CHAPTER XVII

CHAPTER XVII

INIQUITY AND RETRIBUTION

IN THE HINDU-BUDDHIST SOURCES

CHANCHAL BHATTACHARYA

In this paper we mainly shall seek to develop the semantic space which underscores the concepts of iniquity (steya) and retribution (danda) in Classical Hindu Law. The primary reason for seeking to understand the motif of these concepts is to explore whether there are any common factors underneath the baffling diversities of myths, models and symbols of the Hindu-Buddhist and the Judeo-Christian textualities. An analysis of the above material, we believe, will contribute to our awareness of the roots and of some of the sensitivities which are foundational to the Hindu-Buddhist traditions. Such an effort, we believe, may enrich our understanding of the problematics and consequently, contribute to the process of reconstruction of civil society by facilitating the cognitive processes of such reconstruction. A deeper understanding of the above processes, we farther believe, may be catalytic in enriching the evaluative classification of Its types of governance of the futuristic civil society as well. An awareness of some of the hidden factors behind the sensitivities of the above value components in Classical Hindu Law will also enrich our understanding of the Hindu-Buddhist value systems which in turn may help the development of the solidarities, subsidiarities and intermediaries of civil society.

In this paper we shall refer to the Judeo-Christian frame of values through hermeneutic interrelations, and assume that since Brahminism was foundational to Buddhism the way Judaism has been to Christianity, an exploration of the contexts of the steya and danda in their sources will provide us with the semiotic environment common to both Hinduism and Buddhism.

The reasons for selecting the themes of steya and danda, stem from the following considerations:

(a) The concept of steya is foundational to the eighteen titles of Classical Hindu Law.

(b) The idea of danda is inseparable from the idea of steya. In addition, the negation of steya (asteya) is an indispensable prerequisite for pursuing the path of righteousness (dharma) which leads one to liberation (moksa). Needless to say, the attainment of such a goal is central to the very quest of Hindu thinking and philosophy. Around this central theme of moksa, one may affirm, the Hindus developed the axis which remains central to their value systems. Besides, the concept of moksa is an invariable which underlines the non-rational components behind the ‘lexical space’ of steya and danda in Hindu Law.1

Before proceeding to develop the concepts of steya and danda in their primary and interpretative sources, however, it is necessary to outline briefly the spirit of dharma and the genre of literature called the Dharmasastra which provide the contextual references to the above concepts. The Dharmasastras, it should be noted, elaborate the concepts of steya and danda through two types of literature, i.e. the precise aphoristic material (sutras) and verse forms (sastras). The sutras and the sastras are interpreted through a body of commentaries which are the works of some scholarly members of an arcane ritualistic community.2

The Dharmasastra literature which consists of the sutras and the sastras forms a codified body of socio-religious mandates and seeks to complement the spirit revealed in the Vedas. The principal claim of the lawgivers and their interpretators, nevertheless, has been to seek to elaborate the insights of the original Vedic lore.

The symbolic and mystical nature inherent in the morpho-logical structure of the material, however, often suggest a degree of discordance with the spirit in which certain authorities, such as Manu and Yajnavalkya, had mandated certain given injunctions. The commentators on the sutra and the sastra material tended to reconcile such dissonances. The injunctions of interpreters, we need to add, form an independent tier with its own standing of authority in the tradition of classical Hindu law. The relationships in this three-tier system of Vedas, Dharmasastra and commentaries have to be understood in reference to the idea of intratextual coherence factor in the traditional classical hermeneutics of such material (ekavakyata).4

The philosophical system of Purva-Mimamsa stipulates that an unitary element (ekavakyata) characterizes the central axis of all rituals.5 Failure to penetrate the multi-layered rituals of linguistic or other ritual forms to the spirit of its one-wordness is to abort the very essence of such symbolic patterns. Rituals, customs and traditions which contribute to the social ecosystems of the Hindus in their totality are focused on the motif which in its unitary dimension has been called eternal (sanatana) by the classical lawgivers of Hinduism. The term dharma indicates the essential non-transient quality of this concept.

