In order to explore the multiple ways to God it is important first to identify the distinctive modes of awareness of the divine in order to decipher the religious phenomena, and respond thereto in one’s own pilgrimage. Further, some sense of the chronological sequence of the emergence of these ways is needed in order to be able to appreciate the character and goals of the distinctive religious movements, not only in one’s own life, but in the history of people. Finally, there is need to appreciate the mutually complementary character of these ways and of the religious cultures they characterize in order to have principles of mutual understanding and global cooperation. Such principles are to be found not in God who is eternal, simple and unchanging, but in humans who are dispersed through space, complex in their physical and psychological make-up, and who progress or develop through time.

Professor Semou Pathe Gueye points out that this is the heart of the work Hegel, not only in his Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but in his Science of Logic on the form of knowing and in his Phenomenology of the Spirit on the form of consciousness, all of which show that all forms of consciousness and affectivity are ways of moving toward the truth which foundationally and ultimately is God. Religion and philosophy then are the highest forms of consciousness and the truth of history. In this Hegel integrates subject and object, man and nature, the world and God.

This is not to say that religion obeys reason, but rather that with philosophy it is the highest form in which reason expresses itself. Conversely the attempt of reason to proceed outside of a religious vision grounded in the Absolute has always been disastrous because it results in placing the limited as the unlimited,the relative as the absolute, man as God. This is characteristic of Enlightenment reason and perhaps most baldly and tragically expressed in Nietzsche and Sartre.

All of this can be seen in the writings of Hegel which should be read and pondered. The present work has, however, a somewhat different orientation, not one that contradicts the deep truth of what Hegel details in principle and in essence, but one which looks for the way in which this is lived in fact and in existence. Its intent is to search for the significance of the fact that human life in God is lived through time and in multiple modes. Hence, it will be important to see not only how the earlier and simpler modes of awareness are included in the more sophisticated ones which follow, but how their content is proper to them and cannot otherwise be captured; not only how the multiple converge toward a higher synthesis, but the significance of their diversity; not only their unity in principle, but the living of their diversity.

For this reason it has seemed that the model of lived development as analyzed psychologically by Piaget and others might be especially suggestive in directing our attention. Its assistance in following the diachronic as well as synchronic pattern of the multiple ways to God promises to bring us to the existential richness of what Hegel so richly unfolded in terms of essence and idea.

The pattern of sequenced development identified by Jean Piaget and others in the growth of the individual person shows, for instance, that only at a certain age is the capacity for abstract reasoning developed, at which point the child’s kinetic, cognitive and effective modes of action are transformed. This is reflected also in the development of higher levels of moral reasoning, which the cross cultural studies of Lawrence Kohlberg show to take place as life becomes socially more complex and persons take on more sophisticated administrative responsibilities. The very possibility for such differentiation, however, is grounded in the structure of the human person and one’s complex capacities for knowledge. This was the fundamental principle for the ordering of the sciences in the Aristotelian tradition and for the controlled development of scientific knowledge by Descartes.

A Theory of Development. To help understand the progression from one stage to the next Piaget elaborated a theory based upon the notion of equilibrium, its loss and reconstitution.

Any stage in the growth of persons constitutes an equilibrium or integrated state of its component factors in which the persons are able to make their contribution to others and to the whole society. An equilibrium is upset by a need, such as hunger which leads to the activity required in order to satisfy the need and to restore the equilibrium. Where the need can be satisfied by competencies already possessed, such as eating to satisfy hunger, doing so simply restores the previous equilibrium with the same competencies had before at that level. However, where the need can no longer be satisfied by capabilities already possessed, new ones must be developed. The subsequent state integrating these new capabilities, constitutes a new and higher equilibrium. This overall structure of development holds true of the range of transformations from a child’s learning to walk, through the green revolution in agriculture, to the stages in the history of astronomy.

Development implies elements of both continuity and differentiation. There is continuity because in the higher stage the capabilities of the previous stage are not lost, but perfected. The infant’s ability to move its limbs in crawling is not lost, but remains as a substructure and are perfected when the child learns to walk. These abilities are perfected still further when he or she learns to run and then adds the syncopation needed in order to be able to dance. Throughout, the earlier capabilities are retained and increasingly perfected. Where this is not the case what is had is not development but mere change, not improvement but mere substitution.

