If the symbolical mediation from experience to thought gives to the latter its creative liberty, it also places it at the junction between truth and falsehood: one can think that which does not exist, and even more: one can think that which cannot exist. Lewis Carroll’s Red Queen, every morning before breakfast, thought seven impossible thoughts.1  We can err and we can lie.2 

Obviously this is also and in a special way true for that which we say about God. The sheer diversity of religions is the visible confirmation of this. The fact that one can speak about God does not guarantee the existence of God. The ontological argument for the existence of God, whether Anselm’s3  or Descartes’4  or even less Bonald’s5 , is not valid. The mere existence of Christian discourse about God is no guarantee of the truth of the Christian faith. On the other hand, not only Christians but other religions as well lay claim to the truth of that which they say about God. This is particularly true in the case of the foundational assertion of every religion: that God exists. It cannot be the task of a logical or phenomenological analysis to demonstrate the existence of God. Another philosophical method would be needed for that. On the other hand, it is the proper task of logical and phenomenological analyses to determine what sense and what importance a "demonstration of the existence of God" has, and what its role is within Christian discourse about God.

THE REALISTIC SENSE OF CHRISTIAN DISCOURSE ABOUT GOD

When a believing Christian says something about God, he intends what he says in a real way: not only the historical facts essential to the ‘Salvation story" (the life, the death, and the resurrection of Jesus), but also that which he says about God is intended realistically, especially the assertion of God’s existence.6  Every non-realistic "interpretation" – psychological, mythological, philosophical, etc. – changes totally the meaning of the whole discourse to the point where the specifically religious meaningfulness of the discourse is lost.7 

On the other hand, the realism of Christian discourse is not an empirical realism: in the expression "God exists", the word exists does not have the same sense it has in "Kangaroos exist" (in Australia) or "Dinosaurs existed" (millions of years ago) or "Subatomic particles exist"; nor does it have the same sense as "Unicorns exist" (in fable) or "Frodo exists" (in literature). The word exist is an analogous term.8  To speak of God in a Christian sense, which is to say, realistically, means to accept a meta-empirical reality, non-sensible, non-experiential9  yet nonetheless real and factual.10  At the same time, the realistic meaning of Christian discourse about God, especially the assertion of the real existence of God, demands a link, a connection of some kind to experience. Such a link to experience is necessary for all human thought which would otherwise be lost in fantasy.

For the analogical connection between realistic discourse about God, on the one hand, and the totality of human experience, on the other, we must turn to that which we said earlier concerning models. This time, however, we will use the term ‘model’ not for the linguistic significance of a known word, but for special situations11  wherein a horizon is opened up.

There is a phenomenon specific to human intellectual life which goes by a variety of names used analogously: "the opening of the horizon", which borrows the term horizon from Husserl; "alteration in the state of consciousness", inspired by Kant and by psychology; "intellectual conversion", which uses a term of Christian faith but makes it available for an analogous use. These expressions all describe a rather common phenomenon in life and in human intellectual development. I.T. Ramsey calls it ‘disclosure’ or sometimes ‘discernment’. 12 

Let us say that one meets a person for the first time of whom one has already heard much and about whom one already possesses a good deal of information. In the meeting, one may not acquire ‘new’ information, yet all that is already known takes on a new meaning.

After having listened to many musical fragments, one hears a particular selection and says: "Now I understand Bach" or "classical music" or "jazz".

One finally manages to solve a particular type of mathematical problem and one says, "Now I’ve got it." And in fact from now on he or she is able to solve other problems of this type.

In these and similar examples it is not so much the matter of a single experience but rather that in this particular experience one comprehends a whole, a totality: a new horizon is opened.13 

These openings of new horizons have a certain similarity with the ‘powerful experiences’ discussed in the preceding chapter, in which a symbolical repeatability is born. Here too, this phenomenon of the opening of a new horizon or an alteration in the state of consciousness needs to be conceptualized and ‘tested’. A part of this ‘testing’ or verification consists in the possibility of acquiring and subsequently understanding the rules of the language game under consideration — in this case, the interrelated rules of Christian discourse about God.

Obviously the examples we have just used pertain to finite and limited horizons. The horizon within which one can realistically speak about God, within which even an act of faith in God is possible, must necessarily be a horizon which is open and unlimited.

