As a way of life, that is, as a system of beliefs and norms of behavior, religion has a great impact on society. As a force which can foster solidarity among those who profess a particular religion, it confers a sense of identity through their shared beliefs and norms: there is a sense of unity among co-religionists. But by the same token, this identity also distinguishes one group from others, or certain individuals from others.

Inasmuch as there are norms of behavior for members of a given religious group, there is a region of subsidiarity: the religious group need not be governed from the outside, that is, by a broader authority when the issues in question are within the competence of the group. However, in a pluralistic environment, problems are bound to arise: what is prescribed by one religious group might even be proscribed by another. The individual believer/member must reconcile the perceived conflicts, especially of behavior, which can affect others in a given society. At the basic level, one has to exercise his/her freedom and responsibility and determine how to be faithful to one’s religious identity, while at the same time respecting the religion of others.

In this context, boundaries between different religions are areas for the exercise of freedom by individual believers. In the context of society, the question arises how the "official positions" of particular religions regarding certain questions ought to be observed in a manner which fosters social order and cohesion. Freedom in the exercise of one’s religion in a pluralistic environment necessarily entails some order or pattern under which differences do not disrupt social life.

It is within this framework that the present effort explores how changes came to be adopted by a religion in terms of religious freedom. What is sought are clues toward some reconstruction of civil society. By looking into its official position on religious freedom in the context of its relations to other groups or institutions, the Second Vatican Council had to address precisely this question; it will be of special interest here.

The process through which Vatican II developed its position on religious freedom will be reviewed on the basis of the debates and comments regarding the proposed draft or Schema on religious freedom. What principles or values appeared to be in jeopardy? What advanced the positions it advocated? With these as guides, it will be asked whether the affirmation of religious freedom was possible only because of the Church’s unique character, or, whether the "seed of unity" is inherent in other institution as well. If so, what was there in the action of the Catholic Church which can be adopted more broadly in the work of social reconstruction?

It may be observed here that religion is not limited to doctrines and observance of rites for worship. Rather, concrete behaviors flowing from the commandment to love one’s neighbor are constitutive of the observance and exercise of religion. Faith without good works is dead (James 2,17); one who says he loves God but does not love his neighbor is a liar (I John 4,20); and one who does not feed the hungry fails to feed the Lord Himself (Mt. 25,31-46). In such passages as these Catholics are enjoined to participate in public life, up to the point of advocating particular policy options which eventually would be enforced or administered by the State (Gaudium et Spes, #75—also #43). It can be asked: Is this not somehow imposing the beliefs or norms of one group on others; is it not some measure of theocracy?

If religion may not be limited to the so-called private sphere, the question of how the Church and the State must relate to each other must be resolved. If, on the other hand, Catholics must participate in social and political life, certain official positions on particular issues eventually will be questioned. How did the Council treat this problem?

The bulk of the proposed draft was approved in substance by the Council, and promulgated as the Declaratio Dignitatis Humanae. This Declaration defines the place of religious freedom in civil society: the freedom to fulfill its mission of salvation and all that is sacred and necessary. This freedom "is the fundamental principle in what concerns the relations between the Church and governments and the whole civil order."(#13)

When the Schema was being evaluated at the Commission level—that is, prior to its submission to the Council itself—the debates were very spirited. An understanding of this matter requires a thorough review of related doctrines or positions. For convenience, the "minor" changes which resulted in the draft before the final version of the Declaration may be pointed out first. The statement that the Church is superior to the State was rejected and the relevant passage in Dignitatis Humanae merely recognizes that Church and State have distinct areas of competence. The appeal that these institutions avoid encroaching on each other’s "domain" is found not in Dignitatis Humanae, but rather in Gaudium et Spes (#76).

The passage which spells out particular areas where religious freedom may be exercised was deleted so that the promulgated version does not point out economics, family, health, politics, etc., as such areas.

