CHAPTER XVIII

 

ON THE HISTORY, THEORETICAL DIFFICULTIES AND PROSPECTS OF SUBJECTIVITY IN WESTERN THOUGHT

  DUAN DEZHI

 

 

                Since modern times the theory of subjectivity has been one of the fundamental issues and significant achievements of Western philosophy. It has faced many difficulties in its development; and though declared dead, it still has bright prospects.

 

SUBJECTIVITY IN WESTERN THOUGHT

 

The Historical Development of Subjectivity in Western Thought

 

                The word "subject" comes from the Latin word "subjectum", which means something under or constituting the foundations of other things. In Greek philosophy, at least in Aristotle, "subject" is not a philosophical category which belongs especially to a human being or person. Rather it is the opposite of an attribute or of the predicate of a sentence. A subject, such as Socrates, a dog or a stone, is also a substance for Aristotle.1 Up to the age of Descartes, the conception of subject as a philosophical category belonging to the human being does not overshadow the general conception of substance.

                In Descartes's philosophy, a subject is ego, soul or mind. Like a material body, they are a kind of substance, but are different from the latter in essence. The essence of material substance is extension, whereas the essence of ego, soul or mind is thinking. Ego is not only different from the material substance in essence, but also does not come from the latter. This is the meaning of his Cogito, "I think, therefore I am."2 Up to Descartes, the conception of subject as a philosophical category belonging to human being does not predominate over the general conception of substance.

                Because Descartes put forward his theory of the subjectivity of human being within the framework of his mind-body dualism, his conception of the subjectivity of the human being as such could not contain any further and deeper intention. It would be up to Leibniz, Kant and Husserl and others to do this.

                The monadology of Leibniz not only calls the monad a "soul" or "entelechy", and considers the perceptive activity to be the essential content of a monad, but it also clearly declares that a monad is a center of metaphysical force. Leibniz held that the soul has no windows but intrinsically possesses a kind of force, which promotes the transition of a monad from the state of less clear perception to that of clearer perception; thus it is a mirror of the whole universe. All of this enables the ego (the subject) in Descartes's philosophy to acquire a new, active quality.3 It clearly raises the question of the subjectivity of the human being.

                But for Leibniz, the subject still is a kind of substance, and in a certain sense it is even a kind of subject of the same type as Aristotle's. There is no radical change in the notion of subject until Kant. Within the framework of solving the question of "how a synthetic a priori judgment is possible," Kant examines "subject" or "ego," and develops new understanding of subject or self beyond Descartes and Leibniz. He creatively develops Leibniz's thought of apperception, and considers subject or self as a kind of ability or activity of synthesizing perceptual data or constructing experiential objects. This turns the Cartesian-Leibnizian substantiated subject (ego) into an a priori function of consciousness, or grounds for the possibility of all knowledge.4

                Husserl admired this effort of Kant, but did not approve of Kant declaring subjects, selves or egos as "things-in-themselves". For Husserl, subject, self or ego are not unknowable "things-in-themselves", but might be a matter of absolute evidence; thus he puts forward a slogan, "to the things themselves". The method by which Husserl gets to the things themselves is called "phenomenological reduction". In this process Husserl not only systematically reveals the structures of the intentionality of the subject or ego, but also exposes the quality of givenness of the subject as the transcendental ego.5

 

The Theoretical Difficulties of Subjectivity in Western Thought

 

                Subjective Western thought contains some intrinsic contradictions and problems which are resolved with great difficulty from the very beginning. These contradictions and problems are not eliminated or resolved, but sharpened and made manifest in the process of the development of the thought.

                The first problem confronting the Western subjective thought is the contradiction between the possibility of knowing extrinsic objects and the absolute givenness of the knowing subject or ego. Generally speaking, Western thought always considered the problem of knowing extrinsic objects. Descartes and Husserl discuss the subjectivity of the human being in the context of seeking unquestionable certainty for knowledge. This leads to acknowledging existence-by-itself, and the self-sufficiency of a subject or ego, and to emphasis upon the absolute internality and givenness of a subject or ego. That produces the knotty problem of how the subject or ego can reach or correspond to external things, since it is absolutely intrinsic and absolutely given. To deal with the problem, Descartes theorizes about the function of the "pineal gland"; Leibniz distinguishes between truths of fact and truths of reason; Kant puts forward "things-in-themselves" or "noumenon" besides the "phenomenon"; and Husserl distinguishes the scientific world from the "lived world". In a sense all of these may be considered varieties of Hume's fork. They do not resolve the problem of knowing the external things, but expose the limitations of the Western thought.