There are horizons which by their nature are unlimited: one’s own life14 , one’s consciousness15 , knowledge, history, the universe, and also intersubjectivity and language, especially freedom. It would be almost better to say: these horizons can and must be unlimited, since they are all too often thought of as finite and limited, and one needs to show the contradictory nature and even the absurdity of the latter notion.16  Not only is this possible but it constitutes an essential passage for the opening-up of a horizon within which one can speak realistically about God.

The Opening of an Unlimited Horizon and the Semantic Universe. The issues involved in the opening of an unlimited horizon can be seen very well within the context of the ontological argument of St. Anselm.

The true atheist does not deny God, but in fact doesn’t think Him. He moves in a different semantic universe, a universe where there is no place for the terms "id quo maius cogitari nequit" and "id quod maius cogitari debet". How is one to demonstrate the inevitability of a true concept of God? One needs to open up a horizon within which the word "God" has a possible use, even a necessary use — and then to demonstrate that this horizon is a necessary condition for the possibility of any speech and all thinking.17  This is precisely what Kant did with regard to "the ideal of pure reason" – that is, the idea of God – demonstrating that the regulative use of "the ideal of pure reason" is a necessary condition for the possibility of any reasoning process.18 

Since a semantic universe is at the same time a socio-cultural reality, the task of changing, enlarging or opening up such a universe is surely an educational and catechetical task. Even so, the opening of a new dimension of thinkingis still a primarily philosophical task.19 

Now if what Wittgenstein says is true, that "the limits of language are the limits of my world"20 , then a change from one semantic universe in which the expression "God" or rather, "id quo maius cogitari nequit", has neither use nor sense, to another semantic universe where this expression possesses both a meaning and a use, implicates a change of the whole world and the whole life.

How is such a change possible? Wittgenstein says: "The world of the happy is another world than that of the unhappy."21  And again: "If a good or bad will can change the world, what it changes is only the limits of the world."22 

Now, is the change from a linguistic universe that does not include the expression "id quo maius cogitari nequit" to one which includes it a moral act, an act of freedom, that constitutes the whole of a world? Or will it be — also — a salvific act of God that redeems and restores language from its fallen state and from its continued tendency to fallenness, as He has redeemed human social nature and freedom?23 

The opening up of an unlimited horizon is not itself sufficient for the passage from a universe where the word "God" has no sense to one where this word possesses a realistic significance. In Christian discourse about God, as well as in the discourse of other religions, the word ‘God’ does not refer to any horizon however unlimited, but directs one beyond it. God is neither freedom, nor the order of the world, nor the rationality of history; nor is He (except in a very analogous way which must be carefully qualified) the meaning of life. We already examined this in Chapter Five with regard to the attributes of God: their significance is not the summum or the culmination of an infinite series; their significance is rather the transcendent God who is beyond any infinite series. The word ‘God’ is used to refer to One who is totally distinct from every other thing, even from every totality, be it ever so unlimited.

All this notwithstanding we do speak about God, and the word "God" is part of human language. Moreover, we speak about God using ordinary linguistic tools — religious language is not a special language which is to be distinguished from the everyday language we use otherwise. God, as that who is beyond language and beyond every unlimited horizon as well, nevertheless belongs to and is found within this one. Otherwise we would not be able to speak about God and He would remain completely inconceivable. In that case Wittgenstein would be right in saying: "As the world is, it is a matter of absolute indifference to whatever is higher than it. God is not made manifest in the world."24  Indeed in the language of the Tractatus’ logical atomism one cannot speak of God.25  In the Christian faith, however, and in other monotheistic religions, God is conceived not only as beyond all, but also as distinct from every single reality of this world. This is precisely what has already been seen in the similarity of the word "God" to other proper names and in the membership of this term "God" within the group of terms having a unique reference26 . The word "God" is, so to speak, a ‘pro-nome’ which points and refers beyond itself.

For this reason the place of God within the manifold of possible unlimited horizons cannot be simply any place – on the same plane with and similar to the place of other realities. God’s place within the horizon can only be the center , which is a special position, unlike any other position.

The center of a circle is in fact not a point in the circle, but is the origin of the circle, or its total concentration; within the Cartesian system its coordinates are x=0; y=0.