Another change between the Schema and the promulgated version consists of an added acknowledgement that the Church itself had resorted to coercive means in certain times through history. This was not in the draft, but is found in the promulgated version (#12). A veritable confession of fault in even more explicit terms appears in Gaudium et Spes (#43). This signals a change in attitude on the part of the Church, not only in the way it understands its relation to other institutions or groups, but also in its attitude toward these relations. In the context of the privileged position of the Church in some countries, the acknowledgement is a significant step towards an attitude of equality with other institutions or groups. This willingness to renounce its privileges appears also in Gaudium et Spes (#76): in witnessing to the faith it is sincerity that is important; privileges are to be renounced when they jeopardize this witness. When this attitude of equality is related to doctrine and principle, the character of the change or development in the position of the Church comes into focus.

An affirmation of an equality of religions is the central development in the Church’s understanding of the right to religious freedom in society. Aside from this point, there has been a constant and unchanged affirmation—notwithstanding the fault which was acknowledged—of religious freedom. This requires some clarifica-tion because of the way the question had been formulated in the Schema, and the way the responses, observations and debates took shape before the Schema was discussed by Vatican II.

Dignitatis Humanae declares that "the human person has a right to religious freedom. This freedom means that all are to be immune from coercion on the part of individuals, social groups or any human power, in such wise that in matters religious no one is to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his own belief. Nor is anyone to be restrained from acting in accordance with his own beliefs, whether privately or publicly, alone or in association with others, within due limits." (#2)

There are two phases in which the exercise of religious freedom may be encroached upon or coerced. One is when an individual is still considering or inquiring into a particular religion—when he/she has not yet decided to embrace and live by the said religion. The other is when the individual already has embraced a particular religion, and thus is decided to practice or exercise it, that is, to live by the beliefs and norms of the religion embraced.

Sacred Scripture, when read "in depth," from the example of Jesus’ life while on earth, draws the scriptural foundation of the doctrine that one has a right to religious freedom. While the Scriptures do not teach this doctrine expressly, the whole spirit behind certain passages and the patience of Jesus in calling people to Himself manifest respect for human freedom. The teaching of the Church Fathers that no one may be forced to believe, that is, to accept the Christian faith is observed to be a constant and unshakable foundation of this right. Human nature itself as endowed with intellect and will, and hence with self-determination, is pointed out as a matter of human dignity. With insufficient freedom, one’s response to God’s call would be meaningless. This development in the awareness of human dignity and freedom is itself viewed as a contribution of the Gospel to history.

Thus far we have been concerned with the phase before a faith is accepted by a person, with regard to which there was rapid consensus. As to the phase after a faith has been accepted there were areas of uncertainty, and thus debates.

The positions advocated by the Commission members in their deliberations were stated in quite explicit terms as regards doctrine or principles. Other points were left implicit or as entailed by the arguments.

One such point is the sphere of the exercise of religious freedom in a social context. Those who objected to the proposal of safeguards for all religions in society—i.e., an equality of religions in the juridical order—had two significant positions with regard to the sphere in which religious freedom is exercised. Some urged that it was the individual believer who had to resolve such extreme issues as the choice between martyrdom and apostasy, as during the period before Constantine. This suggests on the part of some a weakness with regard to the social dimension: in their view the Gospel is preached (and accepted/rejected) by individuals, not by groups/communities. The point is not that this is not valid, but that their implicit position would limit the scope of the problem to the individual sphere. The opposing side urged rather that what is in the individual conscience must be carried into the sphere of external behavior. This is to translate the faith into the civil or juridical order.

Another implicit point pertained to the role of the Church in society. One option was to view the Church as guardian of the deposit of faith; another was to view it as servant bringing the Gospel to serve mankind. As guardian, it would have the mission, and therefore the right ultimately to "enforce" the true faith. As servant, it would have the mission of merely preaching the Gospel, relying on persuasion on the human level and on grace on the supernatural level to allow the truth to "win" the individual.

