Continuing in the analysis of the progressive specification of the object of the will, it is now possible to relate the above deliberative and syllogistic process terminating in the practico-practical judgment in the area of morality. The object was first apprehended as a physical and/or sensuous good satisfying the appetite of a particular faculty or contrariwise as a physical and/or sensuous evil threatening the good of appetite. It will become apparent that this progressive specification renders this a moral object specified according to its moral dimensions or circumstances. In so doing the practico-practical judgment, spoken of in the previous chapter, is brought under the influence of the universal norms of morality. This is done insofar as the contemplated action is related to man as a rational being, which is effected by reason itself acting in its capacity as rule of human action. It will, however, consider reason as enlightened by the eternal law insofar as the latter directs human action to natural happiness or beatitude. The following points must be considered in this chapter: the twofold rule governing human action reason as the specific rule of human action and the intellectual evil presupposed in every instance of the non-consideration of the rule of reason and divine law.

THE TWOFOLD RULE OF HUMAN ACTION

In various places in Thomas' writings one finds the assertion that human action has a twofold rule to govern it in its operations, namely, reason and divine law.⁽³⁶⁸⁾ The basis for such a twofold rule is found in the fact that man is a creature composed of a twofold nature. Since there are both lower and higher faculties in man, there is a definite order to be had among these faculties "based on the fact that what is less primary is subordinated to what is more primary."⁽³⁶⁹⁾ The higher aspect of human nature is to be regulated by the higher rule, namely, the divine or eternal law, while its lower nature is to be regulated by reason. As shall be seen, in both instances it is reason that is the active principle by which all human action is so regulated; however, insofar as reason itself is regulated by the eternal law, a twofold rule is attributed to human action.

Thomas remarks that, just as every effect depends upon and is subordinate to the First Cause, so reason stands in a twofold relationship to human action.⁽³⁷⁰⁾ As effect to cause, it is subordinated to the eternal law, of which reason is a mere participation or reflection: reason is the light of the divine law found in human reason. On the other hand, as cause to effect, reason is the guide or rule of both voluntary and sensitive appetition. These latter are subordinated to reason insofar as they receive their truly human character, inasmuch as they are directed to a due end by the rule or light of reason, enlightened by divine law.

This dual relation of reason to divine law and to its subordinate appetites is discussed by Aquinas in terms of the `superior' and `inferior' reason in man. Distinguishing them as two aspects of the same faculty, he insists that there are not really two reasons but a twofold relationship of reason.⁽³⁷¹⁾ This relationship is based upon the fact that there are natures above and below man insofar as man is a rational being: above man, there are the angelic and divine natures, and below him the non-rational beings. As such, these diverse natures differ from human nature insofar as the latter's actions proceed from reason and will. In contrast, for the angelic nature its manner of intellection is intuition and for irrational beings their manner of knowing is determined purely on the sensitive level. In the case of angelic knowledge the relationship of their willing/acting to the divine and human natures is not one entailing species. The angel cannot misintuit its own simple nature and itself as an object of self-love, but only insofar as it can will the latter without considering the divine as its ultimate end and/or good. In regard to human nature, it is assumed that the angel as higher being in no way is necessitated to consult such. In the case of man, however, these natures are to be so considered. According to Thomas, in terms of reason's diverse relations to these higher and lower natures it takes on diverse functions.

In respect to the superior natures reason may contemplate the eternal truths found therein or garner from them directives as regard the regulation of human action. The first is a type of speculative science, while the latter looks to the practical order of operation, providing the principles associated with the speculative-practical judgment. As such, this deliberation is not directly related to the inferior reason; it merely provides the speculative-practical principles to be used in future considerations.⁽³⁷²⁾ It is by reason of this relation of reason to the superior natures, specifically, the Divine, that reason is called by Thomas "superior reason." This is by reason of this second function of receiving from the eternal verities directives pertinent to its own operations as rule of human action; whereby it is seen as regulated by the divine law.

In respect to lower natures, reason may turn to them through a consideration of their natures and activities or by considering them in view of disposing them in their operations. The first of these considerations, as noted, gives rise to a type of speculative knowledge, whereas the second looks to the practical order of operation, issuing in speculative-practical judgments about the suitability of such things as they relate to human action. In attempting to understand better Thomas' thinking here we might say that in the first instance, namely, speculative knowledge, the garnering of insights into the sensible and/or sensuous aspect of human nature as evidenced in lower animals might prove beneficial for man's learning more about his own sensible/sensuous nature, whereas in regard to the speculative-practical judgment any practical benefit to be had from observing the activities of lower animals appears less obvious. However, one should not rule out the possibility of profiting therefrom given the abuse of nature now recognized by environmentalists and the researches done by those, for example, studying the behaviors of dolphins, elephants, and many other lower species.

In the Summa Theologica one finds the most synthetic treatment of the two aspects of reason as they relate to the deliberative or syllogistic process so essential to an understanding of reason's role as rule of moral action.⁽³⁷³⁾ The first observation pertinent to this matter regards the relation of the two reasons in respect to our human knowledge: this constitutes their primary basis for the distinction. Thomas remarks: "Now these two--namely, eternal and temporal--are related to our knowledge in this way, that one of them is the means of knowing the other."⁽³⁷⁴⁾ Looked at in terms of that mode of knowledge called by Thomas "invention," it is through temporal things that we come to a knowledge of eternal matters; however, viewed from the aspect of knowledge through judgment, he notes " . . . while by way of judgment, from eternal things already known, we judge of temporal things, and according to laws of things eternal we dispose of temporal things."⁽³⁷⁵⁾ This then is the relation of superior to inferior reason. Man's judgment concerning particular things is influenced by his knowledge of eternal truths, and the latter aid in disposing his judgment about temporal matters. In other words, the superior reason through its `counseling' or consideration of the divine law--that is, the eternal truths as they provide `rules of action'--is regulated by the divine law and is informed with the speculative-practical principles required in human judgments. It provides the universal norms of human conduct.

In another article Thomas further describes the nature of this `deliberative process' as it relates to the superior and inferior reasons. "It (higher reason) does not regard the objects of the lower powers, except insofar as it consults the eternal law about them, and so it does not regard them save by way of deliberation."⁽³⁷⁶⁾ The basic intuitions from which this deliberation proceeds are had by reason of the simple contemplation of the divine truths, just as in speculative reasonings there is an intuition or comprehension of natures which act as the principles for the formation of the propositions and the syllogizing.⁽³⁷⁷⁾ Thus, it is in the practical syllogism that the superior reason plays such an important role. The initial contemplations of the eternal truths are the basic elements which enter into the formation of the speculative-practical judgments or of the universal norms of morality. These, in turn, provide the major premise in the practical syllogism which constitutes the framework of the final specification of the object presented to the will in the last practical judgment.

