Chapter I on the method used in constructing this analysis of ways to God draws extensively on the analysis of the cognitive development of the child by Jean Piaget. It seems helpful in this appendix to provide greater detail on this analysis and to do so largely in the words of Piaget himself.

As described by him in "The Mental Development of the Child," Six Psychological Studies, trans. A. Tenzer (New York: Vintage Book, 1967), ch. I, to which the page numbers below refer.

The following passages by Piaget sketch the main lines of this synthetic presentation of the development of the child as taking place in all four components of personality: cognitive, affective, behavioral and physiological. Here the sequence of the development is described separately in each of the four components. It is further enlightening to see how the development at one level in any of the four enables and is enabled by corresponding developments in the other four components on this level and how together they lead to the development of the next higher level.

(a) Sense perceptions in infancy (years 1-2) proceed according to the construction of four practical or action categories: object, space, causality and time, corresponding to "the substantial permanence attributed to sensory pictures. It is believed that what is seen corresponds to `something’ which continues to exist even when one does not perceive it." (p. 13) (Piaget here reflects the rationalist supposition focused upon mind and Locke’s position that what we know are ideas, which progressively we relate to existing realities outside the mind. A more realist position would recognize the whole process in more existential terms of engagement in reality so that ideas are not means first known in themselves, through the intermediary of which we come to know objects, but rather media in which, as in a mirror, the object itself is known.)

(b) Intuitive over-all pictures, concrete and non reversible in early childhood (years 2-7) are characteristic of children’s games of ‘make-believe’ or hide-and-seek:

Symbolic play is not an attempt by the subject to submit to reality but rather a deforming assimilation of reality to the self. . . . Its function is to satisfy the self by transforming what is real into what is desired. Child in playing with dolls makes his own life as he would like it to be. He lives all his pleasures, resolves all his conflicts. Above all, he compensates for and completes reality by means of a fiction (p. 23).

 

(c) Abstract intellectual concepts, reversible for concrete things, of middle childhood (years 7-12).

The real reason children at this age [begins to be able to] recognize the conservation of substance or weight is not identity (the small child is just as capable of seeing that "nothing has been added or taken away" as the older child), but the [newly developed] possibility of a rigorous return to the point of departure . . . operations that result in a correction of perceptual intuition — which is always a victim of illusions of the moment — and which "decenters" egocentricity so as to transform relationships into a coherent system of objective, permanent relations (p. 46).

 

In contrast below seven years of age children are able to dissociate a whole into its parts, but are then

unable to compare one of the parts with the whole, which they have mentally destroyed; they can compare only . . . two parts. By contrast, at about seven years this difficulty attenuates and the whole can be compared to one of its parts, each part from then on being conceived as a true part of the whole (a part equals the whole minus the other parts, by virtue of the inverse operation). . . .

 

Concepts and relations cannot be constructed in isolation but from the outset constitute organized sets in which all the elements are interdependent and in equilibrium. This structure, proper to mental assimilation of an operational order, assures the mind of an equilibrium considerably superior to that of intuitive or egocentric assimilation. The attained reversibility is a manifestation of a permanent equilibrium between the assimilation of things to the mind and the accommodation of the mind to things. Thus when the mind goes beyond its immediate point of view in order to "group" relations, it attains a state of coherence and noncontradiction paralleled by cooperation on the social plane. . . . In both cases the self is subordinated to the laws of reciprocity (p. 53-54).

 

(d) Formal thought with abstract hypothetico-deductive constructions in adolescence (years 12- ). Here the child not only applies operations to objects, but

must also "reflect" these operations in the absence of objects which are replaced by pure propositions. The "reflection" is thought raised to the second power. Concrete thinking is the representation of a possible action, and formal thinking is the representa-tion of a representation of possible action. . . . Formal operations provide thinking with an entirely new ability that detaches and liberates thinking from concrete reality and permits it to build its own reflections and theories. With the advent of formal intelligence, thinking takes wings (p. 63).

