CHAPTER
XXIV
GLOBALIZATION AS DIVERSITY
IN UNITY
GEORGE
F. McLEAN
THE
EMERGENCE OF GLOBAL CONCERNS
During the 1950s and 1960s the development of technological capabilities
made it possible to design vehicles with sufficient thrust and precision to be
able to break the bonds of earth and soar towards the planets. By the end of the
'60s, as projected by President Kennedy, Neil Armstrong landed on the moon. What
he saw there was of little interest -- a barren rocky terrain,
alternating between great heat and frigid cold. But what he saw from there
was of the greatest consequence. With a few of his predecessors in space
exploration, he was able for the first time in human history to look at the
Earth and see it whole. Throughout the millennia humankind had always seen
fragments, piece by piece; now for the first time the earth was seen globally.
At the time, astronomers sought avidly to learn about the moon. But for
philosophers the questions were rather what would be found about humankind,
about relations between peoples and about their presence in nature. More
importantly, they wondered if this would change the way in which people
understood themselves in all these regards: Would this intensify the trend to
see all and everyone as an object? Or could it contribute to overcoming
alienation and anomie, to transforming antipathies into bonds of friendship?
But, if this were to take place, would life be reduced to a deadly stasis?
Though the stakes were high, the philosophical questioning at first was languid.
Now, at the end of this millennium these questions of globalization emerge with
a full and fascinating force.
Why now rather than then? This would seem to relate notably to the end of
the Cold War, especially if this be traced deeply to the roots of the modern
outlook as a whole. At an earlier colloquium in Manila, Professor Lu Xiaohe1
pointed out how, at the very beginnings of modern times, Giovanni Battista Vico
(1668-1744) identified the limitations of the new way of thinking as bearing the
potential to lead to violent opposition for lack of an adequate capability to
take account of the unity of the whole. If the Cold War was the denouement of
this fatal flaw, and the world is no longer structured in a bipolar fashion,
then it is no longer the parts which give sense to the whole, but the converse:
the global is the basis of the meaning of its participants.
Proximately, this is a matter of communication and commercial
interchange, but their full deployment depends in turn upon a politique of
positive human cooperation in an integral human project. Thus today we reread
Kennedy's words about bearing any burden in defence of freedom in terms of his
positive context, namely, his invitation to all humankind to transcend limiting
divisions and to join together to make real progress. Of this his promise to
break beyond a divided planet and go to the moon by the end of that decade was
symbol and harbinger. The process of globalization transcends regional concerns
not to deny them, but to respond to them from a more inclusive vantage point in
terms of which all can have their full meaning and the opportunity to work
together to determine their own destiny. This is the heart of the issue of
globalization and cultural identities.
Until recently the term `globalization' was so little used that it
warranted only two lines in Webster's Unabridged International Dictionary.2
For the term `global,' however, three meanings are listed:
- the first, geometric, namely, a spherical shape;
- the second, geographic, namely, the entire world, with the connotation
of being complete. This was extended by the ancient Greeks to signify perfection
itself: Parmenides spoke of the One, eternal and unchanging as being spherical.
- the third, qualitative, namely, the state of being comprehensive,
unified or integrated.
It is interesting to note that Webster's saw this third character of
global as implying "lacking in particularizing detail" or "highly
undifferentiated." Today's challenge is more complex and more rich, namely,
to achieve a comprehensive vision whose integration is not at the expense of the
components, but their enhancement and full appreciation.
For insight on these issues I would turn to Nicholas of Cusa, born almost
six hundred years ago (1401-1464) at a special juncture in Western thought.
Often he is described as the last of the medievals and the first of the moderns.
In the high middle ages Thomas Aquinas and others had reunited the traditions of
Plato and Aristotle on the basis of the Christian discovery of the special
significance of existence. In this synthesis primacy was given to Aristotle
whose structure for the sciences began with Physics as specified by
multiple and changing things, whence it ascended to its culmination in the unity
of the divine life at the end of the Metaphysics.3 The ladder
between the two constituted a richly diversified hierarchy of being
John Dewey4 stressed -- perhaps too strongly -- the relation
of that ancient hierarchic world view to the Ptolemaic system in which the earth
is the center around which the sun and the planets revolve at a series of levels
in a finite universe. He traced the development of the modern outlook to the
change to the Copernican heliocentric model of an infinite but undifferentiated
universe.