Before drawing a final conclusion regarding the relation of the superior reason to the practical judgment, it should be noted that Thomas considers the proper object of inferior reason to be the singular pleasures (`delectabilia') of the lower appetites.<sup>(378)</sup> He speaks of its act as being a type of `inferior judgment' or a judgment that centers around the `preambulum' to the human act.⁽³⁷⁹⁾ In other words, when reason merely regards temporal and mutable realities, uninformed by the principles and deliberations drawn from divine law, it stands only at the threshold of truly human action and finds itself dealing with temporal matters on an extremely limited level. This is why Aquinas concludes that the consent of the will to act is rooted in the superior reason and not in the inferior reason.⁽³⁸⁰⁾

Basic to this conclusion is the relation of the superior reason to the last practical judgment, about which he notes: "Now we must observe that in every case brought up for judgment, the final sentence belongs to the supreme court."⁽³⁸¹⁾ This may be seen in terms of speculative matters by the fact that the last conclusion about any proposition is given through a resolution to first principles. So in practical matters the last conclusion or the final practical judgment pertains ultimately to the superior reason, that is, to reason as informed by the divine law. It would be well to quote Thomas in his synthesis of this doctrine in terms of the two rules governing human action:

But it is evident that human acts can be regulated by the rule of human reason, which rule is derived from created things that man knows naturally; and further still, from the rule of the Divine law, the higher rule, it follows that the ultimate sentence, whereby the judgment is finally pronounced, belongs to the higher reason which is intent on the eternal types.⁽³⁸²⁾

It seems quite evident that Thomas draws heavily from St. Augustine in his understanding of `superior reason'--a reason enlightened by divine illumination. As with the latter, Thomas' "higher reason . . . intent on the eternal types" is not to be construed as entering upon the `supernatural', as might be implied in his contrasting it with the "rule of human reason . . . derived from created things that man knows naturally." Again, it reflects his `Christian' philosophy which provides for truths knowable in themselves, but which require divine illumination to understand their deeper significance. Nor does this preclude man's knowing certain `divine' matters by reason alone, according to a more comprehensive understanding of Aquinas's thought, such as the `existence of a First Cause' or in the moral order that `good should be sought and evil avoided.'

This becomes more evident if one considers the final conclusion drawn by Thomas in this matter: one of particular interest to the present investigation, namely, the relation of the two reasons specifically to the question of moral evil. A complete treatment of the latter must await our later analysis of the specific question of ignorance involved in such sinful action. He writes:

Therefore the consent to an action belongs properly to the higher reason, while the preliminary judgment which is about the deliberation belongs to the lower reason, which delivers judgment in a lower court: although the higher reason can also judge of the delectation, since whatever is subject to the judgment of the lower court, is subject also to the judgment of the higher court, but not conversely.⁽³⁸³⁾

As applied to the appetites, sin is said to be in the lower reason insofar as the movement of the appetite follows upon its inferior judgment a judgment enlightened only by human considerations rooted in the senses. Thus, a man tempted to steal will consider this act as contrary to the moral virtue of justice insofar as such an act is contrary to the good of the species; however, such an act as considered by the higher reason as contrary to divine law would find its sin in the superior reason. Still, in both cases there is a judgment and, therefore, an act proper to reason, although on two different levels of deliberation. Thus, sin is said to be the result of either process, if after the moral specification of the inferior or superior reasons, the act is performed contrary to their respective rules, namely, reason and divine law. As long as there is that "deception in the proper deliberation" of either reason, there is sin, although of diverse gravity by reason of difference in the type and depth of the knowledge involved.

According to Thomas, since the consent to the act is found in the terminating character of the final judgment, it is there that the full notion of sin is verified insofar as sin is a privation of species, mode, and measure. The privation of species pertains to the area of `delectation' wherein the good is only an apparent or relative one, but not a good for man absolutely. In the case of the mode and measure the deprivation pertains to the defect of the action in regard to its higher rule, that is, the divine law which should inform reason. Perhaps one way of helping to clarify this distinction would be to reserve the term `sin' for acts performed contrary to the divine law and `moral evil' for those contrary to reason alone; whatever its merits, however, this more restrictive use of the terms is found neither in Thomas nor in our present investigation.

As has been noted, since the final judgment always pertains to superior reason which judges "about all things," the consent to the act given by the superior reason in this final judgment always involves a grave sin ex genere suo if the object in question be contrary to the divine law. Regarding a human act, there will always be in the consent a privation of mode and measure in terms of the non-consideration of a truly rational good. This twofold deprivation follows from the fact that "in man there is a twofold apprehension to be directed by a superior rule." Sensitive knowledge must be directed by reason and the knowledge of reason by wisdom or the divine law.⁽³⁸⁴⁾

Therefore, Thomas concludes evil may be in man's appetite in a twofold way: in one way when sensitive apprehension is not regulated according to reason, for example, seeking an object harmful to one's physical well being; and in another, when human reason is not directed according to divine law, for example, coveting another's wife. The former involves a deprivation of species wherein an evil object is sought, whereas the latter entails a deprivation of mode and order, that is, the seeking of a suitable good but in an inordinate way.⁽³⁸⁵⁾ From these considerations two things follow: one is that sin is present in action insofar as that action relates to reason; the other is that the proper act of reason is deliberation and as such is involved in sin in terms of a kind of deception that occurs. These two notions will be basic in the next two sections of this chapter, namely, as regards reason as the specific rule of human action and the ignorance involved in a sinful choice.⁽³⁸⁶⁾

REASON AS THE RULE OF MORAL ACTION

In the De Malo Thomas develops his theory of the moral specification of human action.⁽³⁸⁷⁾ He begins by observing that, although the good imports a certain perfection, the good of one thing is not necessarily the good of another; for example, the good of an animal is not necessarily the good of a man. As a specific example of this principle, he offers an illustration in terms of sexual intercourse. Considered as a physical action this is a good of nature; but, when related to various beings or to the various faculties of these beings, it takes on new aspects as regard good and evil. For an animal it is in a sense an absolute good insofar as it perfectly conforms to the highest part of its nature, which is specifically a sensitive one: it is the specific act devised to prolong the species and hence an absolute good for the species. If it should become a particular instance a physical evil for this or that individual animal, it still would be essentially an absolute good, although an accidental evil by reason of a particular circumstance, for example, the physical condition of the brute.

