The previous considerations have concluded to two very important principles in the matter of the causality of moral evil: first, the privative character of evil itself, and, specifically, of moral evil as a privation of mode, species, and order in human action; and second, the fact that every such defect in action presupposes a corresponding defect in its principle as its deficient cause. In other words, it has been established that it is the privation itself formally corrupting the human act that renders the act evil. However, insofar as the act involves a moral deficiency, the principles of that deficiency must be sought in the moral principles of human action, namely, the intellect and will. In summary, it was a defect in ordering that caused the human action to be evil, while it was a procession from the proper faculties of man, the intellect and will, that specifies the defect to be human or moral. Thomas describes this two fold aspect of sin in the following manner: "The will lacking the direction of the rule of reason and the divine law, and intent on some mutable good, causes the act of sin directly, and the inordinateness of the act indirectly and beside the intention."⁽²⁸⁵⁾

This description of the evolution of an evil act introduces us to the specific elements which must be considered in the remaining chapters of this study. They involve both the intellectual and volitional aspects of sinful action, namely, reason and divine law enlightening reason as directive of will in its activity and will itself as subject to such direction. Thus, moral evil is to be understood as unregulated human action, willing without direction by its rule. Such unregulated action can be referred to in terms of the non-consideration of the rule of reason and divine law; as such, it involves both the intellectual and the volitional in terms of aversion from the due end in the appetition. However, it is to be noted that the more radical cause of this non-consideration is to be looked for on the part of the will's defection, although the formal element of defective ordering is found in the reason itself.

The above mentioned elements involved in the non-consideration of the rule of reason and divine law are concerned, moreover, with the actual choice of some good contrary to reason. One might refer to this as the `second moment' of rational volition, that is, as the actual tending of the will toward some mutable good while lacking the direction of the rule of reason and divine law.⁽²⁸⁶⁾ Although this non-consideration of the will's twofold rule and its corresponding appetition are integral to an understanding of the will's defection in good, still it is merely a psychological consideration of the question, and as such, is not of primary concern in the present study.

It is rather the ultimate source of this psychological stage of evil volition that is its primary interest. It is not on the psychological level that such a source of evil action must be sought, but on the metaphysical level in terms of the ultimate deficiency on the part of the will in its not moving the intellect to function as rule. Such non-action or deficient action might be referred to as the `first moment' of rational volition constituting the primary defect in the human faculties, which defect is presupposed to any actual commission of evil.

It is this presupposed defect in the will, insofar as the will by non-action or deficient causality is the ultimate source of wrongdoing, that lies at the heart of the present investigation. Such a defect raises a serious difficulty as regards the metaphysical basis of moral evil. In order to pinpoint the goal or purpose of the considerations to be treated in the following chapters it would be well to summarize this difficulty from the outset. It might be stated thus: Is not such a defect, presupposed in the voluntary principle of human action, incompatible with the very culpability inherent in moral evil? The answer to this question has been anticipated to some degree in the preceding chapter's consideration of the voluntary, although non-culpable, character of this defect; its complete exposition and its metaphysical implications, however, must wait until the final chapters of our investigation. In this present summary it will suffice to state that the presupposed defect must be a voluntary one and not one arising from nature or chance; and moreover, it must not be a culpable defect lest sin be considered the cause of sin and an infinite regression be established in the explanation of the source of moral evil.

The solution to the problem will have to resolve itself into a consideration of the non-action of the will with respect to its twofold rule--reason and divine law. This non-action will have to be distinguished insofar as the `two moments' of rational volition are concerned, namely, the will as it relates to the rule of reason and divine law before and at the moment of election of a particular good contrary to these respective rules. Before the election the voluntary non-consideration of the rules will be a mere defect by non-action; whereas at the moment of election this defect will take on the character of a privation, depriving the act of its due mode, species, and order. This distinction between defect and privation is found throughout Thomistic philosophy: a defect being a mere absence of a good while a privation is the absence of a due good, that is, one that ought to be present in the being, knowledge, or action.

From the above it becomes obvious that a preliminary study of the intellectual component of moral evil in terms of the rule of reason should be carried out if its volitional counterpart is to be appreciated. This inquiry into the intellectual aspect falls naturally into two parts, namely, a psychological treatment of the intellect's role in the gradual specification of the object of rational volition, especially in terms of the acts of deliberation and judgment, and an explicit consideration of reason as the rule of human volition. Both of these will be treated in the next two chapters.

Specifically, in this chapter the intellect's contribution to the causality of moral evil will be explored. In order to accomplish this it is necessary to consider the mutual acts of intellect and will involved in the production of a moral act, and especially the mutual causality of the two faculties in the orders of specification and exercise respectively. Finally, the specific acts of deliberation and judgment will be analyzed insofar as these are the proper acts of reason as rule of human conduct.

MUTUAL ACTS OF INTELLECT AND WILL

As a first step toward an appreciation of the intellect's contribution in effecting moral evil through its non-functioning as the rule of human act, it is necessary to consider briefly the various mutual acts of intellect and will which are involved to some degree in every human act. The emphasis in this latter expression is on the word `human', for not every act that proceeds from a person's will is strictly human, but some may be merely what is called an `act of man.' In order to have a truly human act it is necessary that the act proceed from the will with a knowledge of the end; thus, it must be a fully conscious act, that is, an act with both knowledge and volition. The complete human act is seen as coming from the will under the direction of the intellect. In all this, however, it should be noted that there is no question of separating in reality the mutual relations of intellect and will in human action; it is merely a matter of distinguishing their mutual acts in two distinct orders of causality.

It must be emphasized that such distinctions and the explicit consideration of the two faculties do not in any way constitute an hypostatization of these faculties. Without falling into a kind of excessive personalism, it must be insisted that the act of free choice is an act of the human person using one's faculties as the instruments whereby one strives to attain in reality the known goods which are found attractive; in other words, the person acts as a total and/or integral human being. Thomas was quite aware of this, as is evident from the following: "Properly speaking, it is not a power which knows or intends, but the person (suppositum) through a power."⁽²⁸⁷⁾ The operations of the intellect and will, though immediately flowing from a particular power, are attributable to the whole person in virtue of the axiom "actions pertain to the person (suppositum)." Both the intellect and will, as well as all other human faculties, are principles by which human actions are performed; the reality of their operations is rooted in the substance wherein they inhere. The person is always the principle which acts--the only responsible agent--using one's faculties to operate as a human individual.

