THE POLIS

VASILIKI P. PA PANIKOLAOU

No one should discuss the various expressions of Greek culture without giving due credit to the polis, the characteristic form of the state in ancient Greece, which, by common assent, has nourished it. The polis, as literary evidence reveals, has been exalted by the most influential writers of antiquity and has been considered by them the human community par excellence, which assured the conditions for the civilized life. Even in the fourth century B.C., when the polis had started a steady course of decline, Plato and Aristotle continued to regard it as being the final and ideal stage of social development. For the Greeks, as C.M. Bo wra rightly notices, "the city-state remained the focus of their loyalties and their thinking."¹

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries many thinkers were occupied with the institution of the polis and its historical understanding. It should be noted, however, that their views bear the imprint and are affected by the general climate of their time. This has resulted in misinterpretations, as becomes apparent, for instance, in the case of N.D. Fustel de Coulanges.² In our century, W. Jae ger,³ in his monumental work Paedeia, is the most brilliant example of an author who realizes the complete importance and influence of the polis on all levels of the cultural and spiritual life of the Greeks.

As a social and political organization, the polis⁴ was wholly different from what existed before and what came after. Its emergence,⁵ some time between 800 and 700 B.C., was the beginning of essential innovations which mould effectively the Greek outlook of life. Traditional patterns of moral and intellectual attitudes underwent radical changes and new ideas were introduced to define the framework of behaviour and thought.

The formation of the polis kept pace with a number of major developments in the Greek territory: An acute problem of overpopulation, the commencement of overseas colonization, an increase in trading activities, changes in the tactics of warfare, the disappearance of kingship and the establishment of aristocratic regimes and, lastly, the borrowing of the "Phoenician alphabet" and its adaptation to the requirements of the Greek language.⁶

The above processes, and other socio-political events occurring in different parts of Greece during the archaic period, were responsible for the creation of the very distinctive society of the polis, which was able to accomplish the so-called Greek miracle. Already in the early classical age the polis had reached its complete development,⁷ and its peculiar values and features were clearly delineated. This does not mean, of course, that the polis discarded all pre-existing attitudes and outlooks. Many of them endure, although they acquire a new significance as they become part of the spiritual orbit of the polis. However, the originality of the polis consists in certain characteristics and trends which were not found in the tribal stage of Greek society, which was based mainly on kinship and loyalty. In the following pages these characteristics and attitudes, as well as their course of development, will be discussed and analysed.

The Greek word po lis⁸ signified in general an independent political, economic, religious and social unit, with a limited population and a restricted geographic area. As for what its regional organization, the polis consisted of an urban centre (asty) and surrounding land (chora) but, in actual fact, it was not so much a territorial entity. Above all it was a community of people,⁹ with a deep consciousness of the value of common life. For instance, polis was considered primarily to be the Athen ians or Spart ans and secondarily Athens or Sparta. Already, early in the sixth century Alc aeus, the poet of Lesbos, an island in the Aegean sea, was thinking of the polis in terms of the human environment when he said: "Cities are not stones or logs or the handiwork of carpenters; but wherever there exist true men who know how to defend themselves, there will be found a city and wall"¹⁰ (fr. 426 LP, trans. by D. Page). The polis assumed an identity and a form which reflected the totality of its citizens as a body, regardless of their individual inclinations, their ancestral origins, their professions or their social positions.

Not all the inhabitants of a city-state belonged necessarily to the body of its citizens. A considerable number of them were non-citizens, and they consisted of resident aliens--in Athens they were called metics¹¹ (metoikoi)--and slaves.¹² Both were excluded from public life, but their contribution to the existence and perpetuation of the polis was especially significant. Undoubtedly Greek civilization owes very much to these lower orders of Greek society, which, up to recent times, had not received the proper recognition. The metics were freemen and had undertaken a sizeable part of the mercantile activities of the polis. The slaves were, in general, responsible for the daily chores and other onerous work of their owners and were employed also in the city-state as secretaries, clerks, policemen and prison guards. The former had certain legal rights arising out of commercial contracts and they were under the protection of the laws. The latter were deprived of liberty and were not entitled to any rights, since they were legally the property of their masters. Thanks to them, the citizens were able to lead a particular way of life and to devote their energy and interest to tasks which they considered as being on a higher level when contrasted to those of menial labor.

The citizens, in the large majority, consisted of the indigenous population; they were all free men and equals among themselves. In the countries of the East, as G.W.Fr. Hegel¹³ states, there was only one free man, the despot. In the ancient Greek polis, freedom was not limited to a single person, but it was the privilege of a broader group of people.

The fact that Greek society comprised freemen and people held in servitude does not mean that the polis was a mere union of masters and slaves devoid of a common interest. Citizens and non-citizens could live together without apparent tensions and conflicts,¹⁴ since their coexistence was necessary for the realization of the ultimate goal of the political community, which was "the good life."

The po lis, as was indicated above, had the same connotation as the totality of men composing its citizen body.¹⁵ This body consisted more specifically of the adult male members as full citizens--women did not participate in public life--who, through their general assembly, managed all state affairs by delegating functions to their elected officials and regulated the domestic and foreign policies of their community. That the citizen assembly knowingly identified itself with the polis becomes manifest in the phrase, "the polis decided" (edoxe tai poli

. . . ),¹⁶ which was a decree-formula meaning that the approved resolutions expressed the will of the citizen body. It could be of interest to call attention to this identification and to attempt to see what corollaries may be drawn.

First, the notion that the polis was indeed its citizens shows that the concept of the state in ancient Greece did not signify an abstract administrative entity standing above the citizenry. The distinction of state and society was a phenomenon of modern times and not a feature of the Greek polis. Since the holder of state sovereignty was a community of citizens and not a single person, the polis, "shorn of all private and personal character,"¹⁷ was the embodiment of the idea of the "common." From this point of view, one can have an indication why the polis aimed at the common weal and the general welfare, and why it demanded that the private ends be attuned to those of the community. It can also be explained why the institution of the polis was interwoven with the awakening of the collective consciousness, the creation of cooperative values and the development of strong group feeling.

Second, the conviction that the polis and the citizen body were one and the same thing makes it clear why evaluative terms such as `just', `unjust', `honest', `generous' and the like could equally apply both to the citizen and the polis, as evidenced by the extant texts of the classical period; and, furthermore, why it was claimed that the ethos of the individual and that of the state had the same qualities (e.g., Demosthenes, XX.13-14; Isocrates, II.31).

Third, the equation of the polis with the totality of its citizens resulted in the superiority of the whole over its component parts. This can be attested by the steady crystallization of Greek sentiment around the conviction of the priority of the polis over its individual members. The preference of the whole as compared to the part, which had wide application in ancient Greek thought, could receive also another social interpretation. It is worth remembering that wars between poleis were a customary phenomenon in all periods of Greek history. J. Hasebroek is not far wrong in stating that "to the Greek mind the normal condition of things was war between state and state, not peaceable coexistence."¹⁸ This meant that all poleis were constantly in danger of military defeat and even of total extinction. Thucydides describes a typical situation following the conquest of a polis in the following words: "They killed the grown men and enslaved the children and women."¹⁹ It is therefore understandable why there was a deeply rooted belief that the individual could not exist without the polis and why in the Greek consciousness the whole had precedence over its component parts. The memory of the Persian Wars (500/499-479/8) and the awareness of their awesome consequences for the citizen, in case the Greeks had been defeated by the Persians, must have also contributed towards these attitudes. As recorded by Hero dotus (VI.19,20,101,119), a standard policy of the Persians, when they subjugated a polis, was the enslavement of the population and its dispersal in very remote parts of Asia.

