CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VI

MUST GOD CREATE

THE BEST POSSIBLE WORLD?

One of the claims of those who object to the goodness and omnipotence of God is that he should have brought into existence the best possible world--which obviously he has not done.

Insofar as some thinkers might claim that it would be better if there were no world at all, it is fitting here straightaway to distinguish between the best possible state of affairs and a best possible world. An objector might say that we would have a best possible state of affairs or a best possible reality if a good God decided not to create any world at all.1 The best possible state of affairs would preclude not only a best possible world but also any world, and we would be contradicting ourselves if we called it the best possible. If God is truly free, then he not only had the option of creating a world with evil or without it, but also had the further choice of not creating at all. If God chose not to create, then he would still be powerful, free, and still be the highest good.

This argument has an odd Jacob’s ladder character: human creatures using creation to prove that creation should not have been. We who are part of the created world get our concepts from the existence of our world only to show that such a world or any world at all should not have existed. Humans learn what goodness is from the good in the world, but conclude that an all good God should not have brought that good into existence. This position has the peculiar devastating implication that man never should exist. But if it is better that humans never exist, then it is better that the advocate of the objection never exist, and better that the argument never be made. Any human argument that advocates the non-existence of all human argument cannot be taken seriously. The philosopher who would transcend his status as a human thinker and claim that it were better if human reasoning never existed would be using human reason to destroy that to which he is committed. This objection to the goodness of God is, then, self-defeating.

Of course, we cannot get out of our own skin, and only the misanthrope would claim that it would be better if human beings were never created. Notwithstanding those who claim that man is a cancer on the world, or who say that it would be better if they had never been born, most of us consider ourselves fortunate for having been given life. We gratefully accept existence and cannot see the sense in opting for a world without it.

Concerning the best possible world three questions can be asked: 1) Is the best possible world a contradiction? 2) Is the present world the best possible world? 3) Should the good and all-powerful God have brought into existence the best possible world?

1) The best possible world, understood as "a perfection that cannot be surpassed," is ambiguous at best and a contradiction at worst. This can be taken as "the best state of affairs" or "the best reality," both expressions that can be applied in our context to the uncreated Creator. If we take the best possible as implying "uncreated being," and the world as "the created," the best possible world would mean something created and uncreated, a clear contradiction.

We are in a similar bind if we take "best possible" as the epitome of perfection, or absolute perfection. This would be considered as infinite perfection and as such necessarily at an "infinite metaphysical distance" from whatever is finite. In this sense, the best possible world would be infinitely perfect. As created the world would have to be finite, but as the epitome of perfection it would have to be infinite--again a contradiction.

If infinite perfection is interpreted as the infinite Creator who is the source of any world, then no created world can equal or exhaust his perfection. No created world can be the epitome of perfection.

If the best possible world is understood as the last term in an infinite series, it would be a contradiction also, for an infinite series has no last term. The last term implies a point beyond which we cannot go, while the infinite series implies an indefinite going beyond. In the best possible world, then, we would be going beyond that which we cannot go beyond--a contradiction.

From the causal relationship between an infinite being (the Creator) and its effect (the world), again, the best possible world would be a contradiction. An infinite effect as infinite would have to be an infinite being which cannot be dependent, but as an effect it would be dependent upon its cause. The medievals would say that, as dependent, the world is composed of essence and existence, but as an infinite being it cannot be composed. An infinite effect as infinite would be uncomposed and as effect would be composed. And this is a contradiction.2

The great Leibniz points us in the right direction as he forthrightedly asserts that the best possible world is basically finite, and infinite only in a relative way. Taken as finite the "best possible" could mean the situation in which we get the maximum effect with a minimum of effort, as when, in drawing a line between two points, the easiest and shortest route is taken. Or, . . . in laying tile, we try to get the greatest number together in the easiest way. A line drawn between two points is limited, as is the area over which tile is laid.3

Leibniz gives us another way this finite world can be considered as infinite in that it is the high point of a pyramid which has an infinite or endless number of worlds below it, but no world higher than it.4 Our world would be the best possible world which has an infinite number of worlds that are worse than it. It would be at the apex of a bottomless pyramid.