The "guardian" role can be understood from the status of the Church as a privileged and honored group in the Constantinian and subsequent eras. The guidance provided by the Church in the affairs of the State was reflected in the honor and respect accorded to the Church. In contrast, the "servant" role is consonant with the status of a persecuted community. The believers could not coerce anyone to accept their faith; indeed there were great risks attendant on being identified as a Christian. They could only witness to their faith by their lives, and hope that perhaps others too would have the courage and grace to accept the Gospel.

The above positions are historically conditioned in response to the prevailing conditions in which the Church found itself. The next question is more fundamental in nature, and was central to the deliberations of the Commission. The questions of the sphere of exercise and of the role of the Church in society are secondary in relation to the question of truth which influences or shapes the attitudes and behavior of a person. The debates showed a clear awareness of the primacy of this question. Whether "enforced" or merely "offered in persuasion", whether in the "private sphere" or in the "public sphere" of action, the main concern above all was that of truth.

Because of the critical importance of this issue, a number of pronouncements were made early on which had to be taken into account by anything new which was to be said about religious freedom.

The Catholic Church holds in faith that it has the one true religion. This is based on trust in divine revelation. Outside the Church, the validity of this position is difficult to verify, mainly because revelation is not accessible to unaided reason, or because the content of revelation is not available to the people concerned, or simply has not been accepted. The give-and-take indicates that there was a clear awareness of this within the Commission. But the problem was something else: truth and non-truth or error cannot have the same status, the contrary would be revolting to the health of the mind which essentially is oriented to, and axised upon the truth: anything else would create a spiritual vertigo at the center of the person. Further, to grant juridical safeguards for "non-true" religions would be to allow error to be propagated. In 1953, Pius XII had laid down the principle that the State can use its coercive power to curb the propagation of error. The problem than was not merely the externalization of an intent or resolve. It was already accepted that what one holds in conscience may be externalized in action, and the principle governing invincible ignorance extends to this. But to add juridical safeguards for the exercise in society of all religions, whether or not true, could be taken as "stamps of approval" on what is actually erroneous.

The side which favored the Schema had to go back to the question of the role of the State. A neutral State—that is, without the competence to determine positively which religion is true or not—would merely be ordering society or its functioning. Civil equality of the different religions in a given society would promote good will by fostering fairness. The problem of truth seems to have been held in abeyance as far as the comments go in the proceedings, and this with the purpose of avoiding resentment among the different religious groups in a given society.

Still, the Church did not mean to "abandon" the people who already professed the Catholic religion. What would be promulgated eventually was respect for the popular sentiment (ratio populi), which meant that if the majority of the population professed the Catholic faith, arrangements in society should be made to suit their chosen way of life. But in any case, there should be guarantees for a certain minimum of rights for all religious groups in terms of religious freedom.

It is easy to see that the Church can "offer" this measure in societies where the majority of the population professes the Catholic faith. In societies where the Catholic population is in the minority, the Church can only appeal for such an arrangement. This sociological consideration was explicitly addressed by Cardinal Bea as a reason for "enshrining" religious freedom in the juridical order: there would be no need to distinguish between respecting the right of a religious group, on the one hand, and merely tolerating the exercise of a religion by, say, a minority group on the other.

The parable of the tare and the wheat was used to point to the need of at least tolerating those who are in error: everyone will render an account for himself on the last day. The responsibility sincerely to seek truth and abide by it is amply treated in the Declaration.

Hence, "cuius regio, eius religio" does not hold; there is no argument for a "state religion". The importance of this point for religious freedom in society is that by having what in effect is a state-sponsored, favored, or state-enforced religion, religious pluralism is discouraged or suppressed outright. Where there are already a number of religions in a given society, the freedom of the minorities—that is of "the others"—is at least indirectly denied or suppressed.

