The problem of God and evil as it is discussed philosophically in the Western world is set against the background of a personal God who creates. Those who oppose the theist defense object that if you accept God as all powerful and all knowing, then God cannot be good, for he allows innocent people to suffer and, in general, he allows too much needless evil to occur in the world. If God is omnipotent, then he is malicious, depraved and cruel. He is not a good person. If we insist that he is good, then, in view of all the evil in the world, we must downgrade his power and/or knowledge. Either way, we have a powerful objection to the existence of the Judeo-Christian and Islamic God.

This position presupposes that the ontologically good God is also morally good as a person. If God were only ontologically good he would have everything that an ideal God should have, and we might conceive him as necessary, eternal, creator, omnipotent, omniscient, infinite and even, in a sense, the foundation of all morality. However, he would not be a person who could be blamed or praised for what he does.

The claim that God is a person is based on God as Creator, which implies that he is the source of every perfection. Personhood is a perfection, and hence it should be attributed somehow to God. Traditional theism presupposes that the essential notes of person are having intelligence and will. One objection to this view (which we will not consider here) understands "person" as necessarily implying a body. This, of course, would preclude calling a wholly spiritual God a person.

Another important objection to God as a person is the necessity of moral agency. A necessary condition of being a person is that one should be a true moral agent. The claim is made, then, if God is a person, he should be a true moral agent, with a free will enabling him to do moral evil as well as good.

If God would not have to be seen as a moral agent who could do good or evil, then the theist defense of God would be easier. One could then argue that the problem of evil is a pseudo-problem, for God could not be blamed for the evil that occurs in the world. If God were not a moral agent, we could not rightfully complain to God for whatever suffering we must undergo, nor could we call God cruel, a torturer of man, an unsympathetic tyrant who toys with man. The non-believer’s objections to the existence of God, based on the presence of evil in the world, would be undercut.

Central to this issue is God’s status as a transcendent being. If we take that seriously, we will be inclined to be very cautious in attributing moral actions and moral agency to him. For action which makes one a moral agent, is a category and God transcends all categories. Below we will consider some of the arguments that flow from this position and some of the replies that can be made. Of course, if God is a moral agent, then he could be blamed for creating a world with unnecessary evil in it and could be charged as not morally good or not all powerful.

This is a strong objection which would place God beyond the problem of good and evil. However, the difficulty with it is that it removes God so far from creatures that we can say little about him. This would virtually put an end to a philosophy of God and would plunge us into mysticism.

It appears that, if we are to pursue a rational inquiry into who this God is whom some accept and others deny, we have no choice but to have recourse to analogy. If God transcends the categories, the terms that we apply to him have to be used analogically. For example, the freedom which we attribute to God is to be understood differently from our accustomed way of taking it. Rather than essentially being the opposite of necessary or the power to choose this or that, God’s freedom is to be understood as what one has when an agent is in the presence of his proper goal. Freedom here could be considered as the avid involvement, possession and enjoyment of what is good for us. Even should we be determined, we are free when we do what we should be doing. We are free because our decision is seen as the right one. Something of what this freedom is can be seen when, in a moral matter we do what we are supposed to do, we are then free of the pangs of conscience, free of gnawing doubts of indecision, and undisturbed by the criticisms of others. In this sense of freedom one can be a moral agent and still not change. It can be said that this is the way the blessed in heaven are free. In this way, both God and the blessed in heaven are personal moral agents. God is free because he is always in the presence of himself, the only adequate object of his will. Perhaps in a similar way we should try to find an interpretation of ‘person’ that would allow us somehow to consider God as a moral agent.

2. Another argument against God as a moral agent follows from the idea of action which, of its essence, involves change. The traditional view is that God as the necessary being cannot change. If he were free to do evil then he would change, but since he cannot change, then he cannot do evil. Doing evil involves acting, moving from potency to act. If God is changeless and God as necessary being possesses his attributes necessarily, then he cannot be a true moral agent.

We can also view analogously the "act of creation" as having something common to action. As the human agent is seen as being aware of alternatives, we can imagine God as having alternatives. We can conceive of him without creation, as existing without having created: Or, . . . as having created either this world or some other possible world even though he was determined only by his own goodness.

