URBANIZATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA

"Cities, like all social reality, are historical products, not only in their physical materiality, but in their cultural meaning, in the role they play in the social organization, and in people's lives."

Manuel Castells

The first problem which arises when we take up this issue is that `urban' does not have a precisely defined meaning and all do not agree on what we have to reckon with, either as social or as social change. In the field of the social sciences, and of sociology in particular, there is a dispute regarding: (a) what is to be considered as the basic social object, (b) the definition of social change, and (c) the means to accomplish this change.¹ Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to enter into a detailed discussion of these epistemological and methodological subjects, nevertheless, some of these questions must be taken up in treating urban change.

Frequently, studies treat urbanization as an autonomous and self-contained process, or take into account just one of its aspects, namely, the eco-demographic, the economic, the social, the political or the cultural, without trying to relate them and to understand how they are all intertwined. This approach can be very useful as a methodological technique, but it is very misleading when it becomes forgotten that it is only a methodological device to explain an extremely complex and many-sided phenomenon.

The city and urban space are not a priori or fixed categories, but are "the social meaning assigned to a particular spatial form by an historically defined society."² Urban space cannot be reduced to an abstract or geometrical form devoid of social and human content, nor can it be reduced to a reflection of this social interaction.³ Nor are social processes spaceless and timeless, for they take place in a concrete spatio-temporal form. It is just this Kan tian dualism between the spatial or physical order and the social or human order which must be overcome.⁴ There is a common ground between the physical and social reality in which "spatial structure is now seen not merely as an arena in which social life unfolds, but rather as a medium through which social relations are produced and reproduced."⁵

Nevertheless, though space makes a difference, as Andrew Sa yer puts it,⁶ this does not mean that space has of its own the casual power usually attributed to it in physical determinism and other theories.

Just as it is important not to make a fetish of spatial relations, it is important also, as we shall see, not to overstress economic, social, political, etc., relations which takes place in urban space. This has been the main limitation of the theoretical attempts to define the city.⁷ Because of this the four attempts at defining the city as an object of sociological study, namely, as an ecological community, a cultural form, a system of resource allocation, and a unit of collective consumption--all have had a too limited theoretical framework.⁸

According to P. Saun ders all these attempts to define the city are doomed to failure because the modern city is no longer the basic economic, political and cultural unity it was in the Middle Ages. With the emergence of the nation-state the city can no longer be the basic unit of social study.⁹ In other words, to explain the city we must go beyond the city itself.

Keeping in mind the intricacy of urbanization as a dimension of social and historical change, our aim is to outline the basic features of urbanization in Latin America and to identify the main social agents which lead to this process of change. In so doing, we must review some of the basic concepts which have been used to explain this process: in particular the concept of dependency. We do not pretend to give a full account of this historical process of urbanization or of the many theories which have been used to explain it, nor to build up a new general theoretical framework, but rather to open a discussion concerning the complex causality involved in this phenomenon.

Urbanization and Social Change in Latin America:

An Historical Perspective

It can be useful to begin by recalling some of the demographic aspects of the process at hand. In Third World or developing countries there is an undeniable trend toward urbanization. This trend can be illustrated by some overwhelming statistics. At the present growth rate of 3.8%, by the year 2,000 (see table I) the urban population of the Third World is expected to be over 2 billion people; this is three times greater than in 1970.¹⁰ Latin America is the most urbanized area in the Third World (see table II). Compared with Asia which has 27% of its population in cities of over 20,000 inhabitants, and Africa which has 25% (and the USA's 74%), Latin America has over 80%¹¹ (see table III). In 1985 Asia had 9 cities of over 5 million, whereas Africa, which is the least urbanized region, had Cairo with over 10 million and Lagos with about 5 million.¹² In the same year Latin America had four of the fifteenth largest cities in the world (Mexico City, Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires), each with a population of over 10 million inhabitants.¹³ Argentina, Chile and Uruguay are ranked among the most urbanized countries in the world, with 36% of their population concentrated in cities of over one million inhabitants.¹⁴ The only Latin American country with a more balanced distribution is Colombia¹⁵ (see table IV). Commonly, these numbers are used to make gloomy predictions about Latin America's future and to reveal a fear of "urban explosion,"¹⁶ but this is only a quantitative feature of a process which needs to be understood qualitatively.

