Any discussion of the relationship between knowers and the knowledge construct inevitably introduces the problem of the existential role of knowledge. The question is how human knowing is related to the being of the knower. What, if anything, conditions the act of knowing? How and to what extent? How does knowledge affect the knower and why? Is knowing intrinsic to the act of being or are these two acts only extrinsically related to each other? These questions are not new. Indeed, in one way or another they are as old as philosophy. It is not our intention to discuss all the answers given by philosophers — that would amount almost to narrating the history of philosophy. We have, however, to mention some of the influential doctrines. Let us begin with Plato, because of the enduring importance of his ideas for Western thought. His ideas have also a certain resemblance to those common to various Eastern world views, and thus may be considered as representing not only the Western point of view.

For Plato, being in the strong sense of the word, namely, that which lies hidden behind sense images, is spiritual and perfectly intelligible. Being is truth and is identical with perfect knowledge. Being is knowledge and knowledge is being. In his view, true knowledge is supportive of the act of being and vice-versa. Of course, Plato saw being and knowledge in the purely immaterial context of Ideas. The development of knowledge was a process of recall of the knowledge which humans naturally had as denizens of the world of ideas before their earthly birth. Plato’s doctrine is well-known and so is its impact on Western thought. One does not have to subscribe to the theory of ideas to draw a lesson from Plato’s thought. His insights concerning the nature of knowledge have a lasting relevance. More precisely, it is his perception of the relationship between being and knowledge that we find particularly valuable. If there is some truth to the affirmation of this relationship, and we believe that there is, then it is plausible to draw a very important conclusion. Namely, it is possible to affirm that every act of human knowing, imperfect as it may be and certainly far below the Platonic ideal of true knowledge, is, nevertheless, an act supporting, actualizing and developing the human knower.

The massive and overgrowing impact of knowledge on human life which we now observe attests to the plausibility of the above conclusion. Because of its impact, knowledge has an existential dimension which goes beyond the realm of concepts. This fact has far-reaching consequences for understanding the phenomenon of knowledge. The involvement of knowledge in, and its impact on, life cannot be understood if knowledge is studied in itself, without taking into account its dependence on the knowers and their existential condition. This understanding has been lacking in the post-Cartesian idealist and empiricist schools of thought which have dominated the philosophical scene in modern times. In all fairness, one has to admit that a balanced perception of the relationship between thinking and the material frame of thought is very difficult to achieve. Neither the idealist separation of intellectual activity from the life of the body, nor the materialistic reduction of the former to the latter provides a satisfactory explanation of human knowledge.

After three centuries of subjectivistic explanations of knowledge and a century of Marxist theories, it becomes imperative to elaborate a new understanding of cognition commensurable with the gravity of problems induced by knowledge. In light of what we have said thus far, it is rather obvious that the new vision must be a holistic view of knowledge and of the human being, respecting the complexity of his intellectual and material dimensions. Not only must it not consider intellection as a kingdom unto itself, but it must also view it as an element of a larger whole, namely, an integral part of human life and of the order of reality of which humans are a part. Let us call this approach "the new realism," or the systemic theory of knowledge. In this approach, intellection is viewed not only as a set of abstract notions, or an autonomous activity of a quasi-disincarnated intellect, but as an activity imbedded in, conditioned by, and in the service of the concrete, total person. Therefore, the act of knowing is perceived as an existential activity producing concrete consequences within and without the knower. Its presence to and interaction with the realm of being is twofold: material and intellectual.

In the systemic view, the act of thinking and its consequences — the conceptual constructs and the sum total of such constructs, the knowledge construct — are seen as influencing the knower and the world around him. Human knowers and their knowledge appear as elements of a system of being. Therefore, rather than being a logical or methodological approach, the systemic approach which we adopt represents a point of view which may be described as ecological, in the most profound sense of this word, or metaphysical. This approach does not consider itself self-sufficient or exclusive. It does not try to negate the other approaches; it simply intends to say something new. The new realism and its preoccupation with and concern for the total human person and his relation to the external world is also a new humanism. What the systemic point of view finds insufficient is Cartesian idealism, and the subjectivistic tradition issued from that thought. The monumental mistake of Descartes consisted in assuming that we think inter limites intellectus, as if intellect was a self-sustaining, self-sufficient knowing entity, independent from and unaffected by our bodily frame and existential situation.

