NOTES
1. Meta., X, 2, 1053 b 19-21.
2. Hans Meyer, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. F. Eckhart (London: B. Herder Book Co., 1944), p. 3.
3. De Ver., q. 1, a. 1.
4. 4. De Anima, III, 8, 431 b 21.
5. S.T., I, q. 16, a. 1.
6. Cf., Ibid.. Q. 5.
7. Comm. In De Hebdomadibus, b. 4.
8. S. C. G., III, c. 20, 8.
9. De Ver., q. 21, a. 5.
10. S. T., I, q. 5, a. 1.
11. Enid Smith, The Goodness of Being in Thomistic Philosophy and Its Contemporary Significance (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1947), p. 47.
12. S. T. I, q. 5, a. 4.
13. In IV Meterol., a. 3, 380a, 12-15.
14. Ibid.
15. S. T., I, q. 5, a. 5.
16. Ibid., 80, a. 1.
17. Arnold L. Rzadkiewicz, The Philosophical Basis of Human Liberty (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1949), pp. 47-48.
18. Gusta J. Gustafson, The Theory of Natural Appetency in the Philosophy of Thomas (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1944), p. 49.
19. 19. S. T. , I, q. 59, a. 1.
20. De Ver., q. 22, a.1; S. T., I-II, q. 8, a. 1.
21. S. T., I, q. 80, a, 1; ibid., q. 88, a. 4.
22. S. T., I-II, q. 8, a. 1.
23. De Ver., q. 25, a. 1.
24. S. T., I, q. 59, a. 1.
25. Ibid. I-II, q. 17, a. 7.
26. De Ver., q. 25, a. 2, ad 8.
27. Ibid., q. 27, a. 5.
28. S.T., I, q. 60, a. 1.
29. Ibid., I-II, a. 26, a. 1.
30. Ibid., I, q. 60, a. 1.
31. Ibid., I-II, q. 26, a. 2.
32. Joannes a S. Thomas, Cursus Philosophicus, ed. B. Reiser (2 vols.: Taurini; Marietti, 1937), Philosophia Naturalis I, q. XIII, a. 2, ad. 1.
33. S.T., I-II, q. 25, a. 2. Thomas also refers to this as a "connaturality toward the good", ibid., q. 23, a. 4.
34. Ibid., I, q. 60, a. 1.
35. Ibid., I-II, q. 26, a. 1; In Lib. de Div. Nomin., q. 6, a. 1: "The object moving the will is an apprehended suitable good; whence if something good is proposed which is apprehended under the formality of the good, but not under the formality of the suitable, it will not move the will."
36. Joannes a s. Thoma, op. cit., p. 278.
37. S.T., I-II, q. 1, a. 2.
38. Nich. Ethic., III, 1. 1, n. 1110 a 242.
39. S.T., II-II, q. 175, a. 1.
40. De Ver., q. 22, a. 1.
41. Ibid.
42. S.T., I-II, q. 72, a. 2: "To anyone having a habit, that is lovable which is suitable to it according to its own habit; because it becomes to it in a certain way connatural, according to which custom and habit turn into nature." By these words Thomas affirms his position that habits are "quasi" or "second" natures to beings.
43. Odon Lottin, Principes de Morale, (2 vols., Louvain, Abbaye de Mont Cesar, 1946), I, p. 90.
44. Jeanne Joseph Daly, The Metaphysical Foundation of Free Will as a Transcendental Aspect of the Act of Existence in the Philosophy of Thomas (Washington, D.C., The Catholic University of America Press, 1958), p. 110.
45. Rzadkiewciz, op. cit., p. 51.
46. De Ver., q. 22, a. 5.
47. Ibid.
48. William R. O'Connor, The Eternal Quest (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1947), pp. 121-122.
49. O'Connor, op. cit., p. 124: "We are inclined to give the primacy to the freely elicited act of the will and to regard its natural tendency as somewhat secondary. This is not the view of Thomas. For him the principal velle is not the freely elicited act, but the tendency of the will as nature toward its natural end . . . the perfect act in this case is subordinated to the imperfect act, as the means are subordinated to the end." De Ver., q. 23, a. 4.
50. De Ver., q. 23, a. 1, ad 3.
51. F.A. Blanche, "La Liberte Divine," Revue de Philosophie, XXXIV (1927), 237-38.
52. Joseph de Finance, Existence et Liberté (Paris: Emmanuel Vitte, 1955), pp. 98-99.
53. S.T., I, q. 19, a. 10.
54. De Ver., q. 23, a. 4; cf. De Pot., q. 3, a. 15, ad 14; In I Sent., d. 10, q. 1 a. 2; In De Div. Nomin., c. 4, 1. 9.
55. Daly, op. cit., pp. 194-195; cf. S.T., I, q. 19, a. 5; Joannes a S. Thoma, Cursus Theologicus Thomisticus, 3 Vols. (Paris: Desclée, 1931), In I Sum. Theol., q. 19, disp. 24, a. 5 and a. 4. One finds here a brilliant analysis of the above problem. He writes: "There occurs here a great deception on the part of our imagination, which it is necessary to purge when we treat of the liberty of the divine volition, and (it is necessary) to accept it (divine liberty) in an inverse manner to created liberty: since neither the free act of God is specified by the object, as in us, nor is it contingent or able to defect on the part of the subject in which it is, because He is pure act, nor does it proceed from a potency; and still it is supremely free as related to created objects, because it is supremely independent of them and supremely rendering them dependent on itself . . . for the termination (of the creature) is not determining God passively, but (He) is determining creatures themselves actively, whereby they are objects of His volition."
