To follow the lead of Aquinas in his study of the question of evil, one should next consider the origin of evil. Thomas writes in his Commentary on the Divine Names: "The order of the questions is apparent: first, what evil is must be inquired into and afterwards, whence evil has arisen."⁽¹⁸⁷⁾ Aquinas then proceeds to propose a dilemma regarding its origin in terms of whether God is its cause or whether it has another cause apart from the universal causality of the First Cause. If the first alternative were correct, Goodness itself would then be the cause as evil, which seems a kind of oxymoron. On the other hand, if it exists apart from His causality, the fundamental principles of metaphysics seem violated. At any rate, in posing such a dilemma Aquinas wishes to point to the unique type of causality responsible for the existence of evil. In the previous chapter it was shown that, concretely considered, evil enjoyed a certain reality, and as such must be accounted for in terms of a cause. However, inasmuch as evil is a privation existing in a particular good, this cause will have to explain both the privation and its subject. It will have to establish both the positive aspect of the being which suffers the evil and the defective character of the evil itself.

In order to highlight this twofold aspect in the question of the causality of evil it has been thought necessary to preface its explicit treatment with a brief consideration of Thomas' doctrine on causality in general. In so doing the positive aspect of causality will be foremost, insofar as it is seen as transcendentally related to being itself. Each of the four causes, and especially the efficient cause, will be considered precisely as contributors and modifiers of being. Against such a background the defective character of evil will be manifest and its proper causality can be better appreciated.

CAUSE AND BEING

One might begin this consideration of the notion of cause as related to being by noting the advancement made by Thomas over the thought of Aristotle as regards the distinction between a principle and a cause. It is precisely viewing causality as an influx of being that enabled Aquinas to distinguish these two notions. Aristotle had regarded the notions of principle and cause as hardly distinguishable. In one place he writes: "The causes and the principles then (of the material body) are three,"⁽¹⁸⁸⁾ and in still another place, "causes are spoken of in an equal number of senses; for all causes are beginnings."⁽¹⁸⁹⁾ In the first of these quotations causes are explicitly equated with principles, while in the second the Stagirite fails to add, as Thomas will not fail to do, that not all principles are causes. Aristotle merely understands principle in a broader sense than he does cause, without, however, pointing out that precise formality which distinguishes the two. In fact, he proceeds to parallel the various meanings of principle with that of cause, but always in terms of essence and change.⁽¹⁹⁰⁾

Thomas, on the other hand, is quick to note in his commentary on this section of Aristotle's Metaphysics the need for a distinction between the two notions. He comments in this regard:

For something is a principle which is not a cause. . . . This name principle imports a certain order; but this name cause imports a certain influx into the being of the thing caused.⁽¹⁹¹⁾

What distinguishes the two notions is the positive contribution on the part of the cause to the being caused, whereas in his Commentary on the Sentences Aquinas explicitly says that the principle has no influence on the being (esse) of the principatum.⁽¹⁹²⁾ He makes this same distinction in terms of being and becoming in the Commentary on the Physics where he defines causes as things "on which some things depend according to their being or becoming."⁽¹⁹³⁾ In all of this Thomas is insisting on the positive character of causality, insofar as it is a communication or modification of being.

Along the same lines he corrects Aristotle's apparent inconsistency in regarding privation as a type of cause or principle of being. Aristotle had written: "The causes and the principles, then, are three, two being the pair of contraries of which one is definition and form and the other is privation, and the third being the matter."⁽¹⁹⁴⁾ Aquinas, on the other hand, in his correction notes that privations can be considered as constituents of being only accidentally, insofar as the matter to which they are annexed is a constituent of material being.⁽¹⁹⁵⁾ The reason for this correction is not difficult to discover. Again, Thomas sees cause as correlative with being: only that which is, and to the degree that it is, can cause anything. He writes: "Nothing can be a cause except inasmuch as it is a being,"⁽¹⁹⁶⁾ and "Something is not a cause through the fact that it is deficient, but through the fact that it is being."⁽¹⁹⁷⁾ By isolating this formality of cause as an influx of being into the caused reality Thomas succeeded not only in avoiding the certain lack of preciseness found in Aristotle, but has furnished himself with the tool that will enable him to appreciate the specific contribution of each of the four causes to reality.

A third and final precision is accomplished by Thomas by centering his metaphysics on being insofar as it is or exists, namely, according to the distinction between predicamental and transcendental reality. At first Aquinas seems to have accepted his notion of cause from the Greek philosophers, especially from Aristotle, with a certain characteristic docility. However, through a more penetrating study of the texts, one soon finds that, without rejecting any of the classifications and definitions proposed by the Stagirite in terms of causality, he does not incorporate them without reservation into his metaphysics.

As noted above, without contradicting he takes exception to Aristotle both in regard to the notion of principle in contradistinction to cause and in regard to privation in contrast to being. Each of these precisions was effected through a concentration on the act of existing as the ultimate source of cause. In Aristotle, the classification of the causes itself emphasizes his essentialistic approach to the subject. It limits the question of the causes to the categories, to the realm of the predicamental. It does this by relating causes to change, and not to being as such. This is true even with regard to his treatment of the material and formal causes which directly concern essence. In contrast, Thomas manages to see them in terms of "esse," insofar as it is through them that the being receives its act of existence.

However, when one considers the most existential or transcendental of the causes, namely, the efficient cause, the essentialism of the Stagirite becomes even more evident. He defines efficient causality in terms of "moving cause," and thereby, reads into the very definition limitations found in its realizations in finite being.⁽¹⁹⁸⁾ This same essentialistic approach is found in his entire treatment of causality precisely because Aristotle had taken for granted the being of finite reality and concentrated solely upon their essences and correlative changes.

Aquinas, on the other hand, due to his appreciating the act of being to be the "act of all acts," and the "perfection of all perfections," defines causality in terms of its relation to being. He writes: "The name Cause imports a certain influx into the being of the thing caused."⁽¹⁹⁹⁾ It is not just an influx into the changing elements of the being's essence, but in some way it is related to the effect's being as existence, either as an actual conferring of being itself or as a modification of the same. Thus, for Thomas causality is an aspect of being itself, accompanying being wherever it is to be found in terms of second act as related to first act. The latter is attained by observing the effect of the being's operation, but in the mind of Aquinas that operation is the best interpreter and expression of the being itself.⁽²⁰⁰⁾

The importance of all this as related to the present investigation is to emphasize the positive character of causality in order to be in a better position to appreciate the deficient causality involved in evil. But such an appreciation is possible only in terms of relating causality to being, and in this instance, of detailing the distinction between predicamental and transcendental causality by means of this existential emphasis. It is this emphasis that allowed Thomas to limit the causality of finite causes to the order of modifying being or conferring a new type of being, while he saw the causality proper to God (efficient and final) as a communication of being itself. He writes in the De Potentia:

All the created causes communicate in one effect, which is being, although every one of them has its proper effect, and this distinguishes it from the others. . . . These causes agree in that they all similarly cause being, but they differ in that fire causes fire and the builder causes a house. There must therefore be a cause higher than all the causes, a cause because of which they themselves cause being, and of which being is the proper effect. This cause is God.⁽²⁰¹⁾

The "proper effect" in the above citation is in the case of finite causes a new type or form of existence, while the "proper effect" assigned to the Infinite Cause is being itself. No creature can cause being as such, but only a modification of being. No creature can call into existence another in the totality of its being, only that being which enjoys being as such by nature can do so. As Thomas' thought matured in this matter, he denied to finite being even the instrumental share in this creative operation which he had admitted earlier in his career.⁽²⁰²⁾ Thus, Thomas distinguished predicamental or finite efficiency from transcendental efficiency as such, which was accomplished only by centering his metaphysics on the most ultimate of acts, existence itself.

