At the conclusion of the preceding chapter we indicated the centrality of the word "God" with respect to religious linguistic usage. Eliminating the word "God" from religious language alters the significance of all other expressions. These then lose their meaning, simply retaining perhaps a psychological, sociological, political, or poetical significance. All other expressions, even if not the sum total of them, can be eliminated or changed without causing the religious significance of discourse to disappear. Perhaps the type of religion would change: If Christ were eliminated from Christian discourse, such discourse would no longer be a Christian discourse, but it could be still a Jewish discourse.

All the other expressions, not only of Christian discourse but of any religious discourse, possess a significance specifically religious by means of their relation, direct or indirect, to the word "God".1 

With respect to Christian discourse about God, the word "Jesus", which linguistically is a proper name, has a similar centrality and systematically substitutes for the word "God" in many contexts. The most patent example is the "Holy, Holy, Holy" sung during the Eucharistic Liturgy. In the Book of the Apocalypse, from which the liturgy has taken it, it is proclaimed of Jesus, but in Isaiah it refers to Jaweh.2 One quickly observes however that the substitution of the word "God" with the proper name "Jesus" is not possible in all contexts. The Christian doctrine of the "Trinity" develops linguistically, precisely out of the fact of insubstitutibility, when for example, Jesus himself addresses the Father. An explicit reflection on this subject from a logical/linguistic viewpoint constitute be found in the elaboration of the "communicatio idiomatum" by the Fathers of the Church.3 

THE USE AND MEANING OF THE WORD "GOD" IN CHRISTIAN DISCOURSE

The function of the word "God" in Christian religious discourse is in many respects similar to that of a proper name; this is not however to say that for this reason the word "God" is actually to be considered as one proper name among other proper names.

According to certain logical-linguistic theories words are all names, either proper names of particular individuals, or common, general names of a class of individuals.4 The distinction between proper names and qualities can be considered in this light, since ‘qualities’ — for example, ‘red’, ‘heavy’ — would be names common to a class of individuals. In such a case proper names are "indicators" and serve only to indicate a single object, but have no informative content which could tell us what kind of individual this is. That, on the other hand, is the function of "common names", whose content is informative inasmuch as they describe an object by classifying it.

Now if the word "God" were a proper name in this sense, it would have no informative content. In consequence one could use the word "God" only to speak to God, that is, to pray, but it would not serve to tell us who God is.

Given then that God is unique, which is to say, absolutely singular, we cannot attribute to Him other common or general names insofar as He cannot be ‘classed’ – He is not a member of a class of objects, together with other members. One could then speak to Him but never about Him, whether in catechesis, theology, preaching, or other contexts.

In the light of certain aspects of ‘superficial grammar’ the word "God" in Christian usage would seem to be a proper name: the word "God" is written with a capital letter as all other proper names. It is not used, except in rare instances, with an article ("The God"). Nor is it employed in the plural, or with an indeterminate article: "a God", unless with respect to a pagan divinity or in a negative form: "Apollo is not a true God."

On the other hand the word "God" is translated (Theos, Deus, Dio, Gott, God) while other proper names are not translated, at lest after they cease being descriptions and become proper names ("Peter"="rock"). At the most, proper names become transliterated from one language to another, in conformance with phonetical, grammatical, and orthographical rules of the other language: Mediolanum=Milano=Mailand=Milan; Karl= Carlo=Karel=Charles.

What is a Proper Name? At this point we need to ask ourselves how the words we ordinarily call ‘proper names’ function within the usage of our language. The fundamental error of a linguistic analysis unilaterally determined by ‘superficial grammar’ and by formal logic consists in considering exclusively the indicative function of certain proper names within a singular proposition: "Socrates is mortal," whereas the words we generally call proper names are used not for one unique function but for a complex of overlapping functions.

The proper name is used to address a particular person;

The proper name is used to speak about a particular person to others;

The proper name is used to identify a particular person: "This is Mr. Smith";

The proper name is used to call a particular person: "Harry, come here."

The proper name is used to introduce an individual to others, allowing them to address him in turn: "This is Mr. Smith." "And I am Mary Jane Jones" — and there are still other possibilities with yet other purposes. Already in this brief exercise in analysis of the actual usage of proper names, conducted in the style of Wittgenstein, one sees just how reductive is the position of Russell and the others mentioned above.