56. De Ver., q. 24, a. 7; S.T., I, q. 63, a. 1; De Malo, q. 1, a. 3.
57. Daly, op. cit., p. 177. Some authors call the radical freedom enjoyed by the rational creature a "freedom of autonomy." It can be characterized as a quality which describes the will in its unwavering adherence to its last end - an independence of any other thing but itself, and, of course, its end, which perfects it in goodness. This will be treated at length in a later chapter.
58. De Ver., q. 21, a. 1; S.T., I-II, q. 102, a. 1.
59. John H. Wright, The Order of the Universe in the Theology of Thomas (Romae: Pont. Universitas Gregoriana, 1957), p. 6; In III Sent. d. 1, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1.
60. S.C.G., I, c. 42:7.
61. Ibid., II, c. 45: 2; cf. Joseph Legrand, L'Universe et L'Homme dans la Philosophie de Thomas, 2 vols. (Bruxelles: L'Edition Universelle, 1946), I, p. 276.
62. S.C.G., II, c. 46:4.
63. S.T., I, q. 60, a. 5.
64. In III Sent., d. 29, q. 1, a. 3. This will be treated at length when the nature of free choice is considered.
65. S.T., II-II, q. 26, a. 3, ad. 2.
66. S.C.G., II, c. 46:4.
67. In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 19, a. 2.
68. S.C.G., III, c. 111.
69. De Caritate, a. 7, ad. 5.
70. Wright, op. cit., p. 116.
71. Ibid., p. 213. For articles relating to this controversy: Charles de Koninck, De la Primauté du Bien Commun contre les Personnalistes (Quebec: Editions de L'Universite Laval, 1943); I. Th. Eschman, "In Defense of Jacques Maritain," The Modern Schoolman, XXII (May, 1945), 183-208; Charles de Koninck, "In Defense of Thomas: A Reply to Eschman's Attack on the Primacy of the Common Good," Laval Theologique et Philosophique, I (1945), pp. 9-109.
72. Wright, op. cit., p. 124.
73. In Phys., II, 14, n. 268.
74. Joseph Marling, The Order of Nature in the Philosophy of Thomas (Washington: D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1934), p. 71. S.T., I-II, q. 109, a. 3; In De Div. Nom., X, 1; In I Sent., d. 39, q. 2, a. 1.
75. S.T., I, q. 62, a. 8, ad 3. It should be noted that only a being which is its own end is its own norm or rule of action and thus can in no way defect from that end. Since evil, as we shall later see, consists in proceeding to act without applying the rule which measures the act's goodness, such a being's will can never be turned to evil. Daly, op. cit., p. 195; De Ver., q. 24, a. 3.
76. Marling, op. cit., p. 181; S.T., I-II, q. 5, a. 6.
77. S.C.G., III, c. 114.
78. S.T., I-II, q. 91, a. 2.
79. Austin Fagothey, Right and Reason (2nd ed.; St. Louis: C.V. Mosby Co., 1959), pp. 135-137.
80. In IV Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1; S.T., I-II, q. 91, a. 2.
81. In II Ethic., circa princ., 1. 1, n. 249.
82. Henri Renard, "Introduction to the Philosophy of the Existential Moral Act," The New Scholasticism (April, 1954), pp. 146 and 153.
83. S.T., I-II, q. 90, a. 1.
84. Ibid., q. 92, a. 1.
85. Ibid., q. 93, a. 3.
86. S.T., I-II, q. 91, a. 3; ibid., ed. 3.
87. André Stang, La Notion de la loi dans S. Thomas (Paris: Editions et Publications Contemporaines, 1926), p. 11.
88. Ibid., p. 13. This matter will be treated at length in chapter five. At present the reader is referred to an excellent work regarding the rational element in law in Thomas as contrasted with the voluntaristic explanations of the same. Thomas E. Davitt, The Nature of Law (St. Louis: Herder Book Co., 1951), especially pp. 146 ff.
89. S.T., I-II, q. 91, a. 2.
90. Stang, op. cit., p. 39; S.T., I-II, q. 94, a. 1.
91. Rzadkiewoiz, op. cit., p. 56.
92. Joseph W. Evans and Leo B. Ward, Social and Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), p. 17.
93. De Ver., q. 24, a. 10, ad 5 & ad 14.
94. S.T., II-II, q. 44, a. 1, ad 2.
95. Summa Contra Gentiles, I, c. 71:16.
96. S.T., I, q. 48, a. 1; De Malo, q. 1, a. 1; S.C.G., III, c. 7; In De Div. Nomin., c. 4, 1. 14; Comp. Theol., c. 115; In II Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 11.