The case is otherwise with man; for him sexual intercourse may be said to be at most only a relative good insofar as it is a good satisfying a lower faculty of human nature. This faculty is sensitive, although man is specifically rational. It may, therefore, be considered only a relative good to the degree that it is regulated by man's higher faculty of reason enlightened by the divine law. It will be left to reason to judge the relative value of this particular good in terms of the circumstances surrounding the action, and especially in relation to reason's ordering it by proper intention to a due end.

Thomas continues his analysis of the relative character of actions according as they proceed from certain principles by noting that, if one considers an act merely as an act, its goodness consists in its being a certain emanation in respect to a certain power of an agent. Thus, according to the diversity of agents, there will be a diversity of acts as regards good and evil. Among natural things the good act is that which is suitable to the nature of the agent. Essentially no other consideration need be made. This is true even of human action in regard to human agency, that is, the good and evil character of human actions will be determined in terms of their suitability to man as man. In this way an act, if it is to be considered morally or humanly, should be compared to man insofar as it is suitable to him as a rational being. However, a certain difference should be noted: the term of reference in the case of the rational being is not a static relationship. It refers to man's highest principle or faculty, namely, reason, which must actively consider the nature, circumstances, and order of the action. It must actively judge this particular object or good in reference to human nature considered in manifold relationships to self, others, society, and the divine order. Thomas offers an excellent analysis of this active consideration on the part of reason in the article cited above from the De Malo:

Since an act receives its species from its object, the act compared to one active principle will be specified according to a formality of the object, according to which formality it will not be specified compared to another active principle. . . . If then we consider the objects of human acts that have differences according to something essentially (per se) pertaining to reason, the acts will be different in species according as they are acts pertaining reason, although they are not different species according as they are acts of some other power: for example, to know one's own wife [i.e., sexually] and to know a wife not one's own are acts having objects differing according to something pertaining to reason: for "one's own" and "not one's own" are determined according to the rule of reason, which differences however are accidental if they are referred to the generative power or even to the concupiscible power.⁽³⁸⁸⁾

It is obvious from the above quotation that reason is the principle which actively perceives and formulates the distinction between `mine' and `thine'; and it is in reference to this distinction that the object takes on a new moral specification. It is then not sufficient merely to refer this object to man as a rational being without at the same time considering that same `rationality' as an active principle which will, through its rational processes, determine the particular moral species of the object and present that object thus specified to the will: this is what is meant by the reason as the rule of human action. In this same article, however, Thomas also notes that reason is not left to itself in this process of moral judgment; rather it is "reason informed by divine law, either naturally or by teaching or by infusion."⁽³⁸⁹⁾ Thus, he presents us with the twofold rule of human action, namely, reason and the divine law and their mutual relationship.

A more precise definition of Thomas' notion of the reason as a rule of human action and its relation to the eternal law might prove helpful. He gives various senses to the term `reason' in his writings. At one time he uses it in the sense of the faculty or power itself.⁽³⁹⁰⁾ In another instance he understands reason as the operation of that faculty, the rational act proceeding from the power.⁽³⁹¹⁾ A third use is had in its being the dictate of the faculty concerning a particular contemplated act in relation to its moral circumstances.⁽³⁹²⁾ As has been explained in the previous chapter, this dictate of reason is the product of practical reason, involving a type of syllogistic reasoning wherein the end acts as the principle(s) of the demonstration and the particular good in question as the minor premise. The conclusion of such is the last practical judgment.

In light of what has been mentioned above, these principles may come from three sources: nature, divine revelation, or infusion. Neither of the latter two concerns us in our investigation; however, the first stands in need of some clarification. `Reason' as rule of human action is informed by learned principles, intuitions, and conclusions drawn from experience, some of which are connaturally enlightened by divine law in contradistinction to those learned from revelation or infusion. The difference here, for our purposes, is critical since only those which, at least potentially, are cognizable by human reason are susceptible of direct attention. For Thomas, however, divine revelation stands as an external context which urges philosophers to test out by natural reason a number of avenues which otherwise might not have occured to them to investigate. For example left to itself on the speculative level reason might never have investigated the possibility that `the world was not created in time': a truth which even Aristotle never understood. On the practical or moral level Thomas exemplifies this relationship through marital relations being between "I" and "thou", in contrast to mere sexual relations with others: left to itself reason might theoretically have been able to infer this `moral circumstance', but on the practical and/or actual level never become aware of it.

THE PRACTICAL SYLLOGISM AND MORALITY

In the previous chapter this syllogistic process was described in terms of the intellectual framework into which the moral specification of objects is woven. Now, it is necessary to apply this framework specifically to the question of morality as it relates to the rule of reason and divine law. In this regard it should be noted that the reason in its syllogistic demonstration about the particular suitability of an object is able to consider or not to consider the rule of morality. In other words, it is able to come to a practico-practical judgment about a particular good without referring that good to the moral law, that is, without regulating the action by reason informed by the universal norms of morality as its proper rule. This omission of consideration, however, will be seen to involve a certain ignorance as well as culpability. At present, it need only be observed that reason is obliged to consider these universal norms before it proceeds to its final judgment, relating a particular good presented to the will for election to these universal norms.

Specifically, this means that reason acting in its role as rule of human action is obliged to order the actions of the appetitive faculties to a due end, which end acts as the principle in the syllogistic process and is embodied in its major premise. Whether this end is good depends upon whether it has been drawn by superior reason from the universal norms of morality enlightened by divine law. If such is the case, then the action proceeds under the twofold rule. This amounts to reason being informed by the virtue of prudence in its consideration of the universal knowledge required to act with moral rectitude. If, on the other hand, instead of these universal norms being used in forming the major of the syllogism the reason is informed with considerations drawn by inferior reason only from the sensible and delectable order, then the action proceeding therewith will not be duly regulated. This means that such action will be morally evil insofar as the object sought after will not be a morally specified one, which is due to the non-consideration of the rule of human action. Much of the moral specification is implicit and unconscious in any particular ratiocination as regards a specified good here and now to be chosen as best by this individual. Thus, it seems appropriate to work out in explicit detail the syllogistic process by which a final practical judgment concerning the moral dimensions is attained.

There are really two practical syllogisms, as has been said, one issuing in a speculative-practical judgment and the other in a practico-practical judgment. An example of the first would be: "Stealing is forbidden by divine law. This act which attracts me is an act of stealing. Therefore, this act which attracts me is forbidden by divine law." The conclusion of this speculative-practical syllogism expresses the rule of reason as attained by the contemplation of divine law through the superior reason. In turn in its role as active rule superior reason should regulate the motions of the appetitive faculties; thus, in the above syllogism there is a consideration of a universal norm or law and a particular act subsumed under that law. It remains, however, a speculative-practical syllogism, that is, speculative insofar as it concludes to a purely speculative judgment about the morality of an act, but practical insofar as it looks to action or operation. Such reasoning constitutes the material studied in ethical theory.