The important conclusion pertinent to the present investigation is that since human actions look to the good of, and proceed from, the whole individual it will be that whole person as a rational creature that will determine the moral character of a particular act. Thomas notes this when he writes:

For the intellect understands, not for itself alone, but for all the powers; and the will wills not only for itself, but for all the powers, too. Wherefore man, insofar as he is endowed with intellect and will, commands the act of the will for himself.⁽²⁸⁸⁾

With the above observations clearly in mind, it remains to outline briefly the mutual acts of intellect and will which make up the mechanism of human volition and which will enter into the question of the progressive specification of the object of volition. The Scholastics, following Thomas, list twelve acts involved in human action.⁽²⁸⁹⁾ Six are acts of the intellect and six are acts of the will. Before describing them in more detail we might list them as follows.

a1. In the order of intention regarding the end itself: there is simple apprehension of the good on the part of the intellect and simple volition of the apprehended good on the part of the will.

a2. In the same order there is a second act of intellection which is a type of judgment about the possibility and suitability of attaining the good proposed to the will. This elicits a corresponding will-act called intention of the good thus apprehended.

b1. In the order of election regarding the means to the end: there is on the part of the intellect an act of counsel which in turn moves the will to elicit a general consent.

b2. Then follows the intellective act called the practical judgment which is referred to as the last practical judgment; it calls upon the will to make an efficacious election of a particular means thus determined by the practical judgment.

c1. Finally, in the order of execution regarding the means to the end: there is on the part of the intellect the act of command of the practical reason followed by a volitional act called the active use of the faculties.

c2. Two further acts result in the executive powers themselves, namely, passive use or the acts of the executive powers themselves, and enjoyment or fruition, which is the resting of the will in the possession of the desired end.

The first acts of intellect and will are indeliberate and spontaneous. Having initially entered the realm of human knowledge through the avenue of the senses the object is apprehended by the intellect through its abstractive and reflective processes familiar to the student of Aristotle and Thomas. Such acts of the intellect consider the object respectively as essence and this individual being. As such, the object has not yet become one suitable for presentation to the will, which occurs only when the object is apprehended under the formality of the good or appetible and is found suitable for the individual considered in his concrete circumstances.

It is then that the will, following upon this act of simple apprehension of the good by the intellect, suffers a change in itself by which it is rendered attuned, so to speak, to the object apprehended, which has been presented as here and now suitable for the individual. In turn the will is said to be complacent in the good or to approve the good by a simple will-to-end analogously called `an act of love'. The good, therefore, as apprehended as suitable causes in the appetitive power a certain inclination, aptitude, or connaturality with itself: it renders the appetite like itself.⁽²⁹⁰⁾ Thomas comments in this regard: "the motion of the will toward an end absolutely" is called "simple volition."⁽²⁹¹⁾ This act of the will is nothing else "than an inclination proceeding from the interior principle of knowledge,"⁽²⁹²⁾ and is "consequent on the form understood."⁽²⁹³⁾ This latter form, insofar as it is grasped by the intellect under the formality of the good, is the "object of the will, which is the universal good."⁽²⁹⁴⁾ This good now known as suitable for this individual produces, according to Aquinas, a double effect in the will. He writes: "The appetible object gives the appetite, first, a certain adaptation to itself, which consists in complacency in the object; and from this follows movement towards the appetible object."⁽²⁹⁵⁾

The next two indeliberate and spontaneous acts of the intellect and will proceed in the following manner. If the good with which the appetite has been rendered connatural or suitable is not yet possessed, it causes in the appetite another movement called `desire' or `intention of the good.' Such a movement follows upon the apprehension on the part of the intellect wherein the latter sees this good or end as procurable by means yet to be considered. Thus, when the will adheres to an unqualified good (and every end shares in the formality of goodness possessed completely by the final end itself) which is known to be actually attainable, the will is said to intend that known good, not as an object of knowledge, but as that object exists in itself.

Thomas describes these latter two acts of intellect and will when he says: "the movement of the will to the end as acquired by the means is called intention."⁽²⁹⁶⁾ This differs from simple will-to-end insofar as the latter tends toward the end absolutely, whereas intention expresses a reference to an end inasmuch as the end is that to which the means are referred; in fact, in the act of intention one wills both end and means.⁽²⁹⁷⁾ It differs, moreover, from simple volition in that, although both presuppose an act of the intellect, in the act of intention something of reason is said to be present insofar as it presupposes "the act whereby the reason orders something to an end."⁽²⁹⁸⁾ The latter has been accomplished by the intellect through its apprehension of the availability of the end by certain means, which are yet undetermined. Thus, intention "is, however, an act of the will, not absolutely, but in subordination to reason."⁽²⁹⁹⁾

Under the impulse of the intention of the will the intellect now begins its search to gain physical possession of the end desired: it is here that one enters upon that area of human volition centering around means-to-end. Since one is here dealing with the acquisition of a particular concrete object, existing in the real world of being and not only of intention, the following acts of intellect will be those of the practical intellect and the acts of the will be those of reasoned volition. The first act of the intellect is called `deliberation' or `counsel'. Other names assigned to it in the writings of Thomas are: practical syllogism, comparison, and inquisition. Although an explicit treatment of this act and its corresponding volitional acts must be postponed until later in the chapter, a brief description seems in order here since it is around this act that the intellectual aspect of the non-consideration of the rule of morality is focused. Counsel always precedes election (and consent); Thomas' reason for this lies in the uncertainty involved in the choice of particular goods. Since actions concern singular contingents, which due to their changeable nature are uncertain, reason will not issue a judgment in their regard without a previous inquisition. He concludes: "Wherefore the reason must of necessity institute an inquiry before deciding on the objects of choice; and this inquiry is called counsel."⁽³⁰⁰⁾ It is an inquiry into the relative usefulness and availability of possible means; moreover, it concerns only the individual himself in terms of what he will do and not what another might do.