 

This shows the following development:

(a) instincts mark infancy (1-2):

The evolution of affectivity during the first two years corresponds fairly closely to the evolution of motor and cognitive functions. There is a constant parallel between the affective and intellectual life throughout childhood and adolescence. This statement will seem surprising only if one attempts to dichotomize the life of the mind into emotions and thoughts. But nothing could be more false or superficial. In reality, the element to which we must constantly turn in the analysis of mental life is "behavior" itself, conceived, as we have tried to point out briefly in our intro-duction, as a re-establishment or strengthening of equilibrium. All behavior presupposes instruments and a technique: movements and intelligence. But all behavior also implies motives and final values (goals): the sentiments. Thus affectivity and intelligence are indissociable and constitute the two complementary aspects of all human behavior.

 

This being so, it is clear that during the initial stage of reflex techniques there are corresponding elementary instinctive stirrings linked with nutrition as well as the kind of affective reflexes that constitute the primary emotions. . . .

 

At the second stage (percepts and habits), as well as at the beginnings of sensorimotor intelligence, there is a corresponding series of elementary emo-tions or affective percepts linked to the modalities of activity itself: the agreeable or the disagreeable, pleasure and pain, etc., as well as the first realizations of success and failure. The fact that these affective states depend on action per se and not as yet on awareness of relationships with other people, this level of affectivity attests to a kind of general egocentricity. . . .

 

With the development of intelligence, however, and with the ensuing elaboration of an external universe and especially with the construction of the schema of the "object," a third level of affectivity appears. It is epitomized, in the language of psychoanalysis, by the "object choice," i.e., by the objectivation of the emotions and by their projection onto activities other than those of the self alone. . . .

 

When "objects" become detached more and more distinctly from the global and undifferentiated con-figuration of primitive actions and precepts and become objects conceived as external to the self and independent of it, the situation becomes completely transformed. On the one hand, in close correlation with the construction of the object, awareness of "self" begins to be affirmed by means of the internal pole of reality, as opposed to the external or objective pole. On the other hand, objects are conceived by analogy with this self as active, alive, and conscious. This is particularly so with exceptionally unpredictable and interesting objects-people.

 

The elementary feelings of joy and sadness, of success and failure, etc., are now experienced as a function of this objectification of things and of people, from which interpersonal feelings will develop. The affective "object choice" which psychoanalysis contrasts with narcissism is thus correlated with the intellectual construction of the object, just as narcissism correlated with lack of differentiation between the external world and the self. This "object choice" is first of all vested in the person of the mother, then (both negatively and positively) of the father and other relatives. This is the beginning of the sympathies and antipathies that will develop to such an extent in the course of the ensuing period (pp. 15-17).

(b) Stably organized interpersonal emotions (affections, sympathies and antipathies) in early childhood (2-7) linked to the socialization of action, e.g., obedience without reasoning in relation to the authority figure:

the appearance of intuitive moral sentiments as a by-product of the relationships between adults and children; and the regulation of interests and values, linked to intuitive thought in general (p. 34).

 

(c) Will for moral and social choices in middle childhood (7-12) which thus are not simply determined by the circumstances:

A new feeling, which arises as a function of cooperation among children and which social life engenders, consists essentially of mutual respect. There is mutual respect when two individuals attribute to each other equivalent personal value and do not confine themselves to evaluating each other’s specific actions. . . .

 

[This entails that] the new rule can become ‘true’ if each child adopts it; a true rule is merely the expression of a mutual agreement. The older child says that all rules of the game are rooted in a sort of contract among the players. Here we see mutual respect at work. The rule is no longer respected as the product of an external will but as the result of an explicit or tacit accord. For this reason the rule is truly respected in practice and not just in its verbal formulations. It is obligatory to the extent that the individual consents autonomously to the agreement on which the rule is based.

 

That is why mutual respect entails a whole series of moral feelings unknown beforehand: honesty among players, which prohibits cheating not just because cheating is "forbidden," but because it violates the agreement among individuals who esteem one another; camaraderie; fair play; etc. It is only at this age that the child starts to comprehend the implications of lying, and it is understandable from the foregoing that deceit among friends is considered more serious than lying to adults. . . .

 

The mutual respect that gradually becomes differentiated from unilateral respect leads to a new organization of moral values. Its principal characteristic is that it imputes relative autonomy to the moral conscience of individuals. From this point of view the moral of cooperation can be considered as a higher form of equilibrium than the moral of simple submission.