Absolutely false theories are hard to come by, if indeed they exist. As usually happens in the case of great insights, Descartes’s "brilliant error" had a good part of truth in it. We do think within certain limits. Our intellection is conditioned by what we are and by the complex, intellectual and material, existential situation we are in. The conditioning has complex effects. It provides thought with a basic link with the existential parameters of the knower, thus ensuring a degree of relevance for the knower of the act of knowing. It anchors intellection in the Lebenswelt of the knower. Doing this, it structures thought. The process of thinking occurs within certain limits, which give it a personal character. This is why thinking is always an act of a particular individual and why there is no impersonal thought. The question is: what are these limits. Are they provided by the thinking organ, the intellect, or are they broader, encompassing other aspects of the knower?

In light of all we now know about the conditioning of thought through brain research, biological sciences, psychology and sociology, it is possible to affirm with a high degree of certitude that the limits within which our thinking occurs are those of the total individual, not those of the intellect alone. In other words, the entity which directly or indirectly contributes to and partakes in the process of production of thought is the whole person, intellect and body. It is the concrete individual which provides the frame for the process of intellection. We think inter limites totius personae, i.e., within ourselves. The knower is a structured subject, possessing not only a determined nature, but also, and because of that, a particular potential for knowledge of everything that exists. The concrete, therefore limited nature of the knower determines the mode of knowing of the individual knower and of the human species, i.e., of human knowledge in general. But it does not preclude the possibility of a conceptual grasp of the totality of being. The above affirmations define the epistemological position from which the present paper is written. This point of view leads to a very different understanding of knowledge from that of Descartes and his followers. It is the present writer’s contention that this view of knowledge will allow an integrative explanation of cognition necessary for the discussion of the problem of the ecology of knowledge.

The subject of the act of knowledge is neither the intellect and/or the senses, nor consciousness, but the knower — the total concrete individual anchored in space and in time, circumscribed by the spatio-temporal parameters of his biological existence. Such is the person; such is the thought. It is to the complex, concrete subject which is the individual that we have to relate the acts of knowledge and to try to understand them accordingly. Knowledge is an organic, systemic process involving the total person and not just his intellect and/or his senses. It is the product of the existential act of the whole individual, of his multilevel, complex immersion in the ambient world. It expresses directly or indirectly the sum total of exchanges which takes place between the knower and the outside reality, and it serves as a mean in maintaining and furthering this commerce of which life is made. To consider knowledge in itself, abstracting from and forgetting about its relation to and its role in the life of the knower, is to take pars pro toto.

The intellect is the organ of thought but, as we have already said, it does not operate apart from the rest of the person. Quite the contrary, it is an integral part of the human organism, not only present in it but dependent on it for its operations. It acts in relation to, and with the cooperation of, the whole body. Shall we therefore conclude that knowledge is necessarily not only knower-centered but also unavoidably subjective and independent from the outside reality? Not at all! If knowledge is the product of the given individual, the individual in turn is shaped by the constant intercourse between the self and the ambient world. The latter is composed of other individuals, i.e., society and the physical reality. Both of these elements model the individual, but each in a different way. The individual is not an island unto himself. This is especially true on the level of knowledge.

Society and the physical world influence the thought of the individual in his or her very makeup in addition to providing the content of sense data. Physically and intellectually humans live in a feedback relationship with the ambient world. The ambient world may be defined as the portion of reality composed of the sum total of elements with which we are in relation either through knowledge and/or physically, i.e., the things that we are aware of and others which act upon us or on which we act outside of our awareness. So defined, the ambient world is particular to each individual and differs more or less from that of another person. This fact is as important existentially as it is for the understanding of the nature of knowledge. Through sense knowledge, we enter into active relationship with our environment. This apparently obvious fact has been much obscured by the insistence of idealist philosophies on intellectual knowledge. Sense perception, not intellection, is the principal root of the personal nature of cognition. The differences on the level of sense knowledge explain the fact that each knower experiences the world in a slightly different manner. Further differentiation and personalization of the process of knowing is produced by the intellect. Together, sense knowledge and intellection are constitutive elements of the whole which is composed of the knower and his (or her) ambient world. They are at the same time knower-centered and related to the outside reality. Their mode of operation determines the mode of life of the knower in its specific and individual aspects.