Among the more eminent authorities on this question, Cornelio Fabro stands out as possibly the most articulate and erudite. In his masterful work, Participation et Causalité, he maintains that the solution to the problem of distinguishing predicamental from transcendental causality, as accomplished by Thomas, is partly to be found in the natural causality proposed by Aristotle and partly in the intensive notion of "to be," as expounded by Aquinas.⁽²⁰³⁾ It can be solved only in terms of the appreciation of the composition of essence and existence, wherein finite being is seen as depending totally on the Infinite in the order of existence. This insight and emphasis enabled Thomas to advance beyond the thought of Aristotle and to set forth the transcendental character of causality in terms of the "communication of being," either in terms of modifying existing being or of effecting being as such in its total reality. To quote but one contemporary Thomist:

Thus the doctrine of causality in Thomas is a truly metaphysical one, concerned ultimately with being simply as existing, abstracted from change, and not merely with a strictly physical doctrine considering only the changes in the essence of beings whose existence is assumed (as in Aristotle). Nothing emphasizes more the contrast between the essentialism of Aristotle's metaphysics and the existentialism of Thomas than their respective treatments of the doctrine of causality.⁽²⁰⁴⁾

CAUSE AND PRIVATION

In the previous chapter it was established that evil as such was neither a nature nor a thing of any kind, but a privation which is a type of non-being. However, it was pointed out that this non-being was not a mere negation, but rather a positive absence of due being and required goodness in the subject to which it was annexed. It was specifically identified as a "formal removal" of being and goodness. Should one consider this peculiar type of existence in relation to Thomas' doctrine on causality, as expounded in the previous pages, it would appear at first to imply the following. Since cause is an influx of being into the thing caused and since evil is an absence of being, it would seem that evil as such would have no cause nor could it be a cause in the ordinary manner of causality. However, such a conclusion would be only partially correct and would not adequately represent the thought of Aquinas.

Thomas discusses this problem of the relation of causality and privation in his Commentary on the Divine Names.⁽²⁰⁵⁾ There he agrees with Dionysius that it is true that evil, insofar as it is evil, causes neither substance nor generation, but only evil and the corruption of existing things. Moreover, to the objection that evil must be a cause for it is from the corruption of one thing that the generation of another takes place, he answers that corruption does not beget generation but only corrupts; evil produces only in an evil manner. In other words, Thomas insists that, insofar as a thing is evil, it can cause only evil or privation; yet, in a sense, this is to effect nothing. However, its non-being is only one side of the character of evil. One must remember that it is not a mere negation but a privation, and as a privation, it demands something to effect it in reality. Thomas salvages this aspect of evil's causality in the following words:

Evil according to itself is corruptive, but generative only accidentally, namely, on account of the good. Furthermore, it follows that evil is neither existing nor effective of existing things, except accidentally, namely on account of the good annexed to it.⁽²⁰⁶⁾

This same distinction is brought out by Thomas in the De Malo when discussing the relation of evil as a privation to causality.⁽²⁰⁷⁾ There he distinguishes evil taken in an abstract sense, namely, evil itself, from evil taken in a relative sense as a good corruptive of another. The former aspect of evil gives rise to a formal type of corruption, as blindness is said to corrupt sight. This, according to Aquinas, is effected "not by acting but by not acting." In other words, evil as such is said to corrupt the contrary good through a defect of active power. Relative evil, on the other hand, corrupts actively according to its active power. An example of this would be fire corrupting the form of water. Thomas succinctly summarizes this twofold causality of evil when he writes:

To corrupt after the manner of a formal cause is not to move or to act but to be corrupt; but to corrupt actively is to move and to act, in such a way however that whatever is there of action or motion pertains to the power of good, but what is there of defect pertains to evil.⁽²⁰⁸⁾

Again, it must be insisted that Aquinas is claiming that evil as privation cannot be a cause, since by definition privation is non-being while causality is an influx of being. The two are mutually exclusive. However, as a privation rooted in the good, evil can be said to cause corruption, insofar as it accidentally effects evil through the motion and action of the good.

As regards Thomas' development of this notion in the Commentary on the Divine Names, which has been discussed above, a final observation is to be made. He mentions there that what has been said about evil as a privation causing only corruption is true both in the natural and moral orders. He offers the example of fire generating fire and corrupting in turn the air. In such a case the form of fire, which pertains to the good, is annexed to the privation of the form of air, which pertains to evil. He then remarks that "the fire generates fire not from the fact that it lacks the form of air, but from the fact that it has the form of fire."⁽²⁰⁹⁾

On the other hand, it corrupts the form of air only because the privation of such a form is joined to the advent of the form of fire. Thus, it is not the privation as such that is the effect of the form of fire, rather privation occurs only as an effect accidental to the advent of the good. The same is true in the moral order as illustrated by Aquinas in terms of adultery. The latter, he argues, corrupts virtue insofar as it lacks due order, which lack pertains to evil. However, insofar as it is a delectable good, it delights and effects many good things, all of which pertain to the formality of good. Again, it is moral evil as a privation that causes privation, but insofar as it is rooted in the good it effects other good things. Thomas sums up his thought in this regard in the following way:

Whence when it is said that evil does not generate insofar as it is evil, but insofar as it is good, it is not a distinction according to reason only, namely, as if one thing according to one formality was good and according to another evil. But it is one according to the thing, namely, according to the fact that one and the same thing, insofar as it has being, is good, but insofar as it is deprived of due perfection, it is evil.⁽²¹⁰⁾

Again, one notes the insistence of Aquinas on the relation between causality and being and contrariwise on the relation between privation and its noneffective character. It is due only to its being rooted in the good that privation can be said to cause in any way whatsoever. It does so in an accidental manner insofar as the good effects further goodness and perfection, although being defective it in turn effects being with defect in an accidental manner. Therefore, privation as such neither is the resultant of the causality of being nor is it effective of the same. Its total relation to causality is through the good to which it is conjoined and in which it is subjected. Thomas thus concludes:

If evil is not simply speaking a power, it follows that evil itself . . . (should it be taken for the essence of evil) . . . is neither an existing thing, nor a good, nor does it effect generation, nor is it effective of existing things and of good things; but the thing which is evil, insofar as it has something of good, is the existing thing and is productive of generation and effective of good things.⁽²¹¹⁾

THE GOOD AS THE CAUSE OF EVIL

Such a line of argument necessarily brings one to the conclusion that the good must be the cause of evil. This is the repeated teaching of Thomas and enables him to account for the existence of evil without compromising his metaphysics of causality as being the influx of being.⁽²¹²⁾ He writes: "Good is the cause of evil in that way in which evil can have a cause."⁽²¹³⁾ Underlying this assertion of the good being the cause of evil are certain basic Thomistic principles, which should be noted from the start and which both highlight the existential aspect of his theory of causality and demonstrate the deficient character of evil itself. The first of these principles is that "every being is good," in other words, the transcendental convertibility of being and goodness. Secondly, "every agent acts insofar as it is in act." That is to say, to the degree that an agent exists it will be capable of communicating being. Thirdly, "every agent acts on account of the good." This principle is a correlative and a consequent of the above principles in that every agent seeks being in his action, which being is appetible insofar as it enjoys the formality of the good. Finally, "every agent in its action produces that similar to itself," namely, being and goodness.