 

[Finally, the] will appears when there is a conflict of tendencies or tensions when, for example, one oscillates between a tempting pleasure and a duty. Then what does will consist of? In such a conflict, there is always an inferior tendency that, in and of itself, is stronger (the desire for pleasure, in this example) and a superior tendency that is momentarily weaker (the duty). The act of will does not consist of following the inferior and stronger tendency; on the contrary, one would then speak of a failure of will or "lack of will power." Will power involves reinforcing the superior but weaker tendency so as to make it triumph" (pp. 55-59).

 

(d) The auto-incarnation of ideals in adolescence (12- ):

This entails a progression of motor habits, to socialization of behavior on the basis of such intuitive moral values as equality and fairness, to distributive justice and cooperation according to the needs of others, to action and even to sacrifice for an ideal.

(a) Motor habits (years 1-2). During the first two years the construction of the categories of the object: space, causality, and time, all "refer to purely practical or action categories and not as yet to ideas or thinking."

(b) Socialization of behavior on the basis of such intuitive moral values as equality and fairness in early childhood (yrs. 2-7):

With the appearance of language, behavior is profoundly modified both affectively and intellectually. In addition to real or material actions the child learns to master during this period, as he did during the preceding period, he now becomes able, thanks to language, to reconstitute his past actions as a form of recapitulation and to anticipate his future actions through verbal representation.

 

This has three consequences essential to mental development: (1) the possibility of verbal exchange with other persons, which heralds the socialization of action; (2) the internalization of words, i.e., the appearance of thought itself, supported by internal language and a system of signs; (3) last and most important the internalization of action as such which from now on, rather than being purely perceptual and motor as it has been heretofore, can represent itself intuitively by means of pictures and "mental experiments."

 

. . .

With the appearance of language, the young child must cope not only with the physical universe, as was the case earlier on, but also with two new and closely allied worlds: the social world and the world of inner representations. It should be recalled that with respect to material objects or bodies, the infant started with an egocentric attitude, in which the incorporation of objects into his own activity prevailed over accommodation (remodification of behavior as a result of experience). Thereafter, he gradually proceeds to situate himself in an objective universe (in which assimilation to the subject and accommodation to the real world become harmonized). Similarly, the young child at first reacts to social relations and to emergent thinking with unconscious egocentricity, which perpetuates the egocentricity of infancy. This egocentricity is then progressively given up, according to the laws of equilibration. These laws, however, are transposed to a higher level of functioning as a function of the need to cope with new realities. Throughout early childhood, therefore, one observes a partial repetition, on new behavioral planes, of the evolution already accomplished by the infant on the elementary plane of practical adaptations.

 

. . .

 

The most obvious result of the appearance of language is to permit verbal exchange and continuous communication among individuals. No doubt these interpersonal relations germinate as of the second half of the first year, thanks to imitation, since imitation is closely linked to sensorimotor development. There are no specific techniques of imitation. The infant learns to imitate gradually. At first, he copies gestures he can already execute spontaneously by watching the movements of the body and particularly the hands of other persons. As his capacity for sensorimotor imitation increases, he is able to copy the movements of others with increasing precision, provided these movements are within his repertoire of behavior. Ultimately, the child reproduces new, more complex movements.

 

For example it is more difficult for him to copy movements having to do with the parts of his body not visible to him, such as the face and the head. The imitation of sounds follows a similar course, and when sounds are associated with specific actions they result in the acquisition of language itself (elementary word-phrases, then substantives and differentiated verbs, and finally sentences as such). Until a definite form of language is acquired, interpersonal relations are limited to the imitation of corporal and other external gestures and to a global affective relationship without differentiated communication. With language, by contrast, the inner life itself can be communicated. In fact, thought becomes conscious to the degree to which the child is able to communicate it.

 

. . .

 

An examination of the spontaneous language of children and their behavior in collective games shows, therefore, that early social behavior remains midway along the road between egocentrism and true socialization. Rather than extricating himself from his own point of view in order to coordinate it with the viewpoints of others, the child still remains unconsciously centered on himself. This egocentricity vis-a-vis the social group reproduces and prolongs the egocentricity we have already noted in the infant vis-a-vis the physical universe. In both cases there is a lack of differentiation between the self and external reality, which at this stage is represented by other individuals and no longer simply by objects. In both cases this initial confusion results in the primacy of the child’s own point of view.