Following upon the act of counsel the will elicits an act of consent, which, according to Thomas, is "an application of the appetitive movement to something as to be done."⁽³⁰¹⁾ It is in fact an application of the will's action to that which has been judged useful by counsel; and since counsel concerns itself only with means to the end, so in turn does consent.

Immediately there follows upon this consent the final practical judgment of the intellect concerning which means are to be chosen. This final opinion or judgment of the intellect as to the best of possible means issues immediately from the very consent of the will to the means in general. It pertains to the superior reason insofar as it follows the determination of counsel, that is, insofar as it belongs to superior reason to judge about all things.⁽³⁰²⁾ Aquinas, however, remarks that this does not imply that the superior reason always moves toward action according to eternal principles, but only that, if it should fail to do so, it still has such principles before it.⁽³⁰³⁾

Election, according to Thomas, "is materially an act of the will, but formally an act of the reason"⁽³⁰⁴⁾. In other words, the term `election' or `choice' expresses something that belongs to both the cognitive and the appetative orders, although it is fundamentally an act of volition. Due to this ordering of one faculty to another the act in its totality cannot be said to proceed exclusively from either of these faculties.

In the act of choice itself, the operation of the intellect which determines the possible means in its counsel and specifies the best among them in its last practical judgment, and the operation of the will which tends to these means, are related and ordered to one another. Thus, one might say that choice is materially an act of the will, because the proper object of choice is that which is ordered to the end; while formally it is an act of the intellect, inasmuch as it entails an intellectual comparison and/or preference of one means over another. It is precisely in this respect, namely the preference of one means over another, that Thomas maintains that election adds something to mere consent. In the process of counsel many things might seem attractive as being conducive to the attainment of the end, consent being given to each of them; however, he concludes that "after approving of many, we have given our preference to one by choosing it."⁽³⁰⁵⁾ If only one thing, however, is found attractive by the intellect in its inquisition into the possible means, Thomas concludes that consent and election then do not really differ, but differ by only a distinction of reason.⁽³⁰⁶⁾

For the purpose of this study it will not be necessary to delineate any further the remaining acts of intellect and will, which pertain to the execution of the free choice of reasoned will. Moral evil will attain its essential character in terms of the acts already discussed above, specifically in the acts of counsel (last practical judgment) and choice (consent). The actual execution of these final decisions and elections will indeed complete the act of sin, but will not alter it substantially.

We have defined the problem of evil in terms of its ultimate deficiency, namely, the voluntary non-consideration of the rule of reason and divine law. Further we have determined the precise acts of intellect and will wherein this radical deficiency finds concrete expression in the realm of human action. Hence, we are now in position to investigate at length the particular contribution of the intellect as regards moral evil insofar as it is the rule of such action. This contribution can be addressed generally in terms of the specific causality exercised by the intellect in its presentation of the known good to the will. This "known good," as has been said, undergoes a series of determinations on the part of the intellect inasmuch as it gradually relates this good to the end intended by the will. As shall be seen, this determination will enter the moral sphere when this known good is related to reason in its role as rule of human action.

Specifically, the intellect's contribution here is in terms of its being the cause of the freedom of exercise and of specification on the part of the will. As such, this will involve a consideration of the following: the mutual causality of the intellect and will in the orders of exercise and specification; an appreciation of the "known good" in the successive stages of its presentation to the will by the intellect as its proper good; and the latter in terms of dispositive causality, deliberation, and moral specification by reason as rule of human action, along with the ignorance presupposed in every actual non-consideration of this rule. The last three of these progressive aspects of moral specification, namely, the object in its relation to reason and the divine law, will be treated separately in the next chapter together with its negative aspect in terms of "ignorance of evil election."

MUTUAL CAUSALITY IN ACTS OF INTELLECTION AND VOLITION

Although the intellect and will are specifically different faculties, this does not prevent them from exercising a mutual or reciprocal influence in the production of a free act. In beings endowed with knowledge appetition follows some kind of consciousness of the good. Insofar as this knowledge is of a sensible or intellectual nature, there is a distinction respectively between sensible and rational appetition. In humans the will is the faculty of tending toward an object intellectually apprehended as good. Hence, in their case the operation of intellect is a prerequisite condition for willing. If this be absent or partially limited in its operation it affects proportionately the moral character of the action. Furthermore, since the power by which man wills and chooses is not a cognitive power, it cannot be attracted by an object unless the object first be presented as good by that power which renders it intelligible. Hence, not being a knowing faculty the will is not the principle by which one can judge about the goodness of an object; one must depend on the intellect for knowledge of its appetibility and suitability. Without this apprehension of the object as an appetible and suitable good, the will would remain without a sufficient reason for acting in one way or another. Thus, from the point of view of causality, the intellect moves the will in the order of specification as a final or formal cause. And the will, insofar as it applies the intellect to determine its object, moves the intellect in the order of exercise as an efficient cause.

It would be well then to consider this mutual causality further as it is evidenced in the mechanism of free choice. Whether this free choice be a simple movement of the will consequent upon a simple apprehension of the good or a composite movement of the will in its election or consent as consequent to a deliberative process on the part of the intellect, one must distinguish these two orders of exercise and specification. In the case of a composite movement of the will its volition is directed by the intellect to a particular good as concretely possessing qualities attractive or suitable to this particular will in these particular circumstances. In fact, it is a matter of narrowing down the will's free choice to an ever more specified object, rendering the latter `tailored made' vis-à-vis a choice suitable to this particular person's total being as a composite and unique individual. In this sense the intellect does indeed exercise causality over the will; however, it does not thereby necessitate the will, which is naturally necessitated to seek the good only in general.