Knowledge affects the knower in his very being. It shapes his behavior by conditioning his attitude to the external world and his participation in it. This is a very complex fact which is of prime importance for our discussion. Although the knower is always involved with the external world whatever the level of his knowledge, nevertheless, the more he knows the richer, the more complex is his involvement. Let us express this situation by means of a law:

Law VII: "All other things being equal, the complexity of involvement of the individual with external reality is proportional to the amount of knowledge he or she possesses."

 

The progress of knowledge changes not only the amount but also the quality of human involvement with external reality. The radius of activity increases, enlarging the ambient world. As an indication of progress, suffice it to compare the radius of activity of the cave dweller with that of the astronaut, or the reach of the naked eye with that of the radio telescope. The human environment increases constantly not only in size but in complexity, as does our relationship with it. This result of the development of knowledge is all too often overlooked or misunderstood. Our relationship with the external world is a two-way commerce. The more we act on the environment, the more complex is its impact on us. This may sound surprising because the avowed aim of technology is to give us mastery over the environment and shield us from its undesirable influences. In fact, the situation is much more complex. Let us explain.

Nature does not subordinate itself to humans automatically. Nor is their desire of dominion over nature sufficient by itself to achieve this aim. The only natural way humans can subordinate nature and use it to satisfy their needs and desires is by means of gaining efficacious knowledge of the fabric of the universe. The problem is that better understanding of nature requires more active investigation of the world, i.e., greater and more sophisticated, more complex interaction with ambient reality. The more we inquire about the workings of nature and the more we penetrate into its inner structure, the more we have to produce evermore sophisticated mental structures to explain the observed data. To achieve this aim the mind has to adjust itself to the forms of nature which it discovers. The more it does this and the more nature impacts on it, the more it is shaped by the observed.

It would be tempting to conclude that in the process the intellect becomes simply more subordinated to its object. Unfortunately, the situation is much more complex. The study of the subatomic realm makes us aware of the inadequacy of naive realism. However, no matter how important is the role of the observer in the study of microphysics, the resulting knowledge is not a subjective invention. The concrete, practical consequences of this knowledge, such as atomic power, should be sufficient to prove that even in the study of the infinitesimally small, the intellect is not entirely on its own. There, also, it has to respect the data which are not all of its own making. This is why, the progress of knowledge does not consist in the liberation of the intellect from the necessity of submission to its object. No matter how advanced rational knowledge is, the act of knowing remains a process of establishing a relationship with an extra-mental object, and knowledge continues to be the product of this relationship.

Francis Bacon, who conceived the idea of "imperium homini," of human mastery over nature, and those who followed in his footsteps perceived this ideal in physical terms of satisfaction of material needs and liberation from material constraints. Because of the prevailing idealist epistemologies, they did not pay sufficient attention to the subordination of the intellect to its object. Consequently, they misconceived the relationship between humans and the external world. They failed to understand that the relative physical independence of humans from natural conditions through the mastery of the physical environment is achieved at the price of greater impact of nature on the intellect. To master nature physically, we have to subordinate to it mentally. This all-important fact can be expressed in the form of a law:

Law VIII: Physical mastery of nature is proportional to the active, intellectual subordination to it.

 

The law above expresses another aspect of the involvement of the knower with the external reality described by the preceding law. The two laws should be considered together.

In light of these laws it becomes understandable that with the progression of knowledge the Baconian ideal had to reveal itself as too simplistic and that it is being replaced by ecological consciousness.

It is obvious that the progress of knowledge changes the relations of humans with the outside world. The change is twofold: quantitative and qualitative. It is the qualitative change that is more difficult to grasp. One factor of this change is the growing complexity of these relations, but this is not all. It will not suffice to say that the growing complexity of relations explains the change. The problem is that the total human environment is not just nature. The environment is composed to a larger and larger extent of two, not one, elements. Namely, it is made up of nature and manmade factors, i.e., nature and culture. Nature was always there and will remain in place as the basic framework of human life. Culture is a different factor. It is a growing element produced by humans for facilitating life. The more advanced is the cultural construct, the more complex it becomes, the more saturated with intellectual and material products of human ingenuity. The more culture is built up, the more it becomes a protective shield for humans and a satisfactory habitat for the human race.

Culture not only facilitates human life, it also enables a fuller development of the human potential. The richer the cultural construct, the more complex is its impact and the more complicated and lengthy becomes the process of acquisition of all the elements of the given culture. The learning process becomes more formal, more time and energy consuming, and more difficult. A greater variety of possibilities of behavior goes hand in hand with increased necessity of choices and of specialization. Life becomes physically easier but intellectually more demanding. The relations of the individual with the ambient world change under the influence of culture. The cultural space in which we live adds another dimension to the human environment. It makes the human environment richer and human relations with nature more complex, less natural and generating increasingly more problems.