In other words, that which is beyond the series, beyond any and every series, reveals itself as the center. This is what we saw in Chapter Four: the word "God" is not simply one word among the other words used in religious discourse but is this discourse’s semantic center, determining the specific sense in which all religious language is used. To better understand how it is that the ‘center’ of an unlimited horizon can and indeed must be conceived as beyond this very horizon – or: how it is that that which is beyond a horizon can manifest itself as its center – we can examine two analogous situations, one geometric, one pictorial. Nicholas Cusanus argued the ‘conjunction of opposites’ in God, illustrating the correspondence between ‘infinitum maximum’ and ‘infinitum minimum’, and brought in the geometric analogy of the circle, better still: the ‘infinite sphere’27  and its center: in this case the circumference is not located at any particular position and the center is everywhere.28  More or less at the same time as Cusanus lived, the artists of the Renaissance, rediscovered perspective, making use of it in sophisticated and symbolical forms.29  The perspective in a painting goes beyond the painting towards infinity, but departs from its perspective center –the figure in which coincide not only the attention of the viewer but also, in Christian iconography, the sense of the infinite: for example, the face of Christ in DaVinci’s Last Supper, or the host in Raphael’s Dispute over the Eucharist. The center, which as limit both belongs and does not belong to the complex of forms and figures, brings all the figures and forms into focus.

After this rather theoretical exposition, we must turn to the existential and experiential level. If a Christian, or any monotheist, wants to give to the word "God" a realistic meaning the unlimited horizon needs a center, and that which is beyond the horizon must manifest itself as its center. Thus one can say: my entire life has a sense; the story has an end; the universe has a cause; freedom is a call, and so on.

This is the reason why the pure fact of limitless and open horizons is not sufficient. This fact does indeed guarantee the possibility of speaking, thinking, being free, etc. But at this level of consciousness this opening remains merely implicit. For it to become explicit demands the awareness of a center. Reciprocally, in order to individualize a center in an limitless horizon at least a preliminary awareness is necessary — an awareness of the openness and the limitlessness of the respective horizon, the discovery of the horizon as open and limitless.30  Otherwise I remain unaware of it and I am unable to say: "My life has a sense."

But it is important to notice that these limitless horizons are not discovered to be self-grounding; rather they are discovered as simply given. If this then gives them a reality for consciousness it does not give them a grounding or foundation, certainly not in consciousness itself.

Only a center to their very limitlessness, which at the same time is beyond it, gives them their limitlessness, gives them a ground or foundation,31  which as a result guarantees also their oppenness. Without such a transcendental center these horizons close up.32 

The mere discovery, however, of the limitlessness of these horizons is not a simply intellectual act, and even less does it give any indication of their center. These depend at least in part on the will, and belong within the domain of choices.33  Nonetheless we are dealing here with reasonable and often well-reasoned choices. Thus it is quite possible for the discovery process to occur during a course of study, especially the study of philosophy, even if afterwards one speaks more of an ‘intellectual conversion’. In any event, the process has both elements of experience and elements of reasoning. Here again Kant’s dictum is quite applicable: "The concept without experience is empty; the experience without the concept is blind."34 

The traditional "proofs for the existence of "God"" form the logical skeleton of an intellectual process. But without the experience of a real opening up of a limitless horizon and then the further identification of its center, the arguments are mere bones without flesh. Precisely for this reason these proofs can be logically, speculatively and philosophically valid, but alone they generally remain unconvincing.

One essential move is still missing for a full rational justification for speaking about God in a realistic way. Aquinas does not conclude his quinque viae with: "Ergo Deus existet" but with: "et hoc omnes dicunt Deum"!35  This last move is no longer a forensic move, but a move in semantic identification.

Today this move is certainly more problematic than at the time of Aquinas. Many today would not be inclined to consider "God" as the "meaning of life". Precisely for this reason we need more profound information as to the true significance of the word "God" in Christian language.

We need to look again at the role and central function of the word "God" in religious language.36  Directly or indirectly, the term "God" determines the entire semantic universe of religious language, especially Christian language. The opening of a limitless horizon and then the recognition of its center is, as we’ve discussed, a process of discovery, a process of awareness, but the semantic universe of religious language is a linguistic, semantic, social-cultural and historical structure which precedes the process of awareness. In a process of socialization and tradition, one comes to know and learn both the semantic universe of religious language and the structure of this universe as it is focused upon and determined by the word "God".