In this study, the term Hindu law is used synonymously with the Dharmasastra6 and the Arthasastra.7 However, before proceeding to analyze the concept of iniquity and the idea of punishment, I feel it is necessary to sketch briefly the nature of the laws of dharma and the genre of literature called the Smrtis or the Dharmasastra on which this paper is based.

Although the term steya has been traditionally translated as ‘theft’, in this paper I have used ‘iniquity’ instead of the traditional term ‘theft’. Thus the terms ‘theft’ and ‘iniquity’ will be used synonymously in this paper.

THE SOURCES

The Law (Dharma)

The term "dharma" refers to the ordinances that extend beyond the rules dealing with and controlling the daily duties of a Hindu during his life span in two ways: (1) the ordinances of dharma prescribe the ways a man impregnates his spouse; thus, the laws have an impact on the process that generates a fetus. (2) The law codes also prescribe rules concerning the ways a dead person should be cremated.8

Since Hinduism believes in transmigration, the soul (according to the Hindus) continues to live after it is separated from the body.9 And the dharma codes lay down definite injunctions concerning the duties10 of one’s offspring to comfort the soul of the deceased.

The way of life that is regulated by the Hindu religious codes and is consistent with the tradition of the learned is acara. The acara11 codes regulate the details of one’s household duties and daily activities, starting from when one gets up in the morning until one retires at night. Such codes of acara constitute the essence of dharma. For instance, Manu says: ‘The highest code of dharma is acara."12 He also claims that all forms of penance are grounded on the codes of good conduct.13 Thus sincere adherence to the codes of acara is central to dharma.

The dharma, according to Yajnavalkya, consists of the per-formance of acara, self-restraint (dama), non-violence, (ahimsa) acts of benevolence (dana) and engaging oneself in the study of the Vedas (svaadhyaya).14 In addition the duties of dharma also set up the norm that one should let one’s personality be molded by the spirit of the Smrti (law) and the Sruti (Vedas).

Adherence to such a life, Yajnavalkya declares, leads to self-realization (atmadarsana)15 and is the core of all good conduct (sadacara).16 The dharma codes require that while adhering to such a life-style, one should keep pace with the times and take into consideration the milieu in which one operates.

For example, the ordinances of dharma prescribe the giving of gifts to people. While making such a gift, one needs to take into consideration the time, the factors surrounding one’s environment as well as the method of bestowing such a gift, prior to acting on it.17 Whatever the conditions under which such gifts are made, in order to conform to the spirit of dharma one must make a gift with due sense of respect to the recipient. Thus the dharma is not a mere mechanical observance of certain codes.

The dharma, however, is practiced within the frame work of the caste system and the traditions that govern the four stages of life (asrama). The ordinances of dharma enjoin that there are four castes and four stages of life, and the acara a person follows must be suitable for his particular caste standing and the given stage in his life. The entire theme of the ‘Santiparvan’ of the Mahabharata, one of the most revered texts that deals with Hindu law, centers around the above precept. However, the dharma of a king primarily consists of duties related to protecting his subjects; a Brahman’s dharma consists, among other things, of studying and teaching the Vedas.

The dharma laws enjoin that a person should live by the rules of the asrama. For example, a student who is properly initiated (brahmacarin) should study the Vedas in accordance with the dictates of the tradition, i.e. he should read the scripture in its proper order.18 Such a tradition also requires that a student (brahmacarin) should avoid consumption of honey. He should also avoid eating meat, using fragrance and indulging in intimate relationships with women.19

"The term `dharma’, Professor Renou rightly observes, "includes not only religion but all the ethical, social and legal principles associated with religion and together they constitute the real meaning of life of the Hindu."20

In brief, the dharma consists of the ordinances that take the caste and asrama duties into consideration and becomes instru-mental in upholding the eternal (sanatana) ways of life,21 of which the Vedas are the source.22

The Law-Givers

That certain laws are framed in order to perpetuate a given way of life indicates that some form of tradition existed prior to the time these laws were encoded. The codification of laws also presupposes that there were indications that people were tending to break away from the time-honored ways of life. In order to prevent such aberrations, the orthodox elements in the society codified definite injunctional signals or laws. It is difficult however, to observe whether such law codes were put together by some redactors such as Manu, Yajnavalkya, Harita, Kautilya, etc., or whether these were names of certain schools identified by the names of lawgivers mentioned above.