Because of culture, the physical world is no longer the sole factor determining our existence. We are not in a simple, direct relationship with nature as were our biological ancestors. This has consequences worth exploring. The direct relationship between organisms and nature is the rule in the infrahuman world of plants and animals. They coexist harmoniously with their environment, i.e., with nature, of which they are an integral part. They do not disrupt the ecological balance, their conditions of life and of behavior being determined by nature. A similar situation existed also in the initial state of development of humanoid forms. This is no longer the case for Homo sapiens. Because of growing intellectual powers and through the evermore efficient exercise of these powers, the rational animal excluded himself, at least to a certain extent, from the self-regulating "mechanism" of nature. Nature ensures ecological balance and order in the living kingdom, maintaining the size and distribution of living species within certain limits and eliminating excessive growth. Thus the species are not allowed to transcend the carrying capacity of their respective ecological niches.

In contrast to nonrational species, our species continues to grow in size and so does its impact on the environment. Nature does not seem to be able to arrest this expansion. The apparent exclusion of the human species from nature’s self regulating "mechanism" is one of the most far-reaching consequences of the creation of culture. The exclusion, let us stress this fact, is not the result of an interplay of natural forces, if by "natural" we understand nonrational factors. It is the product of the development of knowledge. This may sound surprising because we are usually convinced that it is our sex organs which are the cause of the demographic growth. Sex, however, is a necessary, but not sufficient cause of the multiplication of humans. The direct cause of this phenomenon is knowledge and its development. The main condition of demographic expansion is the production of reproducers, i.e., of sexually adult individuals. The principal limiting factor was the mortality of infants. It is this factor that knowledge has succeeded in eliminating to a large extent.

Through knowledge, humans have learned how to protect their young and preserve them until reproductive age, how to provide food, shelter and social organization for a growing number of individuals. Thus, they removed the natural constraints on the size of the human biomass. This fact is of major importance for humans and for nature. Moreover, it has a rather unexpected consequence for the discussion of the status of the rational animal. Ancient thinkers placed humans above the animal kingdom because of their rationality. Now we can provide another argument in favor of the uniqueness of Homo sapiens, namely, his ability to overcome the impact of factors regulating the size of the living species and the limits of its habitat. The above argument avoids the difficulty encountered by the traditional argument based on the possession of intellect. The belief in the special nature of human rationality and its consequence, the radical superiority of the rational order over nonrational animals, has been criticized as not sufficiently demonstrable. It may, therefore, be worth pointing out that the argument outlined here is based on verifiable observations.

The unique ability of humans to eliminate, at least to a large extent, the natural constraints on the size of their species is, at the same time, a tremendous advantage and a source of problems. Having elevated themselves above the order producing interplay of the forces of nature, humans cannot return to this level anymore, not because of an unwillingness on their part, but for objective reasons. Namely, nature by its own resources cannot support humanity in its present size, hierarchy of needs and level of consumption. This fact is clearly perceived by partisans of deep ecology. Accepting nature as the supreme value and the preservation of nature as the most important and pressing task, they postulate a drastic reduction of the size of the human species as a necessary means of restoring ecological balance badly disrupted by human activity. Tragic as the consequences for the human prospect may be for the divination of nature by this neopagan ideology, the ideas of deep ecologists make us aware of the nonnatural relationship of the human species to its environment. They help us to understand the importance of the intellect and of rational knowledge in the biological expansion of the human race. In light of these theories, the price which humans would have to pay for returning to nature’s fold becomes clear. However, such return is neither desirable nor possible. Because of its rationality, humanity has left nature’s womb forever. In a further chapter, we shall attempt to say more about this fact which has incalculable consequences for the future of the human species.

The elevation of our species above the play of natural forces producing ecological balance would not be possible without the development of culture. This is evident from what we have said about culture. We may now go a step further and establish the following circular relationship between rationality, nature, and present situation of humanity:

Intellect ? rational knowledge ? culture ? independence (relative) from the system of ecological balance ? environment ? problems ? ecological consciousness (intellect)

 

It is a particular achievement of the rational creature that it has replaced the direct relationship of organism-nature, proper to infrahuman organisms, by a more advanced relationship of humans to nature, namely, humans-culture-nature. In comparison with the former, the latter relationship is more dynamic, more rapidly evolving, increasingly more complex and, all the present ecological threats notwithstanding, more propitious for the development of individuals and of the human species as a whole.