Nicholas of Cusa bridged the two. He continued the sense of a
hierarchical differentiation of being from the minimal to the infinite, but
almost a century before Copernicus (1473-1543) he saw the earth as but one of
the spheres revolving around the sun.
His outlook with regard to the relations between people was equally
pioneering. As Papal legate to Constantinople shortly after it had been taken by
the Turks -- much to the shock of all Europe -- Cusa was able to see the
diversity of peoples not as negating, but as promoting unity.
These broad and ranging political, scientific, philosophical and
theological interests qualified him as a fully Renaissance man. In time he was
made a Cardinal in Rome, where he was buried. (As a student my interest in his
thought was stimulated by living for many years but two doors from his tomb.)
More recently, I directed the dissertation of Dr. David De Leonardis, Ethical
Implications of Unity and the Divine in Nicholas of Cusa.5
Expanded by the addition of sections on economic, social and religious unity,
this was published by The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy in 1998.
This paper emerges from that exploration which is summarized in the set of
tables drawn from that work and appended here as figures I-VIII.
It will proceed by looking first at the manner of thinking involved and
second, at Cusa's reconciliation of unity and diversity in a harmony which
Confucius might be expected to find of special interest. On these bases,
thirdly, it will look at the special dynamism with which this endows his sense
of being. Fourth, it will sample briefly some of the implications which this
global vision could have for contemporary problems of economic, social and
religious life, sketched in figures 4-7 and to be explored more extensively in
the separate sessions of this conference.
GLOBAL
THINKING
History
Any understanding of the work of the mind in the thought of Nicholas of
Cusa must be situated in the context of the Platonic notion of participation (mimesis
or image) whereby the many forms fundamentally are images of the one idea. For
Plato, whose sense of reality was relatively passive, this meant that the many
mirrored or were like (assimilated to) the one archetype or idea.
Correspondingly, in knowing multiple things the mind as it were, remembers
having encountered and been impressed by, or assimilated to, the one archetypic
idea which they image, all converging progressively toward a supreme One. For
Cusa, with Plato, this appreciation of the One remains foundational for the
knowledge of any particular. Here it is important to note how Cusa reconceives
the nature of this One, not only, but also, in global terms.
To this Aristotle, whose thought began from the active processes of
physical change, added a more active role for mind. This not only mirrors, but
actively shapes the character, if not the content, of its knowledge. As an
Aristotelian Aquinas too considered the mind to be active, but in the end the
objectivity of its knowledge depended upon a passive relation to its object:
beings "can by their very nature bring about a true apprehension of
themselves in the human intellects which, as is said in the Metaphysics,
is measured by things."6
Cusa's sense of "mind" unites both emphases: the original
measures the image, which in turn becomes like, or is assimilated to, the
original. Sense knowledge is measured by the object; this is even part of its
process of assimilation to the divine mind.7 But as E. Cassirer8
notes, Cusa shifts the initiative to the mind operating through the senses,
imagination, reason and intellect. Rather than being simply formed by sense
data, the mind actively informs the senses and conforms and configures their
data in order that the mind might be assimilated to the object. Thus both "extramental
objects and the human mind are measures of cognitive assimilation, that is to
say, we become like the non-mental things we know, and we fashion the conceptual
and judgmental tools whereby we take them into ourselves as known."9
But in saying this Miller seems not to have reached the key point for our
concerns for global awareness -- or of Cusa, for that matter. This is not merely
the classical realist distinction between what is known, which is on the part of
the thing, and the way in which it is known which reflects the mind by which the
thing is known. Cusa has added two moves: First, the One of Plato is not an
ideal form, but the universe of reality (and this in the image of the Absolute
One); second, the human mind (also in the image of the divine mind) is
essentially concerned with this totality of reality in terms of which global
awareness with all its knowledge is carried out.
Discursive
Reasoning
In his study on mind,10 Cusa distinguishes three levels of
knowledge, the first two are discursive reasoning, the third is intellection.