This ultimate specification by the intellect may be said to indirectly to necessitate the will. But even in this case, the necessitation of the will springs from its own radical determination to the good, which implies Thomas' distinction between will as nature and will as reason.⁽³⁰⁷⁾ As regards the former the will is naturally determined to the ultimate end, that is, to goodness, beatitude, happiness, etc. It is on account of this radical and primary determination, which formally constitutes will as will, that anything is willed at all. One would not seek any particular good unless one's will were determined to seek the good as such. Only this radical determination allows the will to reduce itself in a particular instance from a state of potency to act. Moreover, any other good presented to the will as an end will move the appetite spontaneously in its direction. This implies that there may be many ends in human volition, mediate as well as immediate, each sharing in the formality of goodness, which is the proper object of will as will.⁽³⁰⁸⁾ However, as regards other things, the will remains free to choose; this is what Thomas has called will as reason. Such things are presented to the will by the intellect as means toward the end. As such they are subjected to the deliberative process of reason. He writes:

Whereas any other particular goods, insofar as they are lacking in some good, can be regarded as non-goods: and from this point of view, they can be set aside or approved by the will, which can tend to one and the same thing from various points of view.⁽³⁰⁹⁾

This freedom of choice is rooted in two things. First, it is rooted in the object itself insofar as it is a deficient good and not identified with the universal good, which alone would necessitate the will in its choice. Second, it is rooted in the intellect inasmuch as it possesses an immaterial grasp of the formality of goodness itself with which it can compare every other good and thus perceive its defective character. The above deficiency is to be understood as the intellect's grasp of any particular good which is found to be good and suitable under one aspect, but is found wanting under another. Such deficiency might even be a moral one insofar as reason sees a particular good as pleasing to the sense, but as contrary to the rule of reason and divine law. Thus, will as reasoned will retains an indifference as to specification and exercise, at least to the extent that the object presented by the intellect is not the universal good, nor does the intellect in its presentation of the particular good exhaust, so to speak, every aspect of its apprehension of the good as such. However limited, the will always enjoys freedom in both respects.

It is necessary to note, moreover, that the causality in the act of free choice on the part of the intellect is not merely final causality, since this would be merely a `will-end' relationship and as such would call forth a spontaneous and indeliberate movement of the appetite. Although such a relationship does exist between the intellect and will in these indeliberate and necessary appetitions and is one of specification, still it does not suffice as regards free election wherein deliberation and judgment are presupposed. Thus, it would be well to contrast the two. In order that the process of appetition be started at all there must be this first complacency in, and tendency toward, a particular good apprehended and presented by the intellect. As St. Augustine remarks: "Unless something appear which delights and invites, the will can in no way be moved. But that such appear is not in the power of man."⁽³¹⁰⁾ This necessity then arises from the necessary appetition of the ultimate end or the good in general: it is the very appetition of ultimate end applied in a diverse manner.

However, as has been noted above, free choice demands a further causality. The indeliberate movement of the will toward a good finds its cause in the connatural character of the good with the appetite as apprehended by the intellect. But once deliberation takes place and the good is seen as only a partial good, no such necessary appetition follows. Therefore, there must be an added factor, or cause, which accounts for the choice of this good rather than that: choices are not causeless. There is no willing without a motive.

It is then a question of needing a sufficient reason that will move the will in the order of specification (final and formal causality) to choose a particular good, since the will's appetition for the good is blind and has not within it the power to decide which good is the best here and now. The latter is an act of reason, although it is moved thereto by the will according to its present dispositions, and its imprint is to be found in the act of free choice. This reason is sufficient but never necessitating, unless it be identified with the good in general. Even here, as we have seen, Thomas insists that this does not necessitate the will in the order of exercise wherein its freedom formally lies.

The reason for this phenomenon of a sufficient but non-necessitating reason lies in three things: the finite nature of the particular goods presented to the will by the intellect in this life; the immaterial notion of goodness itself as possessed by the human intellect; and the infinite, so to speak, capacity of the will for the good as such. In its deliberation, and consequently in its judgment, the intellect which possesses a notion of the formality of the good can compare any particular good to the universal good and thus see it as a partial good, that is, as having defective or even evil aspects. Particular goods are seen in most instances as partial means toward a desired end. The motive which is finally accepted by the will and which determines it to choose this good is sufficient only relatively, that is, as related to the will itself at this particular moment; but it is not absolutely sufficient, since the range of the will is universal and as wide as being itself.

Thomas discusses this further causal influence by the intellect over the will in the following way. He distinguishes simple volition, that is, appetition following upon the apprehension of a suitable good, from consent, which regards those things pertaining to the end. He notes that the latter presupposes the determination of counsel.⁽³¹¹⁾ This previous determination is in the order of formal causality, regarding not directly the end but the ordering of means to the end. Intrinsically it is a discursive movement--a deliberation or an `ordered' movement. Nevertheless it is not so ordered by its nature, since the deliberation deals with singular and contingent matters in relation to the necessary or universal.⁽³¹²⁾

The root of the will's freedom is the intellect's ability to perceive this contingency. Moreover, perceiving this contingency the intellect still remains in a state of indifference. In order to come to its final judgment from which election will follow, the intellect must also be determined by the will. Its radical indifference must be overcome not by itself, but by the influence brought to bear by the will. This mutual causality of will and intellect is seen most fully in the acts of judgment and election and/or choice. The latter has two parts, according to Thomas: a material aspect which is the will and a formal aspect which is the reason. This satisfies the necessity of making each human action intellectual inasmuch it is a judgment and voluntary inasmuch as it is willed. As willed, the intellect is rescued, so to speak, from its inherent indetermination in practical matters. Having thus analyzed the mutual causality involved in the interplay of intellect and will in the production of a free action, it now is necessary to treat more thoroughly the precise contribution of the intellect itself. This lies in specifying the object to be presented to the will for its approval and choice, which specification is progressive. It begins with the mere specification of the object as a good here-and-now suitable for this individual as an end to be attained. It then moves into the further specification of the object as the most apt means to be chosen by the will in so doing. Finally, it specifies the object as regards its relation to reason and divine law--the norms of human action; thus, the will is presented with a morally specified object.

Such a gradual process of specification resolves itself, so far as this study is concerned, into the question of the direction by the intellect of the will as it proceeds to act. When such direction is lacking or defective, one arrives at the intellectual prerequisite for moral evil. The latter will be discussed in the next chapter in terms of the ignorance presupposed in every evil election vis-à-vis the ultimate moral specification of the object by reason acting as norm or rule of human action. Presently, the first two stages in the specification of this object will be dealt with. This proceeds from the less determined and non-deliberate stage of the object as a known suitable end to its more determined and deliberate stage as the most apt means to be chosen in the attainment of this end.

