CHAPTER I

  THE CURRENT RENEWAL OF THE STUDY OF VALUES

Today, the study of values needs to be taken up again at a level which is at once more radical and more systematically coherent than ever before. As often happens in the history of philosophy, in their enthusiasm those who discovered the world of values became intoxicated by their first and somewhat hazy intuitions. They did not bother to situate these in a balanced manner within the organic pattern of philosophical thought. Some placed values in open opposition to being, others made them fully autonomous, while others underlined their ties either to thinking, willing or sensing. This lack of balance resulted in divergent and one-sided interpretations.

For lack of a suitable methodology for treating relational beings philosophy has often swung like a pendulum between two opposed stances:  objectivism and subjectivism. Objectivism considers values to be  exalted objects , autonomous and sharply differentiated from the usual understanding of "beings": beings  and  values are different things. In contrast, axiological subjectivism takes the individual as the foundation of value and of the criteria of evaluation. Both interpretations are far from adjusting to the phenomenon of value and, by their inner inconsistency, give rise to myriad ambiguities.

1.By being granted "objective" autonomy, independence and, at times, even primacy over being, values are rendered exterior and even distant from the human person. In this case, one who adheres to a value, seen as external, distinct and distant, would thereby be alienated and estranged.

2.Against this objectivist tendency, experience shows that one who is sesitive to value plays a decisive role in their discovery and hierarchization. The different modes of evaluation suggest that values depend upon the aware individual. If no other form of dependence were known than that between creator and creature, one would have to conclude that values are the fruit of particular attitudes in certain people and lack any consistency in themselves. Thus, the phrase "value exists  in relation to the individual" is misinterpreted as being identical to "value is produced by the subject and undergoes the same changes as his/her attitudes." As it was usual for centuries to consider the model of permanence to be that of substantial things, considered as rigid and unchanging, in contrast, the relational nature of value was interpreted fatally as a sign of inconsistency. Hence, subjectivist relativism had a devastating effect on aspects of human life, such as ethics, whose fate depended upon the permanence of values.

3. The open character of the concept of value led certain authors to identify it with the ancient notion of the good and to reduce modern axiology to a mere critical reaction to Kantian formalism. This approach was blind to the peculiar nature and distinctive significance of the theory of values.

Cumulative intellectual indecision on this subject, together with certain socio-cultural and political circumstances, directed the attention of thinkers toward such other fields of research, apparently far removed from axiology, as: the person as a being in the world; the phenomenology of perception, meaning, intersubjective encounter and the constitution and development of human personality; the "non-objective" nature of the human beings; language and silence;  creativity and play; and the contribution of ordinary experience to philosophical reflection.

Without expressly setting out to do so, these philosophical investigations notably enlarged the field of human experience in close relation to one's creative capacities, and refuted the inveterate reductionist tendencies to limit the human capacity to understanding highly complex realities. Released from such reductionist ideological pressures, new forms of value and unsuspected meaning were discovered in everyday reality. Due to its highly creative nature, so-called natural or daily experience assumed a prime place in the manifestation of value.⁵

Thus, through philosophical research which apparently had been related only marginally to the question of value, today we return to this field with new impetus and--what is more significant--at a more radical level and with more refined hermeneutic and methodological tools. This greater refinement is due above all to the development of the conception of reality and, consequently, of the human person, of knowledge and of truth. From a somewhat rigid substantialist idea of reality ( ratio realitatis ) modelled on the analysis of objects and things, we have moved to a "substantivist" (Zubiri) idea of reality. This is relational and constellational; it is both firm and flexible, and is modelled on the study of "in-objective," that is, of un-measurable, non-delimitable and un-verifiable reality.