 

The psychological and, a fortiori, material constraint exercised by the adult on the child by no means precludes this egocentricity in the small child’s relationship to the adult. While submitting to the adult and seeing him as highly superior to himself, the small child frequently reduces the adult to his own scale, just as certain naive believers do with respect to divinity. This results in a compromise between his own point of view and that of the superior being, rather than in a well-differentiated coordination between the two (pp. 17-21).

 

(c) Distributive justice, according to the needs of others and cooperation in middle childhood (yrs. 7-12):

progress in two directions: individual concentration when the subject is working by himself and effective collaboration in the group. These two aspects of the behavior that starts at around seven years are in reality complementary and derive from the same sources. They are, in fact, so intimately linked that one is hard put to say whether the child has become capable of a certain degree of reflection because he has learned to cooperate with others or vice versa.

 

. . .

 

True discussions are now possible in that the children show comprehension with respect to the other’s point of view and a search for justification or proof with respect to their own statements. Explanations between children develop on the plane of thought and not just on the level of material action. "Egocentric" language disappears almost entirety, and the grammatical structure of the child’s spontaneous statements attests to his need for a connection between ideas and logical justification.

 

. . .

 

there is a noticeable change in social attitudes after the age of seven, as can be seen in games involving rules.

 

. . .

 

Closely connected with this progress of social behavior, there are transformations of individual action which appear to be both the causes and the effects of this progress. The essence of these transformations is that the child becomes capable of at least rudimentary reflection. Instead of the impulsive behavior of the small child, accompanied by unquestioned beliefs and intellectual ego-centricity, the child of seven or eight thinks before acting and thus begins to conquer the difficult process of reflection. Reflection is nothing other than intimate deliberation, that is to say, a discussion which is conducted with oneself just as it might be conducted with real interlocutors or opponents.

 

One could then say that reflection is internalized social discussion (just as thought itself presupposes internalized language). This view is in accordance with the general rule that one always ends by applying to oneself behavior acquired from others. Contrariwise, socialized discussion might also be described as externalized reflection. Since all human conduct is both social and individual, this problem, like all analogous questions, comes back to whether the chicken appears before the egg or the egg before the chicken.

 

The important point is that, in both respects, the child of seven years begins to be liberated from his social and intellectual egocentricity and becomes capable of new coordination which will be of the utmost importance in the development of intelligence and affectivity.

 

With respect to intelligence, we are now dealing with the beginnings of the construction of logic itself. Logic constitutes the system of relationships which permit the coordination of points of view corres-ponding to different individuals, as well as those which correspond to the successive percepts or intuitions of the same individual.

 

With respect to affectivity, the same system of social and individual coordination engenders a morality of cooperation and personal autonomy in contrast to the intuitive heteronomous morality of the small child. This new system of values represents, in the affective sphere, the equivalent of logic in the realm of intelligence. The mental instruments which will facilitate logical and moral coordination are the operation of logic in the field of intelligence and the will in the field of affectivity (pp. 39-41).

 

(d) Action and even sacrifice for an ideal (years 12- ) (joining the affective adolescent development described above):

CONCLUSION

basic unity of the processes which, from the construction of the practical universe by infantile sensorimotor intelligence, lead to the reconstruction of the world by the hypothetico-deductive thinking of the adolescent, via the knowledge of the concrete world derived from the system of operations of middle childhood.

 

We have seen how these successive constructions always involve a decentering of the initial egocentric point of view in order to place it in an ever-broader coordination of relations and concepts, so that each new terminal grouping further integrates the subject’s activity by adapting it to an ever-widening reality.

 

Parallel to this intellectual elaboration, we have seen affectivity gradually disengaging itself from the self in order to submit, thanks to the reciprocity and coordination of values, to the laws of cooperation.

 

Of course, affectivity is always the incentive for the actions that ensue at each new stage of this progressive ascent, since affectivity assigns value to activities and distributes energy to them. But affectivity is nothing without intelligence. Intelligence furnishes affectivity with its means and clarifies its ends.

 

It is erroneous and mythical to attribute the causes of development to great ancestral tendencies as though activities and biological growth were by nature foreign to reason. In reality, the most profound tendency of all human activity is progression toward equilibrium. Reason, which expresses the highest forms of equilibrium, reunites intelligence and affectivity" (pp. 69-70).