Thusfar we reviewed first the history of human reason and its role in relation to religious issues. Reason emerged from the initial primitive and mythical world views, which were deeply religious in character. In its first major philosophical articulation Parmenides defined its essentially religious character by finding the nature of being and hence of Being Itself to be marked by the divine characteristics of unicity, eternity and unchangeableness. Plato followed, showing that multiple beings had to be essentially participations in the divine which was therefore their source and goal.

Next we looked into the dilemma of al-Ghazali and his dramatic choice of the mystical way of Sufism. He was deeply devoted to faith, but with a weak sense of the capacities of human reason due to an occasionalism which implied also that deductive reasoning could not really cause or certify its conclusions. He saw the limitations of objective reason in the Greek heritage pursued by Avicenna, Averroes and other Islamic philosophers — specifically to grasp the spiritual nature of the human person and its relation to God. As a result he "took to the road" along the subjective interior way of the Sufis on which he wrote the 40 books of the Ihya.

Further, we found a companion for Ghazali in the Christian monk and priest, Thomas Aquinas. By further appreciating the power of the creator he saw as well the capability of the creature and hence of human reason. The greatness of God is manifested, not in the weakness of humans to realize their effects, but on the contrary in their being able truly to cause their effects according to their nature in the physical and spiritual areas. In addition he resolved the limitations Ghazali rightly feared in the Greek heritage as it had been continued in Islamic philosophy: the human was not externally spiritual through a separated or separately existing agent intellect, but interiorly spiritual and hence responsible and subject to a final judgement and eternal life along with the resurrection, rewards or punishments of the Qu’ranic eschatology.

This autonomy of human reason opened the road which would lead to modern science. But the question arises whether objective reason could suffice for modern times, and even whether it could take care of itself were it to ignore its subjective dimension and attempt to break away from its religious moorings. If not there would arise a renewed need for faith to provide a context for reason. This, indeed, would seem to be precisely the situation at the present conclusion of modern times and the move to a new and as yet unnamed era of the millennium just beginning.

In order to identify the crisis of reason in which we stand at this turn of the millennia we need to review the history of thought in this era. The first millennium is seen as one in which human attention was focused upon God. It was the time of Christ and the Prophet — Peace be upon them both! — and much of humanity was fully absorbed in the assimilation of their messages.

The second millenium is generally seen as shifting in attention to human beings. The first 500 years focused upon the reintegration of Aristotelian reason by such figures as Ibn Sina, Ghazali, Ibn Rushd and Aquinas, as described above.

The second half of the millennium, from 1500, was marked by a radicalization of reason. Whereas from its beginning human reason always had attempted to draw upon the fullness of human experience, to reflect the highest human and religious aspirations, and to build upon the accomplishments of the predecessors — philosophers sensed themselves as standing on the shoulders of earlier philosophers — in the Renaissance a certain Promethean hope emerged. As with Milton’s Paradise Lost, it was now claimed that humankind would save itself, indeed that each person would do so by his or her power of reason.

It was true that Descartes intended to reintroduce the various levels of human knowledge on a more certain basis. What he restored, however, was not the rich content of the breadth of human experience, but only what could be had with the requisite clarity and distinctness. Thus, the content of the senses which were bracketed by doubt in the first Meditation was to be restored in the sixth Meditation. But only the quantitative or measurable was allowed back into his system; all the rest was considered simply provisory and employed only to the degree that it proved helpful in managing one’s actions and avoiding dangers in the world.

In this light the goal of knowledge and of life was radically curtailed. For Aristotle, and no less for Christianity and Islam in the first 1500 years of this era, this had been contemplation of the magnificence and munificence of the highest being, God. For the Enlightenment it became the control of nature in the utilitarian service of humankind. But even here, as the goals of human life were reduced to the material, the service of humankind really became the service of machines and the explication of physical nature. This was the real enslavement of human freedom, as noted by John Paul II.

(81) One of the most significant aspects of our current situation, it should be noted, is the "crisis of meaning". Perspectives on life and the world, often of a scientific temper, have so proliferated that we face an increasing fragmentation of knowledge. This makes the search for meaning difficult and often fruitless. Indeed, still more dramatically, in this maelstrom of data and facts in which we live and which seem to comprise the very fabric of life, many people wonder whether it still makes sense to ask about meaning. The array of theories which vie to give an answer, and the different ways of viewing and of interpreting the world and human life, serve only to aggravate this radical doubt, which can easily lead to skepticism, indifference or to various forms of nihilism.

 

First, the power of science was diverted to two destructive World Wars and the development of nuclear weapons capable of extinguishing the entire human race.

Second, with reason looking only to itself, religion was reduced to the service of the human rather than the divine, and relegated to the status of a superstructure built parasitically upon the new reductively physical reality or even of superstition.

Fourth, Marxism as a scientific history and organization of society, proved to be cruel and dehumanizing beyond belief, until it totally collapsed from its own internal weakness. Suddenly, the ideology on which meaning was conceived and life was lived by half of humankind was extinguished. It was as if the sun went down never to rise again.

Fifth, on the other side of the Cold War the consumer society has shown itself incapable of generating meaning for life, but capable of exploiting everyone else, until in the midst of the "Asian Crises" of 1998 it concluded that its ideology of a totally free market is destructive of the weak majority of the world.

At the beginning of the 20th century humanity had felt itself poised for the final push to create, by the power of science, a utopia not only by subduing and harnessing the physical powers of nature, but by genetic human engineering and social manipulation. Looking back from the present vantage point we find that history of this century has proven to be quite different from these utopian goals. It has been marked by poverty that cannot be erased and exploitation ever more broadspread, two World Wars, pogroms and holocausts, genocide and "ethnic cleansing," emerging intolerance, family collapse and anomie.

