CULTURAL HERITAGE AND CONTEMPORARY CHANGE

Chapter IX

THE HUMANE COMMUNITY:

HUSSERL VERSUS STEIN

Marianne Sawicki

In five essays composed during the fall and winter of 1922-23, Edmund Husserl offers his first systematic account of social phenomena. He discusses the relation between individuals and community in general; he considers particular civil, religious, and national communities; he develops the groundwork for social ethics; and he takes a stab at cataloging the history of the West into a series of rational stages. All of these themes are fresh departures for Husserl, foreshadowed only in a few disjointed passages of Ideas II composed around 1917. Thus the formulations of those themes in the Kaizo articles have been hailed as important advances in Husserl’s continuing project of explicating intersubjectivity.

But they must be read in another context as well. The agenda of this socialized phenomenology does not unfold directly out of Husserl’s own previous work. Rather, it comes from a vigorous conversation among colleagues in the pages of Husserl’s Jahrbuch. The Kaizo articles are best read as conveying both the emergent consensus of contemporary phenomenologists, and Husserl’s own dissent at particular points. In effect, they package and export the work-in-progress of the German phenomenological community, for consumption in Japan.

The work remains provocative today – not because it is "Husserl’s," but because of the insights it conveys. For a clear understanding of the issues and their solutions, one should follow the threads through arguments progressively elaborated by various writers. (See table one.) In this paper I must limit myself to just three of these. It is clear that Husserl had Edith Stein’s work at hand as he drafted his Kaizo articles. We need not pause unduly to wonder which of them "owned" the ideas and which of them "copied." Stein and Husserl had been student and teacher, and subsequently she assisted him with his Ideas II and several other projects of 1916-1918. Yet clearly Stein is the one who frames the questions that Husserl takes up in the Kaizo articles. My purpose here is to contrast their treatments of these questions, and to suggest a preliminary evaluation.

TABLE ONE: CHRONOLOGY OF A CONVERSATION ABOUT COMMUNITY

A) Max Scheler: Last section of Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, written about 1913, published in Husserl’s Jahrbuch in 1916.1

B) Edith Stein: "Individual and Community," written in 1919, published in Husserl’s Jahrbuch in 1922.2

C) Edith Stein: "An Investigation of the State," written in 1921, published in Husserl’s Jahrbuch in 1925.3

D) Gerda Walther: "Concerning the Ontology of Social Communities," published in Husserl’s Jahrbuch in 1923.4

E) Max Scheler: Concerning the Phenomenology and Theory of Feelings of Sympathy and of Love and Hate, first published in 1913, but expanded and republished as Essence and Forms of Sympathy in 1923.5

F) Edmund Husserl: Five "articles on renewal," written in 1923-24, the first three of which appeared in Kaizo in 1923 and 1924, and the last two of which appeared, with Supplements, in Husserliana XXVII in 1989.6

G) For context and comparison, see contemporary non-phenomenological works such as Ernst Krieck’s 1917 Idea of the German State and his 1922 Philosophy of Education. Krieck later would enunciate key doctrines of National Socialism.7

STEIN ON INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND STATES

Stein’s essay on "Individual and Community" is the second half of a work that was to have been her Habilitationsschrift.8 This work builds a case against Husserl’s earlier argument that experiences (Erlebnisse) lived by one person cannot be lived by another. That argument was summarized in his dictum that there are "no canals" between streams of lived experience.9 In the first half, Stein had described the mechanisms and the intentions through which experiences flow along for the individual consciousness.10 This provided the basis for the second half, in which Stein discovers those "canals." That is, she describes experiences and motivations that can belong to no individual, but only to a community’s experience-stream. These include the entertaining of super-individual objects; for example, empirical facts understood as such, or certain values and goals, or experiences that are common to many subjects at once. The sequencing or temporal connection from one such experience to another is always motivational, never causal. Unlike individual experiences, whose motivation interweaves with causally produced conditions, community experiences involve no causality at all: they are always intentional in that they arise freely out of consciousness.

