This paper is an attempt to understand the concept of civil society as applied to the Algerian experience of development and state-building. The thrust of my argument is that development should not be an exclusive responsibility of the state, and that civil society can play a vital role in the development of post-colonial countries.

The common ground for these definitions, however, remains the fact that they are applied to the historical development of Western capitalist societies characterized, mainly, by democratic political institutions and free market. Another common ground is that civil society is viewed as the non-state sphere of life where people engage in free relationships and associations for their common benefit and thus for the benefit of society as a whole. The driving force of change, then, includes the state institutions (application of law, provision of security, etc.), the free market (profit-making), and local or national associations (realizing common goals).

This particular meaning of civil society makes it somewhat difficult to apply, as a concept, to other societies with different social and political conditions. In the former Eastern European communist countries, for example, the free market or free associations were almost totally absent: the social and economic life of society was subordinated to the state as part of a socialist strategy of development.

The variations on the definitions of civil society and the different historical experiences of societies have led some to question the usefulness of the concept in the study of socio-political change in Africa. Thomas Callaghy expressed this idea in the following manner:

Despite the variations in the definitions of the concept of civil society and despite possible difficulties in applying it to different historical situations, I believe that it can be a useful concept in studying the case of Algeria, as a post-colonial country, and similar societies. The reason is simple. "Civil society," in my opinion, is a concept that can raise serious questions about the nature and extent of state authority, and the boundary that can be sought between state and non-state spheres of activity. In other words, the concept will help us question and understand not only the political structure of a given society, but also the sphere of economic and social life of that society. Therefore, it makes sense to speak of the reemergence of civil society in Eastern Europe, which means practically how much space should be left to non-state actors to be organized by their free will to attain a particular goal.

Civil society is a vital concept in the study of non-Western societies because it explicitly puts emphasis on the role of organized individuals in the life of their society, outside the predetermined official norms which at times can be abusive, conflictual or tyrannical in character, affecting negatively a normal course of development.

Consequently, and for the sake of this analysis, it will be significant to distinguish between three basic spheres of relations in a society: the political-administrative sphere, which is an exclusive domain of the state; the economic sphere, in which the state can play an important, but not an exclusive role; the civil society sphere, which is the organized group activities outside the economy and state control. This includes religious, educational and cultural institutions; local or national professional or other types of associations; and all other forms of social activities organized by the free will of individuals for the common good of people.

The theoretical argument which will guide my analysis of the Algerian case is as follows: In the course of the development of a particular society, the state attempts to extend its control into the economic and social life of society. As a result, civil society is subordinated to the state to help legitimize a certain development strategy. The continuity of this situation depends primarily on the state’s ability to fulfill its promised goals, and on the role of civil society in attaining them. A particular crisis may limit the ability of the state to continue implementing development projects and delivering social services. The weakness of the state leads to the revival or reemergence of civil society institutions to surmount state control and to play a vital role in the course of change.

Algeria was subjected to French colonial rule from 1830 to 1962. During this period the French and other European settlers took over the most fertile land of the country and forced Algerians to relocate in unproductive areas. The country was divided socially and politically into three parts: the colonial state, the European settler population and the indigenous Algerian population.

At the moment of independence, Algeria was in a state of chaos. Peasants in "regroupment camps" were returning to their homes, refugees were returning from Morocco and Tunisia. People migrated to urban areas to take over the homes and jobs of the departing colonialists and settlers. The departure of the latter left the country almost paralysed. In this chaotic situation a new state was born. What were the features of the new Algerian state and how did it deal with this new reality, i.e., how did it mobilize a predominantly traditional society for development and modernization to overcome the problems inherited from colonialism?

THE STATE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

- the agrarian revolution, which will aim at modernizing agriculture and redistributing the land according to the principle: "the land to those who work it",

- the nationalization of certain foreign businesses,

- industrialization, which will create a heavy industrial base to modernize agriculture and society as a whole.

The choice of the socialist option, according to state officials, stemmed from the social and economic realities of Algerian society: nearly 90 percent of the population was rural, the urban population was poor and mostly unemployed, and only a fraction of the population had access to education during the colonial rule. This traditional society needed a mobilizing force to lead the process of development. The legitimacy of the state was, thus, established de facto.