It should be observed that the pronouncements were made in response to concrete cases where the rights of the Church recognized in the civil laws of the four countries concerned had been violated. To some extent, the governmental acts encroached even upon the administration of specifically ecclesiastical matters (e.g., the appointment of pastors). Nevertheless, the pronouncements were over-generalized to the level of principle: immigrants should not have the right to practice their own religion in public—in response to actions of the government of Colombia; the free exercise of whatever religion would lead to indifferentism—in response to acts of the government of Mexico; a country should continue to profess only one religion—n response to what the government of Spain had laid down; and modernism in its pernicious form should not be accepted—in response to tendencies in Italy.

Thus, the debates and observations in the Commission which evaluated the Schema had to come to terms with the spirit of the pronouncements of earlier pontificates, while arriving at a more adequate, if not new, understanding of the role of the State in matters of religion, and of religion in society. By holding that the State has no competence in matters of religion—e.g., regarding which religion is true or not true, which religion may be promoted under the aegis of the State, etc., the Catholic Church understood itself as "merely one among others". And with this change in understanding, it became possible to move towards the civil equality of religions. With civil equality among religious groups, no one group should be impeded from the public exercise of its own religion—not even indirectly.

The more ample appreciation of human dignity advanced by Pacem in Terris in 1963 enabled or inspired the Council itself to develop a new and more adequate understanding of religious freedom where a particular religion had already been accepted by an individual, and in the exercise of religion as a right which must be guaranteed to individuals or groups in the juridical order. In this understanding, religion is viewed as a constitutive element of the common good, and therefore something which the State must foster, subject to the exigencies of the order required so that the society could "function".

In a way, Pacem in Terris was also a response to the request made by some members of the Commission when the Schema on religious freedom was voted on, that is, because of the gravity of the question the Supreme Pontiff should decide and pronounce on the question. In some cases, a Commission member abstained from voting, and made this appeal; in other cases, a vote was cast with an appeal for the action of the Pope. The majority of the votes were cast with qualifications, i.e., "iuxta modum", that is, in the light of accompanying comments or observations.

The final document, Dignitatis Humanae, addresses specific questions in applying its new understanding of religious freedom. The family has the right to choose what religion to transmit to the children; no one may be forced to accept or renounce a faith, nor impeded from doing either; the school curriculum may not be structured so as to deny choice on the part of the students in matters of religion; educational systems may not, in effect, promote a religion against the conscience of the students; religious communities or groups may not be persecuted for their faith.

It can be gleaned from these that the coercive power of the State, exercised through the government, has for its purpose ensuring the order of society. As an institution, the State is not equal to other institutions for then it would not be able to enforce measures designed for the promotion of the common good. The reason for the existence of the State and the only reason for its ability to employ coercive means in exercising "public authority" is to serve society as a whole, and the other institutions therein. Respect for popular sentiment and responsiveness to the articulated needs of its constituents is then enjoined on the exercise of public authority .

In view of the above, the case of those who might be said to be in error can be viewed in terms of the "disparity" between the general truth of human freedom, on the one hand, and the truth about something particular, on the other. The respect called for here would be a minimum requirement. In the context of the concerns of the Commission members in evaluating the Schema, this minimum would lead to an harmoniously functioning society, particularly at the level of institutions in the ambit to be ordered by the State.

By stressing the responsibility to seek the truth and live by it, only in appearance would the Declaration allow the truth with regard to the true religion to be held in abeyance. There has been no change in the doctrine and understanding of the true religion, but only in the way of looking at the response to truth in view of what is known.

By emphasizing its mission to preach the Gospel to all the world, the mission of the Church is precisely to "break the divisions" by "making the outsiders to be insiders", or, more accurately, by joining together. This is a long run goal; Christianity is a "minority religion" at the global level, as it was in the Roman empire before Constantine.

But this says something about the self-understanding of the institution of the Church. The Church is a servant; put differently, like the State its reason for existence is "others" or "outside itself" to whom those in the Church go in hope. When it asks for freedom, the Church asks for a necessary condition for carrying out its mission. While the walls of division stand between particular religions, the Catholic Church asks for safeguards for all religions—and, in effect, for a recognition of the institution of religion in the ordering of society. This recognition pertains to the value of religion as a response to the human need for transcendence.