After describing the various ways in which community experiences achieve their streaming coherences, Stein turns to the question of the community’s ontic structure itself. Carefully, she questions how far one may pursue the analogy between it and the structure of an individual personality. She finds that the similarity consists mainly in this: that the community, too, has at its disposal a lifeforce fueling its experiences. Individuals contribute to charging up that force, and they also draw upon it. This dynamism is analogous to the transfers of lifeforce across the physical, sentient, and intellectual levels of the individual person, as Stein has earlier described them. But the analogy stops there. Although the community is subject of an experience stream, it is not the subject of free actions nor is it responsible for such.11 Thus it has a psyche and it has a soul or character, but it has no intelligence (Geist). The community is not a person.

This line of investigation continues in Stein’s essay on the state, where she argues that various social formations are distinguished by the sort of connection that their members have.12 A mere aggregation or mass of people is held together only through a physical relation of propinquity. By contrast, members of a community are subjects to one another. But the state is not a community, nor is the nation, nor the people. Rather, the state is the intention, the sense, of certain acts performed by individuals in a civil community. It has no independent existence, and it does not act on its own. It exists as a byproduct of choices and as an instrumentality for accomplishing social goals. The state’s sovereignty, necessary to its being, is only loosely analogous to the freedom of an individual person. One might more accurately say: the state is the sovereignty constituted by personal civil acts.

Thus, for its continuing existence the state relies on the freedom of individuals, and persons cannot divest themselves of their freedom by belonging to a state.13 Morality and ethics in fact are founded in this. The moral law is personal and obliges persons. It need not coincide with civil laws, which are positive (that is, enacted historically). Stein argues that the entailment of punishment by guilt is something that transpires in the realm of the personal, rather than by civil law. This argument, resting on a distinction between history and ontology, is made in a curious theological footnote, six pages in length, distinguishing original and actual sin, guilt, judgment, and punishment.

What, then, is the role of the state in history? How can a just society be achieved? Freedom, says Stein, does not undergo gradual development. It simply is. But persons develop toward morality through awakening to freedom, through training in receptivity to values of all kinds, and through progressive use of freedom to realize values.14 The state can be an instrumentality for achieving these values as historical goals; nevertheless it is not a historical agent.15

Stein concludes the essay with a discussion of religion and the state. She finds no principle to distinguish the spheres of church and state. A variety of relationships between the two have occurred in history. Theocracy is the social form in which the will of the deity stands in for the laws of the state. In any other social form, conflict is quite possible between church and state. Of itself, the state has no religious value.

This brief sketch of Stein’s two essays has made known the themes and the general strategy of argument taken up there. Stein dropped out of close contact with Husserl and her phenomenological friends shortly after she finished the essay on the state. A copy of that essay was left for colleagues to read at the orchard home of Hedwig Conrad-Martius,16 and obviously a copy went to Husserl for his Jahrbuch. Stein was baptized on New Year’s Day of 1922.

HUSSERL ON RENEWAL, ETHICS, COMMUNITY, AND SCIENCE

Husserl’s five essays for the Japanese journal Kaizo take "renewal" as their theme, appropriately enough for the pessimistic post-war era. His discussion centers on the requirements of genuine humaneness (echt Humanität) to be reached through various sorts of renewal: ethical renewal, cultural renewal, and the re-enlivening of originary religious and scientific intuitions. Community is to be a key element in this renewal. In content, diction, and argumentation, these essays resemble Stein’s much more than they do Husserl’s previous publications. However, his Kaizo articles are directed to a more general readership than her Jahrbuch articles, and they are briefer (with Supplements, about 125 pages to Stein’s 400). They preach more than they phenomenologize.

To begin with, Husserl uncritically deploys the analogy between person and community.17 He regards the community as a "personality of a higher order," many-headed but also headless. It is a band of individuals. While it does not act like a willing subject, there is a community personality that is realized through the decisions and efforts of individual community members. Yet the latter are also carriers and functionaries of the community’s will.18

Before turning in earnest to a discussion of community in the fourth essay, Husserl considers individual conativity for some 40 pages. He asserts that persons are essentially free and they realize values in a motivated forward flow of conscious life comprised of various acts of willing and inclination. Persons also understand one another. Husserl says that individual "I’s" come on to one another in relations of reciprocal understanding, or empathy.19 Their conscious acts thus found communities.20 Ethics is first of all an individual affair. "The ethical life is, according to its essence, a life standing consciously under the idea of renewal, deliberately led and configured by it. Pure ethics is the science of the essence and the possible forms of such a life."21 Ethical conscience itself is identified as reason’s consciousness of responsibility.22 Freedom is the necessary condition for a human being to come into one’s own reason. The ethical life can be described as a continual renewal inasmuch as it is essentially a struggle with a slippery slope.23