As an example of the second type of practical syllogism, which is of primary concern in this investigation, one might consider the following: "Stealing is forbidden by divine law. This act which attracts me is stealing and would cause me to deviate from what I love best, namely, the rule of reason. Therefore, I shall not do it." Or, on the contrary: "Stealing is forbidden by divine law. This act which attracts me is stealing, and I make it to be what I love bethomas Therefore, I shall do it." The conclusions expressed in these two syllogisms are both practico-practical judgments explicitly specifying the act to be preferred by an individual as morally good or evil respectively. Since the will necessarily follows the last practical judgment of the intellect, the ensuing action in the first example is regulated by reason as informed by the principles of divine law, whereas the action following from the second is not so regulated. What exactly does regulate it and what type of ignorance and/or deception is therein implied will be discussed in the following section. Here it need only be said that in the first instance there is a consideration of the rule of reason, whereas in the second there is a voluntary non-consideration of same.

It is then in regard to this practico-practical judgment that Thomas understands reason to be the rule of human action, insofar as it is an enunciation through a dictate of practical reason of what is to be done or avoided in a particular situation. That conclusion is arrived at through an active consideration of the object, taken in its concrete circumstances and compared with the universal norms of morality known through the speculative-practical reason enlightened by divine law. Reason, therefore, is the rule or measure of human acts, and specifically, of the appetitive motions of man.⁽³⁹³⁾ These motions, being by definition non-cognitive, demand reason to measure and guide them to their due end. In themselves these motions are neither good nor evil, both of which will depend on whether these motions are or are not regulated by reason.⁽³⁹⁴⁾ Reason accomplishes this task through the moral virtues which inform the particular faculties, if such virtues actually be present: "The good of moral virtue consists in conformity with the rule of reason."⁽³⁹⁵⁾

In this capacity of rule of human action, reason is viewed by Thomas as a type of law which participates in divine law.⁽³⁹⁶⁾ Now law is a dictate of reason promulgated by a competent authority. Insofar as it is a dictate, it is a judgment. The eternal or divine law is the divine nature viewed as regulating through specific enunciations the good order of things. Its imprint is found in nature in terms of the physical laws governing things. For Aquinas, however, this is not properly law strictly understood, but only in an analogous sense.⁽³⁹⁷⁾ Law strictly considered must be a dictate of reason or intelligence promulgating what is to be done or avoided; as such, it is an active or dynamic act of reason. Man as nature certainly is a reflection of divine law in the broader sense, as is all physical nature; on the other hand, man as rational being participates in a more real or stricter sense in this eternal law through a similar rational enunciation by his own reason of what is right or wrong.

The article in the Summa Theologica on reason as the rule and measure of human acts shows how Thomas understands its character as a type of law in the strict sense.⁽³⁹⁸⁾ Therein he asserts that reason is such a rule insofar as it orders human acts toward their due end; and it pertains essentially to reason to enact such ordering. From this Aquinas concludes that law itself is "something pertaining to reason," which incorporates such in its very definition as a function of reason. It cannot then be doubted that reason as a kind of law dictating to humans their obligations in any set of particular circumstances is a definite proof that reason performs its ruling function as an active principle which regulates the appetitions of human faculties, both sensitive and voluntary. Reason then becomes the first principle of human acts. Here Thomas uses the term `human' in its formal sense as opposed to merely `acts of man'. If, moreover, it is true that the first principle of all activity in man as a natural being is nature, the first manifestation by which properly human activity differs from the activity of man as nature is to be found in such action as an act of reason. Thomas summarizes this by saying: "Reason is the first principle of all human acts; and whatever other principles of human acts may be found, they obey reason somewhat, but in various ways."⁽³⁹⁹⁾

It can be concluded, therefore, that reason is the first principle of human action insofar as all actions are human only to the extent that they come under the aegis of reason. As formal principle of human action, it is the active principle to which all objects and circumstances surrounding such objects must be referred in order to determine their moral species. Finally, it is the proper principle of the human act, since it is the proper faculty of man as rational being.

It is a much mooted point whether Thomas' notion of reason as the standard of moral specification is to be understood in terms of the substantial form in man or of reason itself as an active principle specifying the moral act. As can be inferred from the all that has been said thus far, the author has adopted the latter opinion in this controversy, deeming it an essential element in the existential understanding of Aquinas's approach to being and causality. It might be well, however, to summarize these two apparently opposing views in order to appreciate the true role of reason in regulating human actions.

Some have held that reason is a term used by Thomas to signify rationality, which is the specific form of man; and thus, it is human nature objectively and statically considered that constitutes the standard in moral matters.⁽⁴⁰⁰⁾ To do otherwise would, according to them, render morality a somewhat relative matter without any objective foundation. The other school of thought maintains that reason in this context is to be understood as man's form dynamically considered in its operation through man's highest and proper faculty, namely, reason.⁽⁴⁰¹⁾ As has previously been explained, it operates in a syllogistic fashion, albeit unconsciously, in drawing its moral conclusions. In so doing, it is not left to itself but is enlightened by divine law, especially natural or positive law. If neither of the these be obvious to the reason in its deliberations, it can fall back, so to speak, on a careful reflection on human nature, deducing therefrom further conclusions about human actions.

Accepting Elter and Lehu as classical representatives of these two views the following points may be garnered from perusing their published writings.⁽⁴⁰²⁾ Both agree that reason is the proximate rule of human acts.⁽⁴⁰³⁾ Also they agree that nature "nude sumpta" is not the rule, but only the foundation of the moral rule.⁽⁴⁰⁴⁾ They disagree, however, on the following two points: Elter maintains that the rule of reason needs an anterior rule to rectify it formally, this rule being nature, which rule he calls "complete spectata."⁽⁴⁰⁵⁾ Lehu, on the other hand, categorically denies these two assumptions, maintaining that reason at the moment it acts as rule of human volition is by that very fact constituted the rule and measure of the entire moral order. He denies, moreover, the existence of such a concept of nature, that is, "complete spectata," in Thomas' philosophy. He writes:

One might tell me perhaps that, considered from the point of view of content, both nature `complete spectata' of P. Elter and right reason such as we have exposed it do not differ extremely. This is possible. But then, the more reason for not abandoning the terminology of S. Thomas, `regula rationis'; for not giving preference to a formula that he has expressly reproved, `the rule of nature' . . . an expression which places under the word of nature a crowd of things which are not nature, nature `complete spectata'.⁽⁴⁰⁶⁾

Fundamentally, it boils down to Thomas' dynamic existentialism as opposed to a static essentialism. For him, even the nature of the First Cause, although the objective foundation of the divine law, is not the proximate source of the First Cause action. As regards the moral law, its nature as such does not dictate the moral order but grounds it, so to speak, as the basis for promulgating the divine law in its intellectual `fiat.'