97. S.T., q. 48, a. 1.
98. De Malo, q. 1, a. 1.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid.
103. S.C.G., III, c. 7:4.
104. Comm. in De Div. Nomin., c. IV, 1. XIV, no. 475.
105. S.C.G., III, c. 7:8.
106. Ibid., c. 7.
107. Ibid.
108. S.T., I, q. 48, a. 1.
109. S.C.G., III, c. 6:1.
110. Comm. in XII Meta., 1. II, n. 2437.
111. De Malo, q. 1, a. 2.
112. S.T., I, q. 33, a. 4, ad 2; Ibid., q. 48, a. 1, ad 1; q. 14, a. 10.
113. Comm. in De Div. Nomin., c. IV, 1, 14, n. 480.
114. De Malo, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2; S.T., I-II, q. 18, a. 8, ad 1.
115. S.T., I, q. 48, a. 3.
116. De Malo, q. 1, a. 2.
117. S.T., I, q. 48, a. 3.
118. De Virt. in Comm., q. 1, a. 3; S.T., I, q. 77, a. 6, ad 2.
119. In II Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 5.
120. Ibid.
121. Thomas de Vio, Cajetan, Comm. in Summam Theologicam, I, q. 48, a. 2., Opera Omnia S. Thomae, ed. Leonina, vol. IV, p. 493.
122. Ibid.
123. De Malo, q. 1, a. 1, and 2 wherein Thomas distinguishes between evil as a privation, which is not something in reality, and as a being of reason, which is a something, namely, something understood. Also In II Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 1.
124. Mary Edwin De Coursey, The Theory of Evil in the Metaphysics of Thomas (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1948), p. 34.
125. In II Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 2.
126. Ibid.
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid.
129. De Malo., q. 1, a. 4.
130. Ibid.
131. Ibid.
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid.
134. Ibid.
135. S.T., I-II, q. 85, a. 4.
136. Ibid., I, q. 5, a. 1.
137. Ibid., I-II, q. 85, a. 4. Here Thomas applies this doctrine specifically to moral evil; however, with proper application, it refers to evil in general.
138. Ibid., pp. 40-41 above.
139. S.T., I-II, q. 85, a. 1; Ibid., I, q. 77, a. 1 & ad 5.
140. Ibid.
141. Ibid. In this reference Aquinas is treating of virtue as the "gift of original justice" and evil as its contrary deprivation. However, on the natural level such a gift corresponds to the good of virtue, as Thomas points out in the Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 85, a. 4.
142. Ibid.
143. Ibid.
144. Ibid., I, q. 48, a. 4.
145. De Malo, q. 2, a. 2; q. 3, a. 1; Comp. Theol., c. 120; In De Div. Nomin. c. IV, 1. 22.
146. S.T., I, q. 48, a. 5, ad 1; De Malo, q. 1, a. 4, ad 10.
147. De Malo, q. 2, a. 1.
148. Ibid.
149. Ibid., a. 2.
150. S.T., I-II, q. 21, a. 2; Comp. Theol., c. 120; De Malo, q. 2, a. 2.
151. Ibid., q. 71, a. 6, ad 5.
152. Henricus Denziger, Enchiridion Symbolorum, ed. Carolus Rahner (31 ed.; Barcinone: Herder, 1957), D.B. 1290.
153. James R. Maloney, The Formal Constituent of a Sin of Commission (Somerset, Ohio; Rosary Press, 1947), pp. 23-30. Suarez, Lessius, Sylvius, Contenson, and others hold that the essence of sin is in the privation of due rectitude, whereas the principal commentators of Thomas, namely, Capreolus, Cajetan, the Salmanticenses, and many modern Thomists, for example, Billot and Vermeersch, maintain that it is something positive connoting a privation. Aloysius J. Welsh, The Scholastic Teaching Concerning the Specific Distinction of Sins (Washington, D.C., The Catholic University Press, 1942), pp. 42-44.
154. In the present study the discussion is limited to a sin of commission, since according to Thomas a sin of omission requires some act or commission beforehand. His reason for this is that if anyone does not do that which he ought to do, it is necessary that there be some cause of this omission, which in turn, is an act of the will. S.T., I-II, q. 72, a. 6; ibid., q. 71, a. 5.
155. S.T., II-II, q. 118, a. 6.
156. Ibid.
157. Ibid., I-II, q. 118, a. 5.
158. De Malo, q. 2, a. 2.
159. Ibid., a. 3.
160. Ibid.
161. S. T., q. 71, a. 6.
162. Ibid., q. 1, a. 1.
163. Ludovicus Billot, De Personali et Originali Peccato (ed. 5, Romae: Universitas Gregoriana, 1924), p.17.
164. De Malo, q. 2, a. 9; ibid., q. 1, a. 1, ad1; Cajetan, Comm. in S. T., I-II, q. 18, a. 5, n. 2; John of Thomas, Cursus Theologicus, De Ultimo Fine Hominis, disp. 9, art. 2, n. 26.
165. Ibid.
166. S. T., I-II, q. 72, a. 1.
167. A. Vermeersch, Theologiae Moralis, Principia, Responsa, Consilia, 4 vols. (Turin; Marietta, 1934), vol. I, n. 112; Welsh, op. cit., p. 30.
