All is not sweetness and light in the relationship between humans and the knowledge construct. Its distinctness and the cumulativeness is not an unmixed blessing. By grasping these aspects of the knowledge construct we can investigate and understand the problems which knowledge and its progress generates. Contrary to what has been assumed in the past and still is generally believed, the relationship between humans and their accumulated knowledge is not simple and uniformly harmonious. If there had been one universal knowledge construct and if everybody had always had equal access to it, deriving equal profit from this access, then the situation would have been much simpler than it really is, and it could then have been regarded as generally positive. This, however, is far from being the case. There are basically two reasons for the complex nature of the human/knowledge construct relationship, namely, the very nature of the knowledge construct and the highly unequal relationship of knowers with the knowledge construct. We are so accustomed to seeing knowledge as a perfection and the acquisition of knowledge as necessary and desirable that we are inclined to overlook the problems which exist in the relationship of humans with knowledge. Let us, therefore, try to say a few more words about the reasons for these problems.

Traditionally, we conceive the relationship between knowers and knowledge as a one-way causal relation: knower — knowledge. Knowledge being produced by knowers, its relation to knowers is one of subordination and dependence. Consequently, knowledge itself and the relation to, and with, knowers cannot be the source of serious problems; if there are any problems with, or because of, knowledge they are superficial and accidental. They are caused not by knowledge, but by the lack of it. Like ignorance, they can always be overcome by more and better knowledge. Unfortunately, this optimistic view is much too simplistic. It offers a one-dimensional picture of a multidimensional situation. In fact, far from being a one-way dependence, the relationship knower-knowledge is a two-way rapport between two distinct and very different entities. It works out differently for each individual and for every organized group of individuals, be it a nation or a business enterprise. We shall discuss this relationship in greater detail in further chapters.

The sources of the difficulty of understanding the relationship between knowers and the knowledge construct come from both sides. There is, on the one hand, the extreme variety among humans — their individual capacities exacerbated by cultural, social, economic and environmental differences. On the other hand, we deal not with one knowledge construct but with a multitude of them of which, moreover, we have a very inadequate knowledge. For the sake of simplicity we may speak of the knowledge construct in general, which is what we have done until now. However, as we have already intimated, what in fact exists is not a universal, unified body of knowledge uniformly distributed throughout humanity, but a variety of knowledge constructs from personal constructs to those proper to a culture. The important development in this field is the rapid growth of Western science and the imposition of this knowledge construct on non-Western cultures. Far from simplifying the noetic situation of the world, the process makes it even more complex and is a source of growing problems.

Besides being many, the knowledge construct’s have other aspects which make their study difficult. Seen from the point of view of Western formal logic, they do not form coherent, well-integrated wholes. This is true even of the scientific knowledge construct. Being the cumulative product of many minds, it is not an intellectual monolith. It has not been developed in a consistent way, with a single purpose in mind, by a team working in unison. It is a product accumulated throughout history, the result of intellectual endeavors of various kinds. When it is sufficiently well-developed, like that produced by Western culture for instance, it represents the results of practical and theoretical knowledge. Such a knowledge construct is a repository of the results of efforts of understanding on different levels of intellectual development, from most primitive to the most advanced. And if it is not a comprehensive depository, we spare no efforts to add the lacking elements. Our desire to know our most remote past and to understand the most primitive mentality is proof of our more or less avowed intention to recuperate all the stages of the intellectual evolution and to include them in the knowledge construct.

Human attitudes towards and involvement with the outside world and with themselves are multiform, which the knowledge construct reflects. This is why it may contain side-by-side science and myth, fact and fiction, advanced explanation and nonexplanatory magic, the most advanced ideas and the most primitive. Thus far studies of knowledge constructs have been limited mainly to logical studies of thinking or to anthropological studies of primitive mentality. Important as these studies are, they do not give us an adequate picture of a knowledge construct, especially of an advanced one like ours. Much more comprehensive, though done with a different purpose in mind, are various attempts to classify knowledge, whether for philosophical reasons or for retrieval purposes by librarians and encyclopedists. The knowledge construct is a reality richer than these studies suggest. A comprehensive study of an advanced one, let alone of the global one, does not yet exist, nor is it even clear whether it would be at all possible.

Since neither the sum total of knowledge possessed by humanity, nor the knowledge constructs of particular cultures are fully logically coherent, one may ask whether a greater coherence may not be found on the lower level of their elements. This, indeed, is the case, for their components are often more noetically consistent constructs. The various intellectual structures, be they scientific theories, beliefs, myths or whatever, each possess a degree of internal coherence necessary to give them a certain unity. The coherence may differ from case to case, but is sufficient for creating the distinctness of constructs. Internal unity is a condition of the intelligibility of these structures, but it also has another important consequence. Namely, by giving them their distinctness, it allows us to view them as individual entities forming a population of entities. Consequently, a knowledge construct may be described as a population of such entities, i.e., a population of systems, and laws governing the behavior of populations (such as, for instance, the law of evolution and ecological laws) may be applied to it. Thus it becomes possible and justified to study one from various points of view including statistical, sociological and biological.

