Among the many consequences of the biblical world view, the one which is of particular interest for our discussion is its, apparently, rather surprising impact on the development of the notion of objectivity. The further consequence was the rise of the ideal of objective knowledge as the highest, most valuable form of cognition. It is this ideal that underlies the development of modern science and, in general, the Western perception of knowledge. Let us discuss briefly the much overlooked influence of religious ideas on modern science and the modern world view.

We have already analyzed the notions of objectivity and subjectivity. What we intend to do now is to discuss the relationship which exists between the notions of objectivity and personality. We have seen that the notion of objectivity presupposes the distinction between the subject and object, i.e., between the observer and the thing observed. This is easy to see, but the distinction is not as simple as it may seem. What is problematic is the degree of distinctness between the observer and the thing observed. The way we conceive their relationship has important consequences for our conception of the nature of knowledge and its value. Let us remember that our ideas about knowledge are not a simple datum, arising automatically out of the act of perception. They are hypothetical, mental constructs, explicit or implicit interpretations of obscure and complex acts.

The question is whether the observer and the thing observed are both essentially similar, whether they belong to the same order of reality, or is the observer somehow superior to the object observed? In other words, it is the status of the observer that is in question. Let us explain. The notion of objectivity implies not only a distinction between the subject and object, it involves a particular attitude on the part of the observer, namely, looking at the object. The act of looking at something is a very different relationship from being with, feeling with, or participating in something. "At" and "with" express, in a sense, two opposed attitudes, two very different relationships. "With" implies a certain community, participation, interdependence, a union. It suggests a degree of equality or, at least, a common denominator. "At" indicates a distinction, a distance, a look from above of an observer who is not with the thing observed. Not only is the observer distinct from the object, he or she is able to consider the object as a mere thing, as something inferior. The looking at things is done best when one looks down at things. To look at things, one has to consider oneself not only independent from the object of observation, at least in the act of observing; one has preferably to view oneself as superior to that object.

The belief in their superiority gives observers the conviction of their right to investigate the object at will. To the extent that the object is a mere thing, inferior to the observers, they think themselves justified not only to observe it passively, but to manipulate it, experiment with it and, if necessary, analyze it into its most minute constituent parts. Without this manipulative attitude there would be no modern science or technology. Nor would humanity have become what it is today. The active investigation of the world is done in the name of objective knowledge; the notion of the objectivity presupposes, as we have seen, a more or less clearly articulated notion of superiority of the observer. This is where the biblical doctrine of personality and of the special status of humans enters into the picture. This doctrine was necessary to give Western people the conviction about their preeminent position, justifying their superiority in relation to nature and their right to treat nature as an object of investigation and exploitation. In the light of what has been said, it becomes understandable that the ideal of objectivity has developed in the culture which conceived the idea of personality and attached to it such importance. It is also understandable why the ideal of objectivity has not been espoused by other cultures which have not developed the notion of personality to the same degree as Western culture.

The notion of objectivity is truly the linchpin of the conceptual edifice underlying modern science. However necessary, this notion is not a sufficient condition for the development of modern science. There is another, even more fundamental, albeit more hidden condition. It is the value attached to form in general, i.e., to determinations existing in the universe, to the "thusness" of things, as opposed to indetermination. Western culture perceives determination, form, the fact of things being determinately this or that, having such nature and not other, i.e., not being indeterminate, as a fundamental and positive aspect of being. This point of view has two kinds of consequences: metaphysical and epistemological. In the first place, perfection is identified with form, with the determinate mode of being. The hierarchy of perfections corresponds to a hierarchy of determinations from the lowest, simplest forms found in nature to the highest, most complex forms of human nature and behavior.

The metaphysical importance of form is reinforced by its epistemological role. For the Western mind, form is the structuring principle, the cause of order in the universe. Order is perceived as a perfection and as the source of intelligibility. Intelligibility makes intellectual knowledge possible and gives meaning to things and to human existence. Form gives shape to things and thoughts. It actualizes the potential for development in beings and is the principle of evolution and progression to more perfect states. The opposite of form — indetermination, chaos — became identified with imperfection. Consequently, it was perceived as something negative to be avoided, and, more importantly, something to be overcome by positive, form-producing, structuring action. The Western perception of form and determination stood at the antipodes of their evaluation by various other cultures, especially that of India.