THE OBJECT OF VOLITIONS--

THE KNOWN AND SUITABLE GOOD

In the De Malo Thomas sets forth two requisites for an object to move the will in the order of specification (final and formal causality): it must be `known' and it must be `suitable'.⁽³¹³⁾ Insofar as the object must be known, he insists that only as apprehended by the intellect does the object move the will and this as `end'.<sup>(314)</sup> No matter how many objects are about us affecting our physical and sensitive being, they will not move our wills to seek them as ends unless the intellect finds in them the `formality of the good', that is, the very essence of the good as such. This object of the intellect in reference to the will⁽³¹⁵⁾ abstracts from the existence of the good and perceives only its formal character as good. This is in contrast to the object of the will which Thomas in the same article states to be "the appetible good" itself, that is, the good as existing in actu exercito.

The will then comes into contact with its object insofar as the intellect is able to apprehend the formality of the good in a particular object, presenting it to the will under this formality. The object thus known is presented to the will in terms of desire and ultimate action--the seeking of the real object as perfective of the person knowing and willing. It is this that renders the dynamic reason as ordered to appetite, concerned not merely with the speculatively true, but with the good as contained in the true. On the other hand, the will is thus made an intellectual appetition insofar as it is concerned not merely with the good, but with a good understood and reasoned. Thomas summarizes his position when he remarks: "The good itself insofar as it is a certain apprehensible form is contained under the true as if a certain true thing; and the true itself insofar as it is the end of the intellectual operation is contained under the good as a certain particular good."⁽³¹⁶⁾

From this analysis of the intellectual character of the good as presented to the will and the appetitive character of the true as found therein, one can more easily appreciate Thomas' tendency to view all action in terms of end to be attained, that is, the known good presented to the will. He writes in the De Veritate:

But it (the end) is in the agent by way of an intention, for the end is prior in intention but posterior in being. Thus the end pre-exists in the mover in a proper sense intellectually. . . . Hence the intellect moves the will in the way in which an end is said to move--by conceiving beforehand the reason for acting and proposing it to the will.⁽³¹⁷⁾

It will be in view of this known good presented as an end to the will that the will moves itself to will those things which pertain to the attainment of that end.⁽³¹⁸⁾ In such volition the will moves the intellect to its acts and thus is said to have dominion over its choice from the very first stage of appetition.

In the simple apprehension of the good, however, it is not sufficient, according to Aquinas, that the object be merely `known'; it must also be `suitable' if it is to move the will to act.⁽³¹⁹⁾ It becomes obvious that many objects apprehended by an individual (`known goods') fail to attract him. There is required also a connatural selection, which Thomas identifies as a further determination of the act of the will on the part of the object, and hence on the part of the intellect. He writes:

Just as the imagination of a form without estimation of fitness or harmfulness does not move the sensitive appetite; so neither does the apprehension of the true without the aspect of goodness and desirability. Hence, it is not the speculative intellect that moves, but the practical intellect.⁽³²⁰⁾

Consequently, the initial apprehension of the good as suitable is a spontaneous, unreasoned, indeliberative one similar to the appetition which follows upon it. It will depend on the existential condition of the person at that particular time and under those particular circumstances. Thomas, quoting Aristotle, frequently remarks that "as each one is, so does an end appear to him."⁽³²¹⁾

The present study is concerned with this natural suitability precisely in its relation to the practical intellect referred to by Thomas. It will center upon the deliberations and elections proper to the realm of morality. In this same passage Thomas notes that such a required suitability is not to be taken only in a universal sense, but "it is required that what is apprehended as good and befitting be apprehended as good and befitting in particular and not merely in general".⁽³²²⁾ The reason given by Aquinas is that these deliberations and elections concerning the suitable deal with particular matters.

So far reaching is this requisite on the part of the object that Thomas goes on to admit here that an object which is seen by the intellect as suitable in all respects will necessitate the will in the order of finality or specification. Such an object would be identified by the person through his intellect with the universal good--beatitude. It does not, however, necessitate the will in the order of exercise since the person by means of intellect can still consider or not consider the object; in other words, he is always free to think or not think about happiness as such. On the other hand, if the good is not found to be good in all respects (which is the case of all finite goods), it will not move the will from any necessity, even in the order of specification.

The question naturally arises as to what specifically influences the will to determine itself in the order of exercise to move the intellect to specify one rather than another object as the `good-here-and-now' to be chosen. The answer lies, according to Thomas, in three possible sources of determination.<sup>(323)</sup> First, insofar as one particular aspect of an object outweighs those of another, in which case reason is said to prevail. One might imagine a cool deliberative evaluation of the various merits of several possible means of attaining a desired end, for example, which kind of car to purchase. Such `cool' deliberation usually will concern something not involving the person too intimately; otherwise, an objective weighing of possibilities becomes quite problematic.

Second, there is the possible consideration of one circumstance without taking notice of others, either in other objects (cars) or in the same object (safety). Thomas notes that this happens most often when some occasion arising from within or without the subject causes him to think about this particular matter or circumstance (in our example, having just read in the newspaper of an accident involving the car one is thinking of buying).

Third, and for the present study, the most important source of determination mentioned by Thomas for the influential character of a particular good in moving the will to choose it in preference to another, is each person's disposition. In this regard he again cites Aristotle regarding the evaluation of the end in terms of the subject's disposition, adding that the will of an irate individual and that of a calm person are moved differently in that the same good is not suitable to both. Carrying through with our example, a person deciding which type of car to purchase should not do so when he or she is in a state of anger due to some recent mishap.