In order to adapt one's mode of thought to this basic concept of reality one must employ "thought in suspension" (" Denken in der Schwebe ," Jaspers). This does not proceed in linear fashion from one point to another, but at one and the same time contemplates the diverse aspects of reality integrated in a single phenomena. This synoptic mode of thought is extraordinarily efficient in grasping the subtle phenomena which come into play in creative processes. These mingle diverse aspects of reality which philosophical thought tends to dissociate by confusing what is merely "contrasted" with what constitutes a "dilemma"--the "different" with the "opposed." A thinker who becomes accustomed to distinguishing diverse aspects in reality, and to seeing them in their multiple possible inter-relations without rushing into insurmountable disjunctions, gains thereby a surprising freedom of maneuver for developing a genetic understanding of creative phenomena. For example, a musical interpretation integrates diverse modes of reality and of time and enables the interpreter's creative power to respond to a certain appeal. In order to integrate these diverse aspects, the mind must be alert and open to "thinking in suspension." In turn, an in-depth knowledge of the logic of creativity enables one to grasp in detail the logic of participation and encounter by putting one on the right track toward the discovery of meta-objective realities.

Contemporary thought, particularly the dialogical-personalist movement and the existential and other branches of the phenomenological movement, strongly contrasts "objective" to "inobjective" forms of reality. "Objective being" ("Das gegenständliche Sein") is counterpoised to "non-objective being" ("Das ungegenständliche Sein") in Jaspers and Marcel, to mention two of the most representative authors in this respect. "Objective" realities can be grasped, measured, pondered, delimited and verified by anyone. "Inobjective" realities manifest a higher spatio-temporal quality than do the empirical and cannot be delimited, weighed, located, grasped, etc. As they cannot be situated at a distance from the knower whom they "include" by offering him/her possible fields of play or action, they cannot be made objective or projected at a distance. Nevertheless, they are able to be known through a type of knowledge by participation which joins knowledge with love, creative action and an active-receptive immersion in realities which constitute fields of play.

The somewhat negative form of the term "in-objective" or non-objective has led many critics to misunderstand the intention  of the thinkers who stress its importance. These were considered "nihilists" and scorned as "men of letters," "poets" or "mystics" because others commonly took the term "objective" as a synonym for "real."

A painstaking study of this question suggests that it would be fitting to speak of the "super-objective" in order to stress the degree of eminent reality displayed by the so-called  "inobjective" entities.⁶ In my most recent papers, I prefer to speak of "ambital realities" ("ambits") and "dialogical realities" in order to stress the importance of reality which is not closed in upon itself but open to creative interaction. "Ambits" are those realities which make up "fields of reality" by being endowed with creative initiative and being without the rigorous delimitation of objects. In the German-speaking world, some authors use the expression "dimensionale Räume"⁷ in the same sense. In French, there is no adequate term to express the reality that makes up a field of possibilities for action or play--a "ludic space". Fh. Fauré Fremiet speaks of "non-dimensional realities" to suggest the type of higher spatiality displayed by "ambits."⁸

Though persons do present objective aspects which can be grasped, measured and pondered, they are not reduced thereby to "objects," but are "ambits." Though they can be measured and  weighed, no one can specify what they entail as human beings, how far their influence over others reaches or that of others over them, or the breadth of their ethical, aesthetic and religious life. Even the persons themselves cannot delineate this precisely. Objectively, human beings face certain precise limits, but on the creative (ludic) plane are open to the beings of their environment, endowed with diverse possibilities of action or play and have the capacity to take on the ludic possibilities offered by other beings. Rather than being closed objects made once and for all, they are "possible existences" (Jaspers) who entail a certain field of reality and are called upon to enlarge this radius of action in diverse directions. Viewed integrally, human beings are ambital beings who are destined to develop through constant relationships, encounters or fields of play.

This creative activity of ambits is carried out by persons with other human beings and with all realities which offer possibilities for interplay (ludic possibilities). A boat is an  object, for it is measurable, delimited, able to be grasped, pondered and situated in time and space; but it is also an ambit , a field of possibilities for interplay for one can converse, walk, sleep, fish or sail in it. The sea likewise offers both aspects: it is an  object  for it can be delimited, touched or located, but it is also an  ambit of reality  because it offers diverse ludic possibilities such as swimming, fishing or sailing. The breaking of a bottle of champagne at the launching of a ship is therefore a collision of objects but a blending of ambits--an  encounter --and its luminous, beautiful, symbolic, festive condition is derived from this nature. For the cleaning woman a piano is a mere object--a piece of furniture to be dusted--but it is also an ambit for those who know how to play the aesthetic game of interpreting piano compositions and who therefore are in position to take on the ludic possibilities offered by the piano as a musical instrument. The blending between the pianist, the piano and the score, seen as a sheaf of possible configurations of musical forms, gives rise to an encounter in which the work in question is born.