The Dharma Literature

The dharma literature can be classified into five sections:(1) Dharmasutras—the ordinances written in condensed prose; (2) Dharmasastras—written in verse; (3) Bhasyas—the commentaries or scholia written on the first two genres; (4) Nibandhas or digests; and (5) the epics and the Puranas.

Dharmasutras

The Dharmasutras are aphoristic statements on the ordinances of dharma. P.V. Kane23 and R. Lingat24 agree that the Dharmasutras were closely connected with the Grhyasutras in their themes and contents.25 The Grhyasutras deal with themes such as sacred domestic fire, various forms of household sacrifices, the rules for performing daily sacred rites, the liturgic principles for performing a wedding and other religious rites (samskaras) and certain rules that govern a Hindu’s daily life.

The Dharmasutras scarcely elaborate upon rules concerning the above rituals. The works ascribed to the following authors were written in the aphoristic prose of the sutras.26 (1) Gautama, (2) Baudhayana, (3) Apastamba, (4) Hiranyakesin, (5) Vasistha, (6) Visnu and the Arthasastra of Kautilya.

Dharmasastras

It is traditionally believed that this genre of literature was written after the Sutra period. The Dharmasastras were written mostly in Anustubh (meter).

The Dharmasastras deal with the same themes as the Dharmasutras. Professor Lingat, however, observes that the latter "give a much larger place to the rule of judicial character.27 The Dharmasastra literature, unlike the Dharmasutras, are unattached to any Vedic carana (i.e.Vedic school). One of the significant differences between these two classes of literature lies in the fact that each Dharmasutra is of interest to a particular liturgic group (carana) while the Dharmasastras are of interest to all Hindus.28

The Dharmasastra literature bears the names of Manu, Yajnavalkya, Brhaspati, Narada, Parasara, Katyayana, among others. Of these (1) the Laws of Manu, (2) the Canons of Yajnavalkya and (3) Naradasmrti are available in their entirety. The Brhaspati-Samhita and the Katyayanasamhita have been recon-structed by scholars from various sources. Recently professors Lallanji and K.K. Gopal have reconstructed the Pulastya Smrti and are in the process of reconstructing the Devala Dharma-Sutra.

Bhasyas (commentaries). These are the scholia written on both the Dharmasutras and the Dharmasastras. Each commentary (Bhasya, Vrtti, Vivarana, etc.) is devoted to a particular text. It is possible, however, that more than one scholar would have contributed to a scholium on a particular text. There are however, several commentaries on works on lawgivers such as Apastamba, Gautama, Manu, Yajnavalkya, etc. Among such commentaries mention should be made of Maskarin’s Bhasya and Ujjvala on Apastamba-dharmasutra, Govindasvamin’s Vivarana on Baudhayana Dharmasutra and Nandapandita’s Vaijayanti on Visnusmrti. There are several other commentaries such as Medhatithi’s Bhasya, Sarvajnanarayana’s Vivrti, Kulluka’s Manvarthamuktavali, Ramacandra’s Manubhavarthacandrika on the Manusmrti and Vijnanesvara’s Mitaksara and Mitra Misra’s Viramitrodaya on the Yajnavalkyasmrti.

It is necessary to note in this context that the genius of Sanskrit scholarship has expressed itself through the various commentaries. Even though the commentators do not necessarily agree on the analysis of the morphological implications of all the terms or on the grammatical structure of given sentences, the sophistication that is peculiar to Sanskrit literature and particularly to the law codes of the Hindus are manifested through such commentaries.

This paper has borrowed insights from various commentators, who true to the spirit of the tradition, brought out the possible nuances on the meanings of the passages on which they elaborated, thus adding to the wealth and charm that are the characteristics of Sanskrit literature and of Indian civilization and culture in general.