A proper name serves all of these functions together, especially that of speaking to a person in his presence and of speaking about a person, often in his absence. One cannot correctly use a proper name if one doesn’t know that this same name can be used for all the other functions enumerated above. This is true also when for cultural-linguistic reasons one uses a diversity of expressions in different contexts, for example: "The last president of the USSR", "The last Chairman of the Central Committee", "Comrade Gorbachov", "Mikhail". For a correct use in these cases it is necessity that the reference of the various expressions always be the same.

In certain situations a proper name can also serve to communicate information. For example, I have already given some information about Frank Smith, who is unknown to my hearers, and afterwards I present him to them, saying: "This is Frank Smith". In that case the use of the proper name is informative, though it remains true the mere name "Frank Smith" does not give this information.

Nonetheless it remains true that the word "God" as used by Christians and by all those who believe in one God has something important in common with proper names: they refer to a unique object; at the same time, the functions of the word "God" within Christian religious language are multiple, as with the functions of proper names.

Besides the word "God", there are other such linguistic expressions which have a unique object. We need to look at them briefly.

Proper names. Proper names, as we have seen, are the most noteworthy member of this group. There are times however when the mere use of a proper name is not sufficient to guarantee its function of identifying a unique object, but only creates equivocal situations. At the university where I teach, for example, there are two "professor Huber’s, such that it is continually necessary to add first names, if known, or descriptions, of which we shall shortly speak, or employ other linguistic instruments, for example: numbers, demonstrative pronouns, indicative gestures.

We need to add that one doesn’t use proper names to refer to all singular objects. Proper names are used only for persons, for certain domestic animals and certain material objects, for cities and countries, for stars, mountains and rivers, hurricanes, etc. When, on the other hand, one refers to other singular objects, one uses other linguistic instruments of unique reference.

Full Descriptions. Describing a particular object by means of diverse characteristic, each of which is common to a class of objects, but which taken together belong to this particular object only, one arrives in fact at the identification of a unique object. How complex and extensive such a description should be is not a logical problem, but a practical one. A ‘logically complete’ description is an absurdity. The completeness which is both practical and necessary depends on the context and the situation, and cannot be determined a priori. It is sufficient to say, "Give me the yellow book" if among all the books in the room only one is yellow.

Singular Personal Pronouns. "I", "thou", "you", "he", "she", when concretely employed, have a unique reference. Their linguistic-grammatical function is that of substituting, in certain contexts, proper names. Thus they have come to be called "pro-nomi". If – as can happen in philosophy – they are used abstractly ("the I", "the Thou"), they then generally lose their identification function.

Numbers. The use of the cardinal number ‘one’ guarantees singularity, and thus a unique reference, but does not serve for purposes of identification because every singular thing is ‘one’. For this reason one takes pains in logic to distinguish the singular proposition from the universal and particular propositions. Ordinal Numbers ("first", "second", "third", and so on) have a unique reference and serve to identify a unique object if they refer to a determinate class of objects, either explicitly or by way of a context or situation. This holds true also for the word "unique". And in certain branches of mathematics a cardinal number, in a way both absolute and abstract, can be a proper name of the respective number, or also of the respective abstract set: "the two", the "six", and so on.

The following linguistic expressions can refer to a unique object when they occur not by themselves but together with other linguistic expressions:

Demonstrative Pronouns. The most general of linguistic instruments, while at the same time fundamental for referring to a singular object and therefore the most concrete, is the use of the demonstrative pronoun together with the general name of a class: "this dog", "this man". Already Aristotle identified this as the fundamental mode of speaking of something determinate : "tode ti", "hoc aliquid", "this such". From this way of speaking about reality, Aristotle arrived at the necessity of the idea of "prote ousia", the ‘primary substance" – the unique concrete reality, the this – which is not reducible to the "deutera ousia", "the secondary substance", which is expressed with a universal term, a class name – the such.

Possessive Pronouns. In certain contexts the unique reference is guaranteed through the use of the possessive pronouns "my", "our", etc. — "my house", "your father". Also the determinate article "the", when used in an absolute sense, can function this way: "the father", "the house".

Titles and Names of Unique Functions. In certain contexts titles and names of functions, for example, "king", "lord", "father", but also "doctor", "professor", "pastor", and so on, have a unique reference: in this context and for a variety of reasons they exist only one at a time. These titles and names of functions may perhaps be qualified by the determinate article "the pastor", or better, with the possessive pronoun: "my father", "our king", "our rock", "my refuge". But at times the function is unique per se: "the King" — because there is no other.