If this identification is made in the first person37  — "and this I call ‘God’" — it is certainly what J.H. Newman called a ‘real assent’.38  The certainty of this identificative assent resides not in the premises of an argumentation that can lead one merely to a ‘notional assent’, but in the ‘real apprehension’ of a limitless horizon,39  which for Newman is the horizon of moral obligation that manifests itself in the conscience.40 

If this identification is made by a believing Christian or by one who is progressing along a path towards faith, then this is something very near to an act of faith.41  If afterwards this identification proceeds to "God as Father of Christ", with the resulting partial substitutibility of the word "God" with the proper name "Jesus" as the fulcrum of the meaningfulness of religious language,42  then one is explicitly dealing with the Christian faith.

This is an important problem not only philosophically but theologically, and also pedagogically. Without the opening of an unlimited horizon and the identification of God the Father of Christ as its center, an act of faith is not possible. Without the conscious opening of an unlimited horizon it is not even possible to conceive of God. One could conceive of an idol, but not of God. We need then to ask ourselves what is the intellectual, emotional and moral level of maturity which furnishes the necessary condition for an authentic act of faith. Clearly we are not asking here about the theological conditions necessary for an act of faith; these are traditionally dealt with in an analysis of faith in the context of theology. Here we are asking about the human psychological conditions necessary for this faith act. And obviously the experience and thus the conscious opening of an unlimited horizon is different for an adult than for a child. We need therefore to begin with the fact that faith is also a reality which is communitarian and social, not only from a psychological point of view but from a theological: the faith in God and in Christ is always also faith in the Church, not only as regards what is believed but as regards the act through which one believes. Thus even the path towards faith, education in the faith, and finally the reasonability of the proclamation of the existence of God are always also socializing processes.

When one baptizes a child, the child is baptized in the faith of a church, and generally the church of the parents and godparents. For this reason the parents are justifiably required to participate in a special catechesis program prior to the baptism of their child. Within the family and in an atmosphere of faith the child in due course learns to use also the word "God" within the language which he or she learns in a process of linguistic socialization.

Elements of linguistic socialization and social behavior in general are present and necessary in any conversion. To believe in God is never a strictly personal act, anymore than knowing is. The problem, however, is the level of intellectual development a child must have for the opening up of a limitless horizon of a human life, the world, etc., and the subsequent apprehension of that horizon’s center. An infant obviously has no such capacity and is thus incapable of an act of personal faith. But a child of six or seven?

Even a young child lives its life in a conscious way, and lives it in a world. The world of the little child is certainly little, but it is nonetheless a world which is whole and total. Moreover, the child quite consciously experiences its world as continuously and concentrically increasing. This is to say that the child grows, wants to grow, and grows consciously. This suggests that even the horizon of the life and the world of a child is unlimited. But the child does not experience this limitlessness in specific moments of the opening up of a horizon, except in rare cases.43  However the child does experience this limitlessness not only through contacts with adults but for itself: in its curiosity that is continuous and insatiable, in its desire to grow. We are dealing here with an experience of limits and with an ongoing passing beyond these limits. This little but limitless horizon of the child has its own precise centerpoint: the center of the world of the child is the child itself. Young children are extreme ego-centrists — the word is not intended here in a moral sense. In order to center the horizon of its life in God the child needs guidance and stimulation on the part of adults, not only however on the level of linguistic-socialization (speaking to the child about God and Christ, teaching the child to pray, and so on). The child is also capable of a personal experience, and indeed has need of it. The experiences through which a child can discover the centrality of God in its own life are those which are linked to the child’s life precisely in the child’s own ‘centrality’, in its own ego-centrism. Such experiences can include those of wonder, of gratuitousness, of thankfulness.

In all of this the great imagination of the child does not constitute a danger but a help. The child sees things that are not seen, is forever playing, but knows well the difference between play and reality, between fable and truth. The child is a realistic animal.44 

The intellectual situation of the school child is quite different from that of the pre-schooler. The school child does not live in a unified and complete world, and he himself, his personality and his life are not for him unified realities. His life and his world are multidirectional. In a certain sense he does not possess one unique horizon but a diversity of partial horizons that are not interrelated by an interior coherence: he lives in the family, goes to school, participates in sports, is part of a group, etc. He has many activities and an active schedule. In doing one thing, other things are forgotten. Yet in some of these activities, in some of these directions — though not in all and not simultaneously — he continues to progress and make new discoveries, acquire new knowledge, and develop his capacities — if it pleases him. Each of his horizons is unlimited, but each is a partial horizon. He is in a certain sense a technical animal. Arguments to the effect that "a good grasp of mathematics will be necessary for your future life" make no sense to the school child. If he doesn’t discover it himself, he will not bother himself about it unless through obedience or force. Yet in the activities which he pursues according to his tastes, he can remain extremely constant and obstinate to the death.