The importance of this third mode of determining the will to choose this good rather than another cannot be overemphasized in our present investigation. For a person disposed by habit and passion will view things according to his present condition and/or situation; for one chooses particular goods as most suitable to oneself at the present moment. Thomas insists that such a dispositive influence over the whole person through habit and passion in no way does violence to the freedom of the election. He writes:

If then the disposition by which a thing seems good and befitting to a person is natural and not subject to the will, the will chooses it naturally and necessarily, as all men naturally desire to be, to live, and to know. But if the disposition be such as is not natural but subject to the will, as when someone is so disposed by habit or passion that something seems either good or bad to him under this particular aspect, the will is not moved of necessity because it has the power to remove this disposition so that the thing does not seem so to him; for example, when a man calms his wrath so as not to judge something in anger.⁽³²⁴⁾

Since Thomas, when discussing the judgment about a particular good, utilizes this notion about the disposition of the subject as the chief reason why certain objects appear suitable and others do not, it seems best to develop this point further. From the above considerations it is obvious that he recognizes the act of free choice, along with the preceding deliberation and judgment, as existential matters. For the question of suitability concerns objects in the concrete and must be decided by the practical intellect as to whether this apprehended object is a good-for-me here and now. This means its suitability to my present existential state with all its natural, acquired, and circumstantial endowments, including at any given moment the habits and passions influencing and modifying the individual. In other words, the total "I" in all its ineffable individuality will be the determinant in the last analysis of the suitability of any given object in the order of specification; it will do this as dispositive cause vis-à-vis the inclination(s) of the will. Thus, in any moral judgment, which is the primary concern of this study, the disposition of the subject in its most intangible depths will account for the decision and election finally made. Here Thomas makes the rectitude of the intellect depend upon that of will because of the existential character of each moral judgment as an act of the practical, not the speculative, intellect.⁽³²⁵⁾

It might be said that here Thomas anticipates what later would be emphasized by Duns Scotus as `haeceitas', the `thisness' in each individual thing that renders one unique and singular. Along with his `principle of individuation' Aquinas provides us with a rich and challenging philosophy of human personality, possibly unparalleled in the history of human thought, at least until our own times. It foreshadows, for example, Gerard Manley Hopkins' `inscape' wherein each individual thing, even the leaf on the bough, bespeaks an ineffability beyond human discourse. That human choice is rooted in this absolute uniqueness of the individual affords some insight into the mystery of human freedom, namely, that although the person in his election of a specified object is not conscious of the least details behind such choice, still the will in its exercise moves freely to choose that which is most suitable to the person here and now. It cannot be said to be coerced in so choosing since the object of its election is that which is `tailored made,' as has been said, to the person in his ineffable individuality. Only the First Cause in Thomas' philosophy is capable of knowing the utmost depths of each created thing, a matter which reaches far beyond the confines of any human analysis. What is equally interesting here is that Aquinas brings us, so to speak, to the very threshold of this mystery without crossing over into the realm which for him is divine revelation.

In the Summa Theologica, writing along the same lines, but in a more detailed manner, he distinguishes in man a twofold quality: the natural and the supervenient.⁽³²⁶⁾ The former concerns either the intellective aspect of the person or his body and the powers therein. According to this natural disposition the individual naturally seeks the ultimate end--happiness or the good in general. His bodily dispositions must be subjected to the control of reason if the acts proceeding from him are to be considered truly human. In this regard Thomas remarks:

And such as a man is by virtue of a corporeal quality, such also does his end seem to him, because from such a disposition a man is inclined to choose or reject something. But these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason.⁽³²⁷⁾

The supervenient qualities, on the other hand, are the habits and passions according to which someone is inclined toward one thing rather than another. Again, these inclinations are subject to reason " . . . as it is in our power either to acquire them, whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them, or to reject them."⁽³²⁸⁾ It is to be noted how Thomas considers individuals in them total existentiality, and how the inclination to judge in one way or another is subject to reason insofar as one responsibly acquires such dispositions and can rid oneself of them. Moreover, the fact remains that, here and now, without considering how a person has come to be as he is, his disposition, both natural and acquired, is a basic determinant of his judgment regarding a particular object.

This same doctrine is set forth by Aquinas in his analysis of the causes of the will's mutability.⁽³²⁹⁾ The reason for the latter is to be found in the mutable nature in which free will is subjected, and not in the nature of free will itself, which matter will be dealt with in the next chapter. Presently, it need only be said that such a change in the will may arise from either an intrinsic or extrinsic cause. The former can involve reason, as when some new knowledge is acquired, which, so to speak, changes the perspective as far as reason is concerned. Or it involves the appetite, as when one is disposed through passion or habit to tend toward this rather than that as suitable object.⁽³³⁰⁾

Thomas relates alteration of judgment more directly to a person's appetition of his end and the means thereto as found in his Compendium of Theology. He writes:

The fact that one man places his happiness in this particular good while another places it in that good, is not characteristic of either of these men so far as he is a man, since in such estimates and desires men exhibit great differences. By this I mean each man's acquired passions and habits; and so if a man's condition were to undergo change, some other good would appeal to him as most desirable. . . . Man's desire and his judgment as to what constitutes the last end are subject to change.⁽³³¹⁾

Although a person formally seeks the good as his proper object of appetition, still materially he can place his happiness, and consequently the means thereto, in any particular object. His judgment inclined by passion and habit may see even the most base things as most apt to be chosen here and now to satisfy his appetites. Therefore, it is reasonable that Thomas considers the dispositions of the subject, whether they concern the physical organism or the emotional makeup of the individual, to be of primary interest in the determination of the suitability of any particular good. Such determinants of suitability ares involved in the specification by the intellect of any particular object seen as the good here and now to be chosen by the will. When applied to the question of moral evil, it becomes obvious that they will cause a person to consider what he knows to be theoretically evil as a good to be preferred. Thus such determinants enter into the realm of moral specification of the object as it relates to reason and divine law.

It might be asked finally what precisely in the thinking of Thomas allows reason to rise above passion and habit since the latter admittedly incline the will to this or that good. He discovers the answer in the composite nature of man according to which things can be diversely related. This is true especially concerning man's intellectual nature wherein when compared to the universal good no particular good can be considered entirely good. He writes: " . . . since man is variously disposed according to the various parts of the soul, a thing appears to him otherwise according to his reason, than it does according to a passion."⁽³³²⁾ Only if passion or habit completely took away the use of reason, as in the case of an insane person, would free will be totally destroyed. As long as there is any use of reason for carrying out deliberations about the contingent and relative character of particular goods, the will remains proportionately free.