In a similar way, a home, in contrast to a mere building, is an ambit or living-space founded by a couple. In this sense Heidegger states that "living" precedes building and is a foundation of thought.⁹ The school too is an ambit or field of possibilities for co-existence and training. The same may be said for the landscape, village, or language when these are considered as fields of meaning which open up indefinite possibilities of understanding and expression for persons.

All forms of play and work are ambits or fields of possibilities for action with meaning. Consequently, the roles people play in their lives are ambits, and as such give rise to literary types and artistic themes: a waiter, a servant, a king, a prince, a soldier, a mother or a priest.

Likewise, events or happenings which imply a complex world of meaning constituted by the confluence of diverse realities and opening up fields of possibilities are also ambits: for example, the "Last Supper," the "Crucifixion," the "Breaking of Bread at Emaus," the "Death of Julius Caesar" or "Napoleon Crossing the Alps." Those events are also ambits which weave the web of social life: the inauguration of a road network or a building, the consecration of a temple, the proclamation of a president or the act of passing a judicial sentence. A mutual promise is a firm mode of ambital blending pregnant with consequences, even though this promise be formulated by so elusive a word as "yes." When acting as the living vehicle of a blending of ambits, this word becomes charged with the highest meaning.

Similarly, we should consider also as ambits those realities or ensembles of realities which make up a field of interaction: a shipwreck, a sower, a pair of lovers, the arrival of spring, the decline of autumn, a field of olive trees, a group of tumblers, hands in prayer, or an old man meditating next to a burning candle.

One should consider as ambits also those cultural works realized dialogically with the environment and which express the fields of meaning deriving from blending such diverse realities as a garden, temple, house, square, street, city, bridge, monument, chair or peasant's clogs. (The reader will have imaged a few famous paintings that record such ambits, for art tends not so much to  reproduce figures  as to  record ambits ). Persons often turn natural spaces into ambits by means of a dynamism which enlightens diverse possibilities of action and meaning. Thus, during an air show air-space becomes a field of play--an ambit, a creative (ludic) space.

As characterized by not having exclusive limits, but offering diverse possibilities which can be taken up by other realities, ambits have a peculiar capacity for blending with one another and providing new possibilities in their fields of action. In this positive sense, M. Buber states that "the thou  does not limit"; this applies not only to the `you' or human being, but to any reality which offers certain ludic possibilities. By not limiting, these realities may blend their ambits and found relevant modes of unity which are qualitatively more elevated than are fusional modes of union.¹⁰ Objects are juxtaposed and can attain only a low degree of mutual presence or interaction, however intense they may seem at times. Ambits can blend, open new possibilities for play and intimately unite. Here "intimacy" means not an inner redoubt as against an exterior space--fortunately, the schema "interior-exterior" is not valid at the ludic level--but two people being in the same field of play which provides for their creative interaction. Thus, relationships between "here" and "there," "mine" and "yours," "inside" and "outside" lose the mutually exclusive meaning they usually would have in terms of our manipulative attitude toward objects, and acquire instead an integrating meaning.

When objectivist habits of thought are overcome so that thought is adapted to the demands of relational realities, one can appreciate--at first with a certain dismay and later with enthusiasm--the intense dialectics of an encounter as the place in which values are born and established. For this the encounter must be seen as the blending of super-objective realities which are not "objects," but "fields of reality" or "ambits." In order to understand values it is necessary to analyze with the greatest care these diverse modes of reality--the objective and super-objective or ambital realities, as well as their possible interconnections.¹¹

This revitalization of the study of values responds to a change of mentality from the objectivist to the super-objectivist, ambital or ludic which does not manipulate objects but founds ambits of reality. Only by the creative realization of this change in the style of thought can theory be opened to the full resonance and reverberation of values.