IGNORANCE IN EVIL ELECTION

Since the non-consideration of the rule of reason and divine law involves some type of deception according to Thomas,⁽⁴⁰⁷⁾ it seems necessary to conclude this chapter on the rule of morality with an analysis of the intellectual deficiency found in evil action, that is, in every moral action not specified according to the principles of superior reason. In so doing an attempt will be made to correlate the above material on the syllogistic process in the moral specification of an object with the ignorance, which Thomas says is found in every sinful act. This consideration will lead us into the final and most important feature regarding moral evil, namely, the deficient causality implied in every evil election infected by this ignorance or deception.

First, a review of the various types of ignorance should be made, isolating that specific type which pertains to the deception involved in morally evil or sinful action. Thomas discusses this matter insofar as ignorance causes or does not cause involuntary action as it relates to the following underlying principle: ignorance causes an act to be involuntary to the degree that it deprives the agent of knowledge needed for the voluntary positing of human action.⁽⁴⁰⁸⁾ It should, however, be noted that not every type of ignorance deprives a person of such knowledge. On the basis of the contribution ignorance makes to the involuntary character of human action, it breaks down into three types: concomitant, antecedent, and consequent.

Specifically, concomitant ignorance concerns some matter which is being effected but which action the ignorance does not cause; that is, the action would have been done regardless of this lack of knowledge of its being contrary to law or inopportune in view of the surrounding circumstances. Such ignorance in no way renders the act involuntary, although it may be said to cause a kind of `non-voluntary' action insofar as one cannot will what he does not know. Antecedent ignorance, on the other hand, is the cause of the voluntary act itself insofar as the action would never have been posited had the matter concerning which there is ignorance been known. Such ignorance presupposes that the agent in no way is obliged to know, or at least conscious of his obligation to know, the fact or law pertinent to the action. Neither of these types of ignorance furnishes one with the specific type involved in evil election, since neither type is itself strictly voluntary.

It is consequent ignorance, a voluntary type of ignorance, which is involved in evil choice, for this ignorance presupposes an act of the will as direct or indirect cause. Thomas distinguishes these two types of consequent ignorance in terms of the two kinds of voluntary action wherein they are found. An act may be directly voluntary when the consequent ignorance itself is directly willed; in other words, the agent wills to be ignorant of a particular fact or law connected with the action. In the case of indirect volition, however, what is willed directly is foreseen as the cause of something else. The ignorance with regard to this consequent is not the direct object of the will; rather a particular good is willed without caring to know the facts surrounding the action or the laws governing it. In essence it is evil choice effected by omission, which is voluntary insofar as the agent fails to ascertain such matters as he can or ought to know; as such, it may proceed from passion or habit, on the one hand, or from sheer negligence.

It is this latter type of consequent ignorance that Aquinas employs in his analysis of the ignorance involved in every immoral or sinful act. He writes:

In another way is one's ignorance said to be voluntary because someone can and ought to know: for thus not to act and not to will is said to be voluntary. . . . Therefore in this way ignorance is said to be either when anyone actually does not consider what he can and ought to consider, which is the ignorance of evil election, proceeding either from passion or from habit; or when anyone does not take pains to acquire knowledge which he ought to have; and according to this way of ignorance of the universals of law, which one is held to know, is called voluntary, proceeding, as it were, from negligence.⁽⁴⁰⁹⁾

In so doing Thomas has isolated that specific type of ignorance found in the syllogistic process as it relates to moral specification, distinguishing again the ignorance of universal laws vis-à-vis superior reason from the ignorance of the particular moral nature of an object sought by the will. The former is the result of the non-consideration of the rule of divine law while the latter is results from the actual non-consideration of the rule of reason insofar as reason is not informed by the proper universal norms at the time it proceeds to regulate the motions of the appetitive faculties. In the human act these two aspects of non-consideration coalesce in terms of reason in its role as `regulans', that is, as rule or measure of the appetites and in its role as `regulata' or ruled by divine law.

The difference between these two types of indirect ignorance is that the ignorance of evil election involves a non-consideration of those things which ought to be considered at the very moment of the person's willing whereas the other type proceeds from some previous negligence in not seeking the truth about universal norms which ought to be known in view of future action. This previous negligence becomes evil or sinful in cause immediately insofar as such knowledge will be required to regulate human action. In the case of ignorance in evil election there is not required, as such, an ignorance of the universal norms of morality, although Thomas does admit the possibility of false judgment in the concrete resulting from an ignorance of these norms.⁽⁴¹⁰⁾ It usually results, however, from the disposition of the subject as modified by passion or habit. In this light the particular relative good, which is simply evil in terms of the universal norms of morality, is seen by the subject as absolutely good here and now. As will be shown, Aquinas insists that another universal judgment has been substituted as major premise for the proper one drawn from a contemplation of divine law; this substitute has been drawn from a consideration of the merely sensible and pleasurable order by inferior reason.

Thomas further develops his notion of ignorance of evil election when he remarks in the Summa Theologica that such ignorance does not result from a lack of knowledge of what one ought to know, but rather of what one ought to do.⁽⁴¹¹⁾ In other words, the person might have an abundance of speculative-practical knowledge about the morality of acts. But when it comes to view the particular object before him, he fails to apply his universal knowledge to this concrete case, although knowing all the while that his particular judgment should be regulated by such knowledge. It is simply a matter of knowing what is right or what one ought to do and not having the will, so to speak, to do it: the age-old story of the spirit being willing but the flesh weak. Viewed from the standpoint of the syllogistic process Aquinas says that such universal knowledge does not become the principle of any act unless it be applied to the particular object in question. In other words, unless the speculative-practical conclusion of the first syllogism presented above be incorporated as major premise into the second syllogism issuing in a practico-practical judgment it is not reflected in one's action.⁽⁴¹²⁾

In order better to appreciate Thomas' thought regarding the ignorance of evil election it would be helpful to consider his analysis of this so-called `substitute-syllogism,' which is found in his Commentary on the Ethics.⁽⁴¹³⁾ He remarks therein that, if anyone wishes to consider the cause wherefore an incontinent person acts outside the aegis of right reason, it is necessary to observe that the syllogistic process employed in such instances involves a twofold judgment: one on the speculative level, the other on the practical. The former regards the universal truth about moral actions whereas the latter looks only to the particular. What actually happens is that another end has been substituted for the end proper to man as a rational being; inferior reason has taken over the regulation of human action without being informed by the truths drawn from divine law.