The most direct statement made by Thomas concerning the good as the cause of evil is to found in the Summa Theologica.⁽²¹⁴⁾ He argues there that evil must have some cause, since it in some way exists, namely, insofar as it is the defect of a good which a particular being ought to have and which is natural to it. Now such a deficiency of natural disposition can be accounted for only in terms of some cause. However, to be a cause pertains only to the good, insofar as nothing can be a cause except that it be a being, and every being is itself good. The good then must be said to be the cause of evil. This is the most basic argument that runs through all of Thomas' other considerations of this matter. It reduces the whole question of the causality of evil to its ontological roots in being and the good. It faces squarely the reality of evil as a formal removal of being and goodness without compromising its character as non-being and deficient good. It affords the principles for explaining the causality of evil.

With this basic line of argument in mind one can proceed to analyze the other arguments of Thomas, among which is that found in the De Potentia.⁽²¹⁵⁾ There Aquinas, when discussing the various theories about the principle of creation in terms of the diversities found among creatures, offers three proofs to show that there can be only one principle of all contraries, even of good and evil. First, he argues that in diverse things, wherein there is found something in common, it is necessary to reduce this diversity to a common principle or cause. Now all contraries communicate in some thing, either in species or genus or at least in being; otherwise, they would not be contraries. Assuming being to be the most common thing shared by all beings, even contrary beings, Thomas concludes that there must be a common principle of all, which is the cause of being. He then recalls that being, insofar as it is such, is good; hence, the good ultimately is the cause of all things, even of evil.

Secondly, he maintains that every agent acts insofar as it is in act and consequently insofar as it is perfect. But evil as such is not in act, since a thing is said to be evil insofar as it is deprived of its proper and due actuality. On the other hand, that which is in act is good. Therefore, nothing acts insofar as it is evil, but insofar as it is good.

Finally, Thomas argues from the order in nature: if diverse beings were not to be reduced to one common principle, they would enter into an order only accidentally. However, from experience one notes that all things, corruptible and incorruptible, spiritual and corporeal, perfect and imperfect, concur into one order. Therefore, appeal must be made to some one principle in order to reduce all to order and unity, both of which are properties of the good.

The same argument from the contrariety of beings is used by Aquinas in the Summa Contra Gentes with a slightly different emphasis.⁽²¹⁶⁾ There he points out that a contrariety of agents would not account for the distinction found in things; this is especially true concerning good and evil. It is, however, impossible that there should be a first principle of evil. As things that exist by reason of another must be referred to another existent that exists of itself, it follows that there would have to be some first active principle of evil itself. However, when one qualifies an existent by the words "of itself," one means "by essence"; and thus there would have to exist an essence that was not good. This, of course, is impossible, since everything that is, is necessarily good, which is proved from the fact that everything loves its own being and desires to preserve it. However, as only the good is desired by all things, evil is not the active principle of evil; rather the good is its active cause.

As a final source for the doctrine of Thomas on the good as the cause of evil, one might turn to the De Malo where he argues from both efficient and final causality.⁽²¹⁷⁾ The first argument deals with the intention of the agent. Anything which has an essential cause must be intended by that cause directly, and that which proceeds from the agent beyond this intention cannot have an essential or direct cause. Evil, however, as such, cannot be intended directly, since it has been proved that an appetite seeks only the good directly. It can neither be willed nor desired for itself, but is only indirectly or accidentally intended by the agent. Hence, it finds its cause in the intention of the good.

The second argument states that every effect which has a direct cause bears a likeness to that cause, since every agent acts insofar as it is in act. But act in turn pertains to its degree of being, which in turn is convertible with the good. Hence, evil as such does not bear a likeness to any agent, insofar as the latter is agent. Therefore, its cause must be the good as an accidental cause of evil. Finally, every essential cause has a definite and determined order to its effect, and by definition, that which is done according to order is not evil. On the contrary, it is evil that is defined as a privation of order.

From the above arguments one readily can see that Thomas analyzes the doctrine of the good as cause of evil from every possible aspect. He argues from the nature of efficient and final causality, from the nature of evil itself, and from the order in the universe. He is forced to the conclusion that evil must be caused in some way, which is evident from the very presence of evil in the universe.⁽²¹⁸⁾ Here he specifies the precise type of cause as an accidental one. It is evident, he remarks, that evil is not natural to a being, insofar as it is destructive of its natural goodness. However, that which is in another in an unnatural way must have a cause which is accidental to the being, and this is the good. The good alone can cause anything directly, insofar as it is actuality. As active principle, it will cause being which is convertible with the good; therefore, it must cause evil only accidentally. Even if evil itself be said to cause evil, it must be understood in this same way, namely, as a defective good; it directly causes good, but this good is defective due to its cause's deficiency. Thomas states this succinctly: "Good causes insofar as it is good and is defective insofar as it is evil."⁽²¹⁹⁾

Aquinas concludes that the good causes evil in a twofold manner, namely, accidentally and deficiently. This is true both in the natural and moral orders, although there is an essential difference between the two as regards deficient power. This difference will be discussed later in this chapter under the heading of deficient causality.

THE CAUSES AND EVIL

Having identified the good as the cause of evil, Thomas proceeds in the Summa Theologica to demonstrate how evil is specifically related to the four causes.⁽²²⁰⁾ It would be well, then, to state first Aquinas's teaching regarding the relation of the four causes to evil; secondly, to discuss the precise influence of the material, formal, and final causes on being and their specific relation to the "being" of evil; and finally, to treat at length the contribution to being through the action of the efficient cause and its accidental causality in the case of evil. This will provide the necessary background for the final consideration of this chapter concerning the nature of deficient causality.

In the above quotation from the Summa Theologica Thomas first relates the good to the species of causes by remarking that agent, form, and end all imply a certain perfection, which pertains to the formality of the good itself. Even matter, insofar as it is in potency to the good, possesses the formality of good. As such then, each must be considered as a possible cause of evil; or better, the good should be considered as a possible cause of evil after the manner of an efficient, final, formal, and material cause. He writes in this regard:

That good is the cause of evil by way of the material cause was shown above. For it was shown that good is the subject of evil. But evil has no formal cause, rather is it a privation of form; likewise, neither has it a final cause, but rather is it a privation of order to the proper end; since not only the end has the nature of good, but also the useful, which is ordered to the end. Evil, however, has a cause by way of an agent, not directly, but accidentally.⁽²²¹⁾

In order to appreciate better the reasoning behind Aquinas's delineation of the four causes and their respective relations to evil, it would be well to detail briefly the various contributions of the material, formal, and final causes to being and thus see the intrinsic reasoning which led Thomas to maintain that only the material cause among these three could be considered as cause of evil. The efficient cause as related to evil will be treated separately due to its particular relevance to this study. In so doing, the intent is to emphasize Thomas' insistence on the positive character of causality in terms of the causes' contribution to being. It is this formality that allows him to determine their relation to evil, which as a privation is caused only accidentally by the good and deficiently by evil.