1. Acta Sanctae Sedis, Tomus XX, Fascia CCXL (1888), p. 604.

2. Ibidem.

3. Acta Leonis XIII (1885), p. 130.

4. The four allocutiones of Pius IX are found in Acta, Pius IX: "Acerbissimum", Pars I, Vol. I, pp. 383-395: no right to public exercise of just any religion by "outsiders"; "Nunquam Fore", Pars I, Vol. II, pp. 538-549: no right to publicly express `harmful’ opinions; "Nemo Vestrum", Pars I, Vol. II, pp. 441-446: policy of just one "state religion" must not be rescinded; "Iamdudum Cernimus", Pars I, Vol. III, pp. 220-230: modernism is unacceptable.

5. Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber II, Caput 48.

Acta et Documenta Concilio Oecumenico Vaticano II Apprarando, Series II (Praeparatoria), Vol. II, Pars IV, Typis Polyglota Vaticanis, 1961. Acta Pontificiae Commissionis Centralis Praeparatoriae Concilii Oecumenici Vaticani II; 12-19 Junii 1962; pp. 657, ff.

Contitutiones, Decreta, Declarationes, [Sacrosanctum Oecumenicum Concilium Vaticanum III, Typis Polyglota Vaticanis, pp. 511-532 (for the text of the Declaration).

Acta Apostolicae Sedis, Tomus XX, Fascia CCXL, 1888, pp. 593-613.

Acta, Leonis XIII (1885), pp. 118-150.

Acta, Pii IX: Pars Prima, Vol. I, pp. 383-395 (27 Sep 1852); Vol. II, pp. 441-446 (26 Jul 1855); pp. 538-549 (15 Dec 1856); Vol. III, pp.220-230 (18 Mar 1861).

Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber II.

What Dignitatis Humanae did was to respond to the need for a more just ordering of social life—a juridically guaranteed equality in the functioning of social institutions. Insofar as it made the Catholic Church equal to other religions in some countries, this "friendly gesture" can easily be replicated by other groups which work for the religious interests of their own members, whereas resentment or ill will on their part would make the work more difficult. The State must retain its privilege by virtue of its function in society to use coercive power .

At a different level, that is, in stipulating that the human response to God’s call must be free if it is not to be meaningless, there seems to be something unique in the Declaration. The sources advanced are the example of Jesus as shown in the Scriptures, the witness of the Church Fathers, the unfolding of the concept of freedom through history, and the philosophical treatment of freedom. Freedom is a requirement in this matter. The same can be seen in institutions of learning, where the pursuit of knowledge is based on the "cogency of truth" itself. The freedom to inquire and pursue the truth is safeguarded in spite of the errors committed by some which can be corrected only in later generations. When institutions of learning ask for safeguards for their freedom, they are asking for the conditions which are necessary in order for them to carry out their function.

The document concerns freedom in relation to the action of God, that is, in relation to the human conscience, "the most secret core and sanctuary", where man is alone with God. It views freedom as inherent in the "functioning" of conscience, and thus as beyond the reach of coercive power. Juridical safeguards operate on the premise that ultimately coercive power may be employed to ensure compliance; these are called for in the Declaration. But these are merely safeguards, that is, they are intended to foster or promote freedom. There is "something beyond all this world", "beyond human capacity", which must be respected at the individual level.

Conceived in this way, the freedom that must be promoted in matters of religion springs from the very understanding of human limits, and a recognition of mystery. If this conception be adopted as a starting point, then impeding the exercise of freedom in matters of religion in a social context would mean impeding man in his task of transcending the limits of which he is aware. Even if there are errors with regard to a currently held norm, the effort to search is itself the point of contact with the mystery. Hence, so long as the common good is not jeopardized by the exercise of an individual’s freedom, the attitude of Dignitatis Humanae is to keep open that point of contact with the mystery beyond humankind.