The infinite character of the finite world can be likened to the way a finite line can be divided infinitely into a number of sections, as we are accustomed to do when we try to show someone that by dividing the distance from ourselves to a wall, we get 1/2 the distance, then 1/4 . . . then 1/8 . . . and so on. Never do we reach zero distance.

In both of these senses immediately above, our world is assumed to be finite, to have limits. Leibniz merely precludes the possibility of worlds better than the present world and focusses attention on the way in which there can be many worlds worse than this one. In the second we know that in reality we reach the goal--we get to the wall. No matter how many times Achilles halves the distance between himself and the tortoise, we all know that in reality Achilles catches and passes the tortoise.5

In this sense it would be possible to view finite humans as having a greatest misery and a greatest happiness, a greatest possible evil and a greatest possible good. In such a way a person could be considered as infinitely remote from his/her potential happiness or goodness. Or, she could be considered near enough to her greatest happiness as to envision it. In the latter case, we might move toward our goal in smaller and smaller units, something like a modern Achilles who never catches the tortoise.

In sum, the best possible world can be understood as a contradiction but need not.

2) Is this world the best possible world? If it is, then we have taken a long step toward solving the problem of God and evil, for we could not then blame God for making a world of less perfection than it is possible for him to make. Whether or not it was possible for God to prevent the loss of our house in an earthquake or the death of a daughter would make no difference, for God would have done the best he could. We presuppose, of course, that God has no obligation to bring about the impossible. If this is the best world possible, then God could not be blamed for whatever evil there is in the world; he could not be called less than good, or less than all-powerful.

Leibniz underscored the difficulty of answering this question when he criticized the nature of man’s knowledge. How can those who have seen so little of the world judge that this world is not the best possible? Critics who claimed that God could have made a better world than the present one have seen little of the world. They see scarcely farther than their nose, and yet they dare to criticize. When they come to know more about the world, they will see a complex and beautiful system that transcends all imagination.6 Leibniz reminds us that the world was not made for man alone, but if we human beings are truly wise, the world will serve us. We will be happy in the world if we wish to be.

"What is "best?" and "How do we arrive at it?" It is obvious that "good," "better," "best," is understood from our knowledge of this world. It is inextricably tied up with this world, the world in which we have learned and developed our language and concepts. And the most important aspect of this world, as far as we are concerned is our own existence. If our starting point from which we can extrapolate to other worlds is our own present world which has humans in such a prominent place, then a world without us would be suspect as a "better" world. We cannot determine "good" in any way other than by the light of what is good for humans and the universe in which we live. We can hardly opt for a best possible world that has no room for us.

For Leibniz this world is the best possible world on the grounds that God cannot be indifferent in his choice of which world to create. The wiser a man is, the more determined he is toward the most perfect.7 God, who is the epitome of wisdom, would inevitably bring about the best world. To do otherwise would open him up to being indifferent with regard to good and evil and would indicate a lack of goodness or wisdom.8

Aquinas also argues that this world is the best possible, but on other grounds. Here he uses the above-mentioned privileged status of this world. In his Summa theologiae9 he says that the present world is now ordered to God’s goodness. If we presuppose this kind of world with its various entities, then God cannot make a better world. The reason is that the good of this universe consists in the order given it by God. If God made one of the creatures of the universe better than it is, then the order of the universe would be changed for the worse, just as a chord in a musical piece, if played too loud, would ruin a melody.

In this argument Aquinas sees this world as the best possible, because whatever world is ordered to God’s goodness according to his wisdom is that which is best. This world is so ordered, and hence, it is the best possible world.

Yet, God can make other things, or add others to the things he has made, and in such a case the resulting world would be the best.10 Whatever God makes is ordered to his goodness and, hence, is the best. So, whatever other world is so ordered is, likewise, the best world.11 But God is infinite. No matter how many effects he brings about, he still can create more.12 Consequently, it is hard to see how we can escape the conclusion that Aquinas holds, that absolutely considered there are better possible worlds, and that God could have brought them about. It is as if the best possible world can be any one of a number of worlds, while any world considered can always be surpassed by a better world. Aquinas allows for a world of greater perfection than the present one.