Thomas writes in regard to the material cause: "It is that from which something comes about and is that which `exists-in'."⁽²²²⁾ By so defining the material cause Thomas designates it as the subject from which something comes to be in a different way. Moreover, it is that which "exists-in," as distinguished from the formal cause through which matter is said to exist and through which it is known. The material cause then exercises a twofold causality or contribution to the becoming or being of a thing: as regards the substance, it is the subject from which the latter comes; as regards the form itself, it is the recipient and sustainer of its actuality, since the form cannot naturally exist apart from the matter. With this understanding of the material cause, Thomas can say that the good is the material cause of evil, insofar as "the good is the subject of evil."

Since every being seeks its own perfection, the activity of the good, which is the subject of evil, is directed primarily to the maintenance and increase of the good of a being; in fact, it would be repugnant for the good as subject to be primarily a privation of its total perfection or actuality. If this were the case, and evil were said to be the recipient of the direct influx of the subject's principles, it would follow that privation would be natural to the good. It would no longer be an evil, which is by definition the absence of what is natural or due to the particular being. Thus, it is only by reason of the good of the subject that evil can be said to exist or to be subjected in the being. Moreover, it must be recalled in this regard that evil does not corrupt the subject as such, but only its inclinations and the habits contrary to the evil in question.

In this way the good, or what we have previously called "being in potency," is the material cause of evil. It acts as the subject in which the evil resides, not however, in any natural way as does an accident, but as a privation depriving the being of its due perfection. Thomas summarizes it thus:

Evil does not have a subject as though through itself as does an accident, but as a privation of perfection; and therefore, it is not necessary that it be caused through itself from the principles of the subject; but it suffices only that there be required an aptitude or oughtness in the subject.⁽²²³⁾

This question of the exact nature of the good as the subject of evil deserves further consideration. When it is said that being in potency or the good is the material cause or subject of evil, it is not meant that the non-being, which is the privation, is present in the very good that is contrary to it; otherwise, this would involve a contradiction, since the same being would be simultaneously and in the same respect both good and evil. Rather, the privation resides in the total subject and not in the particular contrary as such. As Thomas remarks:

Other kinds of opposition belong to some definite genus, whereas good and evil are common to all genera. Every being as such is good and every privation as such is evil . . . but the subject of a privation need not be white or sweet or endowed with sight, because none of these predicates belongs to being as such. Thus, black is not white, nor blindness in the person who sees; but evil is in good, just as blindness in the sense that it is the subject of sight.⁽²²⁴⁾

Thus, evil is said to be in the very being insofar as it is in potency to the good to which this evil is contrary; but not in any contradictory sense, as though the contrary good itself were the subject, for instance, as though blindness were present in sight instead of in the defective faculty. In the moral order, then, this privation will not be had in the virtuous act itself, but in the moral act in which it will be found as in its subject deprived of its due species and order.

To return to a point already mentioned, namely, the fact that evil is not said to corrupt the good completely in the sense that the subject of the good would cease to exit, ⁽²²⁵⁾ Thomas remarks:

The good is diminished by evil more as a result of the addition of its contrary (insofar as the potency is impeded by a contrary act from being able to proceed to the actuality of the form) than by the subtraction of some of its goodness.⁽²²⁶⁾

In the natural order such a diminution cannot go on indefinitely, according to Aquinas, since all natural forms and powers are limited; however, in the moral order it can be said to do so, since here it concerns not the powers themselves or the forms but the acts of these powers, whose number is without limit. In fact, Thomas keenly remarks that the more the will tends toward unworthy ends, the greater is its difficulty in returning to a proper and worthy end. He concludes by noting that the good of natural aptitude can be infinitely decreased by moral evil, although it will never be totally destroyed; rather, it will always accompany the nature that endures.⁽²²⁷⁾ In the De Malo he says much the same when he writes: "the good which is a composite of subject and perfection is seriously damaged by evil, inasmuch as the perfection is removed and the subject remains"⁽²²⁸⁾

The formal intrinsic cause is a correlative and complement of the material cause and is compared to the latter as act to potency. It has a twofold contribution to being: one in regard to the being "in fieri" and the other in regard to the material cause itself. It is said to be the cause of the latter insofar as the matter exists only through the form; on the other hand, it causes the being "in fieri" by specifying the matter to be a determined form of being. Another point stressed by Thomas on the question of the material and formal causes is the simultaneous and mutual causality of the two. This is one of the many instances found in the philosophy of Aristotle and Thomas wherein causes of different genera are causes of one another. In the present instance, it is the matter determining form by limiting it and individualizing it, while at the same time form determines matter, also limiting and specifying it. Each in its own order, as potency and act, simultaneously effect the one composite being.

With these observations in mind it should be noted that the good does not cause evil after the manner of a formal cause. Form connotes a specific actuality or perfection whereas evil by definition is the absence of actuality and perfection. Form is a positive entity and as such, would be a being and thus a good. Such was the force of the remark by Aquinas quoted earlier in this chapter: "that which is in act is good, since according to this, it has perfection and being in which consists the formality of the good."⁽²²⁹⁾ Thomas is even more explicit on the relation of formal causality to the good in the Summa Contra Gentes, where he writes: "Now a form, as such, has the essential character of goodness, because a form is a principle of action."⁽²³⁰⁾ Thus, once again Thomas rules out the possibility of the good being the formal cause of evil, since the latter would then possess actuality and goodness, both contrary to its very definition.

As regards final causality, its common definition is: "That for the sake of which something is done, or that on account of which an agent operates."⁽²³¹⁾ In such a definition the final cause always has about it the aspect of the good, either real or apparent, and therefore bespeaks a relation of appetite or natural inclination to the good. Without a determined end there would be no action, since every agent would thus be indifferent to act. The influence then of the final cause on being is precisely that of being desired or sought by the efficient cause.⁽²³²⁾

This motion of the final cause is not a physical motion, like that of the efficient cause, but a moral or metaphorical one.⁽²³³⁾ In this latter case the appetition is considered as the change occurring in the appetitive faculty, which appetition proceeds from the attracting good.⁽²³⁴⁾ This influx of being, although not physical but metaphorical, is none the less real and actual; in fact, it is so real that without it, as has been said, there would be no physical motion on the part of the agent. Thomas goes so far as to say that it pertains in a certain way to the genus of efficient cause in that it is has the formality of motion by moving the efficient cause to act.⁽²³⁵⁾

In still another place Aquinas states that it is the very reason why the efficient cause is a cause at all.⁽²³⁶⁾ Through it the efficient cause is brought into perfect actuality insofar as it is reduced into act by the moral action of the final cause attracting it. To quote Thomas: "The efficient cause is prior to the end, since from the efficient cause comes a motion toward the end; but the end is prior to the efficient cause, since the action of the latter is not completed except through the end."⁽²³⁷⁾ In summary, the mutual causality involved in the relation of efficient and final causes implies that no potentially efficient cause would determine itself to act, nor be determined, unless influenced by a final cause orienting it to an end, which is seen as appetible or good. Moreover, the good, which is the end of every action, could never be called a final cause nor exercise its causality unless it were related to the appetite of a being capable of tending in its direction. All of which implies the positive contribution of the final cause to the being effected through the action of the efficient cause.