Conversely, development also implies differentiation because the adoption of one from among the many different possible modes of activity for responding to a need means that this type of activity will be the more developed. As further needs arise it will be easier to respond by further developments in this same line than by activating other capabilities which, though in principle equally effective, concretely are less available to this person or people. A family, for example, may solve its food problems by either more intensive farming or more intensive fishing, but seldom by both. The same is true with the virtues of patience and courage. Progressively, one capability or mode of action atrophies as the other is repeatedly employed and developed. Thus, over time and in interaction with their physical and social environment, each people evolves distinctive cultural patterns along with its history.

Components of Personality. In order to render the general theory more concrete Piaget distinguishes four dimensions of a personality:

- (1) The cognitive, by which we are aware of things as they exist over against ("ob-ject") ourselves as knower, even if these be about ourselves. This is the life of our senses and intellect, namely, of sensation and intelligence. When intellectual knowledge achieves reflexion upon itself, it is no longer only objective, but subject centered as well.

- (2) The affective, by which we respond to things with feelings and emotions, such an empathy and love, or rejection and hate.

- (3) The behavioral, by which we act personally and eventually socially.

- (4) The physiological, by which we are constituted bodily or organically.

Levels of Development. All four components or dimensions of personality are linked together and develop in unison. In his general theory, Piaget works out a sequence of levels built especially upon the cognitive component, reflecting the modern rationalist emphasis. Each step in the development of the capacities for knowledge enables corresponding developments in the articulation of feeling and the implementation of action. However, development in modes of feeling also facilitate action, including cognition; and development of demands for action evokes a more sophisticated pattern of feelings and new cognitive capabilities. Hence, one might question the unidirectional development from cognition to affectivity and behavior and see alternate sequences in terms of deeper senses of the constitution of human identity.

In any case, Piaget sees each step in the development of one’s cognitive abilities as being accompanied by a corresponding step in the other dimensions of one’s personality. This proceeds in a series of four progressive steps from infancy — years 1-2 (Mental Development, pp. 8-17), to early childhood — years 2-7 (pp. 17-38), to middle childhood — years 7-12 (pp. 38-59), and to adolescence — year 12- (pp. 60-76).

Two examples show briefly how this works: 1. cognitive development during the stage of infancy, and 2. the stages of affective development throughout all of childhood. A brief, yet more detailed sketch of the overall process is reconstructed through passages from Piaget in Appendix I at the end of this volume.

1. Development in Infancy. The first example is found in Piaget’s brief summary of the development which takes place during the first two years of life. Cognitively, during the first three months of infancy everything is perceived in terms of self. Correspondingly, affectivity is a matter of reflexes, such as fear of losing one’s equilibrium or of falling off a table or ledge, in terms of which behavior is instinctive. As a result physiologically nutritional needs are central with the infant proceeding from perceptions of hunger, to discomfort, to cry for nourishment.

By the second three months the infant develops cognitively the first organized percepts of the other as is seen in the actions of turning toward sounds, repeating what gives good results, or recognizing and adapting to others. This is accompanied affectively by differentiation in the emotions of pleasure and pain, and behaviorally by the first motor habits.

After the first six months the infant evolves practical intelligence of self in relation to others. This is accompanied by elementary affective and sensori motor organization, such as, e.g., experimenting with sight by developing action schemata in order to work out what can be seen by one or both eyes.

(J. Piaget, Six Psychological Studies, pp. 8-17)

Infancy Cognitive Affective Behavioral Physiological

1-3 mos. perceives first instinctive nutritional

all in terms emotions; according to needs

of self instincts, reflexes

reflexes

3-6 mos. first differentiated first

organized emotions motor habits

percepts

6-18/24 sensori- elementary

mos. motor and affective

practical organization

intelligence

of self in

relation

to others

2. Development of Affectivity. A second example is Piaget’s summary description of the affective development experienced throughout childhood. Affectivity first undergoes elementary organization so that joy and sadness are linked to interest and disinterest, and to effort and fatigue. This manifests both initial self-awareness and awareness of other things and persons. The evolution of affectivity during the first two years corresponds to the parallel evolution of motor and cognitive functions, which extends through childhood and adolescence. Piaget describes it thus:

A more complete description of these stages of child development in Piaget’s own terms can be found in Appendix I at the end of this volume.

Piaget summarizes the overall pattern of cognitive and affective development, and their interrelation, as follows:

In conclusion, let us point out the basic unity of the processes which, from the construction of the practical universe by infantile sensorimotor intelligence, lead to the reconstruction of the world by the hypothetico-deductive thinking of the adolescent, via the knowledge of the concrete world derived from the system of operations of middle childhood.