The above conclusion may appear rather odd in light of the traditional philosophical approach to the problem of knowledge which centers on the questions of truth and objectivity: s word of explanation and a reminder is in order. The traditional way of analyzing knowledge appears sufficient as long as the body of knowledge is not viewed as a distinct entity, i.e., as a knowledge construct. Once it is perceived as an entity in its own right, distinct from knowers and the act of knowledge, then it becomes apparent that it would not be sufficient to try to understand the nature and the role of a knowledge construct or of one element of it, by viewing it only in light of the notions of objectivity or of truth. In itself, an intellectual construct simply is and it is as it is, before being true or false, objective or subjective.

Because and to the extend that it exists the construct is a fact. As a distinct entity, it has its place in the objective order of things, and in relation to this order it has a truth value. It is true or false and it exercise its particular causality. Its impact over time may differ from the beginning or later, depending on the truth or falsity of the construct. It would simply be wrong to equate the impact of a conceptual construct with its truth value. Otherwise, it would be rather difficult to explain the appeal exercised by constructs which cannot be proven true, like myth, or by those which have been proven false such as "miraculous," pseudo-medical treatments, or theories such as that of a flat earth. On the other hand, we know that even the most advanced scientific theories are only more or less adequate explanations which, sooner or later, will be replaced by better ones. The quality of the intellectual construct which is most directly appealing to the intellect is not its truth, but its intelligibility and its apparent explanatory value. These qualities give the knower the highly satisfying feeling of intellectual mastery. If this feeling can be coupled with a belief in the material efficiency of knowledge, as for instance in magical formulas, then, of course, the satisfaction is even greater.

It is important to remember that an intellectual construct is a creation of intellect. It is an artifact and as such similar to a painting or a machine. The reason we are not inclined to think of it as belonging to the same class of things as paintings or machines is that it is made of different "material" than these. Namely, it is built of intellectual stuff, i.e., ideas. Being themselves products of intellect, ideas are much more intelligible than things material. This is why intellectual constructs can be so appealing to the intellect. The intelligibility of intellectual products exercises a powerful attraction on thinkers and tempts them to equate ideas with things they stand for, thus giving rise to idealistic theories of knowledge. Indeed, the intellect derives much more immediate satisfaction from dealing with concepts and conceptual constructs than with material objects.

The intelligibility of intellectual constructs is a more complex matter than the intelligibility of concepts. It depends on two factors, namely, on the intelligibility of the elements of the construct — ideas or lesser constructs such as judgments (sentences) — and on the form of the construct, i.e., the manner in which the elements were put together. The form is the artificial product of the intellect: it does not come as such from the outside world; it is not a given. The quality of the form depends in the first place on its creator. The better the construct is formed, the more it is coherent and logically satisfying: consequently, the more it is intelligible and appealing. It is worth pointing out that the intelligibility resulting from the form of the construct is not identical to that of its elements. This distinction harkens back to the classical distinction between the form and matter of a reasoning.

In contrast to the intelligibility of constructs, the intelligibility of ideas depends more directly on the intelligibility of the objects they represent, being their mental image. In the majority of cases the objects are objective entities, elements of the external world. The intelligibility of concepts has its source in the determinations of these entities. If, for instance, the concept "apple" has a particular meaning, it is due to the determined nature of objects which we call apple. If it is worth mentioning this well-known fact, it is to stress the difference in the sources of intelligibility of concepts and of constructs. As we have said above, the intelligibility of constructs is to a large extent, though not exclusively, the product of the intellect, their maker. This fact has many consequences and is a source of a diversity of interpretations which gives rise to different theories of knowledge. Indeed, it is easier to know than to know how one knows.

The difference in the sources of intelligibility is an important fact and a problem for philosophy in general and for the theory of ecology of knowledge, as well. Theories of knowledge recognize this difference, whether they are of the realistic kind in the Aristotelian tradition, or in the idealist, Cartesian tradition. The difference between these two schools of thought is this: the former recognizes explicitly the two sources of intelligibility and incorporates them in its theory of knowledge, while the latter grasps the problem only obliquely because of its rejection of sense perception as a source of ideas. In the empiricist and idealist doctrines, the distinction between the sources of intelligibility finds its indirect reflection in the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. Realistic theories of knowledge do not accept this distinction, considering all judgments as essentially synthetic. The fact is that the objective world and the intellect each have their own principle of intelligibility, namely, form (determination), and contribute each in a different way, on a different level, to the intelligibility of intellectual constructs. Thus constructs have not only their distinctness and their own mode of existence, but also their own intelligibility distinct from that of other entities.