On the religious front, the Islamic association AL-Kiam (Values), beginning in 1964 opposed state socialist policies and the drive to control Islam and the economy. Although it was suppressed, this movement continued to be active particularly in the mosques and on university campuses. The movement became the embryonic base of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), created in 1990.

Following the general guidelines of the Tripoli Program, after 1965 the Algerian state defined the strategy of development as the Agrarian Revolution, the Industrial Revolution and the Cultural Revolution. Development plans were set up to organize and carry on development projects.

The Agrarian Revolution: The first pillar of the Algerian development strategy had as its major purpose, "the modernization of methods and techniques of production on the basis of new modes of management " and the property system. Socially speaking, this meant the destruction of the old property system (known as khamassa, similar to the feudal system) and surpassing the traditional forms of social and cultural organizations by introducing new modes of organization of society which were defined from above.

At least three factors contributed to the formulation of such a strategy:

1. The dominant traditional agrarian economy was seen by the state as unable to undertake the task of development.

2. The dominance of the economic paradigm of development in the world which related development and progress to industrialization.

3. The dominant socialist ideology among the elites of the Algerian state who believed that Socialism ensures economic independence and progress.

This socialist development strategy was carried on through different state institutions:

The public sector. During the 60s and 70s, the state’s direct involvement in economic development (the Industrial and Agricultural Revolutions) resulted in the formation of one of the largest state sectors in the Third World. This resulted from the following:

a. At the moment of independence, the state was the only institution capable of undertaking the task of development. The private sector was not strong enough to lead the development process.

b. The conviction of state officials that a strong public sector can protect the national economy from foreign competition and create the material basis for a transition to Socialism. The private sector remained limited and was subjected to certain regulations.

The state policies were carried on by four ministries: the ministry of heavy industry, the ministry of light industry, the ministry of agriculture and the ministry of commerce. These ministries created a huge bureaucracy which managed the public sector.

The party. The FLN was the ideological tool of the state. After completing its historical role of leading the armed struggle against French colonialism, it became, after independence, the political and ideological institution that defined the general guidelines of the Algerian state and society. It defined development in terms of transition to socialism, controlled the national labor union and all areas of social and cultural local activities. It even managed neighborhood and village activities. In short, it manipulated the concepts of solidarity and cooperation to monopolize the social and cultural life of the society.

Civil society institutions:

1. Education. With the nationalization of private schools in 1971, education became the sole responsibility of the state. The goal of the educational system was technical and ideological. The former aimed at forming the new generation of an educated and trained force that could carry on development in the future. The second aimed at forming a secular and modern mind that would undermine the role of both religion and traditional culture, both viewed as major obstacles to the construction of socialism. To realize that goal the educational programs included religious courses molded to accommodate state ideology.

2. Religion. The state controlled the religious life of the country through the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The latter controlled the mosques and religious property, trained and appointed Imams and prepared the weekly Friday sermon. The Imams became part of the public sector work force who contributed to legitimize state authority.

3. Culture. The cultural life of the Algerian society did not escape state control. A ministry of culture was created to organize the cultural life of the people within the framework of socialist ideology. Traditional cultural beliefs and practices were supplanted by an official "interpretation of culture."

4. Associations. The most important unions and associations, that were subordinated to the FLN and played an important role were: The Workers’ Union (UGTA), the Student Union (UNEA), and The Women’s Organization (UNFA).

The Workers Union (UGTA), the largest trade union in the country, was incorporated to the FLN in 1963. It firmly supported the state’s socialist development programs and played a key role in rallying the workers behind state policies. It had great impact in preventing strikes and containing open opposition to the state. Despite the creation of smaller unions after 1989 (when the new constitution allowed the creation of independent associations and political parties), the UGTA remained a strong social force opposing the newly adopted liberal government policies.

The Student Union (UNEA) although it was created by the FLN, functioned as an autonomous organ. It was behind several student strikes and was very active in opposing some government policies. It was banned finally and replaced by the National Union of Algerian Youth (UNJA). The UNJA, controlled mainly by leftist elements, played a vital role in mobilizing students for voluntary services for the benefit of the Agrarian Revolution. It is important to note that the student movement was actually split into two tendencies: Pro-government, which supported the Agrarian Revolution and other socialist programs, and the religious student movement which opposed state socialist policies and demanded the establishment of an Islamic state. It was a continuation of the activities of the banned association Al-Kiam (Values). The religious student movement became extremely active after the death of President Boumedienne in 1978, the leader of the socialist development strategy in Algeria. Two groups representing these two movements actually clashed at the University of Algiers in 1982.