                The second problem confronting Western thought is the dualistic antithesis between the empirical and the transcendental egos. Descartes's maxim, "I think, therefore I am", projects the existence-by-itself or self-sufficiency of the self or ego. What he emphasizes in the formula of the thinking "I" is some psychological activities such as sensing, perceiving, or willing; he had not question further the possibilities of these psychological activities. Further questioning is necessary to resolve the problem of the possibility of knowing. Because of this Kant and Husserl put forward the theory of transcendental ego, beyond Descartes's empirical ego (psychological ego). He was the first person to do so in his so-called "Copernican revolution." After Kant, Husserl further stresses its activity in his phenomenological suspension or reduction as prior to the empirical ego. His transcendental phenomenology essentially is a doctrine of the transcendental ego,6 which carries Descartes' subjectivity principle to the extreme.

                The third problem confronting Western subjective thought is to confirm "the other self". As stated above, the fundamental requirements and content of Western subjective thought are the existence-by-itself, self-support, self-sufficiency, absolute intentionality and the absolute givenness of a subject, self, or ego. This theory is inevitably solipsistic. Descartes and Kant reconcile the contradiction by casting the subject or ego against the dualistic background of mind-body or phenomena-noumena. Husserl, however, makes the problem more serious for the transcendental ego as a "phenomenological residuum" corresponds to the noumena which for Kant is something one can think of, but not know. As inevitably this threatens to lead Husserl into solipsism, he discusses the problem of inter-subjectivity after having fundamentally finished the theoretical construction of a transcendental phenomenology. The essence of inter-subjectivity is not to recognize the existence of "other things" or "other bodies," but to recognize the existence of a kind of "other-self" as co-existent with the "self" or "ego". Husserl successively puts forward several categories, such as "Appresentation", "Paarung", "empathy Einfuhlung," "to understand each other", in order to open up a window for Leibniz's monad.7 Though Kant and Husserl emphasize the priority of the transcendental ego, they do not entirely eliminate Descartes's theory of the empirical ego. Indeed, their doctrine of the transcendental ego does not allow them to do so because then their transcendental ego would have neither actual apperceptive activity nor intentional activity. The presupposition of the empirical ego, in principle, is a kind of negation or threat to the absolute givenness or the absolute self-sufficiency of the transcendental ego and its activities.

 

The Contemporary Development of Subjectivity in Western Thought

 

                Western thought on subjectivity is connected closely with Western epistemology, not only logically but also historically. Indeed, the formation and development of Western subjective thought are almost synchronous with the latter. Therefore philosophical reflection of Western subjective thought also almost always is closely connected with philosophical reflection on modern epistemology. Consequently, many philosophers pay it special and extensive attention.

                Many contemporary philosophers consider that the difficulty of Western subjective thought is derived from the direct and inner connection between it and epistemology. Those modern philosophers consider the question of the subjectivity of human beings mainly from the position of epistemology. For them there are dualistic antitheses between subject and object, mind and body, the empirical ego and the transcendental ego, the "I" and the "other" as selves, the absolute givenness of subject and the possibility of knowing external things. In order to eliminate the contradictions and the antitheses, the decisive step is to enter into the field of ontology and to leave the field of epistemology. Many famous contemporary philosophers and thinkers, such as Heidegger, Sartre and Buber, have actively attempted to do so.

                The fundamental category of Heidegger's philosophy is "Dasein," whose fundamental intention is "Being-in-the-world". Hence, the subject and object, the mind and external things, in other words, the Dasein and the world, ideas and actuality, are united and identical in the existence mode of the "Dasein". Sartre distinguishes between "in-itself" and "for-itself". When he declares human consciousness nothing, the independence and identity of human consciousness or for-itself from in-itself is self-evident. Moreover, Sartre declares that the fundamental characteristics of human consciousness are its "nothingness" or "negativity" and "existence precedes essence." This, too, reveals the dynamic and dialectical unity or identity between "in-itself" and "for-itself".

                Neither Heidegger nor Sartre completely resolved the relation between the self of the I and the other in Western subjective thought. On the contrary, they make the relation more tense. Heidegger speaks of "co-existence" or "men," but he understands them as "inauthentic existence" which is the opposite of Dasein as "authentic existence". Sartre attempts to surmount the obstacle of solipsism and to acknowledge the existence of others and the existence of us as a wholeness engaged in common activity, but in the end he can only express the view that the "other is hell."8 The monad with windows is no longer the monad of Leibniz; the self of being in the inter-subjectivity-relation loses its inherent subjectivity. This shows that Western subjective thought must be revamped in order to avoid solipsism.