As an example, he cites the case of the incontinent person, noting that, if he sees pleasure as his end, any particular pleasure that arouses his passion will be seen as a good to be sought here and now. Only the conviction that what has been dictated by the superior reason is the absolute best in his regard will save him from evil election when a particular good presents itself, for example, when the person is confronted with a sweet of some sort, to use Thomas' illustration. He concludes that "it is necessary that he who can taste will taste immediately, unless there be something prohibiting" him from taking the sweet.⁽⁴¹⁴⁾ This `something' is the conviction drawn from divine law that sweet things should not be indulged in inordinately, that is, in a certain set of circumstances which, it should be said, are presupposed in the example. He writes:

On the part of the reason there is proposed a universal prohibiting drinking sweet things inordinately, for example, nothing sweet is to be drunk beyond an hour. But on the part of the concupiscence there is posited that every sweet thing is pleasurable, which is sought directly by the concupiscence. Since concupiscence binds the reason in the concrete, it (reason) does not subsume under the universal reason that . . . this is beyond the hour, but it is subsumed under the universal of concupiscence that this is sweet. So follows the conclusion of the operation.⁽⁴¹⁵⁾

Three things should be noted from the above: the need to restrain action on the part of universal reason, if concupiscence is not to rule a person's appetitions; the binding force on the part of concupiscence, if such a rule is not present; and the utilization by the sensuous person of another universal proposition drawn from concupiscence. As regards the first two observations, Thomas goes on to remark that concupiscence gains the upper hand over reason, which is, as it were, bound in its operation, when concupiscence is so vehement as to do away with reason's inclination to resist the onslaughts of lower nature. As a result, the person "acts incontinently against reason and the universal judgment."⁽⁴¹⁶⁾ In fact, Thomas concludes that he who does not possess the habit of this universal knowledge or has it bound by passion cannot actually know the truth concerning a particular object on the sensible level. In other words, if reason has not been informed by the norms of divine law, or if passion binds the reason in its application of such, the individual will be moved to choose the particular good as unregulated by its proper rule: reason informed by divine law.

Thomas applies to habit what he has said about passion in a more limited sense:

Just as a passion present in the irascible or concupiscible power is the cause of choice inasmuch as it fetters the reason for the moment, so a habit established in these powers is the cause of choice inasmuch as it fetters the reason, not now after the manner of a transient passion but after the manner of an immanent form.⁽⁴¹⁷⁾

The words `existing in these powers' are especially noteworthy since in this way Thomas limits his parallel of passion and habits to evil habits in the concupiscible and irascible appetites. The only real difference between habits of this sort and passions insofar as they affect reason in its judgment is in terms of the temporal aspect. This is, passion is a transient and momentary binding of reason, while evil habits in these appetites are permanent qualities, and as such bind reason in a lasting manner in relation to lower nature and its pleasurable objects.

Such a consideration of habit and its effects on reason is much more restrictive than the effects resulting from evil habit as it resides in the will itself, which Thomas identifies with malice as rendering the will ill-disposed to the end itself.⁽⁴¹⁸⁾ This distinction will be of great import insofar as habit is related to the particular type of ignorance involved in a sin from habit or malice, in contrast to a sin from passion or habit taken in its more restricted sense in terms of the sensitive appetites.

Aquinas explains the type of ignorance effected by the passions or habits rooted in the latter appetites as compared with habit or malice in the will itself in the Summa Theologica.⁽⁴¹⁹⁾ He remarks that " . . . man's appetite seeking an evil presupposes some corruption in the principles from which the activity proceeds, namely, the intellect, will, the sense appetites and even the bodily organism. Sin, as such, is present only to the degree that the action proceeds from a corruption of the intellect and will themselves as the moral faculties in man, or indirectly from a corruption of the sensitive appetites or bodily organism as these influence reason and will. If inordinate movements follow from the sensitive appetites or bodily organism without the deliberation of reason, there is, strictly speaking, no sin; however, insofar as sin proceeds from these under this deliberation there is a sin of delectation and even of consent. The superior reason has failed to regulate the inferior reason in its rule of human appetition.

According to Aquinas, each of these specific corruptions and corresponding evil appetitions demand a particular type of ignorance in that each deprives the subject of knowledge in a specific way. A corruption on the part of the intellect excludes that type of knowledge by which someone knows simply that such and such is evil, and the evil action following upon such corruption is commonly referred to by Thomas as a "sin from ignorance." A defect on the part of sense appetite, on the other hand, excludes the knowledge by which a person knows that this particular object here and now is evil, in which case the evil action is called a "sin from passion or infirmity." Finally, on the part of the will as it is turned toward evil as a connatural good there is an ignorance which excludes the knowledge by which someone knows that this evil should not be sustained in view of the attainment of that good. Evil proceeding from this type of ignorance is called a "sin from malice or habit."

Specifically, in the case of a `sin from passion' the will is well disposed toward the good as such, that is, toward the end. But due to the vehemence of passion at a particular moment reason mistakes this absolute evil as the good here and now suitable to the present dispositions and inclinations of the subject. In the case of a sin from habit or malice, however, the will is evilly disposed even toward the end itself, and since the end is the principle of willing, such an inclination toward an evil end as experienced by the malicious will corrupts in turn those things viewed as means to the end.⁽⁴²⁰⁾ Here there is no mistaking an absolute evil for a good; rather, there is question of what the good itself is in relation to this corrupt will. Thomas describes this type of evil election thus: "a man wishes knowingly a spiritual evil, which is evil simply, whereby he is deprived of a spiritual good, in order to possess a temporal good: whereby he is said to sin through a certain malice or on purpose, because he chooses evil knowingly."⁽⁴²¹⁾

In such a sin there is no direct mistaking the evil character of the particular good to be obtained; rather, due to the evil propensity or inclination of the will itself it is sought in spite of such particular knowledge. There is, however, an indirect mistaking of the nature of the particular resulting from a mistake about the end itself. For this reason Thomas further characterizes the different types of evildoers, namely, the one from passion as "one electing sins" and the one from habit as "one who sins from election."⁽⁴²²⁾ In the case of the sin from passion, passion itself is the first principle moving the will to choose evil through the particular misevaluation of the reason, whereas, in the case of sin from habit, the election is the principle of the sin since the will is turned toward an evil before the oncoming of this particular evil object.