The religiously contextualized philosophical traditions not built in terms of the modern enlightenment reductionism were not understandable within that more restricted horizon. Hence the great Hindu and Islamic traditions were dismissed as mystifications and, for reasons opposite to those of al-Ghazali, the medieval tradition of Scholastic philosophy was denigrated not as not going far enough but is having no meaning whatsoever.

It is hard to imagine the utter tragedy of reason in which we now exist, but perhaps some analogies may help. One is the great meteorite which hit the Yucatan Peninsula eons ago. It sent a cloud of dust around the world which obscured the sun for years, killed off the flora and thus broke the food chain for fauna. Life of all sorts was largely extinguished and had to begin to regenerate itself slowly once again.

We move now into a period which is misnamed "postmodern". In reality it is really the final critical period of modernity as it progressively fades in the face of new broader and more humane sensibilities to values, minoriaties and cultures. Modern philosophy, having become conscious of its own deadly propensities, begins to attack these evils by the only tools it possesses: power and control. Hence, its attack is not creative, but destructive. Knowing that it must arrest its own destructive propensities reason destroys its own speculative foundations: all notions of structures and stages and, of course, all ethical norms. Everything must be trashed because the hubris of modern reason closes off any sense that it itself is the real root of its problem. In a paroxysm of despair, like a scorpion trapped in a circle of fire, it commits its own auto de fe.

Where can one find a way beyond this closed, imploding chamber of reason, a way to restore its capabilities for generating a sense of the meaning, direction and goal of life?

We have seen precious pointers in the work of al-Ghazali, Aquinas, Iqbal and recently we have received a detailed blueprint in the Encyclical Faith and Reason. Where Ghazali left the path of philosophy for the way of the Sufis, in contrast, Thomas Aquinas illustrated later how it was necessary not to leave the way of philosophy. Instead, this could be — and indeed very much needed to be — cultivated within the inspirations of faith in order to receive and respond adequately to the prophetic message.

Iqbal for his part remained impressed by the work of science and philosophy, but saw religion as soaring higher in order to enter into "closer more intimate contact with reality".

Most recently an Encyclical entitled Faith and Reason has been written by Pope John Paul II. After the long assault upon religion by a reductive humanism under the pretense of scientific reason, one might expect such a religious source to rejoice in the lowered confidence in reason. The message of the Encyclical Letter, however, is just the opposite. Faith needs reason because faith has always been understood in the Church as an act of intellect. This act is made under the impulse of the will, based upon reasoned confidence in the source of revelation. Conversely, faith is the context within which reason not only began, but now can begin again to rebuild its confidence and extend its reach for the coming millennium. If so then just as the first millennium was that of God and the second millennium that of the human person and reason, the third millennium can be the time when these come together for the glorification of God through human progress.

It is this same person, Pope John Paul II, who now has responded to the broader, general collapse of reason at this end of the millennium. His 100 page Encyclical affirms that reason can be healed, can regain a deeper ground, and once again can fulfill its glorious role not only for faith, but for all aspects of human life. Its message is that reason must retain its autonomy, but situate itself in the broader human and divine reality of faith and the cultures and civilizations inspired thereby. There it can develop the objective and subjective characteristics needed in order for it to be a truly humanizing force at the present point of the transition of cultures at this turn of the millennium.

Method. In sum, this is to begin from revelation and the holy text, from there to proceed to philosophical reflection, and then to return to elaborate a theology of the sacred text. We need to break out of the destructive deception that human persons can save themselves: they did not make themselves and they cannot save themselves. Instead God is the creator and in him lies not only our source, but our goal.

This much can be known by objective reason. But due to human evil reason is weakened and distracted. Hence, God sent the prophets to teach us, as is done in the Bible and the Qu’ran. These open our horizons to the source, the dignity and meaning, and the goal of life. Yet this must be responded to by humans who, as free, alone can open their hearts and minds. The words of the Angelus: "ecce ancilla domini" may be the essential text.

(73) In the light of these considerations, the relationship between theology and philosophy is best construed as a circle. Theology’s source and starting-point must always be the word of God revealed in history, while its final goal will be an understanding of that word which increases with each passing generation. Yet, since God’s word is Truth (cf. Jn 17:17), the human search for truth — philosophy, pursued in keeping with its own rules — can only help to understand God’s word better. It is not just a question of theological discourse using this or that concept or element of a philosophical construct; what matters most is that the believer’s reason use its powers of reflection in the search for truth which moves from the word of God towards a better understanding of it. It is as if, moving between the twin poles of God’s word and a better understanding of it, reason is offered guidance and is warned against paths which would lead it to stray from revealed Truth and to stray in the end from the truth pure and simple. Instead, reason is stirred to explore paths which of itself it would not even have suspected it could take. This circular relationship with the word of God leaves philosophy enriched, because reason discovers new and unsuspected horizons. (Fides et Ratio)

 

1. Francis Bacon, Novum Organon, De Sapientia Veterum (New York, 1960).

2. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (London, 1690).

3. René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy (Cambridge, 1911), I.

4. John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Fides et Ratio, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/, 1998.

5. William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (New York, 1907). John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York, 1920).

6. M. Iqbal, Reconstruction of Religious Thought (Lahore, Pakistan: Iqbal Academy, 1989), pp. 48-49.

7. See Appendix.

8. John 21:18.

9. The Philosophy of Person: Solidarity and Cultural Creativity, eds. Jósef Tischner, J.M. ycinski and George F. McLean (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1994).