                Among contemporary philosophers some consider the problem of human subjectivity from an entirely opposite position, such as Buber, the author of I and Thou. Martin Buber, like Heidegger and Sartre, gives a great deal of attention to the self-understanding of human beings, and he refuses to seek the answer to the question of the nature of human being in divine revelation. Instead, Buber emphasizes that one should not seek it from the individual (a single person) himself, but one should seek it from "the relation between one person (I-self) and another (you-self)," from "the between" of a person and a person, or from the inter-human. As Heidegger distinguishes Dasein from co-existence and Sartre distinguishes for-itself from in-itself, Buber distinguishes two kinds of basic words, two basic modes of existence and two worlds. These are: "I-Thou" and "I-It". "I-Thou" mode of existence and "I-It" mode of existence; the world of relations and the It-world of alienation. Contrary to Heidegger and Sartre, for Buber the individual belongs not to the spiritual world of relations, but to the inhuman "It-world". For Buber the natural world also is not the place in which the Dasein is thrown (as in Heidegger ), or the object ("in-itself") would be denied (as Sartre), but should be a relation of "I-Thou" with human beings.9 These show that it is impossible to deal appropriately with the relation between the "I" and the "other" as selves from the position of individualism.

 

Suggestions and Reminders from Eastern Philosophy

 

                In truth, Buber's relation theory does remedy and rectify some theoretical defects and errors of traditional Western subjective thought and the related thought of Heidegger and Sartre. However, it also has some serious drawbacks. For example, Buber asserts that the capacity and energy of advancing humanity must come not from within the individual, but from the relation between person and person; it must be inter-human. He even stresses that one becomes a person by grace and not by works.10 This clearly colors his theory of a kind of fatalism, which is far from the thought of the subjectivity of the human being, and runs in the opposite direction. It shows that to develop Western subjective thought, one should pay more attention to the problem of reconciling the relation between the autonomy of the individual and inter-human relations by moving deeper into ontology (metaphysics) and away from epistemology. Heidegger and Sartre emphasize the autonomy of the individual and exclude the inter-human; Buber emphasizes the interhuman but excludes the autonomy of the individual. None of these seems to answer the question of the subjectivity of the human being.

                The subjectivity of the human being is an important question concerning the condition of human existence which for the development of our species needs to be handled appropriately by a combination of theory and practice. Therefore, in the process of inquiring into the question of the subjectivity of the human being, it is possible, necessary and instructive that Western and Eastern scholars draw on the results of each other's research. In fact, just as Western scholars have a series of significant achievements regarding human subjectivity, so too Eastern scholars have a series of remarkable achievements in the same field. The Eastern theory of subjectivity has a series of theoretical characteristics distinct from that of the West.

                The first distinct characteristic of the Chinese thought on subjectivity is that Chinese philosophy has investigated the subjectivity of the human being from its very beginning. As stated above, strictly speaking, in the West inquiry concerning human subjectivity is the product of modern philosophy. In this Descartes may be seen as the first philosopher who clearly and distinctly puts forward a theory of the subjectivity of the human being.

                In contrast, Chinese philosophy has advanced a theory of human subjectivity of the human being from its very beginning and always consider it a central philosophical theme. In some sense, Chinese philosophy largely concerns the theory of the subjectivity of the human being. For example, as early as the foundation age (called "the axial age" by Karl Jaspers) of Chinese philosophy, the study of human subjectivity had constituted a theme of the Chinese philosophy. Mencius, one of the classical figures of Chinese philosophy, asserted that one can know and understand his own nature, the nature of all things, and Nature and its necessary laws so long as he or she reflects seriously upon him or herself and gives full realization to his or her heart-mind.11 Centrality and Commonality, another of the classical works of Chinese philosophy, further asserts that human beings can promote the transformation and nourishment of all things in the Universe, and form a trinity with Heaven and Earth.12

                The second distinct characteristic of Chinese subjective theory is that it always stresses inquiring into the subjectivity of the human being from the theoretical ontological level. As stated above, in the early developing stage of the Western subjective theory, such Western philosophers as Descartes, Leibniz and Kant inquired into the subjectivity of the human being mainly from the level of epistemology. Only in the present age have Western philosophers, such as Heidegger and Sartre, begun to inquire into the subjectivity of the human being from the level of ontological theory. In contrast with the West, Chinese philosophy stresses the subjectivity of the human being from the theoretical level of ontology. The Centrality And Commonality not only discusses the subjectivity of the human being from the theoretical height of the trinity of human beings with Heaven and Earth which are considered as the highest noumena of all things, but also prominently emphasizes the ontological rootedness of the human being. It makes clear the purpose and main theme from the very beginning. In the first chapter, it says, " What Heaven imparts to man is called human nature. To follow human nature is called the Way. Cultivating the Way is called teaching." This sets a precedent for discussing the subjectivity of the human being from the theoretical height of an anthropocosmic vision.