The phenomenon of willing in freedom provides Husserl with his bridge from the individual to the community. A will toward community is what produces "genuine human" community, by developing it out of something less worthy, more animalistic.24 Individuals bootstrap their communities, so to speak. While nobody lives as a solitary,25 the bond with the others is something that must be developed and brought to humane perfection as a "willing of community."26 (Husserl projects law-driven development of community; Stein, by contrast, envisions development of the individual through education.) The genuine humane community is a community of willing.27 Community is the value willed: the target that motivates the willing and that is actualized by it.

This notion of the intentional character of community employs a phenomenology of willing borrowed from the Munich phenomenologist Alexander Pfänder. The willing individual ego, for Pfänder, first constitutes a possible future state of affairs as an object, then feels itself affected by that object, then values that object and chooses it for a motive, then takes steps to bring the motivating state of affairs into existence. The problem here is where to place community within this motivated sequence. Is it entirely future at the stages where the individual constitutes it, is attracted by it, and accepts it as a motive – as Husserl assumes? Or, has community already some role within the acts of the individual who is supposedly choosing and achieving it? This is the key issue.

Husserl allows the pre-existence not of an operative community or connectivity among individuals, but only of the ideal of what an ethical community ought to be. Analogously to individuals, on his account, communities develop from less to more worthy states, but only with the assistance of philosophy. All the while, the individual members retain their freedom; they do not become functionaries of an imperialistic organization.28

What then, according to Husserl, is the unworthy proto-community out of which the humane community is supposed to develop? Astonishingly, it is the life afflicted with Original Sin. To my knowledge, this is Husserl’s only foray into theology.29 What can "sin" mean for Husserl? He writes that the essence of community life includes a categorical imperative: "every single human being lives a life that, lived day to day nonarbitrarily, has a value." But living naively day to day without reflection leads to sin. Original Sin belongs to the essential form of the human being.30 Salvation comes from philosophy, that is, from the community of philosophers. Only philosophical reflection can disclose that other human beings are values in themselves, not mere instrumental values. Thus, I realize that the best being, willing, and realizing for myself includes the best being, willing, and realizing of the other – and I will wish for that, thanks to philosophy.31

Husserl says that a community has consciousness and self-consciousness. It can value itself and choose other values, including the reconfiguration of itself. "All acts of the community are founded in acts of the individuals who are founding it."32 Just as individuals can bootstrap themselves and turn themselves into ethical subjects, so can a community.33 It can climb the steps from mere life community, to personal and then to ethical community. But for this to happen, the ideal of an ethical community must already be an intentional configuration in individuals.34 That’s where philosophy comes in, again. As universal science, philosophy is necessary for the acquisition of the ideal form of ethical-personal community in advance of the realization of such a community.35

Thus it is philosophy that produces self-consciousness in the community. Philosophers, then, are the anointed (berufenen) representatives of the mind of reason. Indeed, they are its womb: the intellectual organ in whom the community comes to consciousness of its true self, and who propagate this consciousness among the laity.36 The role of lay members of the community is "nachverstehen," to understand after the philosopher.

Nachverstehen is a kind of re-enactment or re-enlivening of an earlier understanding. Returning to his theme of "renewal," Husserl uses this notion to construct a theory of religious culture. He suggests that Christ re-invigorated the original religious insights of Judaism, and that reading the gospels facilitates such a renewal today.37 Husserl deploys the paradigm of successive renewals to rehearse a history of western religion in three steps, and then of Western science in parallel steps – with special attention to the Middle Ages in both accounts.

There is no satisfying summary or conclusion to the Kaizo articles. They start out in mediocre generalizations, and go downhill from there. Mercifully, circumstances prevented the publication of the last two of them during Husserl’s lifetime. The most charitable reading is that they make a false start toward a solution to the problem of intersubjectivity, which Husserl would treat somewhat more successfully several years later in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation. Husserl needed the money and Japan was far away. Perhaps he did not want to squander his best material, so he borrowed the themes of community, ethics, and religion from the "public domain" of 1920’s phenomenology.