3. Another argument against God as a moral agent is that God as the source of morality does not have to be a person in order to be the source of moral good. Even though God cannot be called good in exactly the same way in which we would call our neighbor good, he could still be the source of morality. As Creator, God is seen as the source of all existence and perfection. As such he is the source of all truth, and, since truth as a perfection encompasses not only the speculative but also the practical, then God can be seen as the source of moral truth. God constitutes an intelligible foundation for right and wrong, a rational element determining the morality of an action. Since moral truth is a good, then God is the source of moral goodness.

Here God would be justified as the source of morality by appealing to his status as Creator, the source of all perfections. Although this does not function as a defense of his personhood, it has a certain relationship to the justification of God as a person. Since being a person is a perfection, then just as the ontologically good God would have to be the basis of the perfection of moral truth, so also he would have to be the ground of personhood. God as the source of all perfections would have to be eminently moral and personal.

Although this argument has a certain power, other factors moderate its force. Analogously we could speak of him in a way somewhat similar to our evaluation of a creative person. What did he have to work with? Is what he has done admirable? Is there beauty and harmony in what he produced? Can we think of a better possible way of doing things? The criteria for our judgment are reason and possibility. When Hume objected that God botched the job of creation, Hume had in mind the possibility of a better world, which he claimed God should have created. We can at least consider the possibility. The inquirer can ask why God did not create a better world which appears possible, at least to the inquirer. If the universe is truly a botched job, then we can judge the Creator to have failed, to have produced a world which is unworthy of a good and all powerful God. Even though creation is a unique effect, it is still an effect which we can compare to some other possible effect which we can conceive of as within the powers of an all-powerful creator. We can conceive of apparently better worlds that God should have been able to actualize, and hence we can at least question whether his act of creation has been a failure. And, surely, we can think of worlds worse than this one. The result of his creation, the whole fabric of creation as one unique effect, could be questioned as worthy or unworthy of a good God. In this way, it seems possible to talk in terms of whether God has failed, whether he has the right intentions, does the right actions. This is in effect to speak of him as a moral agent and hence, as a good or evil person.

What this all comes down to is that it is very difficult to deny to God any connection to moral agency. While God, as the cause of being, is transcendental and does not operate within the categories, as perfect he can be seen as the cause of moral truth and as having the perfections of intelligence and will which are the requirements of a person. And he could be seen as free in that he spontaneously embraces his proper good.

Perhaps a greater insight into the mystery of God’s goodness can be attained by becoming aware of the strength of both approaches, the transcendental and the personal. Perhaps we should accept the distinctiveness of the transcendental God who is not a being and be willing to make modifications in our view of God as a moral agent and person. At the same time, we might be more accepting of a distinctive type of freedom which applies most appropriately to the Divinity.

We should not be surprised that thinkers down through the ages have discussed the problem of God and evil in the context of God as a person. It is not unexpected that we ask to what degree the Judeo-Christian God brings about good or inflicts or allows evil as do we humans who can accept or reject each other, who can help or harm, who can offer the most beautiful gifts or will the most horrible evils.

It is not unexpected, then, that we ask, "What do we mean when we say that God is a good person?" In an attempt at an answer, we will try to flesh out in more detail what we mean by this phrase. The good person is very close to us?we know who she/he is. She/he gives us a chance of understanding more accurately the meaning of "good." Indeed, the good (or evil) person is ourself?we recognize goodness when we consciously do what is right or others treat us with due concern. We know evil when we act against our principles or our conscience and harm someone, or when we suffer from a neighbor’s insensitivity or injustice.

Here we shall draw on what appears in the theist tradition in answer to the many objections to the goodness and omnipotence of God in that tradition; the good person too will be seen in that context. (Possible objections might be that the good person should be an avid skeptic and have little room for faith in his life, that he should be a pessimist, an egoist, or a radical subjectivist in moral matters. I think there are good reasons for rejecting the above types of person, but I do not want to argue the point at this time.) By applying our idea of the good human person to the idea of God, we will try to make clearer what is meant by the good God who allows evil.