Not only did Western thinkers conceive of form as the determining and most positive principle of nature. Having perceived form as a value, they went one decisive step further and conceived the ideal of life as a process of realization of ever higher forms, of "in-forming." The "in-forming" is achieved through an active behavior of actualizing one’s potential. This involved shaping oneself and, in the process, transforming the environment to satisfy the actualized human potential. That is why Western people try to master the situations they find themselves in, why they cherish leadership qualities and a "go-getter" frame of mind. Their attitude towards life is essentially positive, affirmative and active. The underlying ideal of the human is that of the doer, the conqueror. It is this frame of mind which produced the notion of progress in the most general sense of this word.

Western valuation of form affects human life in many different ways. As we have mentioned, it has an important impact on knowledge. Together with the ideal of objectivity it accounts for the development of modern science and of the idea of progress. In light of what we have said about the role of form and of the notion of objectivity in Western mentality, it becomes understandable that the modern notions of science and of progress have a common root. They are the product of the same vision of the world; they represent the same hierarchy of values. It is not surprising that the development of science in modern times coincided with the rise of the notion of progress to its present preeminence. The belief in progress provided the impetus for furthering science; in turn, the success of science and technology reinforced the belief in progress. The positive feedback existing between them has produced the world we live in. Together, science and progress form a system. This is why the waning of the uncritical attitude towards progress coincides with the demise of the belief in science as the miracle cure for all human problems.

The rise of modern science and the belief in progress were consequent upon a fundamental change in views about the nature and purpose of knowledge. With the new perception of knowledge went a new attitude towards nature. Together, they produced a new Weltanschauung which became the mindset of modern times. The new conceptual framework resulted in the most remarkable development which humanity has known in its long history. We glorify the achievements of the modern era, but we forget that they were the product just of the Western culture, not of the whole of humanity. They benefited that culture and gave it its dominant position. Unfortunately, they were not equally beneficial to other cultures. Many of the problems which humanity now faces are the direct consequence of this fact. Let us try to see in more detail the nature of the intellectual developments which ushered us into the new age.

When the initiators of the modern era — for instance, Francis Bacon, the great prophet of the modern age — began to reflect on the situation of humanity they realized two things, one which was common knowledge and the other new. Not only did they clearly perceive the misery of the average individual and the wretched situation of humanity as a whole, but they boldly affirmed that it could be improved. Bacon pointed out humanity’s subjugation to nature as the principal cause of its predicament. The subordination of humans to a force whose finality, if any, did not quite coincide with their desires, and, more often than not, appeared as opposed to them, was seen as responsible for peoples’ privations, their sufferings and, in general, their inability to realize their dreams of happiness.

On the other hand, Bacon realized that nature, when properly used, could be a source of immense riches and could be made to work for humanity. To achieve this aim it was necessary to develop an efficacious science of nature and, generally speaking, to turn the mind away from "sterile" reflection on abstract problems as had been the custom until then and to employ it gainfully in the development of practical knowledge. Consequently, he substituted for the contemplative, a practical ideal of knowledge. Our discussion of the distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge may help us to understand how revolutionary were Bacon’s ideas.

Two centuries later Auguste Comte expressed the new ideal of knowledge in his famous dictum: "To know in order to foresee so as to be able to do." Once the ideal of practical knowledge had been formulated, an approach to the solution of the problem of the condition of humanity and the choice of a means followed logically. It is important to stress that both the approach to the problem of knowledge and often the choice of aims of cognition have exercised a definitive influence on the generations after Bacon and have shaped modern, Western culture. The acceptance by Western man of the Baconian paradigm was a clear indication of its timeliness, and its success was considered as a proof of its theoretical and practical value. The solution of the problem of the condition of humanity was to consist in the betterment of living conditions through the conquest of nature. The consequences of this shift of perspective were very far-reaching indeed. Although science in Bacon’s view retained its Aristotelian aspect of the knowledge of the laws of nature, its aim was to be eminently practical. Namely, it was to enable humans to master nature and put its wealth at their disposal.