The afore-mentioned characteristics of the polis found fertile ground for development with the disappearance of kingship in the Greek world and the so-called `hoplite reform'. Between the eleventh and eighth centuries B.C. Greece was divided into numerous small tribal states in which a single man, the king (basileus), had concentrated in himself all forms of power--military, priestly, judicial. The overthrow of the kings<sup>20</sup> and assumption of their privileges by the social stratum of the aristocrats had very important consequences. Specifically it resulted in a broadening of administrative responsibility. Ruling (archein) ceased to be a single man's monopoly and became the affair of a greater number of people. The state, thereafter, was not conceived in a personified way, since it was no longer identified with the person of a sole leader. For the first time the `group' made its appearance on the political scene²¹ and occupied the top echelon of the social hierarchy. Henceforth, the state was reflected in more than one individual. This number increased steadily until, in the democratic polis, it corresponded to the entirety of the native and adult males entitled to citizenship. Towards this direction the contribution of the `hoplite reform' was undoubtedly significant.

As the available historical sources reveal, the armed forces of the state consisted, until the end of the eighth century B.C., exclusively of the nobles. At some time between 700 and 650 B.C., however, an innovation occurred in the military sphere, known as the `hoplite reform', with many social, political and psychological effects. As A. M. Sno dgrass<sup>22</sup> has shown, it included two phases: At first, modifications in the equipment of the warrior; then the introduction of a new style of fighting, i.e., the massed tactics of the phalanx. One of the main presuppositions of this reform was the increasing availability of iron and its use for warlike purposes. The Greek subsoil was rich in iron ores, the exploitation of which brought on the fall of the price of iron and thus allowed the manufacture of cheap weapons.<sup>23</sup> The acquisition of the hoplite armament was no longer the prerogative of the nobility, but became accessible to the common people. Hence, it could be said for the period preceding democracy that "the whole Greece was `armoured.'"²⁴

In the early archaic age and before the invention of a phalanx, the battle was conducted mostly by individual champions, members of the aristocratic society, operating customarily as cavalrymen. The majority of people did not play any important role in the defense of the country, or in its offensive wars and, therefore, did not have any essential participation in the administration of the state.²⁵ In the new tactical system in massed ranks of hoplites the outcome of the combat was determined by the collective effort of a relatively large number of fighters, who represented not only the thinly populated class of the aristocrats, but a wider spectrum of society. This resulted in strengthening the demand of the common men, who made up a majority in the ranks, for a share in the affairs of the developing polis and in the rejection of the central assumption of the aristocrats that they had an inborn right to rule.²⁶ At least in Spa rta, as P. Car tledge emphasizes, the "`hoplite class' became synonymous with the `citizen-body.'"²⁷ The above can be an indication of how contributive the phalanx was to the increase of the political power of the ordinary man and consequently to the widening of the concept of the state.

To fight in a phalanx formation meant that each man in the line had his right side protected by the shield of the hoplite on his right and that all moved in unison as a cohesive body. The adoption of the use of the phalanx as a military tactic required constant training and imposed upon the hoplites the spirit of cooperation and of strict discipline. Temperance or sophrosyne, which constituted the principal civic virtue²⁸ of classical Greece owed its emergence to this new style of fighting.²⁹ This obliged each one of the infantrymen to be master of himself with a view to being capable of obeying the rules of coordinated behaviour and of mass action.

When the individual warrior decides to serve in the phalanx, he abandons the aristocratic ideal of personal superiority and self-assertion and espouses the communal ideal, which implies a collective endeavor for a common cause. From this perspective, as W. Donlan notes, "the community rather than the individual becomes the focus of brave deeds."³⁰ Thanks to the phalanx, for the first time people of the upper class came in contact with commoners. This had the effect of lessening social antipathies and laid the foundations for the coexistence of men who did not share the same economic, social or intellectual status. The ph alanx tactics allowed comparisons which invigorated the morale of the ordinary humans, cultivated the feeling of comradeship and solidarity and promoted the sense of unity among the hoplites. It also introduced equality into the ranks. This prepared the ground for the isonomia (equality of civic rights and equality before the law), and isegoria (the equal right of any citizen to speak in the assembly), the features par excellence of the democratic city-state.

It is evident that the various implications of the hoplite reform were especially constructive in the creation of the world of the polis. Since those dominating military affairs formed primarily the citizen-body, there is no need to explain why the mentality of the hoplites gave birth to the resulting mentality of the polis.

To live in a polis as a citizen was a unique experience. It meant primarily that the individual belonged to a privileged community which enjoyed full political rights. The institution of the polis imposed on its members a threefold responsibility: They were members of a governing assembly, they composed the judicial bodies and, if need arose, they were obliged to be soldiers. These responsibilities did not amount to a marginal or partial occupation; they constituted the main concern of the citizens and required the greater part of their time and energy. Hence the need to be freed from tasks which would prevent them from performing their public duties.

The idea of the polis did not allow any citizen to retire into private life, that is, to be unconcerned and a nonparticipant in the public life of the state. Its steady tenet was a life dedicated to public-political matters, a life devoted to the common weal of the community. In this context, privacy had a degrading meaning and, as H. A rendt remarks, "a man who lived only a private life, who like the slave was not permitted to enter the public realm, was not fully human."³¹ In the words of Per icles, if we are to believe Thucydides, "he who takes no part in the affairs of the polis is not regarded as someone who minds his own business (apragmon), but as a useless man."³²

The Greek city-states fall normally under two kinds of constitution: Oligarchy and democracy. The former signified roughly that the body of the individuals who shared in the administration of the state consisted of the few rich,³³ while the latter that this body consisted of the many,³⁴ who in the majority were poor.³⁵ In both cases the members of the sovereign assembly were obliged to continuous and intense political activity, enough to occupy almost one's whole existence.³⁶ The reason for this can be sought in the fact that the polis was governed in a direct and not in a representative way. This means that the citizen ought to participate personally in the making of major or minor political decisions, in the settlement of the various communal matters and, generally, in all the manifestations of the public life. Thus, it can be understood why leisure (schole), which stood for a state of release from the compulsory or productive work,³⁷ was a necessary element for the functioning of the political community.³⁸ It was considered by the theoreticians of the fourth century B.C. to be an exclusive condition of the citizen.³⁹

For the Greeks, as many scholars have shown, leisure meant primarily the time reserved for political activities.⁴⁰ Although it presupposed abstention from the toilsome or routine jobs, it was never synonymous with laziness. The citizen set aside the world of bodily labour for the world of political action. He was convinced that ascholia, a word which could be used for all non-political occupations, did not befit a free human. However, it must not be assumed that the citizens by unburdening themselves of many undesirable tasks had become less energetic and ambitious. The world of political action was especially exacting. In parallel with the incessant corporate efforts which were required for the fulfillment of common goals, the members of the polis were in emulation of each other. This competitive attitude, which was an inheritance from the old heroic pattern of behaviour,⁴¹ had a special connotation within the framework of the city-state. The citizen was not like the homeric hero an "isolated, self-centered figure,"⁴² who in his desire for preeminence aspired basically to private satisfaction. The man of the polis strove to distinguish himself from all others through deeds which were not necessarily to his own advantage, but which were of benefit to the whole community. He tried to prove his superiority over his peers by the magnitude of his contributions to the social whole.⁴³ In this point the Greek polis presents one of its most positive facets. Shared, as well as individual action was directed toward the well-being of the entire political association. The citizen broke through the boundaries of self-centered life into a realm which was primarily concerned in the advancement of the public good. He became involved in a life-pattern which demanded openness to the needs and desires of others and "delivered him," as G. L. Dickin son remarks, "from the narrow circle of personal interests into a sphere of wider views and higher aims."⁴⁴

As has been said above, political activity was the principal task of the citizen. This was instrumental in the development of personal responsibility and generally of a personal stance. Man, as a citizen, was equipped with a high sense of liability. He knew that each time he voted, he risked the fortune of the polis and of his own welfare and that, if his judgement was wrong, he would pay a penalty for it. In other words, he acted after pondering carefully the common affairs and in full consciousness of the consequences. This sense of liability was fostered, as well, when the citizen was appointed to function as a judge in the courts and reach verdicts. Thanks to his involvement in politics, for the first time in history man emerged as a "person," in the sense of "a rational being and moral subject, free and self-determining in his actions, responsible for his deeds."⁴⁵ The arena of politics taught the citizen to trust his reason, to appraise his abilities and to know his limitations. Within the polis the belief that "the greatest things are not the works of God or Chance, but of those who were in charge of them"⁴⁶ became widespread. Although, in the words of H.-G. Gad amer, "the self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of the historical life,"⁴⁷ it could be said that the citizen had achieved a fulfilling level of self-awareness.