 

We have seen how these successive constructions always involve a decentering of the initial egocentric point of view in order to place it in an ever-broader coordination of relations and concepts, so that each new terminal grouping further integrates the subject’s activity by adapting it to an ever widening reality.

 

Cognitive (thinking) Affective Behavioral Psychological

(feeling, willing)

Infancy sense percepts from instincts, emotions 1st motor habits nutritional basis

years 1-2 self to others with elementary for relation to

(pp. 8-17) organization others, workd

Early Childhood intuitive concrete stably organized socialization of

years 2-7 non-reversible interpersonal feelings of behavior on intuitive

pp. 17-38 picture pp. 22-23 e.g., obedience pp. 33-38 moral values

Middle Childhood abstract intellectual, will for moral and distributive justice

years 7-12 concepts, reversible on social choices pp. 54-60 and cooperation

pp. 38-59 concrete things pp. 41-54 pp. 38-41

Adolescence formal thought with autoincarnation of ideals according to ideal e.g., integration

year 12- abstract hypothetico- and entry into the society of sexuality

pp. 60-76 deductive constructions of adults pp. 64-70

pp. 61-64

Level I: Preconventional

Stage 1: Heteronomous or punishment-and-obedience orientation. The physical consequences of action, particularly as to punishment and reward by others, determine the moral status of an act.

 

Stage 2: Instrumental relativism. Right action is what is personally beneficial, although this may include reciprocal exchanges of benefit to others in a "marketplace" or trading arrangement.

 

Level II: Conventional

Stage 3: Interpersonal conformity. Moral goodness consists in carrying out what others expect of someone in a role or position, and in the approval of these others.

 

Stage 4: "Law-and-order" orientation. Obeying the fixed laws of the society or group and maintaining social order constitutes right action.

 

Level III: Post-Conventional or Principled

Obviously, it is a big step from Piaget’s stages of cognitive development in children, Kohlberg’s scheme for cognitive moral development, and Gorman’s life long pattern of overall moral growth, to the concern of this work, namely, to learn more about ways to God. It is important not to overextend the analogy between these. Nevertheless, the theory of cognitive and moral development can be helpful as we stand before the broad array of such ways, each with its own special character and contribution. Like an anthropo-logist who enters a native camp, one must know what one is looking for, what can be significant and how the relevant pieces of evidence can be fitted together. Without that everything can be written down, but none of it will have meaning.

Piaget’s work on relations between knowledge, affectivity and behavior, their various stages, and the transition from one to another can have a suggestive heuristic value in our investigation. For, it suggests the range and mode of cognitive, affective and behavioral activity at various stages, as well as correspondences between these. As a result a mode of behavior can be appreciated not just as a bizarre fact, but as corresponding to a distinctive mode of under-standing and the corresponding affective response — and vice versa.

This suggests that at each step in the development of peoples — as of this work — we look for the need, which entails a disequilibrium, and for the development of related capabilities of awareness, affectivity and behavior aimed at restoring the equilibrium. Understanding this should enable greater appreciation of the mode of religious response developed at that point in human progress. By no means does this suggest that God is a human creation. The divine infinitely transcends human capabilities; what evolves are human abilities to appreciate and respond to the divine. Like a mirror or a microscope we do not create what we observe. Rather, we develop multiple modes of observation in order to respond to, and thereby to live with, in and by the divine.

There is much more on this in the chapters which follow. Here, however, it is essential to observe a number of cautions. First, one must not consider the infant to be inhuman because he or she has not developed higher levels of cognition, affectivity or action. In terms of the level of development of the infant’s capabilities of awareness and strength he or she responds to his or her mother as fully and unconditionally as does the mother in response, given her more developed capabilities. Both hold to each other with all the strength and affectivity of which they are capable. Indeed, the gospel will call on the adult to be as a little child in recognition of the difficulty of retaining the uncompromising and single minded devotion had as a child when one reaches higher and more complex levels of psycho-social development.

Similarly, it must not be thought that a person or people is less human before developing some of the higher levels of reasoning and affectivity. The child at whatever stage organizes his or her whole life according to his or her level. A five year old is fully human, deserving of all the protections to life possessed by one of 17 or 35 years; indeed, their needs and rights to protection and education are greater, and accordingly the by-word: "Children first".