Nibandhas (digests). These are the compilations of passages on a given theme such as: (1) steya (theft), (2) Sahasa (robbery), (3) Saksin (witness), (4) Prayascitta (expiatory rites), etc.

The Dharmakosa is a rather recent compilation similar to Nibandha. Laxmnan Shastri Joshi, the compiler of this series, has collected extracts from ancient and medieval lawgivers, commen-tators and nibandhakaras on such topics as (1) vyavahara (judicial proceedings), (2) upanisat (esoteric doctrines), (3) samskara (sacraments), (4) rajaniti (polity and state craft). The Dharmakosa, whether a nibandha or not, is possibly the most outstanding and useful tool for the purpose of research and scholarship, even though it tends to disturb the personality of the source from which one collects the material.

In my endeavor to study the concept of iniquity and retribution which is one of the titles of criminal law (vyavaharapada) in classical Hindu law codes, however, I have compared the passages on iniquity (steya) in the above text with the original sources. On the basis of my comparison, I am convinced of the accuracy and unparalleled wisdom of the editor of this series. The editor of the Dharmakosa has compiled almost all the essential passages on steya (theft) from the Dharmasutras, the Dharmasastras, the Arthasastra, the epics and the Puranas.

Epics and Puranas. The Mahabharata, one of the two Indian epics, is regarded as an independent source of Hindu law, and the nibandhakaras have often cited verses from this epic to substantiate their interpretation of verses or aphorisms relating to Hindu law. The Puranas, a heterogeneous body of material, have also been cited by the nibandhakaras as a source. The editor of the series (Dharmakosa) includes most of the major and significant commentaries that are available on the collected passages. Laxman Shastri Joshi also includes in this series the relevant passages from the epics and the Puranas.

The Dates

It is perhaps useful to say something about the historical context in which the codes were written. Since the laws of Manu are considered to be one of the most valuable sources of Hindu law, we shall begin with Manu. According to some of the internal evidence available in the text, Manu descended from a self-created entity called Svayambhu who divided himself into two halves, male and female. A colossal being entitled Virat Purusa, ensued from that primeval male and female. The above colossal being created Manu through penance. Thus Manu, unlike other mortal beings, did not have a physical birth. Although such an account of Manu’s origin defies any attempt to discuss the times of Manu, one can hypothesize, however, on the basis of some external and internal evidences, the time frame in which the Manu codes were redacted.

Before we attempt even to arrive tentatively at Manu’s times, it is important to note that the corpus known as the Manusmrti establishes the fact that a person called Bhrgu compiled the material that is referred to as Manusmrti. The mythical Manu does not have much to do with the redacted version of the Manusmrti.

The date of the Manusmrti, however, should be placed within two limits, i.e. the upper limit and the lower limit. The lower limit being the times of Kalidasa in whose works Manu is mentioned. Apart from some reference to Manu in Kalidasa, an analysis of the passages on steya in Kautilya shows that Kautilya’s Arthasastra was redacted after the codes of Manu and Yajnavalkya had received their final forms. This presumption is based on two facts: (1) Kautilya elaborates points such as what constitutes iniquity and what kind of punishment should be enjoined; (2) he mentions two kinds of iniquity (on which all the lawgivers agreed) without elaborating the nature of such forms of transgression. Thus it seems that by the time the Kautilya codes were systematized, the forms and contents of the concept of steya as elaborated by Manu, Yajnavalkya, et al., had been established and codified.

Secondly, the time of Manusmrti can also be inferred from the facts that, unlike the sutra literature, the material in Manu does not represent the interest of certain particular Vedic sects (Caranas); on the contrary, Manusmrti deals with material that may have been gleaned from the sutra literature in general.

Thus, since Kalidasa and Kautilya are dated between the third and the fourth centuries A.D. and the Dharmasutras between the fourth and fifth centuries B.C., we can claim that the Manusmrti was redacted between the second century B.C. and the third century A.D. Since the other smrtis such as Brhaspati, Vasistha, and Narada all refer to Manu, they were evidently written after Manu.

The commentary literature, needless to say, was written after the original sutra texts were redacted. P.V. Kane, however, has reasons to believe that this genre of literature was composed ‘over a period of a thousand years from about the 7th to the 18th century A.D.’