Political activity, which was the most prominent part of the citizen's life took place publicly and in full view of the community members. This resulted in a public character for the whole organization and functioning of the polis. Everything that concerned the citizens as a whole belonged automatically to the public sphere. J.-P. Ver nant holds rightly that "the polis existed only to the extent that a public domain had emerged," that is, "an area of common interest as opposed to private concerns, and open practices openly arrived at, as opposed to secret procedures."⁴⁸ Likewise, in H. Arendt's view, the polis stands for the authentic public realm.⁴⁹ The term `public', according to her conception, represents two closely related aspects. The first is that "everything that appears in public can be seen and heard by everybody,"<sup>50</sup> while the second is tantamount to the existence of a common world<sup>51</sup> which provides the basis for the condition of the `public'. It is obvious that the concept of 'public' presupposes and, in a sense, coincides with the concept of `common'. From this point of view the public life of the polis implied a common life, the dimensions of which are hardly intelligible to a modern man saturated by a pattern of private life and actuated by the "ideology of intimacy."⁵²

The insistence on publicness of the Greek polis was supported, as well, by two wholly public and open data: The diffusion of literacy in the Greek society and the written published law. Some time about the middle of the eighth century B.C. the spoken language of the Greeks became alphabetized.⁵³ The new system of writing⁵⁴ did not confine itself to the class of the professional scribes; due to its simplicity, from its very beginning it was addressed to the entire people. From the sixth century B.C. onward the democratization of literacy came to be a reality. This was a particularly significant event.⁵⁵ The storage and preservation of the cultural heritage ceased to be the exclusiveness of the individual human memory. Whatever was put down in writing was open to everybody. Writing, thus, was instrumental in the communication of knowledge and in the development of a common culture. Moreover, it contributed decisively to the organization and durability of the polis, since it permitted the record and promulgation of the laws, which undertook to regulate and control civic conduct. Being equally applicable to all, the laws acquired an irrefutable validity and were regarded as the public property par excellence. Owing to writing, words were not only sounds, but, also, shapes;⁵⁶ the laws were no longer an agent's oral commands, but were impersonal utterances embodied in structures seen by the eye. As a consequence, the sense of vision gained in esteem and value⁵⁷ as compared to the sense of hearing, which under conditions of non-literacy always has precedence. The world of everyday experience obtained an unprecedented visual fiber. It is not a figure of speech that the Greeks were the people "who were able to see."⁵⁸ Along with the political activity, writing and the written law, as well as the open nature of the judicial settlement of disputes were conducive to the formation of the world of the polis and strengthened constantly its claim for openness. This public character penetrated every aspect of political community life. Even religion was not an affair of the inner man, but a matter of external public worship. The inner man did not exist. As W. Jaeger remarks, the conscience of the Greeks was entirely public.⁵⁹ The atmosphere of publicness is one of the reasons why the political society attributed such great significance to the appearance, which is typical of a "shame-culture." Thus it is easily understood why in the context of the polis men had to prove themselves though their actions, that is, through what could be visible and obvious and not through their intentions, which might never come to light.

By choosing politics as a way of life, the citizen decided to live within the realm of `logos'.<sup>60</sup> This meant that politics made possible the appearance of a mode of living based. on speech and persuasion and not on force or compulsion. In the agora,<sup>61</sup> the public place of the everyday meetings of the citizens, the logos gave rise to the `anti-logos' and, finally, became a dialogue. As such it attempted to illuminate and adjust the communal affairs. In the cultural context of Greece the validity of the spoken word remained unquestionable, despite the fact that people had realized the power of speech to deceive or to mislead. Speech was generally acknowledged as the sine qua non of the polis; it conferred dignity and importance on the man as a political being, making him a distinguished personality.⁶² P. Vidal-Naqu et has no hesitation in stating that "the polis . . . is speech (parole), indeed speech, which was effective in the agora"⁶³ and that the Greek civilization is "the civilization of the oral political word."⁶⁴ In the public square the oral word determined the boundaries of action,⁶⁵ inasmuch as action was an activity consisting primarily of the appropriate words at the right time, which, through opposing argument and public criticism, resulted in a sound decision for the benefit of the whole. The experience of open political discourse gave birth to constructive scepticism and critical inquiry which, as modes of thought, were extended and applied widely in the domain of science and philosophy.⁶⁶ In general, this experience was decisive in widening the citizen's mental horizon and moulding his outlook.

On the basis of the above, one could conclude that political life, with its specific effects on man and social consciousness, was what gave the polis its peculiar identity.

The p olis, from its very first steps, brought to light new postulates in the sphere of human relations and attitudes, which gradually resulted in constituting its special moral principles and standards. These could be summarized as the demand for friendship, moderation and a legal status for the rules of civic conduct and action.

While the pre-political forms of human association were organized on the basis of kinship, real or imagined, the political communities rested upon ties of mutual friendship.⁶⁷ However, this was not the kind of friendship that unites two beings in one soul, but the friendly disposition of each individual towards his fellow-men which leads to less passionate and more reason-governed relationships. The climate of amiability and friendliness was cultivated mainly by the conditions of equality and liberty that existed among the citizens.⁶⁸ Civic friendship was the foundation-stone of the unanimity of the polis and secured a warm human coexistence. Its lack implied a state of disorder or dissention. K. Vourveris is correct in pointing out that the friendly feelings and the community of interests constituted the essence of the polis.⁶⁹

That friendship was especially functional in the life of the polis is attested by the fifth century literature, where, as L. Pea rson observes, "the vocabulary and reasoning of friendship is applied to public relationships, even to the relations between states."⁷⁰ He notices, also, that friendship was blended with the conception of justice,⁷¹ on which the ethico-political thought of that time was focused. Civic friendship underlay all co-operative efforts and sharing of activities. It was, therefore, a prerequisite for the realization of the common weal. Undoubtedly, friendship was a virtue of vital importance to the political community⁷² and marked a new stage in the formulation of Greek values. By creating the conditions of a free and genuine human communion,⁷³ the institution of the polis promoted the development of altruistic feelings⁷⁴ among the citizens, thus giving rise to political humanism.

Furthermore, friendship strengthened the steady tendency of the political community towards moderation. "Be moderate" was the permanent tenet of the polis, the basic presupposition of its existence. The polis needed peace and stability within. However, civil discord and strife were an endemic disease of Greek life,⁷⁵ which usually derived from the conflicting claims of contrary social classes:⁷⁶ The minority, the rich, who were not willing to give up anything; and the majority, the people, who, being reduced to destitution, wanted to grab everything. These two opposing parts often pushed things to extremes. It is understood that a polis with antagonistic social forces was in danger of dissolution. This disastrous effect could be avoided in periods when the socially and politically dominant class in the polis was the middle one.