168. De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, ad 5.
169. Ibid.
170. Cajetan, Comm. in S. T., I-II, q. 72, a. 9.
171. De Malo, q. 2, a. 4.
172. Sylvius, Comment. in S. Th., I-II, q. 72 (Venice, 1726).
173. Merkelbach, Moral. Theol., vol. I, n. 17.
174. Salmanticenses, Cursus Theologicus, Tractatus XIII, De Vitiis et Peccatis, disp. 6, dubium 4, sec. l, nn. 53-6.
175. S. T., I-II, q. 73, a. l.
176. Ibid., a. 3, ad 2.
177. Ibid., I. q. 47, a. 1; q. 44, a. 4.
178. Ibid., q. 48, a. 2; S. C. G., III, c. 71.
179. Comp. Theol., c. 142.
180. S. T., I, q. 49, a. 1.
181. De Pot., q. 6, a. 1, ad 8.
182. Ibid.
183. S. T., I, q. 49, a. 3, ad 5.
184. De Pot., q. 6, a. l, ad 8.
185. Ibid., q. 103, a. 8, ad 1.
186. S. T., I-II, q. 79, a. 4, ad 1; In Rom., VIII, 1, 6.
187. Comm. in De Div. Nomin., c. IV, 1. 13, n. 467.
188. Meta. XII, 2, 1069 b, 33ff.
189. Ibid., V. 1, 1013 a, 17. Thomas recognizes that the Greeks used the `causes' and `principles' indiscriminately. S. T., I, q. 33, a. 1, ad 1.
190. Chas. A. Hart, Thomistic Metaphysics: An Inquiry into the Act of Existing (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall), pp. 177-178.
191. I V Meta., 1, n. 751.
192. In I Sent., 29, 1, 1.
193. In I Phys., 1, n. 5.
194. Meta., XII, 2, 1069 b, 33ff.
195. In XII Meta., 4, n. 2470. In this text Thomas uses the word `element' instead of `cause'. Such a term is the more properly Aristotelian one to describe the intrinsic constituent or cause of a material substance.
196. S. T., I, q. 49, a. 1; S. C. G., III, c. 10:3.
197. S. C. G., III, c. 14. 4; ibid., II, c. 21:9.
198. Meta., IV, 2, 1013 a, 29.
199. In V Meta., I, n. 751.
200. In IX Meta., 8, n. 1861.
201. De Pot., q. 7, a. 2.
202. In IV Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4. This latter gives his earlier views on the subject. For his later and more mature views see: De Pot., q. 3, a. 4, and S. T., I, q. 45, a. 5.
203. Cornelio Fabro, Participation et Causalité (Paris: Beatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1961) p. 363-364. For a treatment of the `intensive notion' of `to be', Fabro, La nozione metafisica de partecipazione (Torino: Societa Editrice Internazionale, 1950), p. 192.
204. Charles A. Hart, op. cit., p. 246.
205. Comm. in Div. Nomin., c. IV, l. XVI, ns. 492-497.
206. Ibid., n. 492.
207. De Malo, q. 1, a. 1, ad 8.
208. Ibid., ad 9.
209. Comm. in Div. Nomin., loc. cit., n. 492.
210. Ibid., n. 495.
211. Ibid., n. 497.
212. S. T., I, q. 49, a. 1; Ibid., I-II, q. 75, a. 1.; II Sent., d. 34, a. 3; S. C. G., II, c. 41; Ibid., III, cc. 10 & 13; De Pot., q. 3, a. 6; Comm. in Div. Nomin., c. IV, 1, 22.
213. De Malo, q. 1, a. 3.
214. S. T., I, q. 49, a. 1.
215. De Pot., q. 3, a. 6.
216. S. C. G., II, c. 41:5.
217. De Malo, q. 1, a. 3.
218. Ibid.
219. Ibid.
220. S. T., I, q. 49, a. 1.
221. Ibid.
222. In V Meta., 2, n. 763: "id ex quo fit aliquid, et est ei `inexistens', idest intus existens."
223. In II Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 4, ad 5.
224. Comp. Theol., c. 118.
225. Ibid., p. 49.
226. S. C. G., III, c. 12:5.
227. Ibid., 7.
228. De Malo, q. 1, a. 2.
229. De Pot., q. 3, a. 6.
230. S. C. G., III, c. 7; 7.
231. In I Meta., 4, 70-1.
232. De Ver., q. 22, a. 2.
233. In I Gen. et Corrup., 20.
234. Tilmann Pesch, Institutiones Philosophiae Naturalis (Fribourg: Herder, 1880).
235. In I De Causis, I, 1, 39.
236. De Princip. Naturae, Opuscula Oninia, ed. Johannes Parrier (Paris: P. Lethiellaux, 1949), p. 11.
237. Ibid., p. 12.
238. Franciscus de Sylvestris, Comm. in II Contra Gent., c. 41, Opera S. Thomae, v. XIII, p. 364; S. T., I, q. 19, a. 9.
239. In I De Causis, 1. 1.
240. De Ver., q. 22, a. 2.
241. Meta., V, 1, 1013 a, 29.
242. S. T., I, q. 45, a. 3.
243. Garrigou-Lagrange, op. cit., I, p. 219; also cf. Arthur V. Vogel, "Efficient Causality and the Categories", Modern Schoolman, XXXII (March, 1955), pp. 252-253.
244. S. C. G., II, c. 21:5.
245. Ibid., III, c. 70:8.
246. Ibid., II, c. 21:5; also De Ver., q. 24, a. 1 ad 5 where Thomas considers all beings, even free beings, as instruments of the First Cause. J.S. Albertson, `Instrumental Causality in Thomas', New Scholasticism, XXVIII (October 1954), 409-436.