                The third distinct characteristic of Chinese subjective thought is that it emphasizes the wholeness of the subjectivity of the human being. A great weakness of Western subjectivity theory is its one-sidedness where the subject is usually "one-dimensional". For example, "the psychological ego" of Descartes and "the transcendental ego" of Husserl fundamentally belong to a kind of "knowing subject;" whereas "the solitary individual" of Kierkegaard is fundamentally a subject of "religious belief who refuses and excludes "the knowing subject," "the aesthetic subject" and "the ethical subject". In contrast with the West, Chinese philosophers consider that an authentic subject should be an overall or comprehensive person. He should be both a sage and a king, who is not only a knowing subject, but also a moral, ethical, political, social, historical-cultural subject and a subject of religious belief. According to Chinese philosophers, the relationship among these branch-subjects of an overall subject is not the kind of "either this or that" relationship, such as the "either-or" relationship of Kierkegaard. Rather, it is a kind of compatible and complementary relationship, in other kind of "both-and" relationship. The Great Learning, another of the classical works of the Chinese philosophy, considers that there are eight aspects or steps in the life of the human being. They are: (1) "investigation of things", (2) "extension of knowledge" (a knowing subject), (3) "sincerity of the will", (4) "rectification of the mind", (5) "cultivation of personal life (a religious belief subject and a moral subject), (6) "regulation of family", (7) "bringing order to the state" and (8) "bringing peace throughout the world" (an ethical subject, a political subject and a social subject). This is a typical treatment of the subject, for Chinese philosophy stresses the wholeness of the subjectivity of the human being.

                The fourth distinct characteristic of Chinese subjectivity theory is that it emphasizes the mutual independence and mutual promotion between selves of the "I" and the "other". As stated above, there has been a tense, opposite or even antagonistic relation between these selves in the Western doctrines of subjectivity, from Descartes, Kant and Husserl to Heidegger, Sartre and Buber. In contrast, the Chinese doctrines of subjectivity emphasize their mutual independence and their mutual promotion. The reason for this difference is that, according to Chinese philosophers, the I-self and the other-self share an universal nature from the natural necessity or the Mandate of Heaven, so that there is some possibility of mutual penetration, mutual connection and mutual transition. The other reason is that, according to Chinese philosophers, a person becomes an I and realizes its self-transformation and self-transcendence only if the person (the I-self) is in a dialectical relation of both opposition and relatedness with the other-self.13 This is the fundamental reason that the Chinese philosophers emphasize not only "sincerity of will", "rectification of mind" and "cultivation of personal life", but also emphasize "regulation of family", "bringing order to the state" and "bringing peace throughout the world". Because of such deep and dialectical understanding of the relation of the I and the other, the subjectivity theory of China appears comparatively sound, comprehensive and moderate. It should be noted that Confucius, who lived at almost the same time as Heraclitus, had considered loving others as an essential to the definition of the authentic person or "the profound person"; the Analects says, "humanity means to love others." Confucius also advanced "the principle of reciprocal loyalty" of analogy from I to the other as the fundamental code, intrinsically unifying "what I want to have" and "what I want others to have." He emphasized "let one establish his own character, and also establish the characters of others" and "what you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others". All of these are significant, difficult of attainment and commendable in the history of the doctrines of the subjectivity of the human being.

                The Chinese subjectivity theory also has its own weaknesses as well as contradictions and problems that are difficult to resolve and eliminate. However, undoubtedly all the characteristics or merits stated above can help us to deal appropriately with the problems confronting the subjectivity theories of the present age, especially the relationship of the autonomy of the individual and inter-human relations.

                There are now a series of knotty problems in Western subjectivity theory but, as some Western scholars have asserted, it will never die. Western thought on the problems of subjectivity may be able to broaden so long as Western scholars continue their reflection and engage the related achievements of the Eastern scholars. Similarly, Eastern scholars need actively to understand, absorb and use the achievements of Western scholars in order to promote the modernization of their own subjectivity theory. As an essential human attribute subjectivity will continue to exist and advance. Thus, the prospects of human subjectivity theory remain ever bright. Although in Western thought this theory has encountered a variety of difficulties and setbacks, its prospects remain exceedingly bright.

 

                                                                                                 NOTES

 

                1. Aristotle, Categories, 2a11-17.

                2. Descartes, Discourse on Method, Part IV, Meditation II.

                3. Leibniz, Monadology, §18, §19.

                4. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (translated by Gongwu Lan, Beijing, Commercial Press, 1997), pp. 276, 287.

                5. Husserl, Die Idee der Phanomenologie, Part 2-4, and Cartesian Meditations, IV.

                6. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, IV.

                7. Ibid., V

                8. Sartre, Huis Clos, V.

                9. M. Buber, I and Thou (New York: Scribner, 1958).

                10. Ibid.

                11. Some ancient Chinese literature: Confucius's Analects, The Works of Mencius,  The Great Learning, The Centrality and Commonality.

                12. Ibid. Tu Weiming, Centrality and Commonality -- An Essay on Confucian Religiousness (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York, c1989).

                13. Ibid.