A current theory to explain the process of urbanization in Latin America was launched in the late '60s and the early '70s by Castells¹⁷ and Quijano¹⁸ among others. The cornerstone of this theory may be stated in the following argument: if every process of urbanization is rooted historically and if Latin American history cannot be divorced from its different modes of dependency, then neither can we divorce the process of urbanization in Latin American countries from the different modes of dependency.¹⁹ This cannot be seen as an "external hindrance" or as "a simple state of `submission'"; it is an internal and structural factor which shapes the process of Latin America urbanization.²⁰ Its history has the following steps: colonial domination, commercial capitalist domination, and imperialist (industrial and financial) domination.²¹

Period of Colonial Domination

The colonial cities in Latin America were shaped by the concrete interests of the Spanish and the Portuguese (in the case of Brazil) Crowns. These settlements did not respond to the internal needs of the regions, but were centers mostly of administrative (also religious and military) power, whereby the Crown controlled the surrounding rural areas²² and the strategic suppliers of raw materials.²³

The colonial settlement pattern was decidedly monocentric oriented toward a single large city in which the majority of the economic, political, and cultural resources were concentrated. Internally, the city reflected the European city, with its central plaza surrounded by the main symbols of political power: the church, the prefecture, and the wealthiest merchants.²⁴

Not only was the internal pattern of the Spanish American cities very similar to their Spanish counterparts, but the hierarchical structure was also very similar to the urban networks of Castille: ciudad, villa, pueblo and so forth.²⁵ In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this urban system remained virtually stagnant both because of the dispersal of population and the lack of communication and because the power of Spain was gradually substituted by other European powers.²⁶

In a sense, Hispanic America's war of independence can be viewed as a consequence of the fragmentation or "balkanization" of the urban areas. The economic restrictions imposed by the Spanish Crown contrasted with the more flexible and integrative system established in Brazil.²⁷

After the war of independence the four Vice-Royalties gave birth to the present national configurations with their respective capitals.²⁸ Until the 20th century this urban pattern remained fundamentally the same because the interests of the new criollo oligarchy, "were not substantially different from those of the Crown."²⁹

Period of Capitalist Commercial Domination

This second period is related by Castells to the emergence of the USA as the dominant nation of the international capitalist system and the insertion of the Latin American economies into that system.³⁰ This insertion gave rise to different types of economic structures according to the natural resources available and the maturity of the internal organization of each society.³¹ These types were: the enclave economy (e.g., Venezuela, Chile, Bolivia), the agricultural and cattle raising export economy (e.g., Argentina and Uruguay), and the plantation economy (e.g., Central America and Brazil before 1920).³² Castells finds in the first two a strong trend toward urbanization, whereas in the last the level of urbanization was very weak.³³

We can only add that the pattern has not differed greatly since the colonial period. Gw ynne notes:

Latin American countries did not generally follow the example of their northern neighbor. Indeed from their own independence until 1930, they were a set of free-trading countries, supplying a wide variety of agricultural and mineral raw materials to Europe in return for a wide variety of manufactured goods.³⁴

As a consequence of the world depression in the early '30s Latin American exports dropped abruptly "from an average of about $5,000 million in 1928-29 to $1,500 in 1933."³⁵ The national governments encouraged more autonomous industrialization and shifted "from a set of free-trade economies to one of highly protected economy."³⁶ Castells sees the decline of rural migration and, hence, of urban growth as a consequence of this more autonomous and national orientation of the economy.³⁸ The process of industrialization in this period was more equilibrated because it was oriented to the internal needs of each country, rather than to the external interests of the industrialized centers. Accordingly, the pattern of urbanization too was more balanced.³⁹

A striking factor about this position was its attack upon international capitalism while at the same time it longed for a national capitalism, as if the rules and the contradictions were not the same--outside as inside. This period is viewed as an idyllic interlude in the whole history of capitalist domination; as a utopian regression it permeates the whole analysis.