THE PRIORITY OF SHARING

The alien elements in Husserl’s argument – sin, ethics, history, and an outright evolutionary account of religion and science – signify his attempt to transplant all philosophical conversations into his own back yard.38 These exotics are not native to Husserlian phenomenology, particularly the transcendental variety announced in 1913 and elaborated ever after. They are cloned from the gardens of Stein and her student Gerda Walther.39 Thanks to the arguments of the latter philosophers, Husserl now sees the necessity of adjusting his own phenomenology to embrace the problem of community through a new approach to ethics. Unfortunately, however, he does not (yet) follow their lead in re-engineering the foundations and structures of his argumentation. Husserl persists in taking individual consciousness as his starting point, deriving community as person-writ-large. This is consistent with the trend of his argumentation in the oldest portions of Ideas II – a work never released for publication by him.

However in portions of the Ideas II manuscripts stemming from the period of Stein’s collaboration with Husserl, there is a contradictory and ultimately more viable argument.40 The individual person cannot be phenomenological bedrock, because the very process of personal individuation must rest on a prior experience of sharing that has neither "I" nor "we" for its subject.41 This sharing is non-individuated "empathy": the co-feeling’s sense-content, apart from any "betweeness" of it that is owing to the apprehension of multiplicity and otherness within subjectivity. Einfühlen is simply how subjectivity inhabits live experiences.42

With these two contrasting lines of argument running through it, Ideas II contradicts itself repeatedly. (This is not artful paradox evoking some mystic harmony; the text is simply incoherent.) Ultimately, in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, Husserl abandoned the priority of individual subjectivity in favor of the life world.

I conclude these comments by pointing to two gains that have been made. (1) The historical gain has to do with how we read Husserl. His thought is not one harmonious whole, gradually unfolding from 1900 through 1938. He made some false starts; and he eventually came around to adopt arguments introduced by other people. The antecedents of the Fifth Cartesian Meditation are not his own Kaizo articles, but the Jahrbuch articles of Edith Stein. Kathleen Haney has proposed that the account of intersubjectivity in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation (1931) be enhanced by that advanced in Stein’s (1916) dissertation on empathy. I am arguing to the contrary, that Stein’s published work of 1916-1925 prompted Husserl first to expand his agenda (in the Kaizo articles) and then to reverse the direction of his foundational argument (in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation).43

(2) The more important phenomenological gain is this. When we selectively impute to community only those personal structures that it actually exhibits – namely, a temporal coherence of experience – we keep safe from gross lapses into a reifying naturalism in regard to the ontology of race, family, state, religion, and the historical processes of their appearances. Husserl’s Kaizo phenomenology is a blunt instrument with which to beat the gong of "individual freedom" to exorcise the mythological demon of "original sin" and summon the savior-philosopher, deus ex machina. His account of history is naively developmental, and thus inconsistent with his analyses of time-constitution elsewhere. Too much is analogically transposed from the individual to the social plane.44

But social formations are not big persons. They are not entities at all. As Stein argued, nation, race, and state are coherences of flowing experience. They are continuities of intention, of various kinds. Therefore they do not undergo developmental processes, and they do not exert causality. They belong rather to the futurity of actions. They are the dativities or sakes for which we do what we do. If community were person-writ-large (as Husserl implies), then social ethics would become merely the ballooning of the messianic philosopher’s exemplary assent to "golden rule" reciprocity. But community is not a big person. Renewal is not imitation or replication or hot air; it is sharing. That means: renewal entails the re-enlivening of an experience that has been had before. If community "is" as that dimension of action which affirms one’s own dependence upon a prior intersubjectivity (as Stein has it), then communal ethics is an aspect of the rationality that constitutes the fundamental share-ability of experience. As such, the ethical imperative beckons to all rational persons alike, regardless of their demographic circumstances. There can be no special ethic for the state, or for a particular nation or race.

In closing, I note that the contrary claim was already being advanced in 1922 by the philosopher of education Ernst Krieck. His race-based epistemology and value theory became foundational for the ideology of National Socialism, which he helped to build. Today one again hears talk of racial ethics and race-based ways of knowing, with reckless disregard for the Twentieth Century’s past experience with the very intentionality that seems bent upon renewing itself in such a project.