In any event, regardless of the date of the above lawgivers, one may ascertain that since Gautama, Sankha, Vasistha and Kautilya, among others, did not consider it necessary to develop the philosophical structure of the concept of steya; because, on the contrary, they focused on discussing punishments for various forms of steya, I shall draw most of my data on the punishment section from the above lawgivers. But since Manu, Yajnavalkya, Brhaspati and others developed a philosophical structure of the concept steya, in addition to discussing modes of punishment, I shall refer to them throughout the analysis of both the motif of steya and the ideas of danda.

THE IDEA OF INIQUITY IN CLASSICAL HINDU LAW

The concept of iniquity (steya) in Hindu law in its various nuances transcends the act of taking an object that a person does not own. Steya is a transgression (pataka) which occurs when a person fails to perform his duties or discharge his responsibilities. Such a transgression also results when a person engages in activities that are forbidden by dharmic injunctions. Pataka occurs when someone fails to perform his required daily sacrificial rituals (sandhyopasanadi) or ritualistic bathing (snanadi).31 The idea of pataka is related to the concept of seven limits (saptamaryada) mentioned in the Rgveda.32

Yaska interprets the above passage to mean that the seers (rsis) instituted seven limits, a violation of even one of which constituted a transgression. The limits are as follows: (1) iniquity (steya), (2) incestuous relationships, including having illicit sex with one’s preceptor’s spouse (talparohana), (3) assassination of a Brahmanan (brahmahatya), (4) the destruction of an embryo (bhrunahatya), (5) drinking intoxicating beverages (surapana), repetition of a mischievous act (duskrtasya karmanah, punah punah seva) and (7) false allegations (patake’nrtodya).33

Any violation of the above prescriptive limits constitutes negation of dharma which is adharma. Criminal proceedings (vya-vahara) were instituted to cleanse a man of the smear of adharma, known as pataka.34 It is necessary to emphasize, however, that the Hindu lawgivers also perceived punishment as a means to streamline the society as Manu proclaims:

If the king did not impose punishment on criminals with constant vigilance, the stronger elements in the society would have roasted the feeble ones like fish on a stick, the right to ownership would also have been abolished, and chaos would have prevailed.35

However, a criminal proceeding (vyavahara) is an operation which unveils the ‘wrong’ that is not known between two disputing parties.36 A criminal proceeding (which is used synonymously with judicial proceeding in this work) involves a plaintiff (vadin) and a defendant (prativadin). The plaintiff files a complaint to which the defendant responds..In such proceedings, Bhatta Nilakantha claims, means of evidences as witnesses (saksin), possession (bhoga), etc. are also used to arrive at the unknown truth, the verdict.38

THE IDEA OF RETRIBUTION (danda)

The concept of punishment (danda) is presented in the Hindu law (smrti) as a divinity. Manu writes:

To serve the purpose of the king, i.e. to protect all beings, the Lord (Brahma) created danda (punish-ment) which in essence is dharma and it is imbued with the spirit of the Brahman. It is the offspring of Brahman.

The idea that danda (punishment) is a personified entity created by Brahma and that it is identical with dharma can also be traced to Yajnavalkya. He writes: ‘In ancient times, Brahma devised danda which is identical with dharma itself.’39 Manu identifies danda (punishment) with the king and his ruling power when he says: ‘He (danda) is a person (purusa); he is the king, the leader and ruler.’40 Kulluka, in his commentary on the above hemistich, writes: "In reality danda (personified punishment) is the king and in conjunction with the power of the king, he is the only male person, the rest are females."

