There are two aspects to knowledge: subjective and objective. The act of knowing is subjective but, because of the insertion of the knower in society, this act is also a social fact. Moreover, knowledge is not only the sum total of subjective acts, it is also their product, namely, the knowledge construct. The body of knowledge is a product of individuals, but it takes more than individuals as individuals to build up and preserve it. It requires the existence of an organized group of peoples, i.e., a society persisting through generations, thus making possible synchronic and diachronic communication and accumulation of knowledge beyond the capacity of memorization of individual minds. The storing and preservation of knowledge is one of the most important functions of society. This function allows us to compare human society with animal societies. Animal societies, even the most developed and structured like those of bees or ants, do not have the capacity of accumulating knowledge beyond the capacity of memorization of individual animals and operate generation after generation on a set amount of information. Human society, instead, makes possible a continuous buildup of knowledge. Consequently, individuals can profit from a steadily expanding body of information.

In light of this, it becomes understandable why animal societies are basically steady state societies with changes being imposed mainly from the outside, while human societies are evolving societies containing an internal principle of change. The above remarks allow us to draw a general conclusion concerning the development of societies. All other factors being equal:

Law XIX: "The development of a society is proportional to its storage and use of information."

 

The more a society cares about knowledge and develops it, the more efficiently it accumulates it, transmits it from generation to generation and makes use of it, the more it can progress. It is rather obvious that different societies have different attitudes towards knowledge. They care about knowledge to a different degree and they develop different kinds of knowledge: more or less theoretical, more or less pragmatic, more or less methodical. Their mode of life, their state and rate of development reflect these differences.

In order to understand the role of knowledge in the life of society and its mode of causality it is necessary to realize that the body of knowledge preserved by society, i.e., the knowledge construct, is something different from personal knowledge. This distinction is also important for the proper understanding of the phenomenon of knowledge in general. The diverse and often baffling effects of knowledge cannot be sufficiently accounted for if knowledge is identified with the knower. Nor can they be explained if knowledge is viewed simply as a product of the rational powers of the knower, totally subordinated to that person, a harmonious extension of the knower and having no particular causality of its own. These remarks allow us to formulate a central thesis of the ecology of knowledge concerning the nature of the knowledge construct. If we want to understand the impact of knowledge on humans, whether on the individual, society or human kind has a whole, we have to distinguish the body of knowledge from its makers and perceive it as an entity in itself. In order to avoid misunderstanding let us clarify that we do not conceive the knowledge construct as being akin to the Platonic world of ideas. We do not assign to it an other-worldly mode of existence. We view it as a strictly manmade product, dependent on human knowers for its origin and continuous existence.

Conceived as a distinct entity, it may well appear as an unusual idea, to say the least, and goes against deeply ingrained habits of thought, provoking an almost instinctive objection. If we affirm the distinctness of the knowledge construct it is because, first of all, we are convinced of its validity. But this is not all. We also believe that it has to be done for practical reasons as well. Humanity has reached a stage in its development where, because of the growing power and impact of knowledge, it becomes necessary for our survival to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon of knowledge than that which we have had until now. Since the beginning of philosophy, the knowledge of knowledge was a theoretical endeavor. Because of the development of knowledge, it becomes also a practical need of prime importance. We have spoken about this change of situation earlier, but we find it useful to remind ourselves about it again.

Thinkers intent on preserving the theoretical, contemplative nature of philosophy may easily be offended by the introduction of a utilitarian argument into the justification of their continuous effort of reflection about knowledge. Let us, therefore, state that all the value of a theoretical approach to the problem of knowledge notwithstanding, knowledge is a means of relating the knower to the outside world and a tool allowing the knower not only to think but also to interact with this world. Generally speaking, the more powerful the tool, the more it becomes necessary for the sake of the tool-user to know the tool and to understand its nature, its potential and the consequences of its use. This pragmatic need does not make the theoretical approach superfluous but it does extend the scope of the study of the phenomenon of knowledge. It also reveals the complexity of that phenomenon better than the purely theoretical approach.

Intellectual knowledge is produced in the process of thinking which occurs in knowers, in their psychological interior, at the center of their personality. Thinking is a more personal act than physical activity such as, for instance, walking or doing things with our hands. This is why it is so difficult to look at knowledge as something which may be distinct and different from the knower. And yet, if one wants to study the relationship existing between humans and the product of their most personal and most perfect acts, the body of knowledge, one must grasp the difference which exists between them. They differ by nature and by their mode of being. Although knowledge is produced by humans, for humans and, as far as we can tell, has no meaning or justification outside of humans, it is not identical with humans. This fact has such far-reaching consequences that it warrants much more study than has been accorded it until now. Since knowledge has the personal and social dimension, the relationship between knowers and knowledge has to be analyzed on two levels, namely, personal and social. We have to look at the process of thinking and the knowledge possessed by the individual. But we have also to study the sum total of personal acts of knowledge preserved by society, the knowledge construct, and elucidate the differences which exist between the two forms of knowledge.