The first begins from sense knowledge of particular material objects. This is
incremental as our experiences occur one by one and we begin to construct a map
of the region, to use a simile of L. Wittgenstein's Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus.11
But for Cusa the knowledge of the multiple physical things by the lower
powers of sensation and imagination raises the question of the unity of things
which must be treated in terms of the concepts of reason and intellect.12
For the forms in things are not the true forms, they are clouded by the
changeableness of matter.13 The exact nature of anything, then, is
unattainable by us except in analogies and figures grounded essentially in the
global sense grasped by our higher powers.14
But while sense knowledge is inadequate for a global vision, Cusa
considers innate knowledge or a separate world of ideas to be unnecessary and
distractive. Hence, he concludes (a) that sense knowledge is required; (b) that
both the physical object and the mind are active in the assimilation or shaping
of the mind, (c) that in this process the mind with its global matrix is
superior in that it informs or shapes the work of the senses, and (d) that it is
unable fully to grasp the nature of the object in itself.
As a result discursive reasoning as regards physical objects is limited
in a number of ways. First it is piecemeal in that it develops only step by
step, one thing at a time, in an ongoing temporal progression. Hence, on the
macro level discursive reasoning can never know the entirety of reality. On the
micro level it cannot comprehend any single entity completely in its nature or
quality. This is true especially of uniqueness or identity which for humans are
their personal and cultural identities.
The paradox of attempting to think globally in these terms is that as we
try to form overall unities we abstract more and more from what distinguishes or
characterizes free and unique persons so that the process becomes essentially
depersonalizing: hence the drama of globalization as the central phenomenon of
the present change of the millennia.
In the 20th century the technological implementation of depersonalization
reached such a crises that millions were crushed or exterminated -- hundreds of
thousands in pogroms, six million in the holocaust, 50 million in the Second
World War, entire continents impoverished and exploited. In effect the
limitations Cusa identifies in discursive reasoning simply are now no longer
tolerable, and new modes of thinking are required in order to enable life to
continue in our times.
Cusa recognizes a second type of discursive reasoning, namely, that of
mathematics, which does not share the limitations noted above. But here the
objects are not living beings, but mental objects of the same nature as mind.
Hence the mind can pivot on itself, using its own resources to construct and
process concepts and to make judgments which are exact because they are
concerned with what is not changing or material.15 This is Humes's
world of relations between ideas.16 But as it deals only with the
formal, rather than the existential, it cannot resolve the above-mentioned human
problems but serves to exacerbate them to the degree that its mode of discursive
reasoning becomes exclusive.
Intellection
Hence Nicholas of Cusa turns to a third mode of mental assimilation,
which is beyond the work of discursive reason, namely, intellection. Eugene Rice
contrasts the two approaches to knowledge by likening discursive reasoning to a
wayfarer walking through a valley and encountering things one by one, whereas
intellection is like being on a hill whence one surveys the entire valley all at
once.17 The latter view is global and the particulars are understood
as component parts; each thing has its proper reality but is also an integral
constituent of the whole. It is important to note that the unity of the scene as
known by intellection is constituted not by a mere assemblage of single entities
juxtaposed in space or time, but by multiple participations in a unity. (Indeed,
as we shall see in the next section, the multiple things in the physical order
also are limited images of the whole.)
Were we to express this in terms of modern thought, the distinction of
analytic and synthetic modes of thought would help, but not at all suffice. With
Descartes the moderns undertook a search for knowledge that was clear in the
sense of identifying the simple natures of each thing and distinct in the sense
that such knowledge should be sufficient at least to be able to distinguish one
type of thing from all others.18 This gave primacy to the analytic
process of distinguishing all into its component set of simple natures. The
supposition was that these were finite in number, that they could all be
identified clearly and distinctly by the mind, and that they could then be
reassembled by equally clear and distinct links in a process of synthesis.
This has marked the modern mind and set its goals and its limitations.
Having determined that only what was clear and distinct to the human mind could
qualify for inclusion, due to the limitations of the human mind, it was
inevitable that the uniqueness of each entity would be omitted as not clear to
the human mind and that organic character of the whole also would be omitted
because synthesis could assemble only what was clear and distinct.