Here our distinction between conceivable worlds and possible worlds is of help. The former is what Aquinas has in mind when he talks about any world being surpassed by another world. If God is truly infinite and any created world is finite, then there will always be a gap between them. We humans might go part of the way in conceiving a "better" world than the present by proposing a science fiction world in which laws different from those of our world hold. There is always the possibility, however, that no matter how far we go toward that "better" world, there will always be another one beyond it. The "infinite metaphysical distance" between the most perfect and the finite is the basis for another better world that is possible in the sense of conceivable but not really possible, since the possible has to be considered in relation to our own world.13

Even though Aquinas gives us a reason for seeing the possibility of a better world, Leibniz’s underscoring of the limits of human knowledge causes trouble for anyone who would attempt to justify such a claim. Critics of our own world have to come up with a detailed account of a better world. Such an account has to either preserve the laws of this world as we know them or put forth another world with another set of laws and their particular consequences. This they have not done. It is not sufficient to mention one desired modification of this world without showing its ramifications for the whole.

It seems, then, that we cannot clearly show that this world is the best possible; nor can we prove that it is not the best possible, for we cannot articulate in sufficient detail a better world. Below we will see that whether or not it is the best possible, we cannot argue that God had an obligation to bring it about.

3. Those who say that God should have brought into existence the best possible world claim that a good person always tries to bring about as much good as possible. One always tries to do one’s best and actualize the greatest good. If one had the power to help us one would surely do so. If one had the wherewithal to give us something that we truly had no right to, something that was truly a gift, one would give it. We all know this kind of person who generously gives to others, who will surely help us if it is at all possible. This person has a commitment to whatever is good, and she is staunchly opposed to whatever is evil.

That truly good person would be one who tries to bring out and develop the potentialities of someone, even though that person did not realize the talent that he had. It is said, for example, that a truly good person, if he could, would provide a musical education to a musically gifted child, even though the child were happy, satisfied and without pain.14

One might contend that parents should try to conceive the best possible child. Parents might have serious doubts about whether it is best to conceive a child with a super intelligence, given the present state of human knowledge. Or, they might doubt whether they could properly bring up such a child, or whether he might demand too much of a sacrifice from others. It is claimed, however, that if all these doubts were dispelled, then good parents should and would try to conceive the best possible child.

We are strongly inclined to think that a good person feels obliged to do good and prevent evil as much as he can. A good person tries to do the best he can in every situation of his life. He is convinced that, all things considered, whatever he does is the best he can and should do.

If all of the above is true, then we should expect the good God to bring about the best possible world. If God is goodness itself, and if God has all power, then why should not he create the best possible world? God, who knows all things and doubts nothing, would and should bring about the greatest good in every instance.

This view is attractive, but is not without difficulties. It must withstand pressure from the existence of genuine supererogatory actions. Supererogatory actions are nonobligatory or "beyond the call of duty" for a good person. Such actions might bring about the greater good in one sense, but whether they are actualized is up to the free will of the agent concerned who is under no moral obligation.

If there were no supererogatory actions--if a person would always have to do what would bring about the greatest good, then the scope of our human freedom would be significantly limited. In a sense we might wonder if there remained any freedom at all. That is, once a person fulfills her ordinary obligations to society, there should be circumstances in which she should be free to devote herself to whatever she wants.

While it might be true that each of us should do much more to relieve the suffering of our neighbor, there should be a limit beyond which we should be able to choose without any strings attached. Earlier we noted the person who knows that she has the talent to do wonderful things with youth, but wants to make jewelry. In the circumstances she should be morally as well as physically free to do whatever she wants to do. Noted, too, was how under certain circumstances a good person can decide to do such things as go to a ball game rather than help out at a Kiwanis auction.

Arguing along these lines, Robert Adams remarks that we ordinarily do not criticize a man for breeding goldfish rather than dogs. Against the idea that parents have an obligation to bring into the world the best possible child, Adams notes that we are not inclined to blame parents for having a normal child rather than one with superhuman intelligence and higher prospects for happiness, should this be possible. On the other hand, we would blame parents if they deliberately took a drug that would cause their child to be deficient in comparison with normal children. The reason, from a religious point of view, is that such a child could not enter fully into God’s purposes for human life.15

There are other good reasons why the good person and a good God need not always bring into existence the most excellent type of being.