None of these partial horizons can be crystallized in God; even the faith of a school child has a technical aspect. Yet even in the area of faith the school child can develop a strong interest and make progress. Experiences of the opening up of horizons which are limitless and total are possible but very rare and when they do occur they tend to be fleeting.

The discourse of faith for a school child will be thus a discourse which is predominantly socializing: especially in the belonging to a group of peers. In a certain way these horizons substitute for a total horizon of one’s life, of the world, etc. In this context the centrality of God can and must be realized in the loyalty to God as the loyalty to a group, to friends, etc. This can work however only if the identification with the group is, one the one hand strong, and on the other hand, personal — which is to say, if the identification is not just ‘group-dependent’.

For the adolescent, the situation is difficult precisely because it is a situation of transition. Generally, the adolescent loses interest in a diversification of activities: "I don’t want to play the piano anymore." Particular horizons cease to satisfy him. But the first step toward a possible and indeed necessary transition to horizons which are total — the future, life itself, and so on — is a crisis in the particular horizons. The adolescent no longer understands the world, nor others, nor himself. But exactly insofar as this crisis is itself total, it constitutes a limitless and universal horizon, even if in an empty and negative sense. The adolescent lives out a search for sense which he has so far not found, and he lives it out generally without the capacity to articulate it.45 

The adolescent must be helped to discover this ‘total crisis’ as an opening to a universal and unlimited horizon, helped to articulate it; sometimes one must almost voice it for him. In such a context one finds the possibility to center the universal but still empty horizon in God, and to recover a discourse of faith.

For a mature faith the opening of one single illimited horizon is not sufficient; various and interconnected horizons are necessary — all with their center in the one God, through whom then they find connection with one another: one’s life, the future, communication, history, the world. What is wanted however are not all possible horizons, but the appropriate ones, whether for oneself or for others — at the appropriate moment.

There is also a reverse side to this identification which needs to be addressed — namely, a competence in the semantic universe of religious language that has as the center of its meaningfulness the term "God". Here again we see important differences and variations, and we note its graduality, especially in the passage from an infantile faith to the faith of an adult.

With no knowledge of Christian religious language, of which "God" is the center, the term "God" itself has no Christian religious meaning. The knowledge can be minimal, but even a minimal competence must include factual elements: Biblical information, especially from the New Testament,46  centered around the proper name "Jesus". Beyond this it must include moral elements, information about liturgical rites, prayer, etc. This knowledge is and remains a linguistic competence in a broad sense — socialized, acquired by means of a process of learning. The progressive acquisition of this knowledge needs to follow the parameters of general human intellectual development from infancy to adulthood, paying however special attention to the individual and to his personal and cultural circumstances.

In this last chapter we have not sought to give a demonstration of the existence of God, but a rational justification for a ‘real assent’, in Newman’s sense, to the real existence of him whom Christians call "God", a justification which is also intellectually adequate to what St. Paul describes:

the conviction of realities we do not see.47 

1. Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass (London: Oxford, 1971).

2. For Umberto Eco the potential for use in lying is the definition of a sign. A Theory of Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976).

3. Anselm, Prosologion, chapters II and XV.

4. Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia, fifth meditation; ed. AT VII. pp. 65ff.

5. "Les hommes nomment Dieu, donc il est." De Bonald, M., Legislation primitive, 2 ed. (Paris, Le Clere, 1817); I. p. 379.

6. The assertion is indeed the sine qua non for whatever else is said about God.

7. See earlier, Chapter Four.

8. Thus even the term ‘to exist’ satisfies the condition of analogousness required for a term to be used as an attribute of God, even if ‘to exist’ cannot be gradated. However in the case of ‘to exist’ we are not dealing with an attribute in a logical sense.

9. In this sense it is not possible to be Christian and at the same time a thoroughgoing empiricist, materialist, positivist or even simply to negate the possibility of metaphysics.