For Cusa in contrast, intellection is knowledge in terms not of the
parts, but of the whole in which all participate. Here the intellect grasps the
meaning and value of the whole. It works with the imagination and reason to work
out the full range of possibilities and to grasp how the many fit together: it
"depends not upon the number of things which are known, but upon the
imaginative thrust of the mind" to be able to know "all the
multifarious possibilities which are open to being."19 Finally
it is guided by the senses to know which of these possibilities are actual. The
significance of the actual beings is not merely what we can garner by the
senses, but what is known primarily in terms of the whole by the intellect.
The Aristotelians build knowledge from concrete, changing and hence
limited things. Cusa's more Platonic heritage has him build knowledge rather in
the global terms of the whole and ultimately of the One of which the mind as
well as things are the images. Where these were but form for Plato, for Cusa
they are existent, sharing in the active power of being.
The Enlightenment was so intent on knowledge that it wound up tailoring
all to what it could know clearly and distinctly. As with the Procrustean bed,
what did not fit these specifications was lopped off and discarded as
hypothetical or superstition. Cusa's attitude is notably different for it
includes humility before reality, which it recognizes, and even reveres,
especially where it exceeds the human capacity for clarity of conception and
power of control.
The human mind, he would recognize, has limitations at both ends of the
scale of being. Even a minimal being cannot be exhaustively known. Like
attempting to make a polygon circular, no matter how many sides are added, more
remain always possible; a circular shape can never be attained in this manner.
Such knowledge, though partial and incomplete, is valid as far as it goes, but
it always can be improved upon. One can only project the circle by the thrust of
the imagination.
Knowledge of the Absolute, in contrast, cannot be improved upon.
Moreover, it is basically unreliable, for there is nothing to which the Absolute
can be compared.20 Hence, the negative way of saying what God is not
and the recognition of our ignorance in that regard constitute the relevant real
knowledge, for which reason Cusa entitled a major work: On Learned Ignorance.21
We have seen the limitations of knowledge constructed on the basis of
multiple limited beings understood as opposed one to another. Unity constructed
thereupon not only never manages to grasp such beings fully but simply discards
what is not known. Thus the uniqueness of the person cannot be recognized and is
lost. Conversely, the unities which can be constructed of such contrasting
reality remain external and antithetical so that, to the degree that it
succeeds, discursive reasoning is in danger of oppressing the uniqueness of the
participants. This is the classical dilemma of the one and the many; it is the
particular challenge of globalization in our day and the basic reason why it is
feared as a new mode of (economic) imperialism and oppression.
Cusa's suggestion of another mode of thinking whereby we think in terms
of the whole is promising, indeed essential for our new age. But it faces a
great test. Can it take account of diversity? If so, how can this be understood
as within, rather than in opposition to, unity? Is it possible to conceive
diversity as a contribution to unity rather than as its negation?
Parmenides had shown unity to be the first characteristic of being by
opposing being to non-being. In these terms each being was itself and nothing
less. But such reasoning in terms of the opposition of being to non-being
bespoke also contrast and opposition between beings, each of which in being
itself was precisely not any other being. Today the global reality makes it
necessary to ask whether there are more positive and relational modes of
conceiving multiplicity.
A
GLOBAL STRUCTURE OF UNITY AND DIVERSITY
To summarize then, we have seen the new global political, cultural and
economic phenomena in which we are situated and in terms of which we are called
to act. In looking toward the thought of Nicholas of Cusa, we saw that such a
global response requires a new dimension of thinking. The characteristic modern
discursive reasoning with its analytic approach of breaking all down to its
minimum components and reassembling them synthetically, proposed by Descartes in
his Discourse on Method, proceeds essentially in terms of parts rather
than of the whole, of the discrete without taking account of the overall unity.
As pointed out by Dr. De Leonardis, this entails that relations between
peoples and conflict resolution can be carried out only in terms of compromises
which leave no one satisfied and plant the seeds of further conflicts. Now, if
the means for conflict are so powerful as to be capable of overwhelming the
means for survival, we are faced with the imperative of finding how to proceed
in terms of a capacity to grasp the whole.
This pointed to Cusa's power of intellection, joined with that of the
imagination, to project what we cannot clearly conceive of the individual person
and the divine, to protect what we can only acknowledge of our creative freedom
and that of others, and to promote the growth of which we are capable but which
lies hidden in a future which is not yet.
As such, knowledge is directed toward an ordered reality -- ours and that
of the entire globe -- the central questions are not merely epistemological, but
ontological and ethical, namely, what is the global whole in which we exist, and
how can we act in relation to other peoples and cultures in ways that promote a
collaborative realization of global community in our times?