Such passion or habit disposing one to judge this or that good in a particular way does not violate free will provided it is within the person's power to change his dispositions. Whether one does or does not do so is not particularly relevant; it suffices for the existence of liberty that the person can acquire or rid oneself of the passions and habits which dispose one to choose in this or that way. Thomas puts this as succinctly as possible when he remarks that man is said to be free according as he is able to do this or that particular thing, not according as he is able to act in a particular way. In evidence of this he offers the example of virtuous action, saying that a man who does not have a particular virtue cannot act virtuously; yet, he is still free insofar as he can acquire that virtue.⁽³³³⁾ This distinction is similar to the traditional one regarding freedom "in a composite sense and in a divided sense"⁽³³⁴⁾: the fundamental distinction between `actuality' and `potency'. This distinction will be of capital importance to the final stage in our investigation, namely, deciding the respective causalities involved in the will's non-consideration of its proper rule--reason and divine law.

The above analysis provided by Thomas as to the dispositive causality found in the specification of an object serves to illustrate what precisely is meant by the "known and suitable good," both on the indeliberate and deliberate levels of voluntary action. On the former level there is no question of a moral specification or evaluation since by definition no deliberation is involved. However, the same dispositive causality operates when one considers the specification of the object as a moral object, that is, insofar as it is related to reason and divine law. As has been shown, as regards indeliberate volition the specification of the object is in the order of final causality alone, whereas deliberate volition or free choice involves a judgment specifying the object both in the orders of finality and formality. Only the latter, however, satisfies the demands of the composite act wherein the contingent character of the operable is seen in relation to the necessary character of the good.

THE ACT OF DELIBERATION OR COUNSEL

One is now in a position to consider the second stage in the specification of the object in terms of the intellectual acts of deliberation and judgment. Both may be treated together insofar as Thomas considers the final practical judgment of the intellect to be the conclusion of the operative syllogism or the deliberative process of the intellect. Two things need to be discussed on the part of the intellect insofar as it relates to the will's choice or election, namely, the acts of deliberation and judgment. Such acts provide for the will the object specified as the most apt or suitable means to be chosen by this person in the attainment of his desired end.

There are two kinds of deliberation or judgment, namely, speculative and practical. Since the concern of our thesis is with reason as rule of human action, only the practical aspect of judgment will be treated. This practical judgment necessarily involves a utilization of the universal principles known by the speculative intellect in its process of comparing the contingent and concrete good with the universal principles which should govern human action.

The speculative and practical intellects, however, are not different faculties, but the same faculty concerned with different objects and ends; the former orders its object to the consideration of truth alone while the latter orders its objects to operation or action. In both cases, however, the object of the intellect is the true, not the good. As Thomas puts it in the De Veritate: "The object of the practical intellect is not the good, but the true relative to action."⁽³³⁵⁾

Aquinas begins his treatment of the judgmental act by distinguishing different types of judgment.⁽³³⁶⁾ There are certain beings which act without judgment, that is, without any previous knowledge except that rooted in the finality of their natures. Then there are other beings which act by a type of judgment, but not by free judgment, for example, that found in brutes. They judge the a particular good is the good to be obtained here and now for them according to their determined appetites. According to Thomas, they do so by a certain natural estimation.⁽³³⁷⁾ This is not free since there is no deliberation or comparison in the matter, but only the force of natural instinct or natural estimation. One might say, they desire connaturally in terms of natural endowment, acquired behaviors, and learned experience. In man, however, as in all intellectual beings there is found judgment, not from natural instinct, but from a certain comparison by reason. Because of this man acts by a "free judgment capable of being inclined toward diverse things."⁽³³⁸⁾

This "comparison" or deliberative process, whereby the particular operable is viewed in relation to a universal norm by the practical intellect, is described by Thomas in various ways.⁽³³⁹⁾ It concerns things "to be done" and involves a "certain syllogism, whose conclusion is a judgment or an election or an operation."⁽³⁴⁰⁾ Moreover, its imprint is found in the election insofar as the election is a "prejudged appetition."⁽³⁴¹⁾ Due to this Thomas is able to equate in this instance the judgment and the election. He also connects it with the act of prudence insofar as it is an ordination of means to an end. Thus, the election itself becomes a type of prudential act,⁽³⁴²⁾ which is comparable in a sense to the estimative power in brutes since even on the sensitive level, due to reason's influence, man has a certain comparative judgment in regard to individual intentions. On the intellectual level, however, the comparison is proper only to the rational being, who judges the fitness and propriety of the singular and contingent in relation to the universal.⁽³⁴³⁾ In such an instance it is identified with counsel or deliberation, which precedes the final judgment and election; in fact, the final judgment is said to flow from it as a conclusion from premises.⁽³⁴⁴⁾

Thomas, moreover, maintains that this inquisition is necessarily concerned with means to the end and not with the end itself⁽³⁴⁵⁾; the latter is already determined and presupposed to all deliberation.⁽³⁴⁶⁾ It is this previous willing of the end which allows us to say that the will is present in the counsel as both the matter and the motive of the deliberation.⁽³⁴⁷⁾ The end acts in relation to the deliberation much the same as a principle does in a demonstration. Under its influence the particular deliberations concerning that which ought to be done are carried out.

Moreover, that which acts as end or principle in one demonstration may become a particular operable in another, and so on. The inquiry then pertains properly to singular contingencies about which there is always an uncertainty. Only the will can make up for this uncertainty by causing the singular good to be accepted by the intellect as the "best" for it here and now. Nor need this `best' be seen as appetible in itself, but only as "useful toward action."⁽³⁴⁸⁾

Finally, the various elements involved in this inquisition as it proceeds to a conclusion are, according to Thomas, the data received from the senses, for example, "this is bread," and those principles of both speculative and practical knowledge known universally, for instance, "man cannot live without being nourished by a suitable food." Thomas writes: "The terminus is that which is immediately in our power. . . . And as the end has the nature of a principle, so that which is done on account of the end has the nature of a conclusion."⁽³⁴⁹⁾

With the above in mind regarding the practical judgment we can proceed to detail the various kinds of judgments proper to the practical intellect. Such judgements by definition are ordained to human actions and are distinguished among themselves according to their remoteness or proximity to operation. The more remote, called `speculative-practical' judgments, are of two kinds: (a) universal principles of conduct, such as, good must be done and evil must be avoided; and (b) particular judgments by which it is asserted that under specified conditions a certain act should be done or avoided due to its connection with a universal principle. The most proximate to action are the `practico-practical' judgments which assert that `I must perform, or desist from, this act here and now.'<sup>(350)</sup> Obviously the chief concern of this investigation is with the latter division of judgment, namely, the `practico-practical'. For the reason, acting in its role as rule of human action, is obligated to specify the object morally in the practico-practical judgement, at least implicitly, by relating the particular good to human nature and the divine law.