The relationship existing between them is anything but simple, and any attempt to simplify it may produce a clearer but false picture. Absolutely speaking, at the basis of any knowledge construct lie personal acts of knowledge. However, although thinking begins at zero level of personal intellectual knowledge, it does not occur in the absence of a knowledge environment. Personal intellectual development would be hardly possible without society and the social knowledge construct. This is well-known and we will not insist on it at the present moment. It is the difference existing between personal acts of knowledge and the knowledge construct which preoccupies us here. The former are produced by and contained within the knower. Each such act adds to the body of personal knowledge. This knowledge is contained in the knower and, to that extent, is dependent on that person for its coming into being and its persistence during the lifetime of the knower. The role played by the social knowledge environment and by the objective stimulus in the production of the personal act of knowledge does not change the dependence of this act on the knower. The act has no autonomous existence and it does not survive its maker. This would hardly be worth mentioning had it not been for the fact that, its existential dependence on the knower notwithstanding, it should not be simply identified with the knower.

Knower-dependent as it is, nevertheless personal knowledge possesses its own distinctness. This is why there can develop a feed relationship between the knower and his or her knowledge. The relationship plays a central role in the rational life of the knower and is an essential mechanism in the process of that individual’s mental development. Without this two-way relationship, human behavior and mode of life would not be what they are. The individual’s physical and psychological well-being depend on it, and so does the cultural evolution of humanity. The distinctness of personal knowledge may not be very evident and is, therefore, difficult to admit. The externalized body of knowledge, the knowledge construct, is in a different situation. Its distinctness from individual knowers is obvious. It is not contained as a totality in any one knower’s mind, even though it is the cumulative product of the acts of knowledge of individual knowers. As we have already said, it presupposes not only the existence of individuals and their intellectual activity, but also the continuous existence of society. Yet the knowledge construct should be identified neither with the knower, whether individual or society, nor with the act of knowing. This is a crucial fact central to the ecology of knowledge theory and to the understanding of the existential role of knowledge. Let us, therefore, state explicitly what we have already intimated. The knowledge construct is an entity in its own right, distinct from the knower and from the act of knowing.

Being a sum of externalized knowledge, it is not only distinct from knowers, it also has a different nature from them and their acts of knowledge. It has its own existence and power of causality. It is because of its distinctness that it is not automatically perceived and assimilated by individual minds. The difficulty of learning the existing knowledge is a measure of the distinctness of the knowledge construct. It is a being in its own right, much as other artifacts are, though not as tangible as, say, tools or dwellings. Its distinctness has many different consequences. The most important among them is no doubt its capacity to persist beyond the lifespan of individual knowers. Humans are biodegradable, ideas are not. Humanity is not cumulative beyond the span of three or four generations, whereas, as far as we can tell, the knowledge construct is, indefinitely cumulative. This is why knowledge can grow as it does. knowledge is always an open set; we can always add to the existing knowledge. Not only that, but the greater the knowledge construct, the more can be and is being added to it. We will say more about this fact further on.

It is one thing to state the properties of the knowledge construct, and another to explain their role and meaning. The distinctness and cumulativeness of the knowledge construct are not due to chance. They are not the result of random developments within the evolutionary process. It is obvious that these properties of the knowledge construct are essential for its growth and for the progress of humanity. Their existence is justified by the role they play in the evolution of knowledge. In order to advance knowledge, creative thinking must benefit from existing, i.e., accumulated knowledge. Without the accumulation of knowledge, each act of thought would have to begin at zero level of knowledge, and there would be no progress in knowing, no matter how brilliant were the knowers. Darwin or Einstein would not have formulated their theories without the benefit of the knowledge accumulated in their respective fields before them. Great thinkers are well aware of this fact and acknowledge it willingly.

The affirmation of the nonaccidental nature of the distinctness and the cumulativeness of the knowledge construct posits a methodological problem which must be clarified. Following Darwin, biologists explain evolution assuming the spontaneous and random nature of morphological variations. In the study of life forms other than our own we are necessarily outside observers. We do not have a direct insight into these life processes and no privileged grasp of the situation. Our explanations cannot but be conjectural and so is our understanding. Although knowledge is an obscure phenomenon and difficult to know, we do have a more direct insight into this phenomenon than into other life phenomena and can evaluate some aspects of it more clearly than some other biological processes. The fact of the cumulation of intellectual knowledge, the impact of the knowledge construct on humans and the consequences of this impact, i.e., the role which the development of knowledge plays in the evolution of humanity, are so obvious and indubitable that it would be difficult to explain these facts as products of chance. To deny their finality would defy common sense. Neither individuals as individuals, nor commonly as society, spend efforts, time and money to learn, to preserve and to develop knowledge just by accident and for no purpose at all.

The capacity to develop the body of knowledge beyond the limits of memory is so important for the progress of knowledge that it is worth discussing this fact further. As we have already said, the act of thought never occurs in the situation of zero knowledge. In order for the mind to think it has to be stimulated by some perception of an object or an idea either already present in the knower’s mind or conveyed by means of language. Knowledge grows on knowledge. The more there is accumulated knowledge, i.e., the greater the knowledge construct, the greater is the potential for the development of knowledge and the more knowledge develops. The body of knowledge has a dual role. It is a store of knowledge and it creates the potential for further development of knowledge. Hence:

Law XX: "The potential for the development of knowledge is proportional to the existing knowledge."