Thus, both Manu and Yajnavalkya personify punishment. The difference lies in the fact that in Manu the danda (punishment) is identical with the king, while in Yajnavalkya it (danda) is the same as dharma. Danda (punishment), the Hindus believe,41 is a form of expiation (prayascitta)42 that purges the evil (kilbisa) created by the inequitable transgression of acts (steya).43 Gautama adjoins that, if an accused is assaulted, he is purified.44

Maskarin, in his commentary on the above sutra, indicates that whether the offender lives or dies as a result of such punishment, he is purified. Manu declares that to punish an offender and to protect the good citizens is incumbent upon a king, and that it is by punishing the offender and protecting the law-abiding citizens that a king goes to heaven.45

The Smrti lawgivers, however, differ among themselves concerning the extent of the transgressional demerit a king receives if an act of iniquity occurs in his kingdom. Gautama affirms that all the sins (papa) resulting from thefts in the kingdom pass on to the king in the event the king shows any compassion for a thief and abstains from punishing him. He writes, ‘A king who (out of mercy) does not kill is a sinner.’46

Maskarin, in his commentary on the above sutra, says that when a king abstains from inflicting punishment he receives all the transgressional demerit of the thief. Manu states that a king who collects taxes but does not punish the thieves is precluded from his seat in heaven and his kingdom is in turmoil.47 Apastamba maintains that a benevolent king must free his entire kingdom from any fear of thieves. He says, ‘A prosperous king is he in whose jurisdiction, either in village or in forest, there is no fear of thieves.’48

Haradatta, in his gloss on this passage, emphasizes that unless such a condition is secured in one’s kingdom, one cannot obtain ksema (prosperity) in spite of giving a hundred units of money to everyone. Thus, unless the king is able to uproot all the possibilities of steya throughout his domain, he incurs the kilbisa resulting from it.

In such an instance, inability strictly to live up to the code becomes the object of steya, in the sense that the agent incurs the demerits for not measuring up to the standard called for by his particular situation in life. Cleansing takes place either through the punishment inflicted by the king or through self-inflicted penance.

In any event punishment has two goals: (1) to cleanse the agent of the blemishes of wrongdoing so that he stands corrected spiritually, and (2) to establish justice. There is a consensus among the lawgivers on certain notions, i.e. (1) punishment must be administered in accordance with the caste status of a particular offender, and (2) a Brahmana never receives physical punishment. An analysis of the punishments recommended by various lawgivers indicates that the Hindu’s idea of punishment for offenses evolved through various stages. Gautama, Apastamba, Visnu, Sankha, Harita did not develop any significant theories of punishment. In Manu, for the first time, we come across some important statements on punishment that are mixed in with other considerations such as duties of various castes, duties of a king, problems of polity, etc., which spread over various sections of the book (i.e. chapters VII, VIII, IX and XI). Yajnavalkya eliminates the spurious elements from his theories of punishment and organizes his ideas into a definite system which is elaborated in a chapter called Vyavaharadhaya. In this section Yajnavalkya defines various forms of felony and recommends modes of punishment to fit the transgression. In Kautilya, however, we find a much higher form of systematization of the theories of punishment which is an improvement on both Manu and Yajnavalkya.I shall provide a synopsis of Gautama’s injunctions, because he is the uncontested prototype of all the successive lawgivers. In addition, Gautama’s Dharmasutra is a remarkable account of early Hindu theories of punishment. He begins with the statement that sudras pay in fines eight times the value of an object they take as a non-given object.49 A member of a higher caste pays considerably more than a sudra because members of a higher caste are supposed to be more responsible. Gautama makes it clear that the punishment for thievery for a merchant (Vaisya) is twice the fine a sudra pays, a warrior (Ksatriya) pays twice as much as a merchant, and a Brahmana, who is supposed to be most enlightened of them all, pays the highest fine, i.e., twice as much as a warrior.50 The learned get more punishment for their transgressions. The author of the Maskaribbasya brings out that a learned man not only pays higher fines for his transgressions, but also performs more severe retributory penances.51 Purificatory cleansing resulting from such penances is a sine qua non for salvation (moksa). Thus, the various schools of Dharmasastras as well as the traditional commentaries, while seeking to understand the spirit of dharma, through the concepts of steya and danda, remained focused on moksa, the ultimate goal of human life. The relations, between dharma and moksa, however, are non-linear in character and encompass multiple factors rooted in traditional forms of socio-religious rites and rituals.