As applied to the evildoer who sins from evil habits residing in his sensitive appetites, that is, habit taken in a sense equivalent to passion, the same type of false estimation occurs as would happen if mere passion were involved. Specifically, the universal proposition of the inferior reason is substituted for the universal proposition of the superior reason, and the particular good, which is an absolute evil in respect to man as such, is seen as a good here and now to be elected. There is, however, the above mentioned temporal difference in the two deliberations inasmuch as the evil habit being a permanent quality disposes the sensitive appetites to react against reason in a permanent fashion in regard to anything correspondingly pleasurable on the sense level. For example, one whose concupiscible appetite is infected with the habit of incontinence will view sensual objects always as goods to be chosen here and now unless that habit be removed by the will or unless some other determining factor intervene. This other factor could be the universal norm which has not been maliciously laid aside, but only substituted for by a universal drawn from sense. As will be the case with evil habit or malice, there is no ill disposition toward the ultimate end itself, but a mere substitution of ends. However, in both actions arising from passion and habit in the restricted sense, there is a false estimation of the absolutely evil character of this particular good. As such, this false judgment is peculiar to human sin in involving a strict an `ignorance of evil election.'

Here, there is a difference as regards the erroneous practical judgment resulting from the syllogistic reasoning of the passionate person and that proceeding from the individual modified by evil habit residing in the sense appetites. The former person is said to mistakes the particular good as an absolute good by subsuming momentarily the minor premise under the universal drawn from the concupiscible or lower reason, whereas the latter person is continually disposed to do this. In other words, both mistake the nature of the particular good. However, the person sinning from habit residing in his will errs concerning the universal norm itself insofar as he is ill-disposed toward the ultimate end, even averted from it. The precise nature of such `ignorance' will be discussed later. Here it is merely contrasted with the ignorance involved in sins springing from habit in its more restricted sense, as explained above.

The difference between the two types of ignorance might be better appreciated if one consider the utilization of the syllogism by the sensuous person, as described by Thomas in his Commentary on the Ethics.⁽⁴²³⁾ Therein he argues that the syllogism used by the incontinent or sensuous person involves four propositions. They are specifically: on the part of reason, a universal prohibiting inordinate sense appetition; on the part of concupiscence, a universal declaring the pleasurable character of the sensible, which pleasures it orders to be sought absolutely. Both of these propositions pertain to the speculative-practical premise (the major) of the practical syllogism and, as such, are held simultaneously by the incontinent/sensuous individual.

The second set of propositions deal with the minor premise. Aquinas describes them respectively as the proposition about the particular good, which is in the case of the incontinent person subsumed under the universal premise drawn from the senses by the inferior reason, and the proposition which follows as a conclusion from the premises, namely, that "this sensuous or pleasurable good is the good for me here and now."

In contrast to the above, the person sinning from habit or malice does not `simultaneously' hold both universal propositions. Rather, he rejects the one drawn from a contemplation of divine law and thereby renders his will ill-disposed toward the ultimate end itself. He turns away from the only good which will prohibit him from following the universal premise drawn from the sense by the inferior reason, and in so doing is considered `malicious.' Before analyzing this type of ignorance certain observations of Thomas on the functions of the superior and inferior reason should be noted.

In the Summa Contra Gentes he applies this doctrine of misapprehension or ignorance to the question of the inferior and superior reason, precising the intellectual counterpart of the defect presupposed in sinful action. This is a type of malicious will insofar as the latter tends of itself to a relative evil--an evil under these conditions--having removed that which prohibits such an evil appetition, namely, the restraint of divine law. It is necessary to correlate these two questions in the light of this synthesis.⁽⁴²⁴⁾ He argues that since reason may apprehend many goods and a multiplicity of ends, there is demanded on the part of reason a presentation to the will of a proper good, if the action proceeding from the will is to be a fitting one. On the other hand, if the object presented to the will is one of mere sense apprehension unregulated by the rule of reason or some good not properly ordered to man's ultimate end, there will result evil election. In other words, this is a case of lower reason's not being regulated by superior reason. Thomas describes these two misapprehensions thus:

A defect of ordering to reason and to a proper end precedes a fault of action in the will; in regard to reason, in the case of the will inclining, on the occasion of a sudden sense apprehension, toward a good that is on the level of sensory pleasure; and in regard to a proper end, in the case when reason encounters in its deliberation some good which is not, at this time and under these conditions, really good, and yet the will inclines toward it, as if it were a proper good.⁽⁴²⁵⁾

Specifically, the `defect of ordering to reason' is the lack of the inferior reason's direction of the lower appetition whereas the `defect of ordering . . . to a proper end' concerns superior reason's failure to direct inferior reason in terms of its ultimate good. As regards the former, there is a mistaking of an apparent good for a real good or a good absolutely considered in terms of man as a rational creature. In the case of the latter, there is no such mistaking or misrepresentation of the object; in fact, the object is a real and absolute good, but sought under inappropriate conditions. The defect on the part of inferior reason involves a privation of species in a moral sense insofar as the object is related to reason, whereas that on the part of the superior reason involves a privation of measure and order. In other words, inferior reason chooses an inordinate good and superior reason seeks a good inordinately.

In terms of the syllogistic process, evil action resulting from ignorance as such, that is, from an ignorance of the universal norm or some fact subsumed under that norm in its major premise deprives one of the knowledge by which he knows that this action is evil. In contrast, evil action resulting from passion or equivalent habit regards the minor premise or the particular included under the universal. This deprives the individual of knowledge by which he knows this object here and now before him is absolutely evil. Finally, evil action resulting from habit or malice regards the major premise directly in the sense that a universal premise from inferior reason has been substituted for the universal proposition provided by superior reason, depriving one of knowledge whereby he or she knows that this object ought to be sustained to attain this good.

Thomas' synthesis identifies the specific type of sin proceeding from an evil or malicious will wherein there has been effected a mere "removal" of some prohibiting factor which would have restrained the subject from evil action.⁽⁴²⁶⁾ It involves only a non-consideration of those things which ought to have been considered, namely, as known by divine law. In this final type of sinful apprehension one is deprived of the very universal norm or rule that ought to regulate his seeking proper goods. This, however, is not a mere ignorance of such a norm, but its voluntary removal through voluntary non-consideration.