The seventh, sixth and fifth centuries B.C. had been an age of rising prosperity⁷⁷ in the Greek world, which was made possible by the growth of manufacture and maritime commerce, as well as the invention and spreading of coinage. From the historical sources available, one could conclude that this notable prosperity influenced the standard of life of practically all sections of the population. One of the most significant consequences of this development was the emergence of a class of people who earned their livelihood through means other than the land, that is, by being engaged in manufacturing and mercantile activities. This class could be designated as the middle one,⁷⁸ for the large majority of its members⁷⁹ did not have the wealth of the old landed aristocracy, but neither were they in a condition of indigence. They were able to pay their daily expenses, to become eventually small land proprietors and to obtain their own armour and weapons. The middle class consisted initially of the urban artisans, merchants and traders. In due course it included the small farmers, who, during the age of the tyrants,⁸⁰ succeeded in rising economically.⁸¹ Finally it was extended to all those who managed to have an average standard of living due to their occupation. The `middle' people soon demanded political rights and, after persistent struggles, gained them.

Ever since the middle class managed to participate in the conduct of public affairs it became the stabilizing factor of the polis, for it was able to play a moderate and reconciling role between the rich and the poor. Thus it secured both the necessary social balance for the preservation and well-being of the polis and the like-mindedness (omonoia) among the citizens which was considered to be the greatest blessing a state could have.⁸²

This political rise of the middle class created a new situation, not only in the administration of the polis, but in the matters of social ethics as well. The aristocratic tendency towards hybris⁸³ or arrogance, which cultivated the spirit of excess in human behaviour and entailed the lack of respect for one's fellow men, retreated before the new morals of the 'middle' people, who extolled the moderate attitude in all the manifestations of life. This attitude found its best expression in the famous dictum "nothing in excess" (meden agan), which was inscribed over the temple of Delphi and was supposed to meet with Apollo's approval. This saying constituted the principal moral rule of the polis; in its terms Apollo was fairly characterized as "The God of Civic Morality."⁸⁴ Taking into consideration all the above, it can be understood why the man who acted in a moderate manner and consciously avoided a life that knew no measures was regarded as the embodiment of the ideal citizen. The social order, unity and harmony, without which the realization of the common good was unattainable, could be achieved only by a modest people. Thanks to the middle class and its values the polis set as its goal to overcome centrifugal forces in the public domain and proclaimed that "the mean in all things is best"⁸⁵ (metron ariston).

The principle of limit, of measure and of `no excess' that the individual ought to follow and behave by was the most essential quality of sophrosyne⁸⁶ or temperance. In the archaic and classical periods this emerged as a great political virtue.⁸⁷ In the Greek moral consciousness which was inseparable from the political one, there existed the conviction that a deficiency of sophrosyne would make life in the polis unbearable; the result would be despotism or anarchy, both equally harmful and destructive for the political society.⁸⁸ Besides moderation, sophrosyne was manifested as soundness of mind, restraint, self-control, gentleness, prudence, contempt for luxurious habits, control of pleasure and appetites, proportion and self-knowledge. Sophrosyne in all of its nuances contributed to a suppression of human aggressiveness in the context of the community and to the building of a civilized life. It was, therefore, a highly positive force.⁸⁹ From the first steps of its political career it was associated with the virtue of justice, since only the man who knew his human and personal limitations and was moved by the spirit of moderation and self-control could be just,⁹⁰ that is, able to obey the rules and laws of his society and to treat others without disregarding their rights and their proper claims. Obviously, in the Greek polis the virtue of sophrosyne was not an expression of the ascetic spirit, but a factor able to assure suitable civic conduct.

That the middle class protected and fostered sophrosyne appears clearly in the historical life of the fourth century B.C. Because, through the Peloponnesian War, the middle class became thinly populated,⁹¹ the polis lost its equilibrium. Instead of moderation, many of the known city-states suffered from domestic strifes (staseis) of long duration and extremity reigned. The need for sophrosyne was imperative, as attested by the works of the fourth-century writers who constantly appeal to it and praise bygone days, during which, as they believed, sophrosyne was prevalent.⁹²

Proper behaviour in the polis was of vital importance. Since the citizens needed to act in unison in pursuing the common good their conduct could not be arbitrary and uncoordinated. There had to be an objective and impartial measure, accepted by everyone, that would define behaviour in general, and this was the written law.

In the course of the seventh century B.C. laws were codified and published in many poleis, in widely scattered parts of the Greek world. This was one of the most significant achievements of the archaic period.⁹³ The published law not only contributed to the evolution of judicial practice and procedure towards a more fair administration of justice,⁹⁴ but also to the improvement of the citizens' morals. The latter becomes apparent in the ancient testimonies relative to the legislation of the famous archaic lawgivers, where one could find a considerable number of laws designed to implant sound principles in the minds of the people and to oblige them to act accordingly.⁹⁵ Clearly the first lawgivers showed a strong interest in sophrosyne and in its predominance in the polis. This reflected their social origin. As Aristotle records (Pol. 1296 a 18-21), most of them belonged to the middle class which was inclined to this excellence.

The laws of the polis were regarded as setting the standard of what was right or wrong for the citizens and, thus, as being a code of morality able to exercise a great educative influence.⁹⁶ The moralizing power of the law, that is, its power of inculcating moral and social virtues in individuals, was conducive to the creation of the conditions of the good life, which was the aim of the polis. As the Greeks viewed the law as expressing the collective will,⁹⁷ they did not doubt that the law wanted "what was just and noble and beneficial"⁹⁸ for the whole. Hence, despite their love of freedom and independence, they submitted themselves willingly to it.⁹⁹ The belief that the laws, which functioned as ethical commitments, were a product of common agreement¹⁰⁰ constitutes a strong indication of the anthropocentricity of the polis, since it makes manifest that men and not gods were the ultimate authority for moral norms. This did not necessarily imply the questioning of the validity of law. However, it surely shows that in the context of the polis, men became conscious of the fact that their common agreements were the measure of all things and values and that the good life was an artifact.

The laws of the polis codified the relations among the citizens according to the principle of reciprocal advantage which governs the drawing up of a contract. This means that the law presupposed the qualities of measure and proportion and, thus, it appeared as representing the spirit of compromise and balance which was an essential attribute of the character of the polis.

From what has been said, it seems clear that the ethico-political outlook of the middle class was instrumental in promoting order and friendship within the community. Therefore, it needs no special effort to comprehend why the moral ideal of the polis was shaped on the basis of this outlook.

The fourth century B.C. was one of deep crisis¹⁰¹ for the polis and its institutions. This was mainly due to the Peloponnesian War (431-404), which brought great evils upon the Greek poleis and ushered in the beginning of their decay.

From the point of view of morality, one of the symptoms of this decay was the strong tendency of the individual towards an easy and pleasurable life. The people who survived the war and its miseries had an intense wish to taste any pleasure available and to avoid any pain. Moreover, the turbulent post-war state of the polis increased the uncertainty of life, which resulted in strengthening the hedonistic attitude of the entire society.¹⁰² Another symptom was the growing spirit of individualism.¹⁰³ The average citizen became more interested in his own welfare than in that of the polis, that is, his desire of working for the common weal was eliminated. This tendency is clearly portrayed in Greek New Comedy. Contrary to the Old one which concentrates on public figures and matters, New Comedy deals with private life and its affairs, for such subjects were of interest to its audience. Both hedonism and individualism undermined the foundations of the polis and were considered to be its great enemies. The thinkers of this epoch did not miss the opportunity to criticize the situation, hoping for the rehabilitation of the old authority of the polis, which unfortunately did not occur. Pla to and Aris totle tried, in vain, to revitalize the communal spirit and to reconnect the individual with the community.

In the second half of the fourth century B.C., we also have the destruction of the institution of the polis, which for more than three centuries had inspired the great pedagogues and the philosophers of Greece. The battle of Chaeronea (338 B.C.), which was meant to be the final triumph of the Macedonians, delivered the coup de grâce to the autonomy of the poleis and made them insignificant parts of a large-scale state. The polis ceased to be a self-governing and independent community. Its mission to uplift the morals and the spirit came to an end.