247. S. T., I, q. 49, a. 1.
248. S. C. G., III, c. 10:7-11.
249. Ibid., 7; St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XII, 7 (PL, 41, col. 355).
250. Ibid., c. 10:8.
251. Ibid.
252. Ibid., 11.
253. Ibid., III, c. 10:12-13. Here Thomas arrives at the will as the source of moral evil through a process of elimination. This will be treated at length in our final chapter. Here one need only summarize his thinking. He says that there are four principles in moral actions arranged in a definite order: the executive power, the will, the judgment, and thing apprehended. The executive power presupposes the distinction between moral good and moral evil, since external acts of this kind do not belong to the moral order unless they are voluntary. It would have nothing to do with moral evil if the external act were defective by virtue of a defect having no reference to the will. So too the act whereby a thing moves the apprehensive power and the act of the latter. Thus, moral fault is found primarily and principally in the act of the will.
254. De Malo, q. 1, a. 3.
255. Ibid.
256. Ibid.
257. Ibid.
258. Ibid.
259. Ibid. As has been indicated, in the natural order it is not necessary for the natural agent to remedy this defect, since it does not fall short of the measure of power naturally due to it. S. C. G., III, c. 10:8. In the moral order such defective operation is indeed beside the intention of the agent insofar as it is defective, since the will cannot directly will evil; however, it is culpable insofar as it is in the power of the moral agent to remedy the defect presupposed in the will before it proceeded into action.
260. S. C. G., III, 6:26:2-6.
261. Ibid., 10:10:44.
262. De Ver. , q. 22, a. 8.
263. Comm. in De Div. Nomin., c. IV, 1, 13, n. 467.
264. S. C. G., III, c. 71:2.
265. Ibid., 3.
266. Ibid.
267. Ibid.
268. Ibid., c. 74:3.
269. Op. cit., p. 2ll.
270. S. T., I, q. 49, a. 2.
271. Ibid., ad 2; S. C. G., III, 71:13.
272. Ibid., I-II, q. 79, a. 2; ibid., I, 105, a. 5.
273. Ibid., I-II, 79, a. 1, ad 3.
274. Ibid., a. 2.
275. De Malo, q. 3, a. 1, ad 4; ibid., ad 6.
276. Ibid.
277. In the present context we need only allude to the theological teaching that all men receive sufficient grace from God to save their souls. The philosophical counterpart of this is, according to Jacques Maritain, "shatterable impulse". Existence and the Existent (New York: Pantheon Books, Inc., 1948), pp. 92-105, fts. 9-13. For a critique of this view, J.H. Nicholas, "La permission du pêche", Revue Thomiste, LX (1960), p. 199.
278. S. C. G., III, 71:3.
279. Comp. Theol., c. 142; S. C. G., III, 71:4.
280. In order to justify the introduction of the notion of `corrupt nature' into a purely philosophical treatise one must in some way subscribe to what has been called a `Christian Philosophy' or Christian metaphysics. As a minimum, such an understanding of the relation between Christian dogma and metaphysics demands that the Christian philosopher recognize the dignity of reason, as lying within its power to establish contact between all orders and to belong to all of them. It is not a matter of making revealed truths principles from which to argue or proofs from which to refute in philosophy; but rather, it is a question of recognizing the validity of such conclusions of the theological disciplines and at least allowing them to act as guides and beacons in the philosophical inquiry. This especially pertains to the nature of God and man. André Hayen, La Communication de L'Etre d'après Thomas D'Aquin, 2 vols. (Paris Louvain: Desclee de Brouwer, 1957), v. II, pp. 247-248; Roger Mehl, La Condition du Philosophie Chretien (Paris: Delachaux et Niestle, 1947), pp. 196-198; Maurice Nédoncelle, Is There a Christian Philosophy?, trans. Illtyd Trethowan (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1960), pp. 100ff.
281. De Malo, q. 3, a. 1, ad 9.
282. Ibid.
283. Ibid.
284. Ibid., ad 16.
285. S. T., I-II, q. 75, a. 1.
286. It is to be noted that this is the perspective of Thomas in the description of moral evil given in the first quotation of this chapter.
287. De Ver., q. 22, a. 13, ad 17.
288. S. T., I-II, q. 17, a. 5, ad 2.
289. Ibid., qq. 8-17.
290. John of St. Thomas, op. cit., Phil. Natural, I, q. 13, a. 2, ad 1 wherein he writes: "Love is both the cause and the effect of the end. . . . As actively elicited by the appetite it is the effect of the end. . . . But the love of the end as it holds itself passively to the appetible object, insofar as it is rendered connatural to it . . . is the causality of the end and the reason of the appetition." Ibid., ad 2 and ad 3.