This pragmatic approach resulted in the reversal of positions of humans and nature in their relationship. Nature was degraded from the position of lawgiver to that of primary resource. Thus from the position of master, nature fell to the rank of servant, while man, from his former role of subordinate, rose to become master of the natural, if not cosmic order. The humans "liberation movement" freed people from subjugation to nature and from old beliefs as well. Man the maker and man the master became free, powerful and rampant. His action changed the surface of the earth and the situation of humanity.

Such a dramatic change has had, of course, many consequences. One of them is the ecological predicament. Another, equally important but less advertised, is the growing inequality among nations. There exists, however, still another result which is even less obvious, though not less important, and of great relevance to our discussion. It is the subordination of humanity to the idea of progress and to the process and activity of progress with all that it entails in terms of conditions and consequences. We shall discuss these consequences in greater detail in further chapters.

The liberation of humans from the bonds of nature and the development of the demiurgic ideal went hand in hand with a radical change in the field of philosophy. Aristotelian realism with its idea of subordination of the knower to the object of knowledge and with its insistence on sense perception as the source of information about external reality has been rejected together with the scholastic "Weltanschauung." Modern philosophy has developed on the Cartesian assumption, namely, the principle of immanence, that intellectual knowledge is formed within the limits of the intellect without any intrinsic relationship to, and dependence on, sense perception. Descartes conceived the intellect as a self-contained, self-sufficient spiritual substance, knowing within itself the perfectly intelligible ideas. This quasi-angelic notion of the intellect resulted in the thesis of a radical separation of the mind from the body and in an "inward look" in the theories of knowledge. Intellectual knowledge came to be viewed as being detached and independent from sense knowledge. Consequently intellection ceased to be seen as being subordinated to the extra-mental object. In this perspective, the classical definition of truth as consisting in the adequation between the judgment and its object lost its justification and had to be altered. Truth was not to be sought in the conformity with sense data and with the external world, but in the clarity of ideas, i.e., in subjective certitude.

Whether in the continental form of the rationalistic-idealistic tradition, or in the British empiricist version of modern philosophy, knowledge was viewed in this subjectivistic perspective. The external world was thought to be either unknowable as for Hume or Kant, or created by and conforming to the intellect as in Hegel’s philosophy. In either case, the knower neither had to conform to, nor was he a subordinate part of, the external world or of the cosmic order. Consequently, the act of thinking was viewed as a fully autonomous, knower-centered activity. In this perspective, thinking was a sui generis activity, standing in no relation to anything outside of itself and not a part of a greater whole. Thus, thought was justified in and by itself, not through its conformity to and participation in the universal order of being. Enclosed in his own mind, the knower becomes independent from the world and master of his sphere of knowledge. With Hegel, the subjectivistic point of view reached its climax. The subject became the maker of the object and the object had to conform to the intellect, its maker. Freed from subordination to nature, humans embarked on a man-centered development taking themselves for the supreme value and the supreme unit of measurement for evaluating everything outside themselves. Protagoras’ old saying about man being the measure of all things seemed to have been fully vindicated. The consequences of the subjectivism of modern philosophy do not end with analogies to the ideas of Protagoras, but extend to the conquest of nature and the contemporary predicament. It is important to understand the relationship between philosophical views and the situation in which humanity now finds itself.

Recently, it has become obvious that if humanity wants to continue to exist it has to come to terms with nature and respect its order. The ecological predicament obliges us to do more than just rethink our highhanded treatment of nature and our physical behavior. The revision should go deeper and involve the rethinking of the basic philosophical assumptions and of the "Weltanschauung" which goes with them. Of central interest to us is the problem of the nature and role of knowledge in general and of science in particular. What is needed is a new vision of human knowledge and activity integrated into the context of human existence, and of human existence integrated into its ecological context. The lack of this perception which accounts in large part for present-day problems which lead us to question the value of progress and the value of humanity as such. We take fewer and fewer things for granted: this statement applies to our thoughts and beliefs, as well as to basic facts of existence. To find a way out of our present predicament we have, therefore, to replace the act of knowing and its product, the knowledge construct, in their existential framework. This, we shall attempt to do in the following chapters.