Period of Imperialist Domination

After World War II the remaining Latin American countries engaged progressively in a process of "import substitution industrialization." In this the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and its former director, Raul Pre bish, played an important role. This process, according to Quijano and Castells, was no longer led by national entrepreneurs, but was taken over by large multinational firms. Thus, the commercial domination, which had characterized the second stage of capitalism, changed into a more subtle form of domination or dependence, namely, one that was financial and technological in nature.⁴⁰ In this new international division of labor the process of decision-making was situated outside the boundaries of the Latin American countries and responded to an economic global strategy.⁴¹

In order to lower the cost of production it is characteristic of this third stage of capitalism to locate labor intensive industries in areas where the work-force is cheaper and to transfer the benefits to their holding companies or trusts.⁴² These industries settle in areas with the necessary agglomeration economies (i.e., the support structures required for their development). This generates a mutual reinforcing relation between urbanization (particularly of the capital city) and industrialization.⁴³

In this the urban pull is always weaker than the rural push: the speed of urban growth is faster than the speed of industrialization.⁴⁴ This asymmetrical relationship between urbanization and industrialization is from the beginning a dominant feature of Latin America. This contrasts with the experience of Europe and the U.S.A., where this relation has been more symmetrical and balanced. The construction industry absorbs non-skilled hand laborers, but it is the tertiary sector, mainly the service sector, which absorbs a large part of migration.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, the vast majority of the urban population cannot be absorbed by the formal economy (see tables 5 and 6). If we add to this panorama the ever-changing mode of industrial production, in which the technological innovations tend to a more capital-intensive mode of (industrial) production, the obvious result is an increase in unemployment and underemployment. As a consequence of all this there develops a process of segregation in illegal urban settlements.⁴⁶

This marginal pole is no longer a "reserve industrial army" a concept borrowed from Marxian theory--but plainly a "surplus."⁴⁷ Such urban marginality

can be defined as the inability of the market economy, or state policies, to provide adequate shelter and urban services to an increasing proportion of urban dwellers, including the regularly employed salaried workers, as well as practically all people making their earnings in the so-called informal sector of the economy.⁴⁸

This more accurate definition of urban marginality allows us to grasp its nature. As is illustrated by the case of Caracas, urban marginality cannot be understood merely in terms of low income or unemployment, but by dependence upon public programs and the permission of the state (see table 7).⁴⁹ Such urban marginality is, according to Castells, "the most surprising aspect of dependent urbanization." ⁵⁰ "Ranchos" in Venezuela, "Villas miseria" in Argentina, "favelas" in Brazil or "tugurios" in Colombia are different names, but point to the same reality.

This is repeated in many developing countries (see table 8), but it would be a mistake to think that these are homogenous (see tables 9).⁵¹ As was noted, the key factor to be understood regarding the squatters is their dependence upon the state. The attitudes among the different governments "range from benign neglect, to active opposition, to acceptance and gradually to the provision of some services."⁵² This policy of assistance is very common among Latin American countries.

The existence of urban marginality is now the most notorious feature of urbanization. It is, as it were, a "hard fact" that cannot be denied or hidden. The merit of the theory of Qui jano and Cas tells is that it sensitizes one to these "recalcitrant" or "stubborn facts" and casts light upon important factors which had remained in the shadow. However, as do all theories, this has raised some criticism.

DEPENDENCY, URBAN MARGINALITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE: CRITIQUE AND CONCLUSIONS

The first point of critique is the generality of the concept of dependency, which attempts to explain all the different experiences of Latin American countries and their processes of urbanization. Does this concept of dependency fit well all Latin American countries? Can it account for the differences among them? Can we explain all the intricacy of the process of urbanization in Latin America relying solely on dependency?