None of the above is conceivably applicable to the question of the good as a cause of evil after the manner of a final cause. Evil, as non-being, is the very absence of good and order, which are involved in the causality of an end. Evil, as such, could never attract an appetite to seek it for its own sake, since the appetite seeks only the good. Moreover, evil is said never to be intended purely for its own sake, but only as an apparent good. According to Thomas this can happen in two ways: first, if the evil is completely unexpected and unforseen by the agent, in which case it is said to be beyond the intention of the agent; secondly, if evil is foreseen and known to be concomitant to some good result which is directly and primarily willed. Such an evil is said to be beside the intention of the agent. In the latter case the desire for the resultant good must be greater than the desire for the good which is lost, and greater than the fear of the consequent evil.⁽²³⁸⁾ This type of intention will be quite evident in moral actions, since man possesses many natural appetites, each faculty having its own proper object. Hence, reason is called upon to subordinate each to the total good of man and the divine law. The failure to do so in act is moral evil.

Evil, therefore, must be said to imply some type of order to an end. What Thomas denies in regard to evil is order to a due end. Evil is the privation of this type of order. In the moral area, for instance, it must be said that in sinful action what is willed is the relative good, that is, a good in relation to one particular aspect of man's nature. However, such a good is simply evil, if one consider human nature in its totality. Thus, man's will is ordered to the good in the object, for instance, in adultery, to the pleasurable aspect of the action and not to the evil itself. This is either beyond or beside the agent's intention. In other words, evil cannot be said to be an end in the sense of an appetible good directly and simply, but only accidentally, as explained above. What pertains to evil directly is the absence of order to a due end; and hence, the good cannot be considered a cause of evil after the manner of a final cause.

Thus far it has been shown that Thomas rejects the good as both formal and final cause of evil. He has done so by reason of his insistence that the notion of cause implies a positive influence on the very being of the thing caused and that both formal and final causes exercise this influence through formalities which are the very contraries of evil. In other words, both form, implying specification and determination of nature, and end, implying appetibility, are contrary to privation, which is defined as the "privation of form" and the "privation of order to a due end." On the other hand, Thomas has admitted that the good is the material cause of evil insofar as the being in potency can be said to be the subject of the privation, that is, to lack one of its due perfections. Even here, it must be recalled that Thomas insists that such a privation flows from the principles of the subject only accidentally, but not naturally, as one would say of an accident itself.

There remains but to consider the good as a cause of evil through the manner of an efficient cause. The latter has been taken out of the traditional order of causes and has been reserved for later treatment in order to highlight its importance for the present study, and to be able to move directly from its positive consideration into the area of deficient causality, which is fundamental to this investigation.

It is in the notion of efficient causality that Thomas evidences the greatest advancements in thought over that of Aristotle. He accomplishes this in two important ways: first, by establishing the precise formality that defines the efficient cause as an agent; and second, by distinguishing and reconciling the relation of the primary and secondary causes. In the first instance Aquinas manages to thwart the attempts by the Islamic philosophers who denied all finite causality; in the second instance, he lays the basis for a demonstration of the possibility of, and the necessity for, divine creation.

Thomas defines the causality of efficient cause in two ways: first, "production expresses the causality of the efficient cause,"⁽²³⁹⁾ and secondly, "the influence of an efficient cause is to act."⁽²⁴⁰⁾ Aquinas had taken the term "action" from the metaphysics of Aristotle; but there it had a purely physical character accounting for the motion in the universe and the changes in finite reality. It was never employed by the Stagirite to account for the very existence of these changing beings; always for him it was a question of motion and change. Indeed, Aristotle had placed it among the ten categories as an accidental actualization of his categorized substance. His very definition of efficient causality bears this out: "Efficient cause is that cause which is the first beginning of change or of rest."⁽²⁴¹⁾

As a commentator on Aristotle, Thomas often used this inadequate definition, but recognized its limitations and appreciated its provisional character in his own sweeping metaphysics of efficiency, which would embrace even the action of the Infinite, namely, creation. Thus, he never assigned to the agent cause as such what was only to be found in its finite manifestations as exercised by participated being. He set himself the task of isolating that precise formality which renders a cause an efficient cause as such.

With regard to finite efficiency certain elements are always prerequisites. First, the efficient cause as related to its effect is a source of becoming or change. Second, as related to a subject acted upon, the efficient cause presupposes such a subject; and therefore, its action involves motion and passion. Third, as regards the agent itself, it is presupposed that the latter is in second act, which state of operation necessitated a transition for such an agent from a potentially active state to an actually active one; in other words, there is required actualization of an active potency. Aristotle had read all these obvious limitations into the very notion of efficient causality; but Thomas never did. He did not do so because he was conscious of an action which was neither motion nor change: the action of the Infinite Being.

Thus, Aquinas eliminated from the definition of efficient cause the need for a subject upon which the agent would act, as well as any becoming or motion, strictly so-called.⁽²⁴²⁾ He also recognized that there could be an efficient action wherein there had been no previous actualization of an active power, that is, in the case of an agent which was already totally in act, which is true of the "Ipsum Esse Subsistens." Therefore, Thomas maintained that the only remaining element necessary to verify the notion of efficient action was the emanation or emergence of the effect from the agent. This emanation must be viewed precisely as coming forth from the agent designating the latter as its cause or the source of its new being. Such a notion is truly transcendentally analogous,⁽²⁴³⁾ and can be defined as an emanation or emergence of being through action. It becomes the most perfect index of the actuality of the being exercising it, and thus is a verification of Thomas' constantly repeated principle, which is fundamental to the present study, namely, "a being acts insofar as it is."

One final point might be observed in regard to Thomas' notion of instrumental causality, which is a question of secondary causality. He writes: "All lower efficient causes must be referred to higher ones, as instrumental to principal agents."⁽²⁴⁴⁾ Such an understanding of instrumental causality takes into account the instrumental cause considered strictly and in its broader connotations. Strictly speaking, instrumental causality occurs when an efficient cause is elevated and applied by a principal agent in order to produce a more perfect effect than that proper to the instrumental cause itself. In fact, where the action of the principal cause is not modified by the instrument, one does not have strict instrumentality. Moreover, in such a case the action of the instrument, insofar as it is an instrument, is not separated from that of the principal cause. Thus, only one and the same effect proceeds from their combined action. Therefore, Thomas can remark:

It is also apparent that the same effect is not attributed to a natural cause and to divine power in such a way that it is partly done by God, and partly by the natural agent; rather, it is wholly done by both, according to a different way, just as the same effect is wholly attributed to the instrument and also wholly to the principal agent.⁽²⁴⁵⁾

In a broader sense, however, the instrumental cause is understood to be any cause subordinated to another on which it depends and by which it is moved.⁽²⁴⁶⁾ Obviously, this subordination must be in terms of action or operation. Such a notion will be of special import in the present study wherein rational volition will bear the imprint both of the primary causality of the First Cause and of the secondary cause. In fact, it will be in terms of the latter that the radical deficiency in the morally evil act will be interpreted. Moreover, Thomas applies this same doctrine: the relation of primary and secondary cause and the need for the subordination of the latter to the former, to the entire question of moral evil. He does this in terms of the will as a secondary cause subordinated to the primary causality of the reason in moral matters. In both these respects this teaching has special relevance to the present study.