During the Alexandrian times the public life of the Greek cities declined dramatically. The individual felt himself in the grip of a world, which he could not control or affect. The Roman domination made things even worse. The political helplessness of the age is reflected, as E. Zell er¹⁰⁴ maintained, in the philosophical doctrines of the Stoic apathy, the Epicurean self-satisfaction and the Sceptic imperturbability. The Hellenistic polis had no bearing on the Classical polis, despite the assertions¹⁰⁵ by some scholars that there were close links between them. The former lacked autonomy, the sine qua non of the latter; the gulf was unbridged. With the battle of Chaeronea the ideal of the polis collapsed definitively and irrevocably.

University of Ioannina The Catholic University of America

Ioannina, Greece Washington, D.C.

1. The Greek Experience (1957; London: Cardinal edition by Sphere Books Ltd., 1973), p. 80.

2. N.D. Fustel de Coulanges in his work La cité antique (Paris, 1864). The English translation of this work bears the title The Ancient City (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956). He sees the polis under the influence of the liberal individualism of the 19th century and as a consequence emphasizes the omnipotence of the polis over its members. He expresses also the belief that "the ancients knew nothing of individual liberty" (p. 219 from the Engl. trans.). This assertion is characterized by A. Zimm ern as "a gross exaggeration, or misuse of words." See The Greek Commonwealth. Politics and Economics in Fifth-Century Athens (1911; 5th ed., rev. 1931; rpt., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 82.

3. Ja eger, Paideia. The Ideals of Greek Culture, translated from the second German edition by G. Highet, in three volumes (2nd ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 1945).

4. For more complete information concerning the institu tions of the polis see, among others, G. Glo tz, La cité greccue. Le développement des institutions (1928; Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1968) and V.L. Ehrenberg, The Greek State (2nd ed., London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1969). For an introduction to the constitutional and cultural history of the most important poleis see K. Fre eman, Greek City-States (London: Macdonald, 1950), L.H. J effery, Archaic Greece. The City-States c. 700-500 B.C. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976) and P.J. Rhodes, The Greek City States. A Source Book (London and Sydney: Croom Helm Ltd., 1986). For documents portraying various aspects of the polis, and mainly of Athens, during the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., see the work, The Greek Polis, edited by A.W.H. Ad kins and P. W hite, series, University of Chicago Readings in Western Civilization, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1986).

5. The polis of the classical period was the product of long evolution. Unfortunately our historical sources do not offer adequate information concerning its origin and its early form. For the specific period which gave rise to the polis and is still a matter of controversy see V.L. Ehrenb erg's well-documented article "When Did The Polis Rise?" The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 57 (1937), 147-159. On the historical development of the polis see also more recent discussions in the following books: C.G. Star r, The Economic and Social Growth of Early Greece. 800-500 B.C. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 31-34, 98ff.; M.M. Aus tin and P. Vid al-Naquet, Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece: An Introduction. (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd., 1977), pp. 49-53, a revised English trans. of the French original, Economies et sociétés en Grèce ancienne (1972; 2nd ed., Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1973); J.V.A. F ine, The Ancient Greeks. A Critical History (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 48-51; M.H. Craw ford and D. Whit ehead, Archaic and Classical Greece. A Selection of Ancient Sources in Translation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 27-51.

6. The afore-mentioned developments are not unrelated to each other and, with a proper examination, their causal relationships can become apparent. A correlation of some of them is attempted by R.M. Cook, in his study "Ionia and Greece in the Eighth and Seventh Centuries B.C.," The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 66 (1946), 67-98, particularly p. 79. Cook emphasizes the problem of overpopulation and says that it led to three practical solutions: a) expansion into other neighboring territories, which implies warlike activities, b) decrease of the population by the colonizing movement and c) imports of food and other necessities. The last two solutions require, according to him, a higher level of organization, which can be assured within the boundaries of an organized state, i.e., the developing polis.

7. At the end of the archaic period--conventionally the eighth, seventh and sixth centuries B.C.--the polis managed to suppress the power of the great family groups. This is considered by many scholars as reflecting the initiation of the "true polis." It must be noted that the terms `polis', `city-state', `political community', `political society' are used interchangeably as being synonymous.

8. When the term `polis' is used, one should never forget that in mainland Greece, South Italy, the islands and Asia Minor there were hundreds of separate poleis with many differences in their structure and constitution. However, in spite of the dissimilarities, they had a number of common features that allow us to use the word polis as an abstraction and to proceed in certain generalizations. In particular, we use here sources from Athens regarding the polis.

Concerning the precise meaning of the term polis, as well as of the terms `ptolis', `polisma', `asty' and `kome' in the fifth century Athens one may refer to C.W. Dunmore's dissertation The Meaning of Polis (Albany: New York University, 1961), Dissertation Abstracts 22 (1962), 4008. See, also, E. Bar ker, Greek Political Theory. Plato and His Predecessors (5th ed. 1960; rpt., Bungay, Suffork: Methuen, 1964), p. 27, n. 1.

9. Cf. M.I. Fi nley, The Ancient Greeks: An Introduction to Their Life and Thought (New York: The Viking Press, 1963), p. 39 and E. Ba rker, Greek Political Theory, p. 28.

10. Cf. Sop hocles, Oedipus Tyrannus, 56-57: "Neither walled town nor ship is anything at all if it be empty and no men dwell together therein" and Thu cydides, History, VII. 77. "It is the men who are the polis."

11. Authoritative information concerning the institution of the `metics' in Athens is offered by D. White head in his study The Ideology of the Athenian Metic (Cambridge: Cambridge Philological Society, Suppl. vol. 4, 1977).

12. From the rich bibliography concerning the meaning of slavery in the ancient Greek society and other related issues, I refer only to T. Wiedem ann's book Greek and Roman Slavery (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). This is an especially valuable work, because it is the first publication to include such a great selection of ancient references, epigraphical as well as literary, on the subject of slavery.

13. See Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophy, Bd. I (Sämtliche Werke, Bd. 17) (1831; 4th ed., Stuttgart-Bad Cannnstatt: H. Glockner, 1965), p. 134.

14. Cf. A. Zimm ern, who supports the view that in Athens, the most famous representative of the poleis, the human relations between the citizens and the settled alien population, including the slaves, were based on cooperation and not on compulsion or coercion (The Greek Commonwealth, pp. 380-396). Cf. also R. Schlai fer, "Greek Theories of Slavery from Homer to Aristotle," Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, 47 (1936), 165-204, particularly, p. 110.

15. M.H. Crawfo rd and D. Wh itehead, (op. cit., pp. 1 and 4) are proponents of the view that the polis was meant to be the body of its citizens and they give reference to certain Thucydidian passages, which support this view.

16. See, for example, G. Di ttenberger, SIG³, no. 121. Cf. R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), p 2, no. 2: "The city thus decided . . . ;" (ad' eFade/poli). Equivalent decree-formulas were the phrases "the demos decided" (edoxen to demo)--in decrees and inscriptions the term `demos' meant the people constituting the citizen assembly--and "the council of the citizen assembly and the demos decided" (edoxen te boule kai to demo).

17. J.-P. Ve rnant, The Origins of Greek Thought,trans. from the French (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1982), p. 47.

18. Trade and Politics in Ancient Greece, trans. by L.M. Fraser and D.C. Macgregor (New York: Biblo and Tannen, 1965), p. 118. Cf. M. Ha das, "From Nationalism to Cosmopolitanism in the Greco-Roman World," Journal of the History of Ideas, 4 (1943), 105-111, particularly p. 105 and A.W. Goul dner, Enter Plato: Classical Greece and the Origins of Social Theory (New York, London: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1965), p. 144.

19. History, V. 32.1 and 116.4; III.36.2. Cf. K.J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality. In the Time of Plato and Aristotle (Oxford: B. Blackwell), p. 161.