10. Even the existence of the idea of God is not sufficient!

11. Ramsey originally used the term in this way. See Chapter Five, fn. XXX.

12. Cfr. Ramsey, o.c., pp. 15ff.

13. For Ramsey this experience has something of the instantaneous about it: "The penny drops", "it dawns", etc. The similarity with the "ex aiphnes" of the Symposium 210e4 is most striking.

14. This is a witness to, though not a proof of, the belief concerning the immortality of the soul, of the person, of the consciousness, etc.

15. The ending or the ‘death’ of consciousness is not thinkable.

16. With regard to language and freedom, I have attempted to demonstrate this in: Huber, "Kirche: Zeichen Gottes — Zeichen der Freiheit"; in Wilhelm Sandfuchs, Die Kirche (Würzburg, Echter Verlag, 1978); pp. 11-24. With regard to language, see also: Carlo Huber, Critica del Sapere; pp. 203-223.

17. Ibid.

18. Cfr. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 599-610.

19. One thus more easily understands why the Catholic Church requires the study of philosophy for those who wish to undertake theological studies for pastoral and missionary purposes.

20. Tractatus, 5.62.

21. Tractatus, 6.43.

22. Tractatus, 6.43.

23. Cfr. Huber, op. cit., pp. 17 and 23f.

24. Tractatus, 6.432.

25. Cfr. Tractatus, 6.4: "All propositions are of equal value", and 6.41: "The sense of the world is outside of the world. In the world, all is as it is, and everything occurs as it occurs; there is in this no value. If there is a value that has value, then it must be outside of every occurence and every being-such. Every occurence and every being-such is accidental. Whatever would render them non-accidental cannot be in the world, which otherwise would in its turn be accidental. It must be outside of the world." However, as we saw in Chapter Two, Wittgenstein himself uses another language, an ‘elucidating’ language, in writing the Tractatus.

26. Cfr. Chapter Four above

27. Cfr. D. Mahnke, Unendliche Sphäre und Allmittelpunkt (Halle, 1937) (Facs. Nachdr. Fromann, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1966).

28. Cusanus, op. cit., I, 4.11. According to I, 6.4, however, God is still beyond the conjunction of oppposites.

29. Cfr. Erwin Panowski, Perspective as Symbolic Form (New York: Zone Books; Cambridge, Mass.: distributed by the MIT Press, 1991).

30. We will consider below the intellectual and moral level necessary for at least a preliminary awareness of the various open and limitless horizons in a child, teenager, or adult.

31. Wittgenstein expresses this idea thus: "To contemplate the world sub specie eterni is to contemplate it as a — limited — whole. The intuition of the world as a limitless whole is the mystical." Tractatus, 6.45

32. Huber, Kirche, "Zeichen Gottes — Zeichen der Freiheit"; in Wilhelm Sandfuchs, Die Kirche (Würzburg, Echter Verlag, 1978), pp. 17, 23.

33. This would need to be elaborated in further detail in a phenomenology of the will, which however is not directly tied in with our own reflections here on Christian discourse about God.

34. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 51. Kant said literally: "Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind."

35. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.2 a.3.

36. See Chapter Four.

37. If it is not made in the first person, it would sound: "and this is what Christians and others call ‘God’ (but not I, for I am an atheist)." In this case, the statement is purely semantic.

38. J.H. Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, I pt., Chapter 4.

39. Cfr. Ibid., chapter III. "The apprehension of propositions" and their application to the field of religion in Chapter V: "Apprehension and Assent in the Matter of Religion, 1., Belief in One God."

40. Ibid., "From the perceptive power which identifies the intimations of conscience with the reverberations or echoes (so to say) of an external admonition, we proceed on to the notion of a Supreme Ruler and Judge. . . ."

41. It is not yet the act of faith itself but its final presupposition, which however, in theological terms, is made only with the grace of God, and probably is made already in the light of faith itself. This is, so to speak, the ultimate logical presupposition that is comprehended in faith itself or that the faith pre-supposes for itself.

42. Cfr. Chapter Four.

43. There are instances of childhood mystical experiences. Cfr. Finn, Hallo Mr. God, here is Anna.

44. If Zubiri’s definition of the human being as ‘realistic animal’ has any application at all, it is certainly to the child.

45. At a linguistic level we often encounter a rupture of linguistic codes among teenagers, an incommunicability, even a speechlessness and a kind of aphasia.

46. A knowledge of the contents of the Bible does not necessity require a textual knowledge.

47. Heb. 11:1.