Unity
In response to this question Cusa would begin by identifying four types
or levels of unity:
1. Individual unity -- the identity by which each exists as itself in
contrast to others.
2. The unity of each individual being as within the whole of being. This
is important in grappling with the issue of globalization in our times and is
within the focus of the remainder of this chapter.
3. The unity of the universe by which the individuals together form not
merely a conglomeration of single entities, as with a pile of rocks, but a
unified whole which expresses the fullness of being. This may be the central
contribution of Cusa's thought for a study of globalization.
4. Absolute unity -- the One which, being without distinction, plurality
or potentiality, is all that being can be, the fullness of being, and hence not
subject to greater or lesser degree.22
The fourth is central and foundational for a metaphysics of the issue of
globalization. Here, however, we shall focus rather on the ontology and its
ethical implication. This directs our attention to the second and especially the
third of Cusa's senses of unity to which the recent development of a global
awareness also corresponds, namely, to the whole or total universe in which we
have our being, live and intersect with nature and with others.
This has been appreciated in various ways in the past: in the totem which
was the unifier for the life and universe of primitive peoples, in the myths
which united gods and nature in a genetic whole, in the One of Parmenides as the
natural first step for metaphysics, and in the eschatologies and the classical
hierarchies of being, to cite but a few. Now, however, after a long period of
analytic and atomic thinking, under the impact of technologies which make
conflict too costly and inundate us with global communications, there is special
need to take up once again this sense of unity.
Contraction
The situation is delicate however, for in so doing it is imperative to
avoid the kind of abstractive thinking described above, in which personal
uniqueness is dismissed and only the universal remains.23
Cusa's solution is found in the notion of contraction, that is, to begin
from the significance of the whole and to recognize it in the very reality of
every individual, so that the individual shares in something of the ultimate or
definitive reality of the whole being. One is not then an insignificant speck,
as would be the case were I to be measured quantitatively and contrasted to the
broad expanse of the globe. Rather I have the importance of the whole as it
exists in and as me -- and the same is true of other persons and of the parts of
nature.
The import of this can be seen through comparison with other attempts to
state this participation of the part in the whole. For Plato this was a
repetition or imaging by each of that type of the one ideal form. Aristotle soon
ceased to employ the term participation as image (mimesis) because of the
danger it entailed of reducing the individual to but a shadow of what was truly
real. Cusa too rejected the separately existing ideas or ideal forms. Instead
what had been developed in the Christian cultures was a positive notion of
existence as act24 whereby each participant in being was made to be
in itself. This is retained by Nicholas of Cusa.
But he would emphasize that the being in which this person or thing
participates is the whole of being.25 This does not mean that in a
being there is anything alien to its own identity, but that the reality of each
being has precisely the meaning of the whole as contracted to this unique
instance. To be, then, is not simply to fall in some minimal way on this side of
nothingness, but rather to partake of the totality of being and the meaning of
the whole of being and indeed to be a realization of the whole in this unique
contraction or instance. It retains its identity, but does so in and of the
whole.
De Leonardis formulates this in two principles:
- Principle of Individuality: Each individual contraction uniquely
imparts to each entity an inherent value which marks it as indispensable to the
whole.
- Principle of Community: Contraction of being makes each thing to be
everything in a contracted sense. This creates a community of beings relating
all entities on an ontological level.26
Let us stop at this insight to explore its implications for diversity.
Generally, multiplicity and diversity are seen as opposed to unity: what is one
is not many and vice versa; to have many beings is to imply contrast and even
possible conflict. When, however, each individual is appreciated as a unique
contraction of the whole, others which are distinct and different are
complementary rather than contradictory; they are the missing elements toward
which one aspires and which can help one grow and live more fully; they are the
remainder of the whole of which I am part, which supports and promotes me, and
toward whose overall good my life is directed. Taken together they enhance,
rather than destroy, the unity. This, of course, is not true of Parmenidean
absolute and unlimited One which is the complete and full perfection of being,
the fourth instance of unity cited above. But it is true of the third of the
above unities which are precisely the reality of global unity, and the second
type of unity which is its components seen precisely as members of the global
whole.