DEFICIENT CAUSALITY

Thomas states the relation of the efficient cause to evil in these words: "Evil, however, has a cause by way of an agent, not directly, but accidentally."⁽²⁴⁷⁾ He then proceeds to develop in this passage the divisions of such accidental efficiency in terms of evil in action and evil in effect. The former looks to evil on the part of the agent, while the latter concerns evil in the thing itself. Evil on the part of the agent results from a deficiency in the principles of action, either on the side of its primary or instrumental cause. This is what Aquinas will refer to as deficient causality: a primary concern for the present study.

On the other hand, there is evil as caused in the thing itself or in the effect produced by the agent's action. This can be considered as arising from three sources: first, it can result from the weakness of the agent, which is reducible to evil in action or deficient causality on the part of the principal or instrumental agent; second, it can come from a defect in the matter which is the recipient of the agent's action; finally, it can be due to the agent's power itself insofar as it effects a formal change in the being on account of the natural instability of matter with respect to form. This is a question of the privation of one form necessarily accompanying the generation of another: it is called by Thomas a "fatal deficiency" inasmuch as this kind of being ceases to be. However, it is a quasi-natural deficiency, and as such is attributed to the power of the agent rather than to its defect of power.

These last three types of efficient causality on the part of the effect or thing produced, with the exception of that arising from the weakness of the agent, are what Thomas understands to be accidental causality as such. This is an evil resulting in things due to the active power of the agent, but apart from its direct action and direct intention. Deficient causality, on the other hand, is limited by Aquinas to evil in action insofar as the evil thus effected or caused is the result of the defective power of the agent.

A more comprehensive explanation of these same types of efficient causality is had in the Summa Contra Gentes along with a lengthy comparison of accidental and deficient causality in the natural and voluntary orders.⁽²⁴⁸⁾ Firstly concerning the natural order, if the evil is caused on the part of the agent, it will be due to a defect in the agent's power, the consequence of which is the defective action or the defective effect. Thomas aptly remarks that "this is why we say that `evil has no efficient, but only a deficient cause,'"⁽²⁴⁹⁾ for evil does not result from an agent insofar as he is agent, but from him only insofar as he does not act. The same is true, according to Aquinas, if the evil arises from a defect in the instrument employed by the primary agent. Aquinas then notes that it is accidental to the agent to suffer some defect in his power of action, since one is not agent because of this defect of power, but because of the power itself. It must be concluded, therefore, that evil is caused by a natural agent by reason of its action only in an accidental or deficient manner.

On the part of the effect, or the evil in the thing itself, this is caused by the good of the natural agent by virtue of the matter or the form of the thing in question. The former is due to the indisposition of the matter which, since it does not adequately receive the action of the agent, results in a defect in the product. The latter comes from the privation of one form by the necessary and concomitant advent of a new form. Both of these divisions agree with those in the previous explanation by Thomas.

However, in this context he notes also that the deficiency on the part of the matter and the resulting evil in the effect cannot be attributed to a defect in the agent, which "fails to convert poorly disposed matter into perfect act."⁽²⁵⁰⁾ He argues in this regard that there is a determinate power of each natural agent according to its specific nature, and failure to go beyond this power will not be a deficiency in the power of the agent. His concluding remark in this regard is of special import for the present study: "Such deficiency is found only when it falls short of the measure of power naturally due to it."⁽²⁵¹⁾ Moreover, it should be recalled from the previous explanation of this matter in the Summa Theologica that Thomas attributes the evil in the effect on the part of formal change to the power and perfection of the agent, rather than to any deficiency on the latter's part.

Thus far, Thomas has been applying these divisions of efficient causality to the question of natural evil. Next he turns his attention to the moral or voluntary order, following through with the same divisions in its regard. First, it should be noted that in moral matters evil is observed only in action and not in any effect produced. As Thomas puts it: "Moral evil is not considered in relation to the matter and form of the effect, but only as a resultant from the agent."⁽²⁵²⁾ A simple illustration will demonstrate the truth of this observation. The matter and form of the effect would be the physical constituents of the thing produced by the action; for example, if a man wrongfully damaged a neighbor's property, the evil in the effect would be the damaged item. As such, it has nothing to do with the voluntary action insofar as moral or voluntary evil is concerned; the latter is found only in the will act itself. As it is the will which is the proximate cause of any moral act, it alone will be "the root and source of moral wrongdoing."⁽²⁵³⁾

It must next be recalled that Thomas insists that any defect in action redounds to a previous defect in the agent. In the case of moral evil, it presupposes a defect in the will preceding the moral fault or moral evil itself. The precise nature of this defect and its ultimate ontological significance will be treated at length in the following chapters as the very heart of the present investigation. At this point it need only be noted that such evil involves deficient causality on the part of the will.

Here Thomas proceeds to point out an essential difference between deficient causality in the natural and moral orders. As seen above, the defective character of evil in action in the natural order, although due to a defect of power in the agent, was nevertheless ultimately attributable to some good which is the cause of the defect only accidentally insofar as it causes some good. However in the moral order, the very defect is said to be caused by the agent or the will, insofar as the latter is a deficient cause and not by reason of any active power in an accidental manner. Thus, although the will be the accidental cause of the evil in action resulting from its willing a good contrary to reason and law, it is also and primarily the cause of the very defect which gives rise to the privation of moral species and order in the evil act. Moreover, as will be seen, the will is the voluntary cause of such a defect.

Thomas underlines this important difference by the following examples found in the De Malo.⁽²⁵⁴⁾ Evil in action in the natural order is exemplified by the birth of a monstrosity in nature. The cause of this evil is undoubtedly the deficient power in the seed, which effected the embryo, etc. However, Thomas notes that, if it is asked what is the cause of the defect which is the evil in the seed, and hence in the offspring, it is necessary to proceed to a good which causes accidentally; in other words, it is necessary to proceed to an accidental cause of the defect which caused the defect in the seed accidentally in causing the seed, which is a good. In this regard Thomas writes:

The cause of this defect in the seed is some altering principle which induces a quality contrary to the quality required for the good disposition of the seed; and the more perfect the power of this altering principle the more will it induce this contrary quality and consequently the ensuing defect of the seed; hence the evil of the seed is not caused by a good inasmuch as it is deficient, but by a good inasmuch as it is perfect (and is caused incidentally)⁽²⁵⁵⁾

Such is not the case however in voluntary evil, as will be evident from the example used by Aquinas to exemplify this unique type of evil in action. He first remarks that natural evil and voluntary evil are very similar in certain ways, but not in all. Next, he offers the example of a pleasurable physical good, sexual intercourse, which moves the will of the adulterer. If the latter's will were to receive the impression of this pleasurable object, as do his senses, from a certain necessity, then evil in voluntary and natural matters would be exactly the same.