20. For more details on this subject see C.G. St arr, "The Decline of the Early Kings," Historia, 10 (1961), 129-138.

21. Cf. M.I. Fi nley, The World of Odysseus (1954; 2nd rev. ed., Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, A Pelican Book, 1979), who states that "the aristocrats ruled as a group, equals without a first among them," (p. 106).

22. See his article "The Hoplite Reform and History," The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 85 (1965), 110-122, particularly pp. 110-113.

23. The political consequences of the low cost and availability of iron, which enabled the non-aristocrat to obtain his own weapons, are described and analysed by S.D. Kyriasopoulos, in his book, Politika aitia tes Ethikes tou Aristotelous (Ioannina, 1971), pp. 11-12. Cf. M.O. Wa son Class Struggles in Ancient Greece (Roma: Edizione Anastatico, "L'Erma" di Bretschneider, 1972), pp. 30-32.

24. Th ucydides, History. I.6.1.

25. See the following much-debated Aristotelian passage: "And the earliest government which existed among the Hellenes, after the overthrow of the kingly power, grew up out of the warrior class, and was originally taken from the knights (for strength and superiority in war at that time depended on cavalry; indeed without discipline, infantry are useless, and in ancient times there was no military knowledge or tactics, and therefore the strength of armies lay in the cavalry). But when cities increased and the heavy-armed grew in strength, more had a share in the government." Pol. 1297 b 16-24 (trans. by B. Jo wett).

26. For the political implications of the `hoplite reform' see J. Sa lmon, "Political Hoplites?" The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 97 (1977), 84-101, particularly, pp, 93-101.

27. "Hoplites and Heroes: Sparta's Contribution to the Technique of Ancient Warfare," The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 97 (1977), 11-27, particularly p. 27.

28. H. Nor th supports the view that sophrosyne was not a heroic virtue and that it acquired high value with the growth of the polis. See Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 2-3.

29. Cf. J.-P. Ver nant (op. cit., p. 63), who regards sophrosyne as the characteristic quality of the hoplites, and A. Andrewes, Greek Society (1967; 1971; rpt., Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1975), who writes that "the needs of hoplite fighting, steady discipline and a steadfast refusal to give ground, shaped the classical conception of what a good man ought to be" (pp. 161-162).

30. The Aristocratic Ideal in Ancient Greece: Attitudes of Superiority from Homer to the End of the Fifth Century B.C., (Lawrence Ks: Coronado Press, 1980), p. 40.

31. The Human Condition (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 38.

32. History. II.40.2. Cf. Plato, Republic, 550 A and 620 C.

33. See Pl ato, Republic, 550 C, 551 A-B, 533 A etc., where it becomes apparent that in an oligarchical regime the essential criterion for active citizenship was a property qualification.

34. See Th ucydides, History. II. 37.1: "It is true that our government has been called democracy, because its administration is not in the hands of the few, but of the many."

35. See Pl ato, Republic. 557 A.

36. N.D. Fustel de Coulanges , op. cit., pp. 334-336, presents in a descriptive and colourful way the politically active life of a citizen.

37. See J.L. St okes, "Schole," The Classical Quarterly 30 (1936), 177-187 and particularly pp. 181-182. For an interesting interpretation of how the Greeks, as well as the Medieval Europeans, understood and valued leisure, see T. Pi eper, Leisure. The Basis of Culture, trans. by A. Dru (New York and Scarborough, Ontario: New American Library, `A Mentor Book', 1963), especially pp. 19-68. Pieper's specific message for the bourgeois Western societies is plain: Unless we rediscover true leisure and cease idolizing "work," we are in danger of destroying our culture and ourselves.

38. According to E. Bar ker, op. cit., pp. 32-34, the ideal of leisure was nourished mainly in the oligarchical poleis. In contrast, actual life in Athens, which represents for him the normal Greek community, shows that the assembly included a large number of craftsmen and workmen, who, as Pericles could boast in his Funeral Oration of 431 B.C., were "not prevented by attention to their own business from knowing adequately the political matters" (Thucydides, History, II. 40.2). Barker associates leisure with aristocracy and cites certain Aristotelian passages to support his view. However, it is worth remembering that in the aristocratic society of Homer no work was depreciatory and that kings and heroes did not hesitate to perform manual labour. For more details, see G. Gl otz, Le travail dans la Grèce ancienne. Histoire économioue de la Grèce depuis la période homérique jusqu'à la conquête romaine (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1920), pp. 19-21.

What caused the demand for leisure and consequently the contempt of productive work was the institution of the polis itself, which consumed most of the citizen's time, regardless of whether the regime was democratic or oligarchic. Despite the fact that the citizens of the Greek city-states did not really constitute a purely leisure class, the idea of the polis was never reconciled with the idea of work for the necessities of life. Cf. W. Donl an, op. cit., pp. 172-173.

39. Although the philosophers tried to give a new meaning to the concept of leisure, by associating it with the vita contemplativa (see, for instance, Plato, Theaetetus, 172D-176A, and Phaedo, 66B-D) they never ceased to treat leisure in its widely accepted sense of time assigned to political activities. The above thought is strongly supported by the well known Aristotelian passage "leisure is necessary both for the development of virtue and the performance of political duties" (Politics, 1329 a 1-2).

40. See, among others, T.B. Er iksen, Bios Theoretikos. Notes on Aristotle's Ethica Nicomachea X, 6-8 (Oslo, Bergen, Troms: Universitetsforlaget, 1976), p. 110. But see F. So lmsen, "Leisure and Play in Aristotle's Ideal State," in Kleine Schriften, Bd. II (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1968), 1-28, particularly p. 9, who maintains that because of the "exhausting worries and tensions of the Peloponnesian war" and the restlessness and anxiety of civic life at that time, schole was also thought of as leisure from the polypragmosyne of political life.

41. See W. Ja eger, Paideia, vol. I, p. 7.

42. C.M. Bowra, op. cit.. p. 37. Cf. M. I. Finley, The World of Odysseus, p. 116, who states explicitly that the "notion of social obligation is fundamentally non-heroic." Finley uses as an example of the heroic mentality Hect or's prayer to Ze us and other gods (Iliad, VI 476-81) and comments as follows: "There is no social conscience in these words, no trace of the Decalogue, no responsibility other than familial, no obligation to anyone or anything but one's own prowess and one's own drive to victory and power" (p. 28).

43. A man's influence and status in the polis depended upon what contribution he made to its maintenance, welfare, amusement and protection. This can be attested by the institution of the "liturgies," a wide range of public offices undertaken by the well-to-do citizens. For more details, see M.I. Fin ley, Politics in the Ancient World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 36-39.

44. The Greek View of Life (1896; 4th ed., London: Methuen and Co., 1905), p. 122.

45. C.J. de Vogel , "The Concept of Personality in Greek and Christian Thought," in Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, ed. J.K. R yan (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1963), vol. II, 20-60, particularly p. 23. In this essay, the author ascribes the creation of the concept of the "person" to the ancient Greeks, but she does not attempt to see this development as the result of specific socio-political conditions. On the contrary, B. Snell considers the rise of the personal attitude and the communal establishment of the polis as being contemporary events. See The Discovery of the Mind. The Greek Origins of European Thought, trans. by T.G. Rosenmeyer (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 69.

46. Thrasym achus, (DK 85 B 1). Cf. So lon, Poem 8 (Diehl), Democritus, (DK 68 B 119): "Men have fashioned an image of Chance as an excuse for their own stupidity. For Chance rarely conflicts with Intelligence, and most things in life can be set in order by an intelligent sharp-sightedness" (trans. by K. Freeman) and Pl ato, Republic, 617 E: "The responsibility is his who chooses; God is not responsible." The above passages express ideas which are typical of the classical period of Greek thought, i.e., of the culture of the polis, where a strong faith in man's power and reason, as well as in his freedom of the will and moral responsibility, was prevalent. However, see A.W.H Adk ins' well-known book Merit and Responsibility. A Study in Greek Va1ues (1960; rpt., Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1975), the central theme of which maintains that the concept of moral responsibility was unimportant to the ancient Greek.