291. De Ver., q. 22, a. 14.
292. S. T., I-II, q. 6, a. 4.
293. Ibid., I, q. 87, a. 4.
294. Ibid., q. 105, a. 4.
295. Ibid., I-II, q. 26. a. 2.
296. Ibid., q. 12, a. 4, ad 3.
297. Ibid., corp.
298. Ibid., a. 1, ad 3.
299. De Ver., q. 22, a, 13.
300. S. T., I-II, q. 14, a. 1.
301. Ibid., q. 15, a. 2.
302. Ibid., a. 4.
303. Ibid., ad 3.
304. Ibid., q. 13, a. 1.
305. Ibid., q. 15, a. 3, ad 3.
306. Ibid.
307. In III Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, quaestiuncula solutio 3, ad 1.
308. S. T., I-II, q. 13, a. 3; ibid., q. 14, a. 2.
309. Ibid., q. 10, a. 2.
310. Ad Simpl., I, 2, n. 21; PL 40, 126-27.
311. S. T., I-II, q. 15, a. 3.
312. Ibid., q. 14, a. 3.
313. De Malo, q. 6, un. art.
314. S. T., I, q. 82, a. 4.
315. Ibid., a. 3.
316. De Malo, q. 6, un. art.
317. De Ver., q. 22, a. 12.
318. S. T., I-II, q. 9, a. 3.
319. De Malo, q. 6, art. un.
320. S. T., I-II, q. 9, a. 1, ad 2; ibid., I, q. 79, a. 11 and ad 1.
321. De Malo, q. 6, un. art.
322. Ibid.
323. Ibid.
324. Ibid.
325. Jacques Maritain, op. cit., p. 50-51.
326. S. T., I, q. 83, a. 1, ad 5. It is to be noted that quality here is understood as a permanent, although accidental, habit which disposes a faculty to act in a uniform manner with a certain facility, be this for good or evil.
327. Ibid.
328. Ibid.
329. De Malo, q. 6, a. 6.
330. Ibid.
331. Comp. Theol., I, c. 174.
332. S. T., I-II, q. 10, a. 3, ad 2.
333. De Ver., q. 24, a. 1, ad 2.
334. John of St. Thomas, op. cit., Phil. Nat. IV, q. 12, a. 3. He remarks that "the definition of liberty does not say that, when all requisites (for the free choice) are posited, free will will not act, but that it can not-act in that no requisites can take away that power. " His point is that because free choice actually is made in one way only, its power to choose another good remains.
335. De Ver., q. 22, a. 10, ad 4; Jacques Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, trans. Gerald B. Phelan (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959), pp. 456-64.
336. S. T., I, q. 83, a. 1.
337. Ibid.
338. Ibid.
339. Thomas uses various names or words to designate this act: `conferre', De Ver., q. 22, a. 15; `praeferre': ibid. ; `ordinatio': ibid., 13; `consilium': S. T., I, q. 83, a. 3, ad 3; `inquisitio': ibid., I-II, q. 14, a. 1; `discretio': De Ver., q. 23, a. 1, ad 4.
340. S. T., I-II, q. 76, a. 1.
341. De Ver., q. 22, a. 15, ad 4.
342. Ibid., a. 14, ad 3.
343. S. T., I, q. 78, a. 4.
344. De Ver., q. 15, a. 3.
345. S. T., I-II, q. 14, a. 2.
346. Ibid., ad 1.
347. Ibid.
348. Ibid., a. 3.
349. Ibid., a. 6.
350. Jacques Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, appendix vii, pp. 456-64.
351. S. T., I, q. 14, a. 8. In particular judgments the intellect also needs on the cognitive side the assistance of the `cogitative power' or the particular reason for its knowledge of singulars.
352. Nich. Ethic., Bk. IV, c. 2, 1139b4; In VI Ethic., 1. 2, n. 1137; S. T., I, q. 83, a. 3.
353. De Ver., q. 24, a. 1; S. T., q. 83, a. 1.
354. De Virtutibus in Communi, a. 13.
355. S. T., I-II, q. 57, a. 5, ad 3; In VI Ethic., 1. 2, n. 1130.
356. Cfs., Yves R. Simon, "Introduction to the Study of Practical Wisdom", The New Scholasticism, XXXV (January, 1961), pp. 1-40, especially, pp. 15-7; Nich. Ethic., VI, 2, 1139a27; In VI Ethic., 2, n. 1130; Cajetan, In S. T., I-II, q. 57, a. 5, ad 3.
357. De Malo, q. 6, un. art.
358. Maritain, Existence and the Existent, previously cited, pp. 50-4, especially n. 3 wherein he states: "In the second (the practico-practical) syllogism it is the existential disposition of the subject in the free affirmation of his unique self which decides the question."
359. S. T., II-II, q. 49, a. 2, ad 1.
360. Ibid., I-II, q. 57, a. 4.
361. S. T., I-II, q. 76, a. 1; ibid., q. 77, a. 2, ad 4; In VII Ethic., 1. 3, n. 1345-6; De Malo, q. 3, a. 9, ad 7.
362. De Malo, q. 3, a. 9, ad 7.
363. Ibid.
364. Ibid.
365. Ibid.
366. Ibid.
367. S. T., I-II, q. 13, a. 3.
368. Ibid., q. 71, a. 6; ibid., II-II, q. 17, a. 1; ibid., I-II, q. 74, a. 7.
369. S. C. G., III, c. 108:6.
370. S. T., I-II, q. 19, a. 9.
371. De Ver., q. 15, a. 2; S. T., I, q. 79, a. 9; In II Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 2.
372. S. T., I-II, q. 74, a. 10.
373. Ibid., I, q. 79, a. 9; ibid., I-II, q. 74, a. 10.
374. Ibid. Herein Thomas utilizes the terminology of St. Augustine in describing the two functions of reason in terms of their proper and improper objects. These terms are `conspiciens' and `consulens' and provide the basis for understanding the nature of the acts involved. Especially is consulens an important term implying the deliberative process involved in informing reason with universal principles of morality.