I will use the traditional positive (via affirmativa) and negative (via negativa) ways. The negative way will be twofold.

1. The first kind of negative approach prescribes that the attributes of the good person that imply imperfection must be denied of God. They are many: faith, gratitude, anxiety, humility, courage, a willingness to accept challenges and to increase in virtue . . . Although they are of limited value in the problem of God and evil, their consideration helps toward an understanding of the important differences between God and his creatures and a more accurate grasp of God’s goodness.

The good person sees the reasonableness of faith as she recalls the complexity of the world and the limited state of human knowledge. She sees the need for faith in her fellowman and sees that an action done because it is right is worthy of greater merit than one that is done because of a clear-cut immediate reward. She sees that a person must exercise the virtue of faith in some way, if she is freely to come to accept the existence of God. Faith, however, is one virtue that we do not expect to find in God. We do not say that God is good because he practices the virtue of faith or because he chooses to act without a desire for a reward. We call God good in this tradition because he acts according to his goodness.

Gratitude is another virtue that we should not expect to find in God, although we look for it in the good person. A good man or woman is grateful for the good things that he or she can enjoy. But God does not have to be grateful to anyone, for he is the source of all.

Nor does God have to accept a certain amount of tension and risk as he pursues a task of genuine worth, as we find experienced in the good, conscientious, hard-working person. While the human can fail or be harmed, neither of these can touch the all powerful God. He does not have to take on projects of achievement, for he is the fullness of existence and does not have to grow and perfect himself. God is the epitome of virtue and does not have to develop it.

The good person views unfortunate occurrences as opportunities to develop virtue, but we do not attribute such a characteristic to God. The good person sees natural disasters, disease and the like as an opportunity to practice courage, as a call to greatness. This kind of person believes that when great evils are unavoidable, they can be the occasion of a significant development of virtues such as courage, hope, devotion, faith. This person is not crushed by the need to suffer. Rather, she is willing to face up to her own death, to the time when she will have to leave all pleasures, friends, and earthly possessions. She realizes the value of a test and is willing to be put to it. Although she tries to free herself from evils and shape her destiny whenever possible, she is willing to endure suffering when she cannot change it. She tries to change what she can change and accept what she cannot change. God, however, cannot be harmed by unfortunate occurrences. He does not have to seize the opportunity to develop virtue. Nor do we call God good because he is willing to face up to his own death.

The good person is willing to venture out and test his limits, and to accept the consequences of failure. Here, again, God cannot test his limits, for he lacks limits and cannot be subject to them. Likewise, he does not fail in what he does, and, hence, does not have to accept the consequences of failure.

The good person sees danger as a challenge to a higher kind of life. Not that he always seeks it out, but that he is willing to stand firm when it confronts him. He can defend himself against an aggressor and fight to defend his freedom. But God is not subject to danger, and we do not call him good because of the way he stands up to it. We don’t call God good because he defends himself against someone who might harm him. He is all powerful and this would be contradicted by the existence of someone who could harm him.

Due to the limitations of human knowledge, the good person should be humble and slow to judge when faced with great complex problems, but the good God does not have to have this characteristic. The omniscient God knows all that is to be known about the world and, hence, cannot be under the obligation to be slow to judge.

Nor does God try to preserve and enhance his own freedom as we would expect from a good person. In our context God is the epitome of freedom.

2. In the second use of the negative way, we say that God, like a good human person, is not obliged to do certain things. It is here that we have an idea that is at the heart of our problem. For example, a good person is not held to do the impossible. He is free from any obligation to do what cannot be done. As we do not expect a good person to do the impossible, neither should we expect God to do something which cannot be done.

Another characteristic denied of both the good person and God is pessimism. The good person is not a pessimist, one who is convinced that little goes right in the world and evil will never be overcome.

A third characteristic absent from both is extreme hedonism. The good person is spiritual; he rejects the kind of hedonism that advocates a life in which sense pleasure and the escape from physical pain are seen as the highest goods. Although denying characteristics of the good God is somewhat helpful in coming to some knowledge of his attributes, it leaves much to be desired with respect to an appreciation of the complexity and richness of the divinity.