47. Truth and Method, translation from the second (1965) German edition, edited by G. Bar den and J. Cum ming (1975; New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1982), p. 245.

48. The Origins of Greek Thought, p. 51.

49. The Human Condition, p. 41. For an interpretation of Ar endt's conception of the public realm see M. Canovan, "Politics as Culture: Hannah Arendt and the Public Realm," History of Political Thought 6 (1985), 617-42.

50. The Human Condition, p. 50.

51. See The Human Condition, p. 52. On Arendt's conception of "the world," see L.A. Cooper, "Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy: An Interpretation," The Review of Politics, 38 (1976), 145-76.

52. For more details on this subject see R. Sennet t's stimulating work, The Fall of Public Man (New York: Random House Inc., Vintage Books, 1978), particularly pages 3-32, 259-68, 337-40.

53. This dating is accepted by many scholars. See, for example, L.H. Jeff ery, The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece. A Study of the Origin of the Greek Alphabet and its Development from the Eighth to the Fifth Centuries B.C. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 21ff. and J.N. Col dstream, Geometric Greece (London: E. Benn, 1977), pp. 295ff. On the contrary, E.A. Hav elock supports the view that the alphabet first came into use in 700 B.C., The Literate Revolution in Greece and its Cultural Consequences (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 82, 102.

54. This invention is owed to merchants from Ionia who borrowed from the Phoenicians a number of letter-shapes ("phoinikeia grammata," Herod otus, History, V. 58) and adapted them to the needs and sounds of the Greek language.

55. See A. Bu rns' recent survey of the evidence for Greek literacy "Athenian Literacy in the Fifth Century B.C.," Journal of the History of Ideas, 42 (1981), 37l-87. Burns concludes that "from the end of the sixth century B.C. the vast majority of Athenian citizens were literate" (p. 371). For the effects of the expansion of literacy see E.A. Havelock, op. cit., pp. 82ff.; J.-P. Vernant, op. cit., pp. 52-3; S.D. Kyri sopoulos, To gegonos tes philosophias (Athens, 1969), pp. 46-71.

56. For the relationship among the written word, the ear and the eye, see E.A. Havel ock, op. cit., pp. 181-2, and of the same author, The Greek Concept of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 224-5.

57. This attitude is expressed by Heracleitus in his characteristic fragment "The eyes are more exact witnesses than the ears" (DK 22 B 101 a); cf. Herodotus, History I.8.

58. The view that, due to the written word, the sense of sight was awakened and activated could be supported by B. Snell's challenging position that the Homeric man--who lived under preliterate conditions--did not have the ability to see, op. cit.. p. 4-5.

59. Paideia, vol. I, p. 9.

60. The term `logos' was one of many senses. For a detailed survey of what this word meant in the fifth century B.C. or earlier, see W.K.C. Guth rie, A History of Greek Philosophy (1962; rpt., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), vol. I, pp. 420-4. For a schematized classification of the significations of the term `logos', see D. Guerrière, "Physis, Sophia, Psyche," in Heraclitean Fragments. A Companion Volume to the Heidegger/Fink Seminar on Heraclitus, ed. by T. Sa llis and K. M aly (Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1980), 86-134, particularly pp. 99-100. Here it is used in the sense of `speech', as a coherent and rational arrangement of words.

61. For the meaning and significance of the agora in the life of the polis, see J.-P. Vern ant, Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs. Etudes de psychologie historique (Paris: F. Maspero, 1971), Vo1. 1, pp. 179-181 and G. Gl otz, La cité grecque, pp. 30-31.

62. The fact that `rhetoric', the art of speaking, flourished in the Greek poleis and was considered to be the art of success in public life, as well as the prerequisite for access to power shows what `speech' meant to the ordinary citizen.

63. Le chasseur noir. Formes de pensée et formes de société dans le monde grec (Paris: F. Maspero, 1981), p. 22.

64. Ibid., p. 33.

65. For a profound interpretation of the meaning of action in ancient Greece, see H. Arendt's book, The Human Condition, especially chapter V.

66. For the relevance of the political experience to science and philosophy in the ancient Greek world, see G.E.R. Ll oyd, Magic, Reason and Experience. Studies in the Origin and Development of Greek Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 246-67.

67. Cf. J.-P. Ver nant, Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs, vol. II, p. 28, n. 59, who considers friendship to be an essentially `political' sentiment. For interesting discussions of the Greek view of friendship see L. Pea rson, Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece (1962; rpt., Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 1966), pp. 86-9 and 136-60 and J. Fe rguson, Moral Values in the Ancient World (1958; rpt., New York: Arno Press Inc., 1979), pp. 53ff. and 102ff.

68. Cf. Pla to, Laws 697 C-D, who is conscious of the fact that when the demos is deprived of its freedom and despotism instead of equality prevails, "the friendly feelings" (to philon) and "the common" (to koinon), within the polis, are destroyed. See also Laws 757 A, where the old saying that "equality begets friendship" is quoted, which shows how the Greeks were convinced that civic friendship was the result of equality.

69. "To philon kai to koinon en te polei," in the honorary work Charisterion eis Anastasion K. Orlandon (Athens, 1965), vol. I, pp. 153-165, particularly p. 158.

70. Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece, p. 86. Cf. W.R.Conn or, The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 105-6, where it appears that the politician of that era should present himself as `philopolis', `eunous toi demoi', `philodemos', or the like, if he wanted to make the "demos his loyal friend" (Hero dotus, V. 66) and thus gain political advancement and power. See also the chapter "Political Friendship and Civic Loyalty" (pp. 35-84) of the same book, where the author examines and analyses the political function and relevance of friendship within the framework of the democratic polis.

71. See L. Pe arson, op. cit., p. 87.

72. It is not coincidental that in Emp edocles' natural philosophy `philotes' (Love or Friendship) is regarded as a cosmic principle of great significance. It is in this idea of his that the vital functioning of friendship in the polis is reflected.

73. Where there is no partnership and communion, there is no friendship. Cf. Pla to, Gorgias, 507 E and Aris totle, Politics, 1295 b 24.

74. See E.M. W ood's and N. Wood's work, Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in Social Context, in which is pointed out that altruism was one of the aspects of Greek popular morality. Concretely the authors maintain that "kindliness (philanthropia)" was not an insignificant virtue in the Greek moral code and that it was expressed "as good will toward others, gratitude, affection, and a spirit of conciliation," (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), p. 262. Cf. J. Ferg uson, op. cit., pp. 102-17.

75. The references to civil wars in ancient sources are innumerable. See, for instance, Thuc ydides, History, III. 82-84; Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae, XII. 523 F-524 A; Diodorus, XV.57ff; Is okrates, To Philip 52; Aeneas Tacticus, XI, 13ff. For modern discussions on the cruel struggles between the rich and the poor in most of the poleis during the fourth century B.C., see C. Mossé, La fin de la démocratie athénienne. Aspects sociaux et politiques du déclin de la cité grecque au IV^e siècle avant J.C. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962) pp. 30-31, 224-27 and G. Glo tz, La cité grecque, pp. 326-34.

76. I am aware that the term `class' is not the suitable term for describing the social categories of population, when referring to pre-capitalist societies, like the ancient Greek ones. I utilize the term `class' the way M.I. Finley uses it, that is, "in the sense intended in ordinary discourse, not in a technical sense, Marxist or other" (Politics in the Ancient World, p. 10, n. 29).

77. It should be noted that this economic development was undoubtedly stimulated by the early movement of colonization in eighth and seventh centuries B.C.

78. Among the contemporary scholars there exists no agreement that there was a middle class in the Greek poleis. M.I. Fi nley, Politics in the Ancient World, p. 11, for instance, is not willing to accept that such a class existed and restricts himself to the distinction between the rich and the poor, while F.J. Fr ost, Greek Society (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1971), pp. 87-93 and G. Glotz, La cité grecque, p. 324, consider that the middle class was a reality in several poleis and especially in Athens, which represents the most perfect form of the ancient polis.