Finally, it must be understood that peoples can organize and live their whole life only in terms of the capabilities they have developed. Hence, it must be expected that the organization of the life of a group whose cognitive capabilities are focused in terms, e.g., of imagination or "picture thinking" will be lived accordingly. Whereas a young child needs to care for only a limited area of activity in terms of his or her imagination, an entire people in an analogous stage of development must care in those terms for all the needs of childcare, social organization and culture. The Golden Age of Greece with its great creations of art and public administration was lived entirely in imaginative, mythic terms, for science was not yet possible, yet we struggle, and in many ways in vain, to match that level of civilization. Hence, the steps we shall take in the sequence of the following chapters regarding ways to God is not a univocous transfer from a level of child development to the culture of a people, but an analogous relation according to which the stages of cognitive, affective or motor development specify the modes which the range of a people’s reasoning, affectivity and social relations can achieve.

Indeed, Paul Tillich goes further in pointing out that as persons or people’s move from one level to the next, the mode into which they move, while providing special and needed capabilities, is not able to carry forward all that was developed in terms of the prior level. For this reason, Piaget’s note that earlier stages are not dispensed with, but remain as substrata for the proper realization of those which follow is especially indicative of the importance of a cultural heritage and its indispensable character for authentic human development. From this follows the crucial need of protecting cultural traditions and attending to their proper transposition and adaptation.

All of this suggests that the different ways to God are not indifferently related between themselves, that each cannot be undertaken at any point in life or at any social or historical stage. Rather, it appears:

(a) that there are a series of basic cognitive capacities or powers, technically called faculties;

(b) that each of these has a characteristic mode of activity;

(c) that they are actuated in sequence in the life of each individual;

(d) that this constitutes stages of development, each with its own characteristic, cognitive, affective and behavioral dimension;

(e) that the earlier stages remain as foundations in what might be called "higher" stages, which are characterized by the deployment and implementation of qualitatively more perfect abilities in each dimensions;

(f) that the "lower" stages may never be able to be fully transferred with all their content to the "higher" levels, and therefore must continue to be lived in earlier terms lest they be lost (that there is an element of totem in myth and of myth in science, which is only now being rediscovered); and

(g) that this is a matter not only of individual development, but characterizes the life of peoples as a whole, which suggests an embededness in the culture which cannot be adequality articulated in conceptual terms, but is appreciated aesthetically.

Hence earlier people may articulate their personal and social lives entirely, and indeed very richly, in terms of the first levels of thought or understanding, and order their physical, social and religious relations thereby. In a parallel manner, each of the ways to God is essentially a profound and integral responses to the religious call of its time and remains an integral dimension of the religious response in our times. To be fully conscious of one’s religious life today and creative in its development for the future requires then some sense of these components.

We can begin to sort out the distinct ways to God by identifying first the basically different cognitive capabilities on which they are based. According to these basic human capabilities for knowledge — technically called faculties — the structure of the levels of knowledge of the sciences and of the ways to God can be charted. Basically they are threefold, being divided between sense and intellect, while the senses are further subdivided between those that are external and internal.

The external senses are classically the five senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch, though recent psychology would add to the list. They present to us the world outside and do so directly or by intuition. The object must be physically present to be seen or touched, or if mediated by a mirror or television these must be close to us with an unobstructed line of sight. Further, we can see only what is on the screen at that time. Thus, sensation is a physical or material capability, and, as with all things in the physical world, is characterized by space and time. These are the external senses.

We must not only gather impressions from our various senses, however, but combine them in an integrated image of the single object. This is the work of common sense. Further, we are able to continue to work with what we have sensed in the past, but which remains in our memory available to recall. Finally, we are able not only to repeat the images of the past, but to recombine these in limitless ways. From the memories of the red color of a barn, a horse and a bird in flight we can form with our imagination the composit image of a flying red horse, though no such a thing has ever existed.

This work of the internal sense capability is essential if we are not merely to remain in the given situation, but to begin to find new ways of arranging our physical and social relations. Without these capabilities we would be simply condemned to whatever be our circumstances. The internal senses, however, remain senses, and their presentation of objects retain physical or spatial characteristics. Hence, the imagination always works with some shape, figure or picture, even if it be a word. Indeed it was by combining this figurative character had in geometry with the arithmetic precision of algebra that Descartes was able to develop algebraic geometry and to know within a month its capabilities and limits.