The National Union of Algerian Women (UNFA) also played a significant role in organizing working women to support state policies. The UNFA was created by the FLN in 1965 as the number of working women was growing rapidly. Despite the fact that the rate of women in the work force (excluding agriculture) never exceeded 7 percent, the UNFA was an efficient mobilizing force in urban centers.

The strategic goal behind the state’s development strategy was to surpass traditional ethnic cultural differences, and mold society into a new unified national culture. Development was seen as a process of integrating various ethnic groups and social categories into a modern socio-political system. This strategy was financed and maintained by oil and gas revenues. When the oil prices fell drastically, beginning in 1986, development projects were affected by major cuts. Shortages appeared and unemployment rose. The population was becoming more and more frustrated as the standard of living fell and the state was unable to provide practical solutions.

In October 1988, thousands of people, mostly youths, descended into the streets, rioting, burning and destroying state property, such as buses, department stores, and government buildings: the symbols of state authority. A new constitution was adopted and a multi-party system emerged. As a result 40 thousand voluntary associations have appeared since February 1989, covering almost all aspects of the social and cultural life of society, domains which were reserved to the state until a few years earlier. The problems strengthened the religious movement which wanted to regain control over the mosques and to expand its influence to the educational sector. The religious movement was the only strong institution that could oppose effectively the tremendous strength of the state.

In view of this, one might ask: how did the state manage to control the economy and civil society for so long? and how and why was such control challenged? I am here using the term challenge deliberately to describe a situation in which the state, with all the upheavals that occurred since October 1988, still maintains a substantial control over the economy and civil society. As if it has built-in mechanisms of self-defense, the state, despite its apparent weakness, has resisted even the fiercest of all opposition movements, namely the Armed Islamic Group, GIA. There exist, in my opinion, two main sources of state legitimacy in the case of Algeria:

First, historical legitimacy: This was derived from the particular social conditions of the country and from the role of the elite in the liberation struggle against French colonialism. As stated earlier, at independence the Algerian population was mostly of peasant origin and the rate of literacy was very high. When independence was won, the elite that had led the struggle against colonialism became the legitimate holder of state authority. In the eyes of the population, the elite had another historical objective to achieve: development.

The ability of the state to carry on development projects and to provide various social services can ensure consent on the part of the population. This is why civil society institutions were so easily subordinated to the state. As long as the state gave privileges and provided free services, the state’s legitimacy was not challenged. But state officials, for reasons that need a separate study, were using their positions to acquire wealth and maintain their privileges. The trend continued for so many years that it affected greatly the part of capital investment in development projects and the part allocated for social services. Hartmut Elsenhans, a German economist, describes this situation as follows:

The radical fall of oil prices in 1986 resulted in an acute reduction of money allocated to development projects and to social services particularly health and housing. During that crisis, the state was unable to fulfill its promised objectives. The pressure and opposition intensified demanding political and economic reforms. The adoption of the new constitution in 1989 opened a wave of criticism of the shortcomings of government development policies.

The religious movement, which traditionally opposed the government, took advantage of the weakness of the state and of the disenchantment of the population, particularly the youth, to organize a very strong social base especially in the poor urban centers. This movement, vowing to establish an Islamic state, became even stronger when it was recognized as a political party. The private sector, especially in commerce, might have played a role in that by supporting the movement, probably for economic reasons, knowing that an Islamic state will cut taxes and promote private business. This movement gained momentum as it attacked the state and the party as corrupt institutions and vowed to establish a just system within the framework of Islamic law.

1. Michael Bratton, "Civil Society and Political Transitions in Africa," in Civil Society and the State in Africa, ed. by John W. Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994): 53-55.

2. Victor M. Perez-Diaz, The Return of Civil Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).

3. John Gray, "From Postcommunism to Civil Society: the Reemergence of History and the Decline of Western Model," Social Philosophy & Policy 10 (1993), 26-50.