79. From the class of the merchants and craftsmen there came into being a number of people who surpassed the economic status of a middle class man and acquired even greater wealth than that of the aristocrats. They were the first of the commoners who demanded equality of political privileges with the nobility and soon separated their interests from those of the middle class. Probably these were the parvenus against whom the poet Theognis of Megara addressed his complaints (See Theognis, 39-58).

80. This age is the period from about 650 to 510 B.C. See A. Andr ewes, The Greek Tyrants (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1958), p. 8.

81. The tyrants' policy was anti-aristocratic in character. One of the most significant reforms they brought about for the benefit of the peasants was the redistribution of land, which contributed decisively to the betterment of their economic situation.

82. See, for example, Xen ophon, Memorabilia, IV.4.16 and Lysias, XVIII.17.

83. For more details on the concept and meaning of hybris see, for instance, C.M. Bo wra, The Greek Experience, pp. 106-107; L. Pear son, op. cit., pp. 71ff, 104-107, 137-44; H.D. Oakeley, Greek Ethical Thought. From Homer to the Stoics (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), pp. xv-xvi.

84. This characterization was given to Apollo by S.D. Kyriasopoulos in a well-documented essay that bears the same title, published initially in Epeterida Stereoelladikon Meleton, 5 (1974-75), 11-32 and later in a collection of essays of the same author entitled Logos kai ethos. Philosophia tou archaiou Ellenikou pneumatos (Ioannina: University of Ioannina, Dodone, Suppl. 6, 1976), 26-47. An English translation of this essay has been published in Mosaic, Journal of the Comparative Study of International Literature, Act and Ideas (New Delhi, 1976), 23-44.

85. Cleobulus, Stabaeus III.1.172 a 1 (DK 10 A3). Cf. Phocylides, fr. 12 (Diehl). For a thorough inquiry concerning the concepts of the mean (mesotes) and measure (metron) in Greek thought, with the exception of Aristotle's doctrine on the mean, see G.P. Cousoulakos "Mesotes kai metron en te ellenike dianoesei," in Xenion," Festschrift für Pan. T. Zepos, Herausgegeben von E. Von Caemmerer, T.H. Kaiser, G. Kegel, W. Müller-Freienfels, H.T. Wolff. Unter Mitarbeit von Th. T. Panagopoulos (Athen-Freibourg/BR.-Köln: Ch. Katsikalis Verlag, 1973), Bd. I, 203-264.

86. The most exhaustive enquiry into the concepts of sophrosyne, from its earliest appearance in the Homeric poems to its transformation into a Christian virtue during the first centuries A.D., is offered by H. No rth in his splendid work Sophrosyne. Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Litera- ture (op. cit.). For the meaning of sophrosyne in the classical Greece, see A. Kol lmann, "Sophrosyne," Weiner Studien, 59 (1941), 12-34 and G.J. de Vries, "Sophrosyne en Grec classique," Mnemosyne, 11 (1943), 81-101.

87. On sophrosyne as a political virtue, see especially H. North, From Myth to Icon. Reflections of Greek Ethical Doctrine in Literature and Art (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), Chapter 2, 87-134. It is worthwhile mentioning that sophrosyne did not have any political significance in the heroic age. Furthermore, the Homeric society did not attach high value to it. As A.W.H. Adki ns has pointed out, it was unnecessary for the Homeric hero to possess this excellence, Merit and Responsibility. A Study in Greek Values, pp. 37, 61.

88. See Aesch ylus, Eumenides, 516-34. Cf. Sophocles, fr. 622 (Nauck), where one could clearly see that sophrosyne and justice were regarded as salutary for the polis.

89. The opposite view, which does not ascribe a positive value to the Greek concept of sophrosyne, has been maintained also. See, for instance, C. Kluckh ohn, Anthropolocy and the Classics (Providence, Rhode Island: Brown University Press, 1961), pp. 64-7 and J. Fergu son, op. cit., pp. 32-42. However, the majority of the modern scholars emphasize the dynamic and positive nature of sophrosyne and see its characteristic imprint in every achievement of the classical civilization.

90. What mainly supported the political status of sophrosyne was its connection with justice which was considered the supreme socio-political virtue. The belief that justice presupposes sophrosyne finds in Plato its climax. See, for example, Gorgias 507 A-C; Laws 691 C.

91. See Arist otle, Politics, 1296 a 23-4, who notices that "in most poleis the middle stratum is small" in his days.

92. See H.F. N orth, From Myth to Icon, p. 124.

93. For recent evaluations of this period, see A. Sno dgrass, Archaic Greece: The Age of Experiment (London: Dent, 1980) and C. Mo ssé, La Grèce archaïque d'Homère à Eschyle. VIII^e-VI^e siècles av. J.C. (Paris: Editions du Seul, 1984).

94. See M. Gag arin, Early Greek Law (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1986), who points out that the early Greek inscribed laws referred greatly to procedural matters concerning the judicial process (pp. 81, 86, 123, 128), in order to prevent it "from being corrupted or otherwise abused for political or financial gain" p. 86. Contrary to the published law, the unwritten customary law of the pre-political stage of Greece usually functioned at the expense of the common man, inasmuch as it could be modified and interpreted to suit the interests of the nobles who had the privilege of administering justice. See Hesiod, Works and Days, 38-9 and 220-24, who is full of complaints about the `bribe-devouring' kings (aristocrats), who violate justice through the lure of gain.

95. Cf. R.J. B onner and G. Sm ith, The Administration of Justice From Homer to Aristotle (1938; rpt., New York: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1968), vol. I, p. 82, H.F. North, From Myth to Icon, pp. 122-3 and G.C. F ield, Plato and His Contemporaries. A Study in Fourth-Century Life and Thought (1930; 3rd ed. London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1967), p. 82.

96. For the educative function of the law see J. de Romily La loi dans la pensée grecque. Des origines à Aristote (Paris: Société d'édition. "Les Belles Lettres," 1971) and especially the chapter "L'éducation par le lois," pp. 227-50.

97. See [Dem osthenes], XXV.16. Cf.Xenophon, Memorabilia, I.2.42.

98. [Demosthenes], Ibid.

99. See Her odotus, History VII. 104.

100. It was also held that the laws had a divine origin. See, for instance, Hera cleitus (DK 22 B 114) and Soph ocles, Oedipus Tyrannus, 865-72. However, this conception did not characterize the spirit of the classical polis, but is was associated with the period of the first lawgivers, when the civic consciousness was not fully developed and the story of the extra-human status of law was necessary for the effectiveness, validity and inviolability of the laws.

101. For more details on this subject see M.M. Austin and P. Vidal-Naq uet, op. cit., especially the chapters 7 of the first and second part of the book, pp. 131-55 and 334-83 respectively; C. Mo ssè, La fin de la démocratie athénienne; G.R. Morrow, Plato's Epistles. A Translation with Critical Essays and Notes (Indianapolis, New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), mainly the chapter "Faction and Disorder in Fourth-century Greece," pp. 123-30.

102. Besides certain Platonic dialogues, such as the Protagoras, Gorgias, Republic, Philebus, etc., many of the extant speeches by the Athenian orators are an important source of information about the tendency of the fourth-century man towards hedonism.

103. For the growing spirit of individualism from the fourth century onwards, see G. Gl otz, La cité grecque, pp. 303-16 and F.J. Frost, Greek Society, pp. 99, 102.

104. See his work, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, trans. by O. Reichel (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1870), p. 18.

105. See, for instance, V.L. Ehr enberg, "Some aspects of the transition from the Classical to the Hellenistic Age" in Man, State and Deity. Essays in Ancient History (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1974), p. 55.