of some other power. The example offered by Aquinas deals with sexual intercourse. If such be had with a woman who is one's wife or with one who is not, there is no specific difference, insofar as these acts are related to the generative or concupiscible powers. But there is a specific difference when these acts are compared to reason: the one is adultery and the other is not.⁽¹⁷²⁾ Therefore, the object which specifies the moral action is not merely the object considered in itself and with its accompanying physical circumstances, but rather it is that object, both proximately and remotely considered, in its relation to reason. This entire question will be developed in the fifth chapter of the study when the rules of reason and divine law are explicitly treated.

The above distinction of objects has been aptly summarized by F. Merkelbach under three headings: the formal proximate object, namely, the moral object specifying the act as good or evil; the material object, which is the object physically considered toward which the will tends; and the formal ultimate object, which is the perfect good.⁽¹⁷³⁾ This latter object, as such, is beyond the scope of the point under consideration, but is implied in the notions of recession from the end and departure from the rule of divine law.

One might conclude these considerations of the aversive or privative aspect and the conversive, or positive, aspect of the sinful act with the summary afforded by the Salmanticenses.⁽¹⁷⁴⁾ These commentators on Thomas find in every sin four elements, each of which has been treated explicitly or implicitly above: a) the conversion to a mutable good as it is in itself, which has been identified above as the physical object and its physical circumstances; b) the conversion to the same object as opposed to reason, the principle proper to man, which object has been called the moral object, insofar as it ought to be regulated by its twofold rule of reason and divine law; c) the contrary aversion, which is the turning away from the ultimate as implied in the will's turning toward a mutable good without the direction of its rule; and d) he privative aversion, which is the actual aversion of the will from its ultimate end.

Thomas incorporates these various elements in his description of sinful action when he writes in the Summa Theologica: "The intention of the sinner is not directed to the point of straying from the path of reason; rather is it directed to tend to some appetible good whence it derives its species."⁽¹⁷⁵⁾ In the third article of the same question he states: "From the very fact that man turns unduly to some mutable good, it follows that he turns away from the immutable Good, which aversion completes the nature of evil."⁽¹⁷⁶⁾

As a final consideration in this chapter, it would be well to apply the doctrine of Thomas on evil in general and specifically, moral evil, to the order of the universe. It has been mentioned more than once that in investigating the metaphysics of evil as related to the human will, one must constantly keep before one's eyes the correlative doctrine of Aquinas on the ultimate purpose of creation, especially as regards the rational creature. Only in this light can moral evil be seen as the one thing that has no place in an ordered universe.

If the good is the principle of order in the universe, that which is opposed to the good must be said to be the principle of disorder. However, in a corruptible universe perfection requires an inequality among creatures, if that finite universe is to mirror in any adequate way the divine perfection.⁽¹⁷⁷⁾ Hence, there results a gradation of defectible beings⁽¹⁷⁸⁾ which at times actually will defect.⁽¹⁷⁹⁾ As has already been noted, this is particularly evident in the realm of physical evil or evil of nature, wherein one nature, good in itself, effects evil on another by its action.⁽¹⁸⁰⁾ However, Thomas remarks that in such a case only a particular order is upset.⁽¹⁸¹⁾ Therefore, in this matter our judgment must be directed toward the universal good, and this particular evil must not be viewed in any absolute sense.⁽¹⁸²⁾

Aquinas observes that evil in general is of less frequent occurrence than is the good, since physical evil is confined to generable and corruptible being, which is only a small part of the universe. In each species, moveover, defects are the exception rather than the rule. However, he notes with an almost embarrassed attitude, that only in man does evil seem to predominate. Though the good of man is not of the sensual, but the rational order, yet more men follow the former than the latter.⁽¹⁸³⁾ This is due to many factors which shall be studied in detail in the following pages from the viewpoint of their ultimate causes.

Contrary to physical evil, moral evil in itself does totally exclude the order of the universe relative to divine goodness.⁽¹⁸⁴⁾ The reason for the latter, as we have seen, is that sin alone turns the creature away from the ultimate end. In fact, by turning to a mutable good contrary to the rule of reason and law the creature sets himself up as a quasi-ultimate end of his own action. Sin, however, does not lie completely outside divine governance.⁽¹⁸⁵⁾ By the infinite wisdom good can be drawn even from moral evil, although the latter is not accidentally willed for this purpose.⁽¹⁸⁶⁾

As was noted previously, special consideration must be given to any evil befalling a rational creature. The reason for this is that the ultimate happiness and perfection of that creature is the "raison d'être" of the universal order as reflective of divine goodness and wisdom. In such a realm even the evil of nature takes on the special significance of punishment to indicate its undue character and its being a result of previous fault. In all this the peculiar character of moral evil is highlighted which demandes a further investigation of this question in terms of its causality.