Hierarchy. After the manner
of the medievals, Cusa saw the plurality of beings of the universe as
constituting a hierarchy of being. Each being was equal in that it constituted a
contraction of the whole, but not all were equally contracted. Thus an inorganic
being was more contracted than a living organism, and a conscious being was less
contracted than either of them. This constituted a hierarchy or gradation of
beings. By thinking globally or in terms of the whole, Cusa was able to
appreciate the diversity of being in a way that heightened this ordered sense of
unity.
Lovejoy wrote classically of The Great Claim of Being27
in which each being was situated between, and in relation to, the next lower and
the next higher in the hierarchy. We had, in other words, our neighbors with
whom we shared, but there was always the danger that we were correspondingly
distanced from other beings. Thus the sense of the human as "lord of
nature" could and did turn into exploitation and depredation. Cusa's sense
of beings as contractions of the whole unites each one intimately to all other
realities in one's being, one's realization, and hence one's concerns. This
converts the sense of master into that of steward for the welfare of the parts
of nature which do not possess consciousness or freedom. These become the
ecological concerns of humankind.
Another approach, built upon this sense of each distinct being as equal
inasmuch as each participates in the whole, would image overall reality as a
mosaic. But Cusa's sense of each of those pieces as also a contraction of the
whole went further by adding the importance not only of each to the whole as in
a mosaic, but of the whole in and by each being. Unity then is enhanced and is
the concern of each being to the full extent of its own reality understood as an
integral participant in the whole.
However, both these metaphors of a chain of being and of a mosaic are
static. They leave the particular or individual beings as juxtaposed externally
one to the other. Neither takes account of the way in which beings interact with
the others or, more deeply, are even constituted internally by these relations
to others. What Cusa sees for the realm of being is relationships which are not
external juxtapositions, but internal to the very make-up of the individuals.
Internal Relations. This
internal relationship is made possible precisely by a global sense of the whole.28
For this Cusa may have drawn more directly from the Trinity, but this in turn is
conceived through analogy to the family of which individuals are contractions,
especially as this is lived as the interpersonal relations of a culture grounded
in such a theology. The philosopher can look into that social life as a point of
manifestation of being. Indeed, hermeneutics29 would suggest that
this constitutes not only a locus philosophicus whence insight can be
drawn but also the prejudgments of philosophers which constitute the basic
philosophical insights themselves. The critical scientific interchange of
philosophy is a process of controlled adjustment and perfection of these
insights.
In a family all the persons are fully members and in that sense fully of
the same nature. But the father generates the son while the son proceeds from
the father. Hence, while mutually constituted by the same relation of one to the
other, the father and son are distinct precisely as generator and generated.
Life, and all that the father is and has, is given from the father to the son.
Correspondingly, all that the son is and has is received from the father. As
giver and receiver the two are distinguished in the family precisely as the
different terms of the one relation. Hence each shares in the very definition of
the other: the father is father only by the son, and vice versa.
Further, generation is not a negative relation of exclusion or
opposition; just the opposite -- it is a positive relation of love, generosity
and sharing. Hence, the unity or identity of each is via relation (the second
unity), rather than opposition or negation as was the case in the first level of
unity. In this way the whole that is the family is included in the definition of
the father and of the son each of whom are particular contractions of the whole.
To highlight this internal and active sense of contraction and hierarchy
Cusa uses also the analogy of a seed.30 This is able to develop and
grow only by heat of the sun, water from the clouds and nourishment from the
earth. Hence each of these elements of the whole are interrelated in mutual
dependence. Moreover, thereby the seed brings new being into existence -- which
in turn will be creative, etc. Finally, by this action of the sun and clouds,
the seed and the earth as contractions of the whole, the universe itself is made
fruitful and unfolds. But this is identically to perfect and fulfill the
universe. Hence, the plurality of beings, far from being detrimental to the
unity and perfection of the universe, is the key thereto.
Explicatio-Complicatio.
Cusa speaks of this as an explicatio or unfolding of the perfection of
being, to which corresponds the converse, namely, a folding together (complicatio)
the various levels of being the perfection of the whole is constituted. Hence
Cusa's hierarchy of being has special richness when taken in the light of his
sense of a global unity. The classical hierarchy was a sequence of distinct
levels of beings, each external to the other. The great gap between the multiple
physical or material beings and the absolute One was filled in by an order of
spiritual or angelic beings. As limited, these were not the absolute; yet as
spiritual they were not physical or material. This left the material or physical
dimension of being out of the point of integration.