To demand that a good person produce at every moment the best action that he can places too much of a burden on people. It seems realistic, rather, that the benefactor does not have to give the greatest gift that he can. To require more from a person appears unrealistic and an undesirable restriction on our freedom. It is better that a person retains a domain in which he can exercise freedom. The good artist should not always, without fail, have to produce the most valuable piece of work of which he is capable. Rather, he should have the freedom to choose to produce something of lesser value. Or, semantically one can avoid the supererogatory if we put it this way: Under certain circumstances, the best thing for someone is to do what one wants to do at some time.

If the good person is not obliged to bring about the greater good at all times, then why should we demand that God do so? Even if it could be established that we humans must do the greatest thing we can at any time, we cannot easily apply that principle to God. Aquinas makes good sense when he claims that in creation God’s will is attracted to infinite goodness alone, which is God himself. No created goodness could compel God in any way.

This is in accord with the principle that what is best in a created situation is determined by the nature of the things concerned. What is best for a dog or a horse is not the same as what is best for a human being. When God and man are concerned, our expectations have to be different. Although what is good and what is best in regard to God is understood basically from a human point of view, they are not to be equated; we must make adjustments. At first glance this might suggest that although humans are not obliged to perform supererogatory actions, not obliged to perform the most perfect action, God is. However, this obligation would limit God’s freedom in much the same way that it would limit human freedom. God is limited only by his own nature in the sense that he cannot do what is inherently inconceivable. He cannot be limited in creation by the nature of the things concerned, as a carpenter in building a house is limited by the quality of wood and stone available. We have accepted Aquinas’s position that God’s will is determined only by his own goodness. If we say that in order to be truly good and all-powerful God should create such and such a world, then we are implying that creatures determine his creative act. As such they would limit and determine him, even though they are merely possible and not actual. This would downgrade his freedom and his independence.

In this view, God is free because he is his own proper end and exists for his own sake. God’s freedom is rooted in his willing things other than himself without any necessity, although he wills himself necessarily as the absolute good.16 The important thing here is that the divine goodness can be attained through many modes and orders of beings. God’s will is not restricted to one type of being or one order. If we want to preserve God’s independence and spontaneous freedom, then the mode of a creature’s being (i.e. possibility) cannot determine the act of creation. Possibility taken as conceivability or the lack of contradiction is not sufficient of itself to lay an obligation on God to create things in a certain way. There is no reason why God should have to do everything that is conceivable.

God’s independence and freedom is a genuine obstacle to any demand that he create a world with this or that type of creature. This divine status forbids the possibility of creating only those persons who would never do anything evil in their lives.

In the theist tradition creation is often spoken of as an expression of God’s love. Love leads one to share what one has, and God’s love led him to share his perfection and goodness. That is, a determining factor in creation was love, not the degree of goodness had by the conceivable or possible created beings. It is not that God was led to create this or that world because it was better than some other conceivable world. God is and always was in possession of his goal, namely his own goodness. He needs nothing else to attain it. In creation he did not have to use any particular kind of world to reach his end, for any created world would be indifferent to his ultimate end.

The creating God is said to be gracious. Grace is taken by Adams to be "a disposition to love which is not dependent on the merit of the person loved."17 God’s grace allows him to create and love less excellent creatures than the best possible. That God is gracious does not demand that the perfection of creatures be the ground for God’s choosing to actualize them. We do not praise God for creating us because we are so perfect, sophisticated, or potentially great. The typical Judeo-Christian attitude toward the fact of our existence is one of gratefulness for something which we in no way deserved. The good God is seen as perfectly good not because he created the best possible world, but because he created us and loves us without worrying about whether we are worthy of his love.18

In this view, God’s freedom to give something to which nobody has a right must be preserved. Those who demand that God give humans whatever is conceivable fail to recognize this necessity. God should be able to freely give or deny something without conforming to any obligation to do so. What is owed to us in virtue of our nature we expect from God; if we lack it, we are troubled and feel that God has short-changed us. What is not owed to us, however, should not give rise to a complaint, for it is not really fair to fault God for not freely giving us something to which we have no claim.

Attempts to say what the best possible world is move into the area of high-powered science fiction, where mystery and abstract speculation prevail. In this view, even if one could articulate what the best possible world would be like, there would be no obligation on God’s part to establish it. And there would be no good reason to be bitterly resentful of God the Creator for bringing about our own world rather than the best possible world.