The relationship produced by human rational activity is in fact three relationships in one: a) humans / nature; b) humans / culture, i.e., humans / the sum total of intellectual and material products; c) culture / nature. Let us stress that since the development of culture — and to a larger and larger degree culture is the proper milieu for humans — it has become a habitat for the individual and for society. The complex relationship between humans and culture in general and the knowledge construct in particular is responsible for much of what they do and of what happens to them. The impact of culture on humans is rapidly increasing.

Culture is a historical and social construct. It always has a past and a territory. It transcends the individual both in time and space, having a richer content than any of the individual contributions. Culture is the common property of a group, and the common bond uniting individuals and introducing a degree of homogeneity in their physical and mental behavior. Being the common denominator, culture facilitates intracultural communications, broadens the scope of exchanges between members of the same culture, puts at the disposal of the individual the common patrimony of society and thus facilitates personal development. From the ecology of knowledge point of view it is the influence of culture on knowledge that merits our attention. Among the factors influencing thought there is, in the first place, the Weltanschauung, with its point of view, basic ideas, hierarchy of values and intellectual tradition habitually shared by members of the group. There is, further, the style of thinking, a predilection for certain types of intellectual preoccupations and some degree of consensus. These are all well-known aspects of the intellectual life of a community. What interests us here in particular is the mechanism of the development of these communal aspects of the life of the intellect and the laws which underlie it.

In this respect, knowledge in general, i.e., the knowledge construct, is the result not only of the intellectual activity and personal qualities of individuals, but also of the human group as a group, its shared values, goals and actions. There exists, of course, a hierarchy of groups from the family up to the culture group which may be multinational as in the case of Western culture. Each group facilitates communications proper to it and each group level has a specific potential for communications. The group which is of greatest importance to us is the one at the top of the group hierarchy, namely, the culture group. Because of the number of individuals within its reach, it has the highest potential for communications and for the development of knowledge. The personal and the social aspects are both constitutive elements of the knowledge construct. In this respect, the most fundamental fact is the demographic one, namely, the very multiplicity of individuals in the group. The existence of a plurality of knowers is an essential condition of the existence and development of the body of knowledge. Because of the plurality there exist exchange of information, confrontation of judgments and verification. The result of this is intersubjectivity and objectivization of elements of knowledge. The following law may be formulated expressing this:

Law IX: "There exists an interdependence between the size of the human group, the amount of communications within the group, the spread of intersubjectivity of the knowledge construct and the progress of knowledge."

 

The interdependence is characterized by two-way causality of the feedback relationship. Each factor influences other factors and is in turn influenced by them. Generally speaking, the larger the community, the more communications are necessary and the greater the chance of divergence of opinions and possibility of confrontations. All other factors being equal, the greater and more complex the sphere of intersubjectivity, the greater the need for and possibility of forming objective, verifiable judgments, the more rapid the development of knowledge. The greater the knowledge, the greater the means of sustaining greater numbers of people; the larger the community . . . and so on; the cycle can begin again. Of course, it would be a gross error to consider all these relations as automatic and univocally applicable to all human communities. The fact remains, however, that the individual knower is part of a community — of several communities to be exact. For instance, an educated individual, besides being a member of a family, is a member of a culture group, of a nation, of a social class, of an intellectual group, which is, first of all, that of the educated people in the nation. If a scholar, he or she is, moreover, a member of the group of persons of similar education involved in the study of the same field of knowledge. The latter group, by the way, may be international in scope. The inclusion in each group is expressed by the interrelations and the interdependence which exist between the individual and the group.

The role of the group as a group in the phenomenon of knowledge is now well-known and extensively studied in the sociology of knowledge. Suffice for our discussion to point out that one of the unavoidable consequences of the role of groups in knowledge is the existence of the consensus of opinion. The consensus is not only essential for the existence of society, it is also important for the advancement of knowledge. Thomas S. Kuhn made us aware of the role of the consensus, which he calls paradigm, in the development of science in this respect. Consensus plays an important role in all branches of knowledge and at all levels of its development. What distinguishes science from other modes of cognition is not the existence of consensus, but the role played by the creative factor which is responsible for the progress of science alongside the consensus. The growth of science leads to the creation of an ever greater number and diversity of branches of knowledge. Each branch having its proper paradigms, the number of paradigms is constantly increasing. As a result, the knowledge construct grows continuously and becomes more and more complex. Let us discuss briefly some of the consequences of the growing complexity.