In contrast, Cusa, while continuing the overall graduation, sees it
rather in terms of mutual inclusion, rather than of exclusion. Thus, inorganic
material beings do not contain the perfection of animate or conscious being, but
plants include the perfections of the material as well as life. Animals are not
self-conscious, but they do integrate material, animate and conscious
perfection. Humans include all four: inorganic, animate, conscious and spiritual
life.
Thus, the relation to all others through the contraction of being is
intensified as beings include more levels of being in their nature. On this
scale humans, as material and as alive on all three levels of life, plant,
animal and spirit -- play a uniquely unitive and comprehensive role in the
hierarchy of being. If the issue is not simple individuality by negative and
exclusive contrast to others (the first level of unity) but uniqueness by
positive and inclusive relation to others, then human persons and the human
community are truly the nucleus of a unity that is global.
A
DYNAMIC GLOBAL ORDER
Thus far we have been speaking especially in terms of existence and
formal causality by which the various beings within the global reality are in
specific degrees of contractions of the whole. To this, however, should be added
efficient and final causality by which the ordered universe of reality takes on
a dynamic and even developmental character. This has a number of implications:
directedness, dynamism, cohesion, complementarity and harmony.31
Cusa's global vision is of a uniquely active universe of being.
1. Direction to the Perfection of the Global Whole: As
contractions of the whole, finite beings are not merely products ejected by and
from the universe of being, but rather are limited expressions of the whole.
Their entire reality is a limited image of the whole from which they derive
their being, without which they cannot exist, and in which they find their true
end or purpose. As changing, developing, living and moving they are integral to
the universe in which they find their perfection or realization and to the
perfection of which they contribute by the full actuality and activity of their
reality.
This cannot be simply random or chaotic, oriented equally to being and
its destruction, for then nothing would survive. Rather there is in being a
directedness to its realization and perfection, rather than to its contrary. A
rock resists annihilation; a plant will grow if given water and nutrition; an
animal will seek these out and defend itself vigorously when necessary. All this
when brought into cooperative causal interaction has a direction, namely, to the
perfection of the whole.
2. Dynamic Unfolding of the Global Whole: As an unfolding (explicatio)
of the whole, the diverse beings (the second type of unity) are opposed neither
to the whole (the third type of unity) or to the absolute One (the fourth type
of unity). Rather, after the Platonic insight, all unfolds from the One and
returns thereto.
To this Cusa makes an important addition. In his global vision this is
not merely a matter of individual forms; beings are directed to the One as a
whole, that is, by interacting with others (the third type of unity). Further,
this is not a matter only of external interaction between aliens. Seen in the
light of reality as a whole, each being is a unique and indispensable
contraction of the whole. Hence finite realities interact not merely as a
multiplicity, but as an internally related and constituted community with shared
and interdependent goals and powers.
3. Cohesion and Complementarity in a Global Unity: Every being is
then related to every other in this grand community almost as parts of one body.
Each depends upon the other in order to survive and by each the whole realizes
its goal. But a global vision, such as that of Cusa, takes a step further; for
if each part is a contraction of the whole, then, as with the DNA for the
individual cell, "in order for anything to be what it is it must also be in
a certain sense everything which exists."32 The other is not
alien, but part of my own definition.
From this it follows that the realization of each is required for the
realization of the whole, just as each team member must perform well for the
success of the whole. But in Cusa's global view the reverse is also true,
namely, it is by acting with others and indeed in the service of others or for
their good that one reaches one's full realization. This again is not far from
the experience of the family, but tends to be over looked in other human and
commercial relations. It is by interacting with and for others that one
activates one's creative possibilities and most approximates the full
realization of being. Thus, "the goal of each is to become harmoniously
integrated into the whole of being and thereby to achieve the fullest
development of its own unique nature."33
CONCLUSION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
There is much more to be said on these topics. The role of the
imagination should be exploited to understand the nature and role of cultures.