NOTES

1. "Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik." Part 2, Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, 2 (1916); cf. Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values: A New Attempt Toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism, tr. Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973.

2. "Psychische Kausalität" and "Individuum und Gemeinschaft," Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften, Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, 5 (1922), pp. 1-283; repr. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1970; cf. Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, ed. Marianne Sawicki, tr. Mary Catharine Baseheart and Marianne Sawicki [The Collected Works of Edith Stein, Vol. 7] Washington: ICS Publications, 2000.

3. "Eine Untersuchung über den Staat," Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, 7 (1925), pp. 1-123; repr. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1970, pp. 285-407 in Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften. An English translation by Marianne Sawicki is forthcoming as a future volume of The Collected Works of Edith Stein.

4. Gerda Walther, "Zur Ontologie der sozialen Gemeinschaften," Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, 6 (1923), pp. 1-158.

5. Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle und von Liebe und Hass, Halle: Niemeyer, 1913; Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, Bonn: Friedrich Cohen, 1923 (cf. The Nature of Sympathy, tr. Peter Heath, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954).

6. Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922-1937), ed. Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp [Husserliana XXVII] Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989. [The first five essays are the Kaizo articles.]

7. Ernst Krieck, Die deutsche Staatsidee, Jena: E. Diederichs, 1917; Erziehung und Entwicklung, Freiburg i. Br.: J. Boltze. 1921; Philosophie der Erziehung, Jena: E. Diederichs, 1922

8. Cf note 2, above. Stein was working on this essay in the summer of 1919, and mentions it in her letter to Fritz Kaufmann of 15 August 1919; see Self-Portrait in Letters 1916-1942, tr. Josephine Koeppel, Washington: ICS Publications, 1993, p. 31. [This translation includes material from two earlier volumes in Edith Steins Werke, but leaves out some of the correspondence with Ingarden that was published in German in 1991.] The essay must have been completed soon after that, for it was rejected as a Habilitationsschrift at Göttingen in late October; See Self-Portrait, p. 35. Stein’s letter to Kaufmann on 31 May 1920 indicates that Husserl had the essay in hand at that time and was considering Stein’s request to publish it in Volume 5 of the Jahrbuch; see Self-Portrait, p. 43. Publication of Volume 5 was delayed until 1922 because of the dire economic conditions in Germany after the First World War. I discuss Stein’s publications of the 1920’s and her earlier work for Husserl in Body, Text, and Science: The Literacy of Investigative Practices and the Phenomenology of Edith Stein, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997.

9. Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität: Texts aus dem Nachlass. Part One: 1905-1920, ed. Iso Kern [Husserliana XIII] Den Haag: M. Nijhoff, 1973, p. 189. Stein had already challenged Husserl on this point in her 1916 dissertation and subsequently while working as his assistant, according to her correspondence with Roman Ingarden. See Self-Portrait, pp. 3-4, 6-14.

10. Examining the interplay of material somatic influences with free choices in what she terms the "psychic causality" of human bodily life, Stein developed a psychology of motivation that has certain similarities to Sigmund Freud’s early work on "libido." Stein, however, described the drives and the inclinations phenomenologically, as components of the living stream of experiences, fed by a variable supply of "lifepower" (Lebenskraft).

11. Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, p. 174.

12. This essay of Stein’s has received little attention in the secondary literature in German, French, or English. See Note 3, above.

13. Here Stein is expressing a phenomenological impossibility, not a moral directive.

14. "Eine Untersuchung über den Staat," p. 115; cf. p. 399 in reprint.

15. Ibid., pp. 116-117; cf. pp. 400-401 in reprint.

16. According to Stein’s correspondence with Roman Ingarden.

17. Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922-1937), pp. 5-8, 22.

18. Ibid., p. 22.

19. Stein had argued for just such relationships in her 1916 dissertation on empathy. Her correspondence with Roman Ingarden indicates that she continued to press this point with Husserl while working with him on Ideen II. These arguments are reflected in the passages of that work that discuss empathy.

20. Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922-1937), p. 8.