We have said earlier that an intellectual construct is more intelligible than an external object. This holds true even though all constructs are not equally satisfactory as objects of study. There is a difference in this respect between a personal construct, i.e., an element of personal knowledge, and one which has been communicated to many and belongs to the realm of public knowledge. From the methodological point of view, the latter is a more satisfactory object of study than the former for several reasons. An exteriorized construct is an objective entity, knowable to many. The more there are people who know it, the better. To the extent that it is publicized, it is more persistent and more durable than a personal act of knowledge. As an object of knowledge, it transcends the limitations of space and time proper to individuals and their acts of knowledge. It can, therefore, be known objectively and studied at different moments of time by many individuals in different places. Thus, it can be the subject of verifiable propositions. As we know, verifiability is a necessary condition which an object has to satisfy to become an object of science. Externalized intellectual constructs satisfy this condition, making possible, at least in principle, a science of knowledge construct’s.

This conclusion is important from the methodological point of view and because of the role played by science in the contemporary world. In modern times, science is the principal cause of the development of the global knowledge construct. Scientific knowledge is so successful that we tend to look at science as the most perfect mode of knowledge in general. In this situation it is important to remember the difference between a knowledge construct as a totality and its elements. The difference which interests us here is that between the Western (or global) one and that of exact sciences, and between the latter and its elements, seen from the point of view of the cumulative character of knowledge. The higher we go in the hierarchy of constructs, the more they are cumulative. The least cumulative are scientific theories. Each new theory replaces the previous one, and even though elements contained in the older theory are found in the new one, the new explanation is different from the one it replaces. The new explanatory structure is not an accumulation of previous explanations. Relativity theory is not simply more of Newtonian mechanics. Nor is modern chemistry operating with the notions of atoms and molecules simply an extension of the phlogiston theory, to give just two examples. Rather, science is cumulative because we continuously learn more and more and science expands, all the time adding to its pool of knowledge new data and their explanations.

The most cumulative of them all is the highest, most complex knowledge construct proper to a culture and, of course, the global one. Outdated modes of knowledge, theories and ideas belong to it, just as do the most advanced elements. Not only do the outdated elements remain in the intellectual patrimony of humanity, but having ceased to play the noetic role which they played originally, they become the object of research for history. Their noetic role has changed, but they continue to have an intellectual role and value. There is in this respect an important difference between intellectual products and material artifacts. In the great majority of cases, material products either wear out and disintegrate, like clothes, or are scrapped and recycled, like bottles or cars. But we do not scrap or recycle ideas or theories as we do clothes and bottles. If someone tries to scrap ideas or theories, as is sometimes done for ideological reasons, sooner or later they are reclaimed and returned to their legitimate status. The preservation of intellectual constructs in the knowledge construct is a very important and general fact. Let us express it in the form of a law:

Law XXI: "An intellectual construct always retains a noetic role."

 

In other words, an intellectual construct always remains a valid object of knowledge. The desire to preserve them is an integral part of the desire to recover and to preserve the whole human past. Intellectual constructs are products and preservers of intellectual energy as well as stimuli of intellectual activity. The preservation of constructs is a manifestation of the general tendency of the preservation of energy.

In order for an intellectual construct to retain a noetic role indefinitely, it has to be preserved indefinitely. The law stated above would be rather meaningless had it not been for our capacity to preserve constructs beyond the limits of the physical existence of their makers. The problem of the preservation of knowledge is as vast as it is important. Suffice it for now to mention the fact that an intellectual construct transcending the capacity of individual intellects to memorize it requires, in order to be assembled and to persist, a material support physically independent from knowers. In other words, it has to be externalized and stored outside of knowers. It has to have a material base or container. This statement may appear shocking to those who are accustomed to think of knowledge as a purely intellectual phenomenon. Let us, therefore, remember that human intellects are bound with organisms and cannot operate without their bodily frame, at least not during their lifetime on this earth. Just as the intellect requires the physical support of the body to operate, so, too, a knowledge construct requires an adequate support in order to develop and persist. In the case of a dynamic knowledge construct, its continuous development depends on a parallel development of the material means of preservation of the body of knowledge. Let us express this important fact in the form of a law:

Law XXII: "The level of the material support system for knowledge has to be proportional to the level of knowledge."

 

What exists in fact in the field of knowledge is a whole composed of assemblages of ideas and their material support. There exists a feed relationship between the development of knowledge and of the support system. The progress of knowledge requires and produces an increasingly more perfect support system and is, in turn, stimulated by the developments of that system. Ideas and their support system form an evolutionary system. Presently, the knowledge construct is a vast and highly sophisticated structure supported by libraries, data banks, information network, etc.

Let us end this chapter by stating unequivocally that it is impossible to understand the phenomenon of human knowledge without realizing the intrinsic relationship between ideas and their material support, be it in the process of formation and acquisition of ideas, or of their accumulation and preservation.