The positive approach?positive expressions of how God is said to be good?is called for. In a positive vein, then; God, like the good person, has everything he should have. We have an idea of what God should be, an ideal God. Whatever we see that this God should have we attribute to him. In this sense knowledge, power, justice and all human perfections (in a purified way) should be found in him.

Four characteristics of the good person are eminently relevant to the problem of God and evil. In a positive approach, first, a good person from time to time allows or even brings about evil for a greater good; second, God can provide remarkable powers to his human creatures; third, God is the goal that all humans seek; fourth, negatively, a good person need not do the most perfect thing possible at any time.

God’s goodness is not necessarily diminished by his allowing or indirectly bringing about a genuine evil from time to time. In the last chapter we noted how real but justified evils are brought about by good persons doing their duty. Examiners who fail medical students and airline pilots, and parents who discipline children cause suffering. We do not blame such persons for what they have done, even though they have caused disappointment, distress, financial difficulties and the like. So too, God might from time to time be the cause of an evil and still not be worthy of blame, and still be a good person.

He is good because he has given us the power to endure and rise above the dangers that confront us in the world. He is good because he allows us to participate in his generosity, his magnanimity. He has given us the power to become better persons. It’s not that we deny the goodness of a person who listens to us and is the source of aid and comfort in time of need. Surely, God is this kind of good person; we are grateful to him, we respect and value him. It is rather that as Creator he has given us more. God is good because he has given us a power that surpasses our expectations, a power that we are tempted to call, in Jonathan Seagull fashion, infinite. It is a tremendous power that is there to help us attain peace and contentment, if we choose to use it.

Third, God as good?what all humans seek?is related to the possible eventual triumph of good over evil. A good human person has a magnetic quality about him which draws others to him. A truly moral person is someone whom we value and want to be with. So, surely, the God we seek has this characteristic. As the source of morality he draws us to him. In this regard, we might see one way in which God takes on a challenge: to draw free creatures to himself without forcing himself upon them.

Fourth, in a negative sense, if a good person is not obligated to do the best possible action at any time, then we can hardly demand that of the good God. God is not then obligated to create the best possible world on the grounds that whatever he does has to be the best possible. At the end of the last chapter, we noted the difficulty in demanding that a good person always do whatever is the best possible action at any moment. We decided that the obligation is questionable, for it unduly restricts human freedom. Once a person fulfills her obligations to society, there should be circumstances in which she should be free to devote herself to whatever she wants to do. If, for example a person is equally talented in counselling young people, in raising dogs, in growing roses and in making jewelry, there should be circumstances in which she should be free to choose whichever endeavor she wants to engage in. A person should be allowed some domain of genuine freedom. This means that under certain circumstances a good person can decide to putter in the garden or go to a ball game rather than help out at a Kiwanis auction. He can collect cars rather than raise dogs or feed the birds. We have noted in the last chapter that there is good reason to think that there are supererogatory actions. Even if one rejected their existence, the rejection could be interpreted as ineffectual. For it could be argued that that the best possible thing for a person would be to be free to do what she/he wants to do in a certain situation. The obligation would be there, but would imply that following one’s own desire is the best possible path. The best possible action would be to bring about the greatest value, but in a particular case that would be to follow one’s own bliss.

This is one possible way of understanding the goodness of God with all its complexities. In sum, it is based on his nature as Creator of the universe—all that we have is owed to him. Creation can be seen as a manifestation of love, as when a person who loves tends to share whatever she has. As Creator, he allows us to participate in his being and thereby manifests the generosity that we see in the good person.

1. Cf. Brian Davies, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 22-24.

2. Davies, ibid., p. 23.

3. Rebecca Penz, "Rules and Values and the Problem of Evil," Sophia, vol. 21, no. 2 (July, 1982), pp. 26-27.

4. Thomas V. Morris, "Duty and Divine Goodness," The Concept of God, ed. Thomas V. Morris (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 107-121; p. 117.

5. Davies, Ibid., p. 24.

6. Errol E. Harris, "Atheism and Theism" Tulane Studies in Philosophy, vol. xxvi (1977), pp. 105-132; p. 120.