The fecundity of this interrelational, ambital or ludic methodology inevitably is linked to a disconcerting ambiguity. The knowledge of super-objective "ambital" realities, of ethical and aesthetic events, of ludic experiences of all kinds does not provide the conditions of accuracy and delimitation characteristic of scientific knowledge. Far from being a defect, this is a privilege, for the goal to which philosophical thought aspires is the attainment, not so much of "accurate," as of "profound" knowledge. Rather than seeking "security," the philosopher attempts to probe more deeply into the ever-evasive enigma of reality. Ambiguity which springs, not from a lack of intellectual clarity, but from fidelity to the super-objective ambital nature of the objects-of-knowledge is a condition of philosophical thought which must be cultivated with care. The Cartesian demand for "clarity and distinction" must be moderated according to the ontological protocol of each object-of-knowledge.

By not recognizing this and taking accurate "objective" knowledge as a model, the objectivist mentality sets an extremely dangerous trap, for it leads one to believe that by this type of thought one masters reality. In the end this distracts one from what is truly real--errors of philosophical perspective are paid for dearly. If one's thought is framed within objectivist coordinates, even a very penetrating thinker who desires to be  faithful to reality can never manage to elaborate a theory adjusted to the relational events which make up the web of one's personal life. His or her intellectual battle will be fought on enemy soil and, being subjected to reductionist strictures, inevitably he/she will fail. The only chance of surpassing the objectivist stumbling-block is not to engage in it, but to soar above it by deliberately adopting an interrelational, ambital or ludic style of thought.

This change of methodologies already has been carried out to a great extent by such thinkers as M. Blondel, J.H. Newman, F. Ebner, K. Jaspers, E. Brunner, K. Heim, A.N. Whitehead, M. Heidegger, L. Lavelle, G. Marcel, A. Brunner, X. Zubiri and A. Amor-Ruibal, who offer extraordinarily efficient methodological suggestions. However, we still lack a systematic study of values carried out integrally in the light of a ludic methodology, that is, one elaborated on the basis of the analysis of creative events rather than of mere objects. Despite its inborn ambiguity, this analysis will display a peculiar solidity because adapted to the flexible and evolving nature of reality.

Once an appropriate and sensitive axiology has been developed the inferiority complexes vis-a-vis the supposed rigor of scientific knowledge will vanish, as will the fear that the "ambiguity" inherent in values may make their knowledge irrational. It suffices to state fairly the question of values in order to feel secure in their study and to discover that as a relational style of thought responds to the needs of this particular object-of-knowledge such knowledge is of appropriate rigor. Nothing authorizes us to single out one type of intellectual rigor as the unique model and to consider modes of knowledge which do not adjust to this model to be superficial, banal or spurious. True criticism regarding knowledge consists in approaching each of its objects with appropriate categories and mental schemas, without extrapolating from one to the others.

This fidelity to the objects-of-knowledge demands of the philosopher a highly refined sensitivity to the conditions of each reality and an adjustment thereto of his or her mental coordinates. At the beginning of his work,  La pensée et le mouvant ,¹² Bergson warned that philosophy made its most serious mistakes by neglecting its duty to think each reality "to size." Philosophical methodology can acquire rigor and total flexibility only if we accept in principle and without hesitation all the richness and complexity pertaining to each object-of-knowledge. The tendency to reduce the value of objects-of-knowledge by interpreting the superior by the inferior, the complex by the simple, the irreducible as a sum of components, leads philosophical thought to adopt unrefined methodologies which are too coarse to do justice to human events.

       Contemporary thought, above all the phenomenological, existential and personalistic-dialogical movements, underline the need to discover and evaluate justly those aspects of reality which do not focus upon the characteristics of objects, but are concerned with more eminent forms of reality. Attention to the "super-objective" or ambital opens up unexpectedly rich possibilities for understanding values