 

The above law explains why knowledge develops faster and easier in the presence of a large knowledge construct, than in its absence. It is, therefore, not surprising that the progress of knowledge is increasingly more rapid. The law also justifies intellectual and material efforts of accumulating, preserving and making accessible large knowledge constructs. Let us recall here Law V: "Thought induces change." The greater it is, the more we can and do think, and the greater becomes the potential for action and for change.

Thinking is an activity of humans who are organic creatures. One may, therefore, ask whether there is any resemblance between the process of thinking and organic processes. In fact there is an analogy between the two but not an identity. Life depends on life. The more we learn about life, the more we become aware about the conditioning of the organic mode of being in general and its dependence on other organisms in particular. Organisms require living and dead organisms for their existence. They depend on them for the creation of proper environmental conditions and for food. Organic life recycles matter from which organisms are built. It is not by accident that organisms do not survive their death. They have to be decomposed in order to make way for new organisms and to feed them. Organisms have to exist in proper balance with their life supporting environment. Consequently, they cannot accumulate indefinitely and exceed the carrying capacity of their ecological niche. In contrast, there is no such apparent limit to the accumulation of knowledge. But this is not the only difference between organic and intellectual processes.

In contradistinction to organisms, intellectual knowledge does not feed on knowledge, though it presupposes and grows on knowledge. An organism feeds on an other organism either by destroying it or by digesting an already dead one. The development of knowledge involves a different relationship to already existing knowledge. There is no destruction of knowledge properly speaking in the progress of knowledge. The attitude of knowers to a given element of knowledge, such as an explanation, may change radically, but that explanation does not cease to exist. A new theory replaces a previous theory, but it does not decompose it, it does not digest it. Nobody today believes that the earth is flat and supported by four elephants, but this explanation remains as a true element of the history of cosmology. It continues to be a part of the knowledge construct, although its place and role in the structure of knowledge has changed. While elements of previous levels of knowledge are often absorbed into new conceptual structures, there is no recycling of knowledge in the biological sense of the recycling of matter as it occurs in organic life. Instead of destruction of organisms, there is a continuous preservation and accumulation of knowledge with the resulting growth of the knowledge construct.

Thus far we have insisted on the advantages of its cumulativeness. However, it would be very wrong to believe that all the effects of its growth are equally beneficial, or that its cumulativeness is the only aspect of the knowledge construct worth discussing. If there is any justification to the present study and any value to the theory of the ecology of knowledge, it is because the knowledge construct is a very complex phenomenon and its effects are many and varied, as we shall try to explain in this and following chapters. It is the most complex, the most perfect and the most powerful construct ever produced by humans, with the most diverse and far-reaching consequences. Among all human products it is the one which is most specifically human. At the same time, it differs more from our human material frame than any other artifact. It is neither organic nor tangible and poses unique difficulties for its study.

Let us compare the knowledge construct with the brain which, to the best of our knowledge, is the organ of thought. The brain is a concrete entity. It has a certain mass and shape, and occupies a well-defined space. It can be observed, measured, experimented with and is subject to physical laws just like any other material object. Its product, the knowledge construct, has none of these characteristics. This is why it is difficult to imagine that the body of knowledge is an entity existing apart from the act of thinking and, more importantly, that it exercises an all-pervasive, determining influence on humans. Yet, this is precisely the case. Humans produce the knowledge construct and, in turn, it shapes their thinking and behavior on the individual and social level. The greater the knowledge construct, the more complex and the more formative is its impact, and the more humanizing is its effect.

Philosophers have been accustomed to look at ideas as abstract forms, carriers of meanings and logical elements, components of judgments and reasonings. But ideas are not only means of understanding whose role begins and ends with understanding. Ideas play also a more concrete role in human life, because understanding does not end with understanding. The understanding determines in a large, though not exclusive, measure the hierarchy of values of the individual and of the society. And, consequently, it guides human behavior. This is why ideas, either in the form of explanations of the scientific type or as beliefs, have a major influence on human life. The shaping impact of ideas can be clearly seen through a comparison of attitudes and modes of life proper to different cultures. The understanding of the formative role of ideas in human life is important not only for the understanding of the behavior of individuals and societies in a given time and place. It is essential also for the explanation of cultural evolution. Indeed, without the impact of ideas, the advancement of humanity becomes unintelligible. Material factors alone cannot explain it adequately.

The feed relationship between knowers and the knowledge construct is the single, most important "mechanism" in the specifically human mode of evolution. It makes possible the progression from the semi-animal state of early humans to our postindustrial society. It is also responsible to a large measure for humanity’s present woes, for the good and bad aspects of progress. Rationality — the possession of a mind and an ability to think — by itself without the feed relationship between mind and body of accumulated ideas would not be enough to produce the advancement of knowledge and the progression of humanity. Thus, the understanding of this feed relationship is a key for the comprehension of man’s rational odyssey since the origin of his species. The understanding of the feed relationship involves, in turn, the grasp of the nature of the knowledge construct as an entity in its own right, distinct from knowers.