The justification for this last precision regarding ignorance and/or defect in sinful action as proceeding from a malicious will (a mere defect of knowledge and not a strict ignorance) is found in various places in Aquinas. In his Summa Contra Gentes, for example, when discussing the nature of sin in a separated substance he notes that such a sin involves no strict misapprehension in terms of the true moral nature of the object sought, but only a non-consideration of those things which ought to be considered.⁽⁴²⁷⁾ He argues that, since the nature of separated substances is simple, unlike man's composite nature, there can only be one reason in that being. In contrast, there is no question of the angel, for instance, having to intuit lower natures which are to be regulated by it in its proper actions. Hence, its sin cannot involve an error, strictly speaking, that is a false estimation of the moral character of a particular good. Rather, according to Aquinas, it must consist "in not considering the higher good to which its proper good should have been directed,"⁽⁴²⁸⁾ the proper good being the nature itself of the separated substance.

The reason assigned for this inordinate appetition is that the angelic will is vehemently drawn toward its own good insofar as it seeks its own good inordinately by not utilizing the necessary means to attain it. Here we have a privation of measure and mode but not of species, that is, there is no question of error about the nature of the good in general or in particular, but only an unregulated appetition. Still, there must be some type of error in such a judgment in that both principles must be corrupted in a proportionate degree.⁽⁴²⁹⁾ Every sin presupposes some defect in judgment, as has been shown, either in terms of universal or particular knowledge. The angelic intellect cannot be said to lack knowledge of divine law insofar as this is presupposed by reason of its simple intelligence knowing its own value. The angelic intellect, moreover, cannot be thought to have ignorance about its own simple and immaterial nature, which it intuits directly without species. Nor can it have a particular object of choice apart from the good of its whole nature, since it cannot be subject to passion. Therefore, its `error' must be sought in some type of defect in the intellect or judgment, namely, a non-consideration of those things which it ought to have considered as regulating its proper appetition.

This specific intellectual defect, as has been noted, is a privation of mode and measure, that is, the fallen angel sought a good suitable to itself; but, it sought it inordinately and immoderately, not seeking it by means of divine grace but by means of its own power. This manner of acting exceeds its condition as creature, as will be shown in the next chapter, insofar as every creature is subject to the divine rule in its activity. For the intellectual creature this is by ordering and measuring its activity according to the dictates of superior reason. Thomas goes on to describe the said defect of ordering as an aversion.⁽⁴³⁰⁾ It is a sin centered upon the end insofar as the will turned itself away from that end by seeking its proper good without its direction or in a manner beyond its condition as created will. In conclusion, Thomas writes: "It is not necessary to stipulate such a defect of the intellect in the first sin of the fallen angel that he judged something falsely, . . . but rather in his failure to understand his rule and his order."⁽⁴³¹⁾ Obviously, Aquinas has entered upon matters found also in sacred Scriptures and treated magnificently in Milton's Paradise Lost. The work just cited by James Collins, The Thomistic Philosophy of Angels, analyzing the properly philosophical character of this reasoning is an outstanding example of metaphysical writing which illumines as well human self-understanding. Thus our own purpose in examining this area of Thomas' thought is to contrast it with the evil peculiar to the human condition wherein two aspects of intellect, and consequently two rules, are involved, entailing a certain weakness of intellect inapplicable to separated substance.

Although this type of intellectual defect is proper to the angelic sin, Thomas maintains in the Summa Theologica that it is presupposed in every sin.⁽⁴³²⁾ Therein he asserts that sin may be found in the will in two ways: in one way, insofar as someone elects an evil object in which case sin proceeds from a strict error or ignorance; and in another way, inasmuch as a good is chosen but without due measure or rule. This latter type of evil appetition does not demand a strict type of ignorance, but only an absence of consideration in regard to those things which should regulate a created will's appetition. Hence, two types of defects may found in evil choice, namely, the defect of contrariety found only in a sin from passion and called strictly "the ignorance of evil election" and the defect of mere negation, which is presupposed in every sin as a mere defect of non-consideration of the higher rule.

One final remark might be made concerning an objection raised by Jacques Maritain regarding a conclusion drawn by Cardinal Cajetan in this matter. The latter commentator considers the defect of negation described above to be an ignorance, strictly so-called. He writes:

It must be said simply that the will determines the intellect to judge that one of the opposites is to be done, but diversely in goods and in evils. For, when neither of the opposites has the nature of moral evil, the will itself alone bends the judgment whither it will; but to one of the opposites which is morally evil, the will itself bends the judgment, but not unless some other defect of intellect occurs in the bending, at least a non-consideration of all that should be considered, which suffices that every evil person is ignorant, as was said concerning the sin in the angel.⁽⁴³³⁾

Cardinal Cajetan is commenting here on a passage from the Summa Theologica which explicitly refers to human appetition, since Aquinas is dealing with the relation between superior reason and passion. Therefore, the phrase `non-consideration of all that should be considered' should not be applied indiscriminately to angelic and human appetition. In the context of this passage wherein a distinction is made between universal and particular knowledge, the appetition proceeds from a non-consideration of those things that ought to be considered, which would place this particular object in its proper perspective in regard to the universal knowledge possessed by the superior reason in man. Such non-consideration involves concretely a false estimation of a particular object, which is a defect of contrariety or of knowledge in concreto. As regards the angelic sin, the context is entirely different. Therefore, it demands a further precision, as shown above, in terms of a defect of mere negation, which is not strictly a case of ignorance.

M. Maritain seems perfectly justified in his objection to this indiscriminate application of this type of ignorance to the question of the angelic sin. He argues that the latter's sin involves a voluntary non-consideration of its rule, which is undoubtedly a defect or negation, but which is not a privation or ignorance.⁽⁴³⁴⁾

It has been thought useful to point out this disagreement between these two eminent students of Thomas due to its relevance vis-à-vis the following chapters wherein it will be shown that this voluntary non-consideration of the rule of divine law presupposed in every evil and/or sin has as its ultimate ontological source a defect in the will. In order to accomplish this, it will be necessary to lay the ontological basis for this voluntary, although non-culpable, defect in the will itself. This conclusion will constitute the subject-matter of the final chapter. Before proceeding, however, one further point might be made concerning the distinction between angelic and human non-consideration of divine law. In the case of the separated substance its proper knowledge is intuition whereby the divine law as its rule of action is known directly without ratiocination, as is the case with human beings. The latter's knowledge of divine law as known by superior reason is either inferred from contemplating created things or given it by divine revelation. Since the latter does not concern this investigation, it easily may be seen how vastly different the two intellects, angelic and human, operate vis-á-vis their respective wills, and how fundamentally different is the nature of sinful/evil action proceeding from each.