If a global outlook be evolved in which unity is promoted by diversity, then the
progress of world unification could be, not at the cost of the multiple
cultures, but through their deployment and interaction. Strategy could move
beyond the dichotomy of business and begging to the true mega project for the
new millennium, namely to develop a global community in which all are looked
upon with appreciation, and progress is evoked by mutual respect.
For this Cusa's global view has pervasive implications. To overcome past
human tendencies to subdue and exploit nature, some would want to eliminate the
unique role of humans in the hierarchy of being. Cusa would recognize the
equality of all as irreducibly individuals within the whole. Yet he would also
recognize the unique position of humankind in that hierarchy as integrating all
possible levels of the being, inorganic, living, conscious and spiritual, within
the One existing being. To express that humankind realizes all the types of
possibilities of life, Cusa uses the term "poss-est".
This, however, is not a license to plunder and exploit the rest, but it
is a commission and destiny to assist in bringing out of others and of the whole
the realizations not otherwise possible for them. It is then the view of
Teilhard de Chardin34 that it is precisely in man that we must look
for further global evolution.
The relation of person to person also is shaped notably by such a vision.
Generally it has been seen that order rather than conflict is the condition for
the exercise of freedom. This is to appreciate the whole globally, rather than
merely as a set of contrasting individuals. It is this context which truly
enables and promotes the exercise of human freedom.
To see each as a contraction of the whole provides each not only with
equality, but with definitive status as endowed by the significance of the
whole. I cannot be instrumentalized, much less reduced either abstractively or
concretely to a least common denominator. Thus equality can be promoted without
the reductionism entailed by egalitarianism. At the same time, by thinking in
global terms it becomes possible to see that diversity is the key to enriching
the whole and thereby drawing it closer to the fullness of perfection.
De Leonardis says this well when he concludes that:
human endeavors can be successful only to the extent that they achieve
this integration whereby the isolation of the lone individual is overcome by
social participation and the emptiness of alienation is transformed by unifying
love into an active and liberating communal existence.35
NOTES
1. Lu Xiaohe, "G.B. Vico and the Contemporary Civil World", in
Wang Miaoyang, Yu Xuanmeng and M. Dy, Civil Society in a Chinese Content:
Chinese Philosophical Studies XV (Washington: The Council for Research in
Values and Philosophy, 1997), pp. 37-45.
2. Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language Unabridged (Springfield, MA: Merriam, 1969).
3. XII, 71072b 26-19.
4. Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon, 1920).
5. (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1998).
6. Idiota de Mente / The Layman: about Mind, tran. and ed. Clyde
Lee Miller (New York: Abaris, 1979).
7. Trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinnes (New York: Humanities, 1961).
8. The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy (New
York: Harper and Row, 1963).
9. De Veritate, q. 1, 8. "Truth in the intellect is measured
by things themselves," ibid., I, 5.
10. De Mente, 4, p. 53 and 55.
11. Miller in De Mente, intro., p. 24.
12. De Mente, 7, p. 63.
13. Ibid., p. 65.
14. Ibid., p. 59.
15. Ibid., p. 65.
16. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Chicago: Regnery,
1960), pp. 14-21.
17. Eugene Rice, "Nicholas of Cusa's Idea of Wisdom," Traditio
13 (1957), 358.
18. Descartes, Discourse on Method, 2.
19. D. De Leonardis, p. 60.
20. Henry Bett, Nicholas of Cusa (London: Meuthin, 1932), p. 180.
21. Trans. G. Heron (London: Routledge, Kegan, Paul, 1954).
22. G. McLean, Plenitude and Participation: The Unity of Man in God
(Madras: University of Madras, 1978).
23. Of Learned Ignorance.
24. G. McLean, Tradition, Harmony and Transcendence (Washington:
The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1994), pp. 95-102.
25. Of Learned Ignorance, pp. 84-88.
26. De Leonardis, p. 228.
27. Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (New York: Harper,
1960).
28. Of Learned Ignorance, I, 9-10.
29. H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Crossroads, 1975).
30. Dato Patris Luminum in Jasper Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa's
Metaphors of Contraction (Minneapolis: Banning, 1983), p. 25.
31. De Leonardis, pp. 233-236.
32. Ibid., p. 235.
33. Ibid., p. 236.
34. Phenomenon of Man (New York: Harper, 1959).
35. De Leonardis, p. 241.