It has already been shown earlier in this chapter how the intellect and will are related mutually in an act of free choice. It should be recalled that the act of free choice is concerned with what is judged here and now, concretely, to be good for this individual. However, it must be kept in mind that the intellect as such can determine what is good only abstractly, its proper object being the universal unless moved by the will to compare the latter with an object in particulari. In other words, the intellect cannot be practical of itself; it can be so only in partnership with the will whose basic tendency is toward an individual thing as it exist in concreto. As Thomas remarks: "The intelligible form does not designate a principle of action, according as it is only in the one knowing, unless there be joined to it an inclination to the effect, which (inclination) is through the will."⁽³⁵¹⁾

The last practical judgment is, therefore, elicited by the intellect under the command of the will, representing the cognitive aspect of the act of free choice. So intimate is its role in the evolution of the latter that Aristotle hesitated to ascribe free choice definitively either to the cognitive or to the appetitive power.⁽³⁵²⁾ As has been said, choice resides formally in the will, but it does result from a concurrence of the intellectual and volitional powers through a mutual causality in the orders of specification and exercise respectively. The culmination of this mutual causality is realized in the act of self-determination wherein freedom is terminated cognitively by the practico-practical judgment, and appetitively by the spontaneous choice of the will.⁽³⁵³⁾

In this regard it should be noted that the truth of this practical judgment does not consist, as does that of speculative judgment, in a conformity of mind to thing, which is a relationship of thing as measure and intellect measured. Rather, the practical intellect is related to its object as a measure to the thing measured because its aim is action by which the mind imposes its own order on being and things. The truth of the practical judgment consequently consists in a conformity, not to things as they are, but to what they ought to be in accordance with the rule of right reason.⁽³⁵⁴⁾ Since the practical judgment is commanded by the will, its truth is found in an agreement of the intellect with right desire, that is, with the will properly disposed by possession of the moral virtues.⁽³⁵⁵⁾

Regarding the last observation it may be said that the judgment will be `right' insofar as the inclinations or desires of the appetite are right, that is, in accord with reason abstractly considered as nature. In other words, the rectitude of reason in practical matters depends entirely upon the rectitude of desire.<sup>(356)</sup> Actually the practical reason will never be at variance with the present existential condition of the appetite; it will never specify a particular good as good for the individual here and now to be chosen unless this good conforms to the deepest and ineffable inclinations of the appetite.<sup>(357)</sup> For this reason the will ultimately elects freely the motive by which it would be determined. The will intervenes to determine the assent to motives which have an intellectual basis but whose preponderant force is rather volitional and emotional.<sup>(358)</sup> Whether, however, this determination is `right' depends on whether the person's appetitive inclinations conform to right reason, that is, to reason acting in its capacity of rule of human action.

The final practical judgment is derived from a practical syllogism consisting of a universal major premise and a particular minor.⁽³⁵⁹⁾ The major premise is a general moral principle having its source in `synderesis'--a speculative-practical judgment. The intellect perfected by the virtue of prudence applies the universal principle to a particular instance expressed in the minor premise and deduces thereby the means to be employed here and now to achieve the moral end held forth in the major premise.<sup>(360)</sup> The practico-practical judgment is the conclusion of the practical syllogism which, as such, may not be present to consciousness, but which does represent logically the reasoning that precedes the judgment. Introducing the term `virtue' warrants a certain caveat, since most often the term is used in a moral sense; applied to the intellectual virtues, however, no moral implication as such is intended. A person may possess, for example, the virtue of prudence in a marked degree and still be vicious and use his intellect to attain the most outrageous ends by the most despicable means. Again, the morality is found in the individual's actions as they are freely chosen by the will in its final election, and only indirectly as judged so in the final practico-practical judgment of the intellect.

THE PRACTICAL SYLLOGISM

Further examination of the practical syllogism is suggested insofar as it is through this that the moral specification of the object will come about. Thomas follows Aristotle in detailing this syllogism and discusses it in several places.⁽³⁶¹⁾ The description in the De Malo seems the cleareat⁽³⁶²⁾ He begins by noting that in any act of sin or virtue, since it is effected according to an election which presupposes a certain inquiry on the part of reason, there must be a certain syllogistic deduction wherein reasoning will be tempered by the disposition of the individual. For example, an intemperate and temperate person will reason differently in any given instance. He then proceeds to illustrate the three propositions used by each in reasoning to a final judgment: the temperate person reasons that no act of fornication is to be committed and, since this is such an act, it should not be committed. Such an individual "is moved only according to the judgment of reason."⁽³⁶³⁾ The intemperate person, on the other hand, totally following concupiscence, reasons that every pleasure should be enjoyed and, since this is pleasurable, it should be enjoyed. Thomas concludes: "the temperate man is moved only according to the judgment of reason" whereas "the intemperate man yields entirely to the movement of concupiscence."⁽³⁶⁴⁾ There is, according to him, a fourth proposition in each case: "No sin is to be committed" and "everything pleasurable is to be pursued."⁽³⁶⁵⁾ Each has, so to speak, this other proposition haunting it and tempting one to follow reason or sense respectively. The continent person draws his conclusion under the influence of the first universal, while the incontinent under the second. In the latter's case Thomas notes that "although he may know universally, nevertheless he does not know in particular because he adopts the premise not in keeping with reason but in keeping with concupiscence."⁽³⁶⁶⁾

In the Summa Theologica Aquinas observes that such a syllogism may be multiple insofar as an end in one can become a means to an end in another, thus falling under the election itself.⁽³⁶⁷⁾ Thus, health is seen as an end for the doctor, but since the health of the body is ordered to the good of the soul, the doctor may freely choose to elect health or sickness for the patient in view of this hierarchy of values. This is often the case in moral matters wherein the good of a particular sensitive appetite should be subordinated to the higher good of reason if the action is to be morally good, that is, consonant with the rule of reason as it is guided by divine law.