Also the word "God", as used in a monotheistic context, has a unique reference, and in this respect forms part of the group of words under consideration. For reasons then of "superficial grammar" the word "God" is indeed similar to proper names, of which we have spoken above. All pertain to the class of words with a unique reference. The similarities vary however according to the various kinds of the words which have a unique reference, listed above.

In this context certain similarities of the word "God" with other terms of unique reference are of special importance.

First of all, there are the terms used in Sacred Scriptures when they speak of God. There are the "titles of God" in the Old Testament: "Lord", "King", "Shepherd", but also "The Holy One of Israel", and others; then there are also the "Christological titles" of Jesus which are, moreover, often taken from that same Old Testament: "the Christ", "the Messiah", "the Redeemer", "the Son of Man", "the Son of David", "the Son" (used absolutely), "the Son of God", "the Son of the Father", and others. Precisely in this context arises the theological-philosophical discussion on the "Divine Names", from Dionysius the Areopagite to Ockham: God has need of a name, because he is unique; but God does not have a name in the same way as do the persons of this world, who are to be distinguished from one another. God has many names, all of which however refer to the Same.5 This discussion has been continued in Apologetics and in "Fundamental Theology" in the traditional section on "Christological Titles".

The linguistic usage of the Sacred Scriptures, particularly of the Old Testament, gave rise to a consideration of the use of personal pronouns for God. The Old Testament often avoids not only the word "Yahweh", particularly forbidden by the Second Commandment, but also alternative linguistic expressions, substituting the word "God" with a pronoun "He": "He has done marvels for us." The use of personal pronouns, especially the "Thou" with a capital letter, has a biblical foundation in prayer, especially in the psalms, but receives speculative elaboration in the modern philosopher-theologians of a personalistic orientation: Rosenzweig, Buber, Levinas and others. But historical precedents for the use of personal pronouns for God, at least as "I", are found already in Augustine, Descartes and Kant.

Of no small importance in this context is the fact that also the term ‘universe’ is a term of unique reference. Even in contemporary cosmology the term "the Universe" is a ‘singularity’.6 "Universe", as also "world", is a term of unique reference because it is a term which points to an unlimited totality or, as Kant would say, an Idea of the Pure Reason. Precisely for this reason the term "Universe" has a specific logical similarity with the term "God", which Cusanus pointed out7 even before Kant.8 

All that we have said in this chapter not only does not constitute a ‘definition’ of the word "God", but still does not impart any content to the term. We have set forth the significance of the word "God" only in the sense of its central importance for Christian religious discourse and it logical function as a term of unique reference. In the next chapter we will take up the contentual significance of the term "God" by way of God’s attributes and the special way of using them. We will return however to the "names" of God in the eighth and ninth chapters when we turn to a consideration of the various horizons of transcendental opening in human experience and thought, and how they come to center upon God or how they come to focus around God.

1. See Chapter 5.

2. Cfr. Is. 6: 3, and Apoc. 4: 8. Out of this linguistic convergence one can make an argument for the divinity of Christ in Sacred Scripture.

3. See for example, Thomas Aquinas, Lect. II in 1Cor 2, and Summa Th.Q. 16a.4.

4. See for example, John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, iii, 1-3; but also Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language (London, 1951); and especially, Bertrand Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism," The Monist, 1918.

"Onoma" in Aristotle and its definition in Peri hermeneias, chapter 2, has a different meaning. Cfr. Also Petrus Hispanus, Summulae logicales (Venetiis, 1610), Tractatus primus, p. 17.

5. Cfr. Aquinas S.T.I. q.13 a.2-11. — Ockham, S.L. I,63; Quodlibet III q.2. — Suarez, Disp.Met. XXX sect. 6; De divina substantia, lib. I, chaps. 10-14.

6. Cfr. B. Kanitscheider, Kosmologie (Stuttgart, 1984) (with an extensive bibliography); S.W. Hawking, Brief History of Time (New York: Bantam, 1998), p. 72, passim.

7. Nicholas Cusanus, De Docta Ignorantia, II, 4, 112ss.

8. Kant, Crituique of Pure Reason, A 367-394: The Transcendental Dialectic: Book 1, "On the Concepts of the Pure Reason".