The title of the paper is surprising to say the least. What kind of causal relation can the exist between sensation and the behaviors of the twentieth century? What have vision, hearing and other senses in common with the production by humans of antechambers of Hell on earth? And what has philosophy to do with this? Strange as it may sound, there is a relationship between the role which we attribute to sensation in the process of cognition and the way we behave. There is also one between our perception of knowledge and evil [criminal?] attempts to explain this relationship and thereby justify the title.

To achieve our aim we will have to bridge the gap between knowing and doing and to distinguish clearly the difference existing between sensation and intellection as well as between personal knowing and the impersonal, public body of [existing?] knowledge, the knowledge construct. Much of what will be said in this paper will sound odd to philosophical readers, unusual and off the beaten paths of philosophical inquiry. And rightly so. The paper is written from the point of view of the author’s theory of an ecology of knowledge. Since readers may not be familiar with this theory and its conclusions, a short explanation is in order.

The ecology of knowledge theory was developed by the author over the past thirty years to deal with the problem of knowledge seen as a source of problems. This required a different approach to knowledge than that traditionally adopted by philosophers. Since the beginning of philosophy, philosophers have concentrated on what we now call the epistemological or logical problematique of knowledge. They were inquiring into questions of the truth and falsity of knowledge, its subjectivity and objectivity, i.e., problems resulting from the relationship between knowers and the object of cognition. Or else, they were analyzing the structure of the process of thinking, establishing logical rules of correct reasoning.

The distinction between knowers and the object of knowledge was obvious, but the relationship existing between them was not. It demanded explanation which philosophers were providing by means of various theories of knowledge. All these endeavors were, of course, eminently well-justified and important. But they left out one aspect of the phenomenon of knowledge which makes it difficult if not impossible to understand the evermore massive and quite ambivalent consequences of the development of cognition. Among these developments are those we will be dealing with in this paper and they are essential for understanding the problems of the present day world.

If thus far philosophers have not dealt with the negative consequences of knowledge, it is mainly because they have not conceptualized the distinction between knowers and the process of knowing on the one hand and its result, the body of knowledge as an entity distinct from knowers on the other. Consequently, they could not delve into the problem of the relationship existing between knowers and the knowledge construct . Hence, the problematique of the impact of knowledge on humans and on the ambient world remained outside the purview of philosophical analysis. Instead, this problematique is the principal subject of reflection of the ecology of knowledge theory.

It is not an accident that traditionally the philosophical problematique of knowledge was developed as it was, leaving out the discussion of the relationship between the knower and the knowledge construct. There were at least two good reasons justifying this omission. Firstly, all ancient thinkers, of whatever philosophical persuasion, were convinced that the intellect was the highest human faculty and its product, intellectual knowledge, the most perfect human achievement. Secondly, in those days intellectual knowledge had not yet been sufficiently developed to produce perceptibly negative results and appear as a threat. Humanity was small and weak; nature loomed all powerful and abundant. Human activity did not seem to harm it.

The uncritical attitude towards knowledge appeared to be perfectly justified. Unfortunately, today this attitude is no longer satisfactory. Currently, knowledge is the most powerful factor impacting on humans and changing human condition. It is undoubtedly the most impressive human achievement, but its consequences are far from being uniformly positive. In fact, they are more and more threatening. All the great problems which humanity now faces are man-made, the products of rational activity, not the products of nature. Overpopulation, pollution, atomic power, future shock or growing inequalities among humans—individuals and societies—to name but these issues, are direct or indirect consequences of the development of intellectual knowledge.

As long as the body of knowledge is not clearly distinguished from the knowers and the knowledge construct is not perceived as a distinct, sui generis, entity, all the above mentioned knowledge-generated problems remain unexplained and baffling. What is more, the analysis of knowledge itself cannot be advanced significantly beyond what philosophers have said about it already. This situation justifies just such an approach to the problem of knowledge as that provided by the ecology of knowledge.

The theory is based on three affirmations, two of which are immediately evident, while the third one becomes such after a moment’s reflection:

a. Knowledge exists.

b. Intellectual knowledge grows.

c. The knowledge construct is an entity distinct

from knowers.

The third affirmation is the cornerstone of the ecology of knowledge theory, distinguishing it from all other theories of knowledge. It also makes possible the writing of this paper. It allows [us? readers? people?] to view the phenomenon of knowledge in a new light and to draw many interesting conclusions hitherto not foreseen by philosophers. Among them is the ability to compare sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge in a more thorough way than has been done before.

Without going into details of the comparison discussed more thoroughly in appendix 1 let us stress two facts, one of which is well-known while the other is less familiar. Firstly, sense knowledge is the older and more basic form of cognition. It arose in the process of evolution hundreds of millions of years ago, as a life enhancing device. Sensation connects us directly with the outside world, gives us the vital information about the environment that makes organic existence possible. Sense knowledge is biologically necessary and determines to a large extent the mode of existence of the given organism. In the context of this general statement, let us explain that there is a particular type of information provided by the senses which is directly relevant for our discussion.

Namely, the senses tell the knower, animal or human alike, about one’s measure and how one compares to other things, living or inanimate, in one’s environment. The sight informs us that the church steeple is taller than we are; hearing, that the sound of thunder is louder than our own voice; touch warns us against hot objects and so on. The result of the information thus provided is the basic, vital rule of animal behavior: "If the perceived living thing is smaller than myself, I attack it; if it is bigger, I flee it." This sense knowledge serves as an unerring life saver. It also establishes the pecking order in nature.