21. Ibid., p. 20. Yet there is also the ethics of the community as such, which is not just about how one individual treats another (p. 21). But that notion is not systematically explicated.

22. Ibid., p. 32.

23. Ibid., p. 43.

24. Ibid., p. 44.

25. Ibid., p. 45.

26. Ibid., p. 44.

27. Ibid., p. 52.

28. Ibid., p. 53.

29. Husserl seems to be following Stein’s outline and has picked up this theme from her long excursus on guilt and sin. The novelty of this theme for Husserl is underscored in Ulrich Melle’s 1995 review ["Selbstverwirklung und Gemeinschaft in Husserls Ethik, Politik und Theologie," Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 57 (1995), pp. 111-128] of Hart [James Hart, The Person and the Common Life: Studies in Husserlian Ethics [Phaenomenologica 126] Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992], who has presented a new overview of Husserl’s phenomenological project.

30. Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922-1937), p. 44.

31. Ibid., p. 46.

32. Ibid., p. 49.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid., p. 50.

35. Ibid., p. 51.

36. Ibid., p. 54.

37. Ibid., p. 66. Cf. Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922-1937), "Religiose Wirkung von Legenden, dichterischen Gebilden (1922/23)," Beilage IV, pp. 100-103). Husserl’s theory of reading resembles that suggested in Stein’s 1916 doctoral dissertation on empathy. The gist of Stein’s argument had been that the feelings, intuitions, inferences, and other live experiences of one person could be "followed along with" by another. Husserl writes (pp. 100-1, probably phenomenologically rather than autobiographically): "I read the gospel like a novel, like a legend, I feel myself into it (ich fühle mich ein), and I become filled with infinite love for this super-empirical pattern, this incarnation of a pure idea...".

38. As an indication that "ethics" and "community" are foreign to Husserl’s normal working vocabulary, one may note that they do not appear in the indexes of the major studies by Ricoeur and Bell (see Paul Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, tr. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967; David Bell, Husserl, London: Routledge, 1991). Even in Carr’s, Ströker’s, and Zahavi’s indexes, community has only a few references (see David Carr, Phenomenology and the Problem of History: A Study of Husserl’s Transcendental Philosophy, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974; Elisabeth Ströker, Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology, tr. Lee Hardy. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993; Dan Zahavi, Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivität: Eine Antwort auf die sprachpragmatische Kritik [Phaenomenologica 135] Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996).

39. While there is no space here to demonstrate this further, Husserl’s debt to Stein and Walther is apparent from a simple inspection of the tables of contents of the women’s lengthy contributions to the Jahrbuch volumes of 1922, 1923, and 1925. Husserl had these on his desk before he drafted the Kaizo articles. Stein’s correspondence confirms that Walther studied under her when Stein was teaching for Husserl as his Privatdozent in all but name; see her letter to Roman Ingarden of 7 August 1917, Self-Portrait, pp. 19-20. Walther went on to study with Alexander Pfänder, a co-editor of the Jahrbuch whose work on motivation was widely influential. Although she was no longer in direct communication with Stein, Walther’s work clearly shows the influence of her former teacher.

40. These portions stem from Stein and represent her attempt to rectify flaws in the logical structure of the work. Ideas II was never released for publication by Husserl. The text appeared posthumously, in two editions, in the series Husserliana. Its account of the priority of a lone transcendental ego for the constitution of the other remains fundamentally incoherent with its account of empathy as a prior condition for individuation of the ego and the ego’s subsequent activity of constitution.

41. That is to say, individuation rests on something phenomenologically prior. As a process occurring in history, individuation follows sharing chronologically and temporally as well.

42. This is what the term means in its earliest uses in the work of Theodor Lipps, from which it came into Husserlian phenomenology. I trace the uses of this word in my Body, Text, and Science.

43. See Kathleen M. Haney, Intersubjectivity Revisited: Phenomenology and the Other, Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1994. I concur with Haney that the two approaches to intersubjectivity are complementary and convergent. But I think that Husserl’s position approached Stein’s. The earlier creative proposal does not "enhance" the later copy.

44. Space prevents my pursuing this criticism into Husserl’s mature statement of his historical theses in his "Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie: Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie," Philosophia 1 (1936), pp. 77-176; reprinted in Husserliana VI.