Against this, Jerome Weinstock maintains that a state of affairs in which God graciously creates a perfect world is to be more highly valued than one in which God graciously creates a less perfect world.19 The perfection, value and merit of possible creatures is a criterion for creation, but not necessarily a criterion for God’s love. In creating, God must bring about the best possible world, but in loving he is indifferent to the objects of his love and can be gracious. A God who creates an imperfect world with grace, when he could have created a perfect world with the same grace, would be perverse. If he were omnipotent and good, he would remove the imperfections and choose a world with perfect creatures—plus grace. By not doing so, he would be choosing what was worse. He would be like the physician who shoots his victim and then heals him, or the clergyman who induces cancer in someone so that he might comfort the sick.

This objection fails. First, it destroys the meaning of gracious (or creating freely). In it, the conceivable status of the "better" world would function as a determinant influencing the creative act, thereby destroying God’s freedom in that context. That only God’s goodness can move his will is a sound principle. To claim that God is perverse because he brings about a world that is less than perfect is to claim that God is not moved only by his own goodness.

Second, a more perfect world might be more highly valued in one sense, but in the overall view it would be a less highly valued state, for God’s freedom would be degraded.

Third, the role of love as a possible motive for God’s creating is ignored by the objector. God creates because his infinite love overflows and moves him to give of himself. Moreover, the objector’s distinction between the criterion for creation and the criterion for God’s love appears arbitrary. It cannot be made so easily.

Fourth, the objector assumes that a good person must bring about the best possible effect at all times, a principle that we have questioned. It precludes the possibility that true supererogatory actions can be applied to our understanding of God.

Fifth, like other objectors, he has to tell us what a perfect world would be like. This he has not done.

I do not think that it can be proved that this is the best world. Nor do I think that it can be proved that this is not the best world. Central to the discussion is the elaboration in some detail of the characteristics of a better world. This I find lacking in the thought of those who say that a better world is possible. God might have been able to make a better world, but it is not easy to say either what it should be like or why he should have brought it about. And, for all we know this might be the best possible world. Objectors fail to show clearly that a good and all powerful God would have to bring about the best possible world. They fail to give us a comprehensive picture of the "better" world they are advocating, and they fail to respect the right of the Creator to bestow or deny a perfection that goes beyond what is required by a creature’s nature.

We should not blithely act as if there can be no world better than the one we have, as if our own world should not be improved, as if we had no obligation to try to rid the world of the evils that we find in it. Nor should we act as if the obligation to bring about all conceivable improvements should fall upon the Divinity.

This being said, we know that the objectors to the good and all-powerful God think that this is not the best possible world and that God should have created a better world. In the following chapters, we will consider some of their proposals for such "better" worlds and point out their shortcomings.

NOTES

1. Cf. Richard La Croix, "Unjustified Evil and God’s Choice," Sophia, xiii, no. 1, (April, 1974).

2. Aquinas, Summa theologiae, ed. P. Caramello (Taurini: Marietti, 1948), I, q. 25, a. 2.

3. Leibniz, The Monadology and other Philosophical Writings, trans. R. Latta (London: Oxford University Press, 1925), p. 341.

4. Leibniz, Theodicy, Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil, par. 416.

5. Cf. W. Shea, "God, Evil and Professor Schlesinger," J. Value Inquiry, 4 (1970), pp. 219-228.

6. Leibniz, Theodicy, par. 194.

7. Leibniz, "On the Ultimate Origination of Things," The Monadology and other Philosophical Writings, trans. Latta, p. 343.

8. Leibniz, Theodicy, par. 175.

9. I, q. 25, art. 6, ad 3.

10. Ibid.

11. De potentia, q. 1, art 5, ad 15.

12. De potentia, q. 1, art. 2, c.

13. Paul Siwek, The Philosophy of Evil (New York: The Ronald Press, 1956), pp. 206-207.

14. George Schlesinger, "Omnipotence and Evil: an Incoherent Problem," Sophia, iv, no. 3 (October, 1965), p. 22.

15. Robert Adams, "Must God Create for the Best?" Philosophical Review, 81, (1972) pp. 317-332.

16. Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 19, art. 3, c, art. 10, c.

17. Adams, p. 318.

18. Ibid., pp. 323-325.

19. Cf. Jerome Weinstock, "Must God Create the Best Possible World?" Sophia, xiv, no. 2 (July, 1975) pp. 32-39.