375. Ibid.
376. Ibid., I-II, q. 74, a. 10.
377. Ibid., ad 2.
378. Ibid., a. 7.
379. Ibid.
380. Ibid. Thomas seems to identify the `consent' with the `final judgment' De Ver., q. 15, a. 4: "This final judgment is the consent to the act." This is explained by Aquinas in terms of "will tending toward that which is judged by reason." S. T., I-II, q. 74, a. 7, ad 1.
381. Ibid.
382. Ibid. It is to be noted that this last practical judgment pertains to the superior reason inasmuch as the latter should be employed in every human act. Man should, that is, he can and ought to, inform his intellect with the universal norms of morality drawn from a consideration of the divine law. These norms should direct his actions toward their proper end. If they be lacking, his actions will not be `regulated' actions.
383. De Ver., q. 15, a. 4.
384. De Malo, q. 16, a. 2.
385. Ibid., ad 4; ibid., q. 2, a. 1. Thomas remarks: "In sin two things must be recognized: scil., a recession from a rule or measure and a recession from the end."
386. It is to be noted here that reason is considered as the rule or measure of human action as including both aspects of the one faculty, namely, the superior reason as regulated and directed by the divine law and the inferior reason as regulating the actions of the appetites subordinate to it, namely, the rational and sensitive appetites. It is, in other words, informed reason that functions as the rule of human action. These conclusions should be obvious from the above analysis of the relation between the two reason.
387. De Malo, q. 2. a. 4.
388. Ibid.
389. Ibid.
390. S. T., I-II, q. 56, a. 2, ad 3: "Prudence is really in reason as in a subject."
391. Ibid., q. 66, a. 1.
392. De Virtutibus in Communi, a. 13; Leonard Lehu, La Raison Règle de la Moralité d'âpres Thomas (Paris: Gabalda, 1930), p. 7, n. 1.
393. S. T., I-II, q. 64, a. 1; q. 90, a. 1.
394. Ibid., q. 24, a. 1.
395. Ibid., q. 64, a. 1.
396. Ibid., q. 21, a. 1.
397. Ibid., p. 18 above.
398. S. T., I-II, q. 90, a. 1.
399. Ibid., q. 58, a. 2.
400. For example, Victor Cathrein, "Quo sensu sec. Thomas ratio sit regula bonitatis voluntatis?" Gregorianum, XII (1931), 447-465.
401. For example, L. Lehu, "A propos de la règle de la moralité," Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques, XVII (1929), pp. 449-66.
402. E. Elter, "Norma Honestatis ad mentem divi Thomae," Gregor., VIII (1927), pp. 337-57; Victor Cathrein, loc. cit.; L. Lehu, loc. cit.
403. Elter, ibid., p. 343; Lehu, ibid., p. 217.
404. Elter, ibid., p. 347; Lehu, ibid., p. 218.
405. Elter and Lehu, ibid.
406. Lehu, ibid., p. 239.
407. De Malo, q. 3, a. 9, ad 4.
408. S. T., I-II, q. 6, a. 8.
409. Ibid.
410. De Malo, q. 3, a. 9, ad 4.
411. S. T., I-II, q. 13, a. 1, ad 3.
412. De Malo, q. 3, a. 9, ad 7.
413. In VII Ethic., 1, 3, ns. 1345-53.
414. Ibid.
415. Ibid., n. 1347.
416. Ibid., n. 1348.
417. De Malo, q. 3, a. 12, ad 12.
418. Ibid., q. 3, a. 12; ibid., a. 13; S. T., I-II, q. 78, a. 2.
419. S.T., I-II, q. 78, a. 4.
420. Ibid.
421. Ibid., a. 1; De Malo, q. 2, a. 8, ad 4; ibid., q. 3, a. 12 & ad 11; ibid., q. 3, a. 13; S. T., I-II, q. 78, a. 4, ad 3.
422. Ibid., a. 4, ad 3.
423. In VII Ethic., 1. 3, n. 1347; De Malo, q. 3, a. 9, ad 12.
424. S. C. G., III, c. 10:16-7.
425. Ibid.
426. De Malo, q. 3, a. 14, ad 7; S. T., I-II, q. 78, a. 3.
427. S. C. G., III, c. 108; 3 & c. 109:10.
428. Ibid.
429. Ibid., c. 110:2.
430. De Malo, q. 16, a. 2, ad 4.
431. Ibid. For a detailed study of Thomas' philosophy of angels as substances separated from matter (separated substances) see James D. Collins, The Thomistic Philosophy of Angels (Washington: The Catholic University of America, 1947).
432. S. T., I, q. 63, a. 1, ad 4.
433. Thomas de Vio Card. Cajetan, Commentaria in Sum. Theol. S. Thomae Aquinatis, Leonine ed., vols., IV-XII (Romae: R. Garroni, 1896-1906), In I-II, q. 77, a. 2, n. IV.
434. Maritain, op. cit., p. 62.
435. S. T., I-II, q. 1, a. 2.
436. Ibid., I. q. 60, a. 5.
437. Maritain, The Sin of the Angel, trans. Wm. L. Rossner (Westminster, Maryland: Newman, 1959), p. 23. He remarks in regard to the above distinctions: "This is a particular case of the law of `hyperfinality', according to which every creature tends to its proper end by virtue of its love for the supreme end: for the inclination of the created agent toward its proper end and its inclination toward God are one and the same inclination; and therefore it goes - under the aspect of the intensity of exercise - first to God (with a priority of nature) and afterwards to the end proper to the agent; however, under the aspect of the specification of the object, it goes first to the end proper to the created agent, and then on beyond to God." Ibid., n. 19.