Finally, the motif of steya (which is traditionally translated as ‘theft’) as discussed in this paper becomes synonymous with ‘insincerity’52 and can be the ground for voiding all convenental relationships. Such an element, we believe, can contribute to, and perhaps be equated with, the superficial quality of emotion that Dante had attributed to troubadour poetry.53 The model of danda for such steya, is found in Sen and Nassbaum’s thesis on promoting inner growth.54 An awareness of such a semantic gap between the original Sanskritic textualities and their traditional translated synonyms could help us sharpen our sensitivities and help us conceive and structure a civil society that lays the foundation for bringing poetry back into our lives with a deeper sense of humanity.55

NOTES

1. Chanchal Bhattacharya, The Concept of Theft in Classical Hindu Law, passim.

2. Commentators on the Dharmasastra such as Medhatithi, Vijnaneswara are comparable to Thomas Aquinas or Augustine in terms of their authority in the Hindu interpretative tradition.

3. Noam Chomsky, Reflections on Language, p. 137.

4. Mimamsa Paribhasa, p. 2.

5. Ibid.

6. P.V. Kane, History of the Dharmasastras: Ancient and Medieval, Religious and Civil Law, (Poona), vol. I, pp. 13 ff.

7. R.P. Wangle, The Kautiliya Arthasastra: A Study, pp. 3-5.

8. Manu, II:16; see also P.V. Kane, op. cit., vol. IV, pp. 35ff; Robert Lingat, The Classical Law of India, trans. D. Derrett (Berkeley), pp. 171ff.

9. Bhagavat Gita, II:22.

10. Yajnavalkya, I:41-46.

11. Robert Lingat, op. cit., pp. 14-17

12. Mann, I:110.

13. Ibid.

14. Yajnavalkya, I:8.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., I:6.

17. Ibid., P.V. Kane, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 1-4.

18. Manu, II:1-7.

19. Manu, II:177.

20. Louis Renou, Religions of Ancient India, p. 48.

21 Robert Lingat, op. cit., p. 6.

22. Ganganath Jha (ed. & tr.). Manusmrti: The Laws of Manu with Bhasya of Medhatithi (Banaras, 1924), vol. I, pt. 1, pp. 172-222.

23. P.V. Kane, op. cit., vol. I, p. 11.

24. Robert Lingat, op. cit., p. 18.

25. P.V. Kane, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 11-12.

26. Robert Lingat, op. cit., p. 73.

27. Ibid., p. 73.

28. Ibid., p. 74

29. Dharmakosa, vol. I, pt. 1, p. 1.

30. Manu, XI:44; see also P.V. Kane, op. cit., vol. IV, pp. 1-23.

31. See Kulluka’s commentary on Manu, XI. 44

32. Rgveda, X:5-6.

33. Nirukta, VI:27.

34. Mann, VIII:3-18.

35, Ibid., VII:20-21.

36. Bhatt Nilakantha, Vyavaharamayukha, ed. P.V. Kane, p. 17.

38. Ibid.

39. Yajnavalkya, 1:8.

40. Manu, II:177.

41. A.D. Taylor, "The Basic Patterns of Hindu Personality," The Journal of Abnormal Psychology, pp. 7-12.

42. P.V. Kane, op. cit. (1953), vol. 1, p. 59.

43. Julius Jolly, Hindu Law and Customs, trans. B. Ghosh (Banaras, 1975), pp. 251-265.

44. Gautamadharmasutra, XII:41.

45. Manu, IX:254.

46. Manu, XII:42.

47. Manu, IX:254.

48. Apastamba Dharmasustra, II. 25.15.

49. Ibid, XII.12.

50. Ibid, XII.23.

51. Maskaribhasya on ibid.

52. Lionel Trilling, Sincerity and Authority (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard, 1971), pp. 2-25ff.

53. Butler Jefferson Fletcher, Dante pp. 24-25.

54. David Crocker, "Functioning and Capability: The Founda-tions of Sen’s and Nassbaum’s Development Ethic", Political Theory, 20 (1992), p. 584 ff.

55. George F. McLean, "Philosophy and Civil Society: Its Nature, Its past and Its Future", Chap. I above.