This, however, is not the case, since the will always retains the power to receive or accept the impression or not to receive it, as it so chooses. Thus, it is not the fact that the will is moved in a particular way, even accidentally, that causes the defect in the will, which gives rise to the evil action when the will chooses a good contrary to reason and law. What causes the defect in the will is the will itself, which was not necessarily, but freely moved by the delectable good; in other words, it voluntarily accepted or received the impression from the senses as presented by the intellect.

Another way of looking at this is to consider the relation of the intellect to the will in its presentation of its object. In the case of a delectable good moving a sense the two are determined in their relation to one another. In other words, the former necessarily moves the latter; whereas in the case of an object presented by the intellect to the will, there is no such determination since by definition the intelligible object is of an abstract nature, thus allowing the will to choose voluntarily or in an undetermined manner. Its very indefiniteness as abstract object is the source and/or root of the will's freedom to choose.

These notions will be basic to the remainder of this investigation; but here it need only be noted that the will is the deficient cause of the very defect which gives rise to the evil in action. It is not its accidental cause, as though moved to a relative good which happens to be simply evil. Thomas expresses it thus:

Consequently the cause of the evil which occurs from the acceptance is not the seductive pleasure itself, but rather the will. Indeed the will is the cause of evil in each of the forementioned ways, namely, both incidentally (per accidens) and inasmuch as it is a deficient good⁽²⁵⁶⁾

This brings up the final point in regard to evil in action in voluntary matters; namely, that the will is the accidental cause of the evil as well as the deficient cause explained above. It is its accidental cause insofar as the will in act wills a relative good, that is, a physical good which is a good in one respect to the person, but not in respect to him as a total personality. In so willing the person wills, what is called by Thomas, evil simply speaking, that is, an evil for the whole man. This is to relate the physical good to the moral order by reason of the fact that it has become the object of an intellectual apprehension and a rational volition.

Moreover, this privation of moral species and order in action is due ultimately to the defect presupposed in the will before the action takes place, as explained above. This defect, as will be seen, is the non-subordination of the will to the reason; its result in act is the willing of a good contrary to the dictates of reason and divine law. Finally, this defect is presupposed in the will before the deficient election.⁽²⁵⁷⁾ Unlike the defect found in the deficient cause in the natural order, this defect in the will lies within the power of the will to remedy. Hence, its cause is the deficient will itself as a deficient power, and not as an accidental good.⁽²⁵⁸⁾

One last problem confronts Aquinas in respect to his analysis of evil in action both in the natural and moral orders. He has maintained that the defect in the will is voluntary and is to be accounted for by reason of the will as a deficient cause. This is in sharp contrast to such defects in the natural order which are considered to be natural or fortuitous.⁽²⁵⁹⁾ In the moral order, however, Thomas argues that the cause of the defect is neither natural nor from chance, but voluntary, that is, the will itself is its cause as a deficient good.⁽²⁶⁰⁾ He says that, if the defect were from nature in voluntary matters, the will would cause evil in action every time it acted. On the other hand, if the defect pre-existing in the will were from mere chance or accident, there would be no moral fault when the will proceeded to act with this defect, since it would be premeditated and it (the defect) would be beyond the control of reason.⁽²⁶¹⁾ Thus Aquinas salvages his principle that a defect in action is reducible to a defect in the principle of action, and yet can allow this defect to be found in the will, not as a natural defect or one caused by chance, but as one that is voluntary, that is, caused by the will itself as its deficient cause.

DEFICIENT CAUSALITY AND THE PRIMARY CAUSE

In order to complete the treatment of deficient causality as related to evil, it seems proper to situate such causality in perspective as regards the primary causality of the Infinite Being. This will serve two purposes: it will aid in further appreciation of the precise role of the deficient cause in moral evil, and at the same time it will provide background for a subsequent consideration of the place therein of the Primary Cause.

One of the unique features in Thomistic philosophy is its insistence on the primary causality of the First Being in the order of both existence and action. Such causality necessarily involves even the free actions of rational creatures.⁽²⁶²⁾ However, a special problem presents itself when such causality is applied to evil, and more specifically, to moral evil. As has been said, Thomas poses this difficulty in general terms in his Commentary on the Divine Names.⁽²⁶³⁾ The philosophical dilemma is that either the First Cause is the cause of evil, which is philosophically repugnant, or its cause is to be sought in something apart from the universality of the First Cause, which is equally untenable.

From previous considerations it has been shown that deficiency in the effect or in reality is had in two ways, namely, in the matter or in the form. The former considers the matter as unable to receive the action of the cause, while the latter regards the action of one contrary form on another, in which action the one form is said to be reduced to the potency of matter while the other formis educed therefrom. In any case, neither of such deficiencies is attributed to the agent insofar as the agent is deficient; rather, it is attributed to the active power of the agent. Thus, the deficiency results from the agent as an accidental cause, which causes directly only the good to which an evil is accidentally attached either for the subject itself or for another.

It has been noted also that it is not necessary that such a cause or agent remedy the defective matter, since failure to go beyond the natural powers of natural agents does not indicate a deficiency in power in the cause. Nor in the case of evil resulting from the action of the contrary form is there required a cessation of action on the part of the cause, for otherwise the natural order would be subverted. This follows from Thomas' general principle that in the natural order, which by nature is corruptible, it is only right that at some time there be defection or corruption. Since this principle will be of some consequence in the following considerations, it seems advisable to develop the point further.

(However, before doing so a word of caution is suggested vis-à-vis the responsibility for correcting such natural deficiencies as in the case of genetic engineering. Provided other ethical principles are not violated, if a fetus is found to have a genetic defect, for example, why should persons not be held responsible to correct this defect, mutatis mutandis? To argue that the natural order would be subverted by this seems a bit extreme, although the limits of such `manipulation' should always be strictly defined by those concerned medically, legally, and interpersonally. Considering Thomas' unusual penchant and facility in adapting philosophical principles to problems confronting his age, it is not at all fanciful to address his principles to problems resulting from modern technology. In light of his profound analysis of instrumental causality, it would seem that a role in working through such challenges is ethically demanded, rather than being an interference.)

Thomas states the principle thus: "What is able to fail does fail at times."⁽²⁶⁴⁾ This arises in the metaphysics of Aquinas from his understanding of the perfection of the universe and the contingent nature of the causes therein. Such perfection, according to Thomas, demands defectability or corruptibility on the part of some creatures. He writes: "The perfection of the universe requires both grades of goodness," namely, goods that "cannot fall from goodness" or incorruptible beings and goods that "can fall from goodness" or corruptible things.⁽²⁶⁵⁾ Moreover, he goes on to assert that "it does not pertain to divine goodness, entirely to exclude from things their power of falling from the good; but evil is the consequence of this power, because what is able to so fall does fall at times."⁽²⁶⁶⁾

It is this latter point that is of special interest here. His argument for its necessity rests upon his connecting the above doctrine with the contingent nature of the causes involved in a defectible universe. However, it should be noted that this `necessity' is from nature and does not, therefore, imply a moral responsibility on rational beings always to permit such defection and/or corruption. It is our contention that at times it is quite the opposite: rational beings under certain circumstances have an ethical responsibility to prevent such occurrences.