As we already know, changes in the field of knowledge do not end with knowledge. They always affect concrete human existence in one way or another. Since the knowledge construct is a social fact, the growth of the diversity of branches of knowledge and the concurrent multiplication of paradigms produces complex social consequences. One of them is the growing multiplicity of fields of specialization and the resulting increase of the variety of professions. This produces a growing complexity of the systems of education, of research and of communication between the professions within the given society and worldwide. The result is the continuous growth of the complexity of social structures which, in turn, requires a more complex system of administration. Let us remind ourselves that the chain of consequences described here is the result of the intersubjectivity of knowledge. At first glance, there seem to be little, if any, relationship between the intersubjectivity of knowledge and the size of the administrative apparatus of a country. And yet such a relationship exists, although, of course, the intersubjectivity of knowledge is not the sole factor responsible for the growth of the administrative structure. Let us represent the relationship in question in a schematic manner:

intersubjectivity of knowledge ? growth of the knowledge construct ? number of professions and paradigms ?complexification of the structure of society ? growth of administration

 

Many thinkers, to name but Jean Jacques Rousseau and Karl Marx, dreamed about a return to or creation of a simpler and thereby less oppressive society. In view of the consequences of the development of knowledge discussed above, we may describe the chances of bringing about a simpler society amid progressing knowledge by means of the famous warning which Dante placed over the gates of Hell: "Lasciate ogni speranza" which translated freely into less poetic but more understandable American idiom means: "Not a chance in Hell." This conclusion has a message not only for present and future social reformers, but for all of us. There is an important lesson to be drawn from it. If we desire to improve society, we must take into consideration the factor of knowledge and its social consequences in a much more comprehensive way than has been done until now. Otherwise, our plans to produce a more satisfactory society will remain ineffectual.

Let us now look more closely at the problem of communication in the situation of the growing diversity of branches of knowledge and professions. The more knowledge advances, the more complex the system of communications has to become. This is a necessary and irreversible relationship. The more there are different groups in society, the more and the more varied communications are needed. The situation may be expressed in the form of a law:

Law X: "The need for communication is proportional to the size of the society, the number of groups within the society and the amount of knowledge available."

 

It is not, therefore, only the very size of the society that counts. The society may be very large indeed, like that of the Chinese for instance, and yet the amount and level of communications generated by it and the actually felt need for communications may be smaller than in a smaller society such as the American society. Until this century, the problem of communication was not studied sufficiently. The law above explains the present-day preoccupation with this problem in its various aspects. Linguistics and cybernetics find their justification in it. In light of this it becomes understandable why modern philosophers, in contradiction to their ancient and medieval predecessors, have become more and more preoccupied with the problem of intersubjectivity. Although, technically speaking, the philosophical problem of intersubjectivity is the result of Cartesian subjectivism, nevertheless its study corresponds to an increasing need to explore the domain of intersubjectivity. Besides, it could perhaps be argued that Descartes’s philosophy itself was an unconscious answer to this need, that it too has been conditioned by the social and noetic development taking place since the Renaissance. The law above makes it plausible to suspect that there may exist correlation between apparently diverse aspects and fields of human activity on the one hand, and the size and physical development of humankind on the other.

If there is some correlation of this kind, then it becomes apparent that not only is the act of knowing of the individual related directly to the concrete, existential situation of this individual, but also the development of knowledge in general as to its direction and quality is conditioned to a certain extent by the demographic situation of the society. The conditioning is reflected in the areas of prevailing interests, kinds of problems and solutions suggested over more or less extended periods of time. Of course, it would be futile to try to push these correlations too far. We must avoid the danger of oversimplications to which fall prey monistic philosophies whether materialistic or idealistic. Moreover, it has to be remembered that all these relations must be considered as dialectical, i.e., two-way causalities occurring in an ever-changing situation. This means, among other things, that simple analogies cannot be used as explanatory models in the discussion of the development of knowledge. If, however, there is some such relation as described above, it does offer an important insight into one aspect of the problem of knowledge. Consequently, it should be useful for the discussion of the ecology of knowledge and for knowledge planning.