A major difference is found, however, between sense knowledge, whether external or internal, and intellection. The former are material modes of knowledge and hence characterized by space and time; intellection, in contrast, is precisely freed from such characteristics: it is not material but spiritual. Thus it is able to grasp the nature of things unspecified as to space and time; and to establish symbolic relations so as to develop language and entire cultures and ways of life. It is able to think in terms of being, unity and truth, goodness and beauty. This enables the mind to grasp the meaning of the physical world, to establish laws and rights, to create beautiful buildings and symphonies, and to evaluate things in terms not only of passing time but of eternity. By this a human, while fully animal, can transcend not only the animal kingdom, but especially oneself and one’s ego. Thus, one’s life and the lives of others can be appreciated in their global dimensions and sacred meaning.

This threefold division of the powers of knowledge was central to the establishment of the pattern of the sciences in ancient as well as modern philosophy. Aristotle’s division of the sciences proceeded on the basis of this division.

First, it recognizes that the intellect is distinct from the senses and that its knowledge is not held to the concrete singularity of its object as are the senses. I can touch only this or that tree, but in both cases I can know it as a tree rather than a rock. That is to say, the intellect abstracts from the individuality of its objects and hence is able to develop knowledge that is not simply of a collection of single things, but concerns the nature of a whole class of things. This makes it possible to develop sciences as coordinated bodies of knowledge of general types or species.

The sciences, however, are themselves grouped together. Things as presented by the external senses are characterized by their external qualities whereby one is able to distinguish e.g., trees from animals. Knowledge of the former will come within the field of botany and of the latter within zoology; both life sciences in turn will be distinct from geology as a science of inorganic realities.

Secondly, if the intellect works with objects presented not with the qualitative information provided by the external senses, but only with the quantitative factors received by the internal senses, then one is no longer in the physical sciences but in mathematics. Here one abstracts not only from the singular individuality of the object as do the physical sciences, but also from whether the object be plant or mineral. It is concerned only with such quantitative factors as sizes and shapes; its work is mathematics.

Thirdly, when the intellect prescinds or abstracts from the characteristics of all sense knowledge, both external and internal, and its physical objects to consider things simply as existing, rather than as characterized either qualitatively or quantitatively, it has gone beyond the physical to the meta-physical.

Aristotle’s classical threefold division of the sciences was further developed by Thomas Aquinas in the Middle Ages (see Chapter V below). It is central also to the Meditations of Descartes, the father of modern philosophy. In initiating his famous method of doubt in Meditation I he noted that it was necessary to assure the truth of knowledge and hence to bracket or put all under doubt until its truth value could be assured. But though it was not possible to do so singly for each instance of knowledge, he could employ a class action approach by establishing a doubt about the principles or sources of whole areas of knowledge. These — not incidentally — were of three levels. The objectivity of the external senses was subject to doubt because of the experience of dreams. The internal senses could be subjected to doubt because of the fantastical imagination of artists and other image makers who could make up images unrelated to any reality. The intellect, however, which saw clearly could be doubted only on the supposition of an evil genius able to deceive us in our thinking Correspondingly, the re-establishment of modern philosophy through his subsequent series of Meditations consisted precisely the recertification in reverse order of these three levels of knowledge.

To distinguish these three basic modes of human knowledge is identically to open three corresponding ways to God as each constitutes a distinct mode of awareness in terms of which the divine can be articulated. Thus in relation to the external sense, the totemic intellect used visible objects to express the divine; in relation to the internal sense of imagination the mythic intellect developed the stories of the gods, while in terms proper to the intellect the philosophical mind proceeded to express the divine as Being itself.

It is time now to bring together this synchronic series of ways of knowing and compare it to the diachronic developmental series in human life and its history. From the above, on the one hand, we have the threefold synchronic series of: (a) the division of the powers of knowledge and (b) the corresponding division of the sciences. On the other hand, we have the two diachronic sequences of: (a) the emergence of different modes of thinking throughout human history and (b) the recent developmental insights of Piaget, Kohlberg and Fowler. Comparing these two sequences we find a threefold pattern each with its own way to God. (1) To the work of the intellect as proceeding with, and according to, the data of the external senses there corresponds the totemic mode of thinking, social organization and overall sense of life which was characteristic of earlier and simpler forms of social life, but which remains later as a substructure. (2) To the work of the intellect as proceeding with, and according to, the internal sense of imagination and its picture thinking there corresponds the later mythic mode of thought. Finally, (3) to the work of the intellect proceeding in, and according to, its own intellectually developed capabilities there corresponds the scientific mode of thought. This, in turn, as noted above, can be of three levels of abstraction or separation, namely, the physical, the mathematical and the metaphysical. To all of this, which is according to cognitive development, should be added affective development on the part of feelings and will, which would generate a second parallel schema, as well as a third schema based on the physical and kinetic order.