If secondary causes of a contingent nature are allowed to operate according to their own modality, then it is necessary in Thomas' thinking that some of these do in fact defect or fail. Their very contrariety and incompatibility one with the other results in the necessary clash and failure of some. He writes in this regard:

It would be contrary to the rational character of the divine regime to refuse permission for created things to act according to the mode of their nature. Now, as a result of this fact that creatures do act in this way, corruption and evil result in things; due to the contrariety and incompatibility present in things, one may be a source of corruption for another.⁽²⁶⁷⁾

It is to be noted that the power to fail or corrupt is intrinsic to the beings themselves, although the actual and necessary corruption or the consequent evil is due to the interaction of causes, one of which is a "source of corruption for another." Thus, the form of water is naturally "corruptible" in regard to fire; however, it will actually corrupt only when brought into contact with the form of fire or some similar contrary or incompatible form. Such contact will actually come about by the mere fortuitous or chance meeting of such causes. This is the very meaning of things occurring by chance that they fail "in regard to an end that is intended." Moreover, "it would be contrary to the meaning of providence, and to the perfection of things, if there were no chance events."⁽²⁶⁸⁾

Such is the doctrine found also in the Commentarium Ferrariensis in this regard. It reads:

From the fact that creatures so act according to the mode of their proper nature, it follows that (there will be) evil and corruption in things, on account of the contrariety and repugnance existing in them.⁽²⁶⁹⁾

To return to the matter of the deficient cause, it is to be repeated that as regards neither type of deficiency cited above regarding evil in an effect is there any question of defective action springing from a cause insofar as that cause is deficient; thus the causality of the First Cause is not at issue here. However, it is now necessary to consider more closely defective action precisely as it results from the agent as deficient cause. Thomas remarks: "Evil which consists in defect of action, or that which is caused by defect of the agent, is not reduced to God as to its cause."⁽²⁷⁰⁾ He develops his thought further in the same article by distinguishing what there is in evil as regards the reality of being and perfection and what is therein as privation or defect. He writes:

The effect of the deficient secondary cause is reduced to the first non-deficient cause as regards what it has of being and perfection, but not as regards what it has of defect. . . . And, likewise, whatever there is of being and action in a bad action, is reduced to God as the cause; whereas whatever defect is in it is not caused by God, but by the deficient secondary cause.⁽²⁷¹⁾

Such a line of reasoning follows from the more general principles on efficient causality as developed in the preceding sections. Every being acts insofar as it is in act. Its proper effect will resemble the actuality of its cause. Thus, action and perfection are from Pure Act and Transcendent Perfection whereas deficiency in action is from an instrument, defective in nature. Although natural evil in effect was attributable to God as intended accidentally for the good of nature, defective action, insofar as it is defective (which means insofar as it is non-being), is rooted in the defective secondary cause alone.

Specifically as regards moral evil Thomas remarks that "the act of sin is both a being and an act; and in both respects it is from God. . . . Therefore God is the cause of every action, insofar as it is an action."⁽²⁷²⁾ However, as has been noted in the previous chapter, sin is an action accompanied by some defect; such a defect, according to Aquinas, proceeds from the created or secondary cause, namely, the free will, inasmuch as the latter defects from the order of the first agent, God.⁽²⁷³⁾ In such defection there is no need for a first action from the universal cause of all being and action, since there is present only a privation subjected in the moral action which, considered positively, is the tendency of the will toward the relative good. The First Cause acts only in regard to the entitative and operative aspect of the action, and not in regard to the defective aspect. This latter springs only from the creature through its not endowing the act with the order which ought to be there. Employing the distinction then between sin and the act of sin Thomas notes: "God is the cause of the act of sin: and yet He is not the cause of sin, because He does not cause the act to have a defect."⁽²⁷⁴⁾

Regarding the defect itself the First Cause merely omits to remedy the defect found in the creature; this is done not by acting but "according as it withdraws from God".⁽²⁷⁵⁾ Thomas draws the analogy of one who would not give a hand to someone falling, which person would be said to cause the fall, but only in a negative way. He immediately adds that God "does this from a just judgment that he does not give to some help, lest they not fall."⁽²⁷⁶⁾ This, however, does not concern us in this study, since it is strictly a theological problem: the problem of divine predestination. Here it is necessary only to point out the metaphysical basis for the defective character of moral evil in terms of the respective involvements of the primary and secondary causes, not to probe the mysterious matter of God's "just judgments" in the order of grace.

Obviously, if one limits one's consideration to the problem of preventing and/or impeding evil on a human level, its moral aspects become a bit clearer, but not totally so. Using Thomas' own example of "lending a helping hand" the rational and/or ethical person would under certain, if not most, circumstances be morally obliged to do so. Even here, however, `just judgment' requires consideration of other moral and physical circumstances such as whether in so doing one is abetting a crime or whether one is physically capable of doing so without endangering his own life. As in all moral matters prudence is a much needed virtue, and the imposition of ethical obligations vis-à-vis preventing evil is often problematic.

Thomas refuses, moreover, to admit that in not remedying the defect of the secondary agent the permissive will on the part of the First Cause, in not remedying the defect of the secondary agent is against the providence which is proper to the governor of the universe. Since it does not pertain to the divine goodness to exclude the ability of the created being to defect, which power springs from the very contingency of their being, he employs the principle previously explained that "evil is the consequence of this power, since, what is able to fall, does at time fall" if left to itself.⁽²⁷⁷⁾ In fact, Aquinas says that the total suppression of such defectibility would be a greater defect or evil than the particular defections in question.⁽²⁷⁸⁾ He, therefore, concludes that it is not the concern of divine providence to safeguard all beings from evil, but to see to it that the evil which arises is ordained to some good.⁽²⁷⁹⁾

Concerning human beings specifically, Thomas distinguishes between man in the state of integral nature as established at creation and man in the state of corrupt nature.⁽²⁸⁰⁾ In the former state "man had nothing inciting him to evil, although the good of his nature did not suffice for the attainment of glory".⁽²⁸¹⁾ Moreover, in such a state he does not require grace to avoid sin. In the state of corrupted nature, on the other hand, man does have in himself inclinations impelling him to evil; therefore, "he needs the help of grace not to fall."⁽²⁸²⁾ It is in this state that divine grace prevents whatever evils the human will does not commit.⁽²⁸³⁾ Furthermore, aversion is said to be proper and natural to the will in the state of corrupt nature, whereas it is not such in the state in which human nature was established.⁽²⁸⁴⁾

The importance of these observations concerning fallen human nature, or what one might call concretely existing humanity, cannot be overemphasized, if the defectible character of the will as analyzed in the thought of Thomas is to be properly understood. Man is considered in his present existential state as naturally inclined toward evil. This inclination, if not impeded by divine help, may impel the individual into moral fault. It is to this radical defectibility, aggravated by a weakened nature, that he will appeal in the question of the causality of the will in the case of moral evil.

Possibly nowhere in the historical confrontation between reason and faith is the finiteness of man and the infinity of God's wisdom more strikingly illustrated. This is the problem found in the case of Job as he wrestled with his tempters; it is at the heart of Paul's Epistle to the Romans. In a certain sense it brought about Martin Luther's break with the Roman authorities and proved the inspiration of the latter's attempt to address the problem at the Council of Trent. Throughout the ages people have asked "why" as they attempt to reconcile their trust in a kind and merciful God with the evil things that befall them: "why," some complained, "do bad things happen to good people." Even on a human level the question can be turned around: "why do good people allow bad things to happen."