438. It should be noted here that there is another level of tendency between the mere natural appetition and free choice, namely, sense appetition wherein the object to be sought is first apprehended and even in a sense judged as regards suitable means to be used for its attainment. However, since such appetition is ultimately determined `ad unum' by reason of the natural instinct of the brute, for the present purpose it might be subsumed under natural appetency. For a justification of the subsuming of the second level of ontological under the first level, explained above in Thomas, S. T., I-II, q. 12, a. 5.
439. S. T., I, q. 60, a. 5, ad 5.
440. S. C. G. III, c. 1:2.
441. Ibid., 3.
442. Ibid., 4.
443. Ibid.
444. Comp. of Theol., I, c. 112.
445. Ibid.
446. Ibid.
447. Ibid.
448. De Ver., q. 22, a. 6.
449. Ibid., ad 3.
450. Ibid., q. 24, a. 7, ad 3.
451. Ibid., q. 24. a. 7.
452. Ibid.
453. In XX Meta., 1, 10, n. 1883.
454. De Malo, q. 16, a. 5.
455. S. T., I, q. 63, a. 1, ad 1; De Ver., q. 24, a. 7, ad 8.
456. In IX Meta., 1. 10, n. 1887. Thomas, however, notes in this passage that this incorruptibility of the heavenly bodies should be understood under the precise formality of their being eternal and incorruptible and that under other respects they can suffer corruption. S. T., I, q. 75, a. 6. This same incorruptibility extends, according to Aquinas, to the natural action of such beings; but, it is necessary to point out that this is due to two things: one is the fact that these actions proceed from an incorruptible nature, that is, one not rooted in corruptible matter unlike the actions of material beings; and secondly, the fact that these actions are necessary and not free actions. Both of these types of actions, that is, those proceeding from corruptible matter and those from created free will, are corruptible but for different reasons, namely, that the former, though necessary, are rooted in a corruptible principle - matter - while the latter, though free, are subject to the regulation of higher extrinsic principles from which they can defect. Ibid., q. 63, a. 1, ad 2.
457. Ibid., p. 91 above.
458. S. T., I, q. 63, a. 1, ad 1.
459. Ibid., q. 50, a. 5. There is in the angel no matter subject to contrariety which would allow for such a potency; in other words, there is no pure subjective potency in the nature of the angel. Ibid., q. 75, a. 6.
460. Ibid., q. 59, a. 3.
461. De Ver., q. 24, a. 7, ad 8.
462. S. C. G., I, c. 82:6; S. T., I, q. 9, a. 3, ad 4.
463. Ibid.
464. In IX Meta., 1. 10, n. 1884.
465. S. C. G., I, c. 82:6.
466. Ibid.
467. De Ver., q. 24, a. 1, ad 16.
468. This higher rectitude presupposes that of the lower appetite as regulated by reason according to the good of the whole nature considered in all its parts and relations.
469. Comm. in de Div. Nomin., c. IV, 1. 19, ns. 537-39.
470. De Malo, q. 2, a. 1.
471. Ibid., q. 16, a. 2; S. C. G., III, cs. 108-10.
472. Ibid.
473. S. C. G., III, c. 108:1.
474. Ibid., c. 109:5.
475. Ibid., 110:2.
476. Ibid., 3.
477. Ibid., 4.
478. Ibid.
479. Ibid.
480. S. C. G., III, c. 10:13.
481. S. T., I-II, q. 79, a. 2.
482. De Malo, q. 3, a. 2, ad 1.
483. Ibid., q. 1, a. 3, ad 13.
484. S. C. G., III, c. 10:14.
485. De Ver., q. 22, a. 6, ad 3.
486. S. C. G., III, c. 10:11-7; Maritain, Existence and the Existent, p. 90.
487. Ibid., c. 10:13.
488. Ibid.
489. S. T., I, q. 49, a. 1, ad 3.
490. Ibid.
491. Ibid.
492. De Malo, q. 1, a. 3; ibid., ad 13.
493. Ibid., pp. 178-80 above.
494. Ibid., q. 1, a. 3, ad 6.
495. S. C. G., III, c. 10:17.
496. S. T., I-II, q. 6, a. 3.
497. Ibid., q. 7l, a. 5, ad 2; De Malo, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2; cf. In II Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 3.
498. In III Ethic., I, 11, ns. 496-506.
499. Ibid., n. 502.
500. De Malo, q. 2, a. 1.
501. Ibid.
502. Ibid.
503. Ibid., ad 2, ad 4 & ad 9.
504. Ibid.
505. Ibid., ad 11.
506. S. T., I-II, q. 6, a. 3.
507. S. C. G., III, c. 10; De Malo, q. 1, a. 3, ad 13.
508. S. T., I-II, q. 6, a. 3; De Malo, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4.
509. Ibid.
510. Ibid., ad 3.
511. Ibid.
512. De Malo, q. 2, a. 1, ad 11.
513. Ibid., p. 37 above.
514. S. T., I-II, q. 9, articuli 1-6.
515. De Malo, q. 6, un. art.
516. Ibid.
517. Ibid.
518. Ibid.
519. Ibid.
520. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, Dieu, son existence et sa nature (6 ed.; Paris: Beauschene, 1939), II, pp. 626-31.
521. De Malo, q. 6, un. art.