From the above the following cognitive schema emerges:

Consciousness

1. external sense sensing totem

2. internal senses picturing myth

3. intellect abstract complex reasoning scientific

systems

a. simple physics

apprehension.. mathematics

b. judgement metaphysico-

religious

This schema, as with the classical structure of the sciences, is built on the pattern of powers or faculties for objective knowledge, that is, for knowledge of reality as distinct from the subject. However, it has been characteristic of more recent thought (echoing in part the orientation of St. Augustine long ago) to turn from the objective to the subjective, that is to the self-reflective and free awareness of the properly human consciousness as central reality in all creation. This is reflected in Heidegger’s dasein or self-conscious human being where Being properly enters into time. Classically, this was seen as the human precisely as image of God. Further analysis of the structural and hermeneutic characteristics of the method of this study of ways to God is found in the succeeding chapter, drawing upon Lévi-Strauss and Paul Ricoeur on the concrete issue of the interpretation of totemism.

We should not underestimate how great is this inversion of horizons from the objective to the subjective. In terms of our physical nature Aristotle and Thomas had considered change, i.e., the physical, to be what is most obvious; all was judged from there. The present inversion from objectivity to subjectivity points rather to reality as self-conscious (Part III). Hence, it directs our attention to the divine, and particularly to the Trinitarian interchange of knowledge and love, as the archetype of reality. It follows that it is through a degree of participation or imitation of the divine that all is to be understood and responded to, whether in mind, in heart or in body.

The significance of ways to God is that they enable our human outlook to be truly God-centered; that is, to appreciate ourselves and others, including nature, in terms of our divine origin and goal, and hence as holy and indeed sacred. In this light we find the real meaning and value of all our capabilities or powers.

Further, the ways to God not only provide a foundation for knowledge, but evoke love or charity as the form of all the virtues. Thus they invite us to mystical union of love with God. Hence, these many ways to God bring us truly home.

Each of these ways will need to be identified in detail along with their corresponding activities and patterns of social consciousness. This will be the burden of the subsequent chapters. Indeed, doing so will constitute an archeology of consciousness, not only in the sense of identifying the sequence in which each emerges, but also of digging deeply into ourselves for our capabilities for responding to God and bringing these to light.

Further, following the suggestive developmental theory of Piaget it may be possible to gain some insight into how and why these modes have succeeded, without entirely replacing, one upon the other. If so, we could better appreciate the fundamental religious meaning of these ways, what must be retained of each way in those which succeed, and the new vistas on the divine that are opened by each succeeding way. This will make it possible to respect and promote each of these ways to God, while relating them ecumenically one to another.

Finally, if these are not only ways to God, but entire modes of human awareness and their corresponding cultures and civilizations then they will constitute a high wisdom. They will enable us to see how knowledge itself and hence all of human life — knowledge along with its corresponding affectivity and action — is a process from and to God. This endows human life with that sacredness in meaning and dignity which makes it at once the personal subject of rights and the bearer of social responsibilities, both inspired by ultimate concern for God who is made manifest and is glorified through all.

1. Jean Piaget, "The Mental Development of the Child," Six Psychological Studies, trans. A. Tenzer (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), chap. I. (Page numbers in the text refer to this work.)

2. J. Fowler, "Stages in Faith: the Structural-developmental Approach," in T.C. Hennesey, ed., Towards Moral and Religious Maturity (New York: Paulist Press, 1977b).

3. L. Kohlberg, "High School Democracy and Educating for a Just Society," in Ralph L. Mosher, ed., Moral Education: A First Generation of Research and Development (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), p. 21. Kohlberg claims to have validated these stages cross-culturally.

4. Margaret Gorman, "Life-long Moral Development", Psychological Foundations of Moral Education and Character Development: An Integrated Theory of Moral Development, Richard T. Knowles and George F. McLean, eds. (VI. 2; Washing-ton, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1992), pp. 267-319.

5. M. Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961), p. 130.

6. Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, How Natives Think (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966), p. 62.

7. Placide Tempels, La Philosophie Bantoue (Elisabethville: Lovania, 1945).