The senses tell an organism its status in the natural order of things and do not allow it to mistake itself for something bigger than it really is. Scholastics called this function the estimative sense. Unfortunately, modern, post-Cartesian philosophy ignored this aspect of cognition. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the role which the estimative sense plays in knowledge and, indeed, in life in general, as well as for our discussion in particular. If the discussion carried in this paper sounds to philosophical readers odd and unusual it is because of the oversight by modern philosophers of the estimative function of sensation.

Having discussed sensation as the more basic form of cognition, let us now turn to the less obvious aspect of sense knowledge. Namely, to its inability to form, like intellection, a depository of sensations outside the knower, whether irrational or rational. Because intellectual knowledge is made of ideas, it can be expressed in words. Words can be externalized, preserved in a material form outside the knower and accumulated indefinitely whether in writing, print or electronic means, forming a constantly growing knowledge construct. This is why intellectual knowledge can, and indeed does, grow, whereas sensation does not increase in time.

Sensation remains stable in animals and humans alike. It is species specific and steady during the duration of the species. A fly, a cat or an elephant have the same level of sensation as their ancestors thousands of years ago. And so do humans.

As far as we can tell Plato and Aristotle had similar sense acuity as we do. But the knowledge construct to which they had access was infinitely smaller than the present one. We know the ideas of Plato and Aristotle, discuss them and can grow on them. But their sensations died with them. Sensations are not externalizable, and therefore are mortal. Ideas can be externalized and preserved outside brains, thus surviving the death of their authors. The ability to preserve ideas outside knowers together with their abstract nature and capacity to form explanations makes intellectual knowledge a much more powerful mode of cognition than sensation, and humanly much more satisfying.

Outside extreme, life-threatening situations, whenever humans have a choice they will value intellection over sensation. They have this choice because intellection in relation to sensation is a semi-independent mode of cognition. This fact is the source of problems justifying the present paper. The intellect can receive sense data, accept them, thus be measured by them and form ideas and reason accordingly. Consequently the knower will be in communication with the outside world and knowledgeable of one’s station in the natural order of things. One will not be tempted by dreams of grandeur and mistake himself for something more than one is.

Above all, the knower will not be imagining that one’s intellect is a self sufficient faculty capable of knowing inter limites intellectus. However, because the intellect is a semi-independent faculty in relation to the senses and superior to them, humans can conceive the intellect as a fully autonomous and self sufficient entity. As it is well-known, Descartes contemplating the stove in one’s room came to this conclusion, and, unwittingly, began a train of thought which led to the death camps of the twentieth century.

The founder of modern ideals naively thought of himself as a realist. When a disciple demonstrated on the basis of the Cartesian principle of immanence that the outside world is not knowable, Descartes angrily rejected one’s demonstration. And yet it was the disciple, not the master, who was right in this matter. Having transferred the source of certitude from the senses to the intellect, Descartes liberated the intellect from the measure of the senses and ignored the estimative sense and its function. Had the intellect been the only faculty involved in human behavior, the consequences of Descartes’s choice would not have been perhaps so drastic.

If it did become drastic, it is because human behavior is the consequence of two faculties: intellect and will. The intellect presents objects or aims as desirable, while the will wills them and makes humans act to achieve them. When the intellect is freed from minding the knower’s material conditions, one can overlook one’s corporeal limits and forget about one’s station in the order of things. Consequently, one can let one’s imagination soar freely and satisfy one’s deep seated longing for grandeur, reject any submission to a higher authority and view himself not only as master after God but as master without God. This psychologically inevitable consequence of Descartes’ principle did happen.

Hegel brought the idea of the independent, self-sufficient intellect to its logical conclusion. Intellect became the source of reality and Hegel’s intellect became identical with the Supreme Intellect. This is why, when a student at Berlin University remarked that "facts are against you," Hegel could calmly reply, "the worse for the facts." Overblown ego goes hand in hand with unbridled pride. Their principle victim is morality with its recognition of the distinction between good and evil and respect for objective order of things, justifying the basis of classical logic with its affirmation that "yes" is "yes" and "no" is no."

Having rejected the mind’s submission to an objective order of reality, Hegel could invent dialectics and argue that "yes" can be either "yes" or "no." This intellectual device helps to dissolve objective reality thereby abolishing all limits to the ego’s whims and desires. Interestingly enough, another victim of Hegel’s radical idealism is the individual perceived as less perfect than the state and the glorification of the authoritarian Prussian state. Thus Hegel sets the stage and becomes the inspiration for the twin diabolical ideologies of the twentieth century: Marxism and fascism. Though outwardly different, they both meet in their disrespect for the objective order of things, and of the fundamental value of the human individual as well as their rejection of traditional morality based on an objective order and respect for the individual.

Descartes certainly did not desire nor envisage the gas chambers or the Gulag universe, and would have been horrified to learn that one’s ideas had such consequences. Yet having radically separated intellection from sensation one unwittingly opened the door for modern idealism which produced these tragic results. One may of course wonder why Plato’s ideas did not yield similar results? What saved antiquity from the horrors of the twentieth century was a much lower level of social and technical development. It takes very big states and advanced technology to kill so many people. In antiquity, knowledge was much less owerful than in the twentieth century.

There are important lessons to be learned from the fate of Descartes’ ideas. Ideas do matter, and so do philosophical theories. They are powerful and can be dangerous. This is why, when we philosophize we should be aware of the volitional side of our being and keep our hubris under control. Philosophizing is not playing games with words and should never be seen as such. Discussions about counter factual conditionals may be fun, but they should never replace deliberations about relevant, fundamental problems of existential importance. Philosophers should leave concerns about flies and fly bottles to other specialists. Philosophy at its best has always been, is now and will remain very serious stuff. May philosophers heed this warning.