4. Thomas M. Callaghy, "Civil Society, Democracy, and Economic Change in Africa: a Dissenting Opinion about Resurgent Societies," in Civil Society and the State in Africa, p. 236.

5. Hisham Sharabi, New Patriarchy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 15.

6. "The Tripoli Program", p. 658.

7. Ibid., p. 701.

8. Maria A. Macciocchi, "An Interview with Ben Bella," in Man, State, and Society in Contemporary Maghreb, ed. I. W. Zartman (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p. 124.

9. Marc Raffinot and Pierre Jacquemot, Le Capitalisme d’Etat Algerien (Paris: Maspero, 1977), p. 67.

10. Raymond Vallin, "Muslim Socialism in Algeria," in Man, State, and Society, p. 50.

11. Gerard Chaliand, L’Algerie est-Elle Socialiste? (Paris: Maspero, 1964).

12. Slimane Madhar, Tradition Contre Developpment (Alger: ENAP, 1992), p. 126.

13. Ibid., p. 128.

14. Francois Perroux, L’Algerie de Demain (Paris: PUF, 1962), p. 74.

15. Perez-Diaz, p. 59.

16. Ibid.

17. Hartmut Elsenhans, "Contradictions in the Algerian Development Process: the Reform of the Public Sector and the New Approach to the Private Sector in Industry," The Maghreb Review, 7 (1982), 70.

18. Hartmut Elsenhans, "Capitalisme d’Etat ou Societe Bureacratique de Developpement," Etudes Internationales 13, (1982), 31.

19. Sharabi, p. 19.

1. One of the most interesting elements in the actual presentation of this chapter was Professor Bourouh’s suggestion that the description of civil society as the realm between the state and the economy may be too static. It identifies their distinct realms, but does not describe their dynamic interaction. Thus division is between the official institutions of the state regulated by laws and enforced by the power of coercion; this is "the authority". The economy is seen as the profit-making sector: the free market. In between is placed all the rest: family, education, labor, all the free associations constituted of people by their own choice.

Professor Bourouh suggested a more dynamic conception visualized by concentric circles in which the state is the center. This is small in a democratic society. The second or surrounding circle is the economy which controls or limits the expansion of the state. This leaves a large space for the rest of society, called civil society.

In the case of Algeria, after colonial rule there was need to establish a political reality for the country. In the vacuum the elite had the mission of creating the state which in turn created and dominated the market.

To understand this it is necessary to remember that a socialist ideology was adopted, perhaps in part in reaction to the international capitalist character of the colonial rule, and with a view to restoring to the people ownership of the land and productive industries which had been exploited and/or developed by the colonists. Whatever the reason for which socialism was adopted, however, it induced the sense that the state needed to control the economy and hold much of industry and the large natural deposits of gas and oil in the name of the people. As a result the state, rather then being reined in by the economy expanded to absorb the economy, and then onward to absorb education, religion and culture in the service of this ideology.

Whatever be the case of Algeria, this helps to see civil society and its relation to the state and the economy in a dynamic fashion, and indicates how one can encroach upon and suppress the other. It illustrates also that each needs the other for their mutual benefit.

2. It is essential to consider different senses of development. In the case cited it was taken baldly as technical development in order to rebuild the country after colonial dislocations. All was directed then toward the development of agriculture and especially the petroleum industry of the country. To this education, religion and culture were bent by the state.

Another sense of development focuses upon empowerment of the self-expression of the people through science and culture, religion and the economy. In this light the focus of the government should be first of all on its people and their growth or formation (bildung). In the Algerian experience, given the poverty of the people, all was defined for them from above. There was a radical disregard for the people not with regard to their material well-being which was sought at all costs, but of their spiritual and cultural well-being as free and personal.

This points to the need for a new model built upon personal dignity and the freedom to develop one’s personal and social capabilities. This points first to solidarity as a joining together in natural bonds of family and community, and in these unities seeking their appropriate and self-determined goals. Second, it points to subsidiarity, for this effort of a free people must come first from below where it is decentralized at the local level. This stresses the emergence of the forces of development from the freedom, creativity and cooperation of the people.

This contrasts strongly with a centralized theory in which all comes from above and the people are considered instruments to serve the project of the state. In order to avoid this a vibrant sense of civil society is needed.