We cannot deny that dependency has existed, and still exists to different degrees among Latin America countries, just as we cannot deny the existence of squatters, but can we consider dependency to be the only factor in shaping the process of urbanization past and present? What does dependency mean? Is it a working hypothesis, an all explaining theory or a blatant reality that pervades all the dimensions of Latin American countries? Or is it all of these at the same time? This is just the point. Dependency may play all these different functions; it can be used to explain all the historical process of Latin American countries. As Singer says "indeed it is always possible to find some relation between dependency and any historical event in a `dependent' country; we just need to work at a sufficiently high level of abstraction."⁵³ Once again it is not the case of denying its existence, but rather of casting some doubt about its unlimited power of explanation.

For instance, according to Gwynne, Quijano's standpoint of urban marginality is influenced by his Peruvian background or experience, but cannot be generalized to such Latin American countries as Mexico, Brazil or Venezuela.⁵⁴ To him, Quijano underestimates the growth potential of some Latin American Countries, as he illustrates in the case of Brazil. In this country, between 1950 and 1960, the manufacture and service sectors grew at a rate of 4 and 4.8 respectively, adding 8.41 million new jobs to the work market.⁵⁵ In the next decade, "the secondary sector grew at a faster rate than the tertiary sector".⁵⁶ As may be evident, comparing the different performance of Latin American countries, the industrial growth is closely link with the size of their internal market (See table X). This is so because only in a large market the unit cost of each manufactured product (scale economies) can be reduced in order to accomplish the four stages of import substitution industrialization (ISI).⁵⁷ Owing to the limitations of this process some Latin American countries are engaged in an open process of export promotion and the exploitation of comparative advantages. Indeed, these economic indicators sometimes hide the real social structure. As Fr iedmann comments in a similar context:

One might be tempted to conclude from this quotation that economist don't like to talk about the cities at all. As by magic, they have made the city disappear into the air.⁵⁸

And he adds:

In the economist's language, particular cities are dissolved into market configurations, their history is replaced by something called the urban dynamic, people disappear as citizens of the polis and are subsumed under the categories of abstract urbanization processes, while human concerns are reduced to property, profits and competitive advantages.⁵⁹

Exactly; and this is why we must look very carefully at these economic factors.

Another fact is that Latin American companies are more and more organized in a monopolist manner and become international corporation themselves (see table XI). In part, this is due to the nationalist policies of these countries and the international scale of the capitalist system. An important consequence is the bargaining power this gives some of these countries vis à vis multinational corporations.

A more useful framework within which to analyze transnational power in Latin American countries is that of bargaining--bargaining between multinational enterprises, on the one hand, and the territorial organization (national or regional governments), on the other. Some studies have shown how the host government can often hold the strongest bargaining position as with the nationalization of the foreign oil interest in Venezuela.⁶⁰

Another question is whether this bargaining power has been translated into more social welfare and a better quality of life for the overall population. Friedmann notes that "Latin American cities, located as they are on the periphery of the global economy, are more accurately regarded as 'parasitical' than as `generative'. Expressed in human and social terms their growth is an illusion."⁶¹

But the question is whether we can blame foreign capital or multinational corporations as the main source of social disparities (a similar questioning of "foreign" investment and its "evil" consequences is noticeable now in USA, as if the same capitalistic rules were not working in this process). The idea that one need only break this link of dependency in order to solve inter-urban and intra-urban disequilibria seems, to say the least, dubious. More likely, as we have seen, "the monopolistic sector of Latin American economies would display the same features as at the present even though it was not dominated by foreign capital."⁶²

To Singer, this view of urban marginality and urban growth has the flavour of `reactionary utopia' and reveals a set of dominant anti-urban ideas.<sup>63</sup> Cast ells' and Qui jano's urban ideas entail that a more autonomous and `national' capitalist development would diminish the urban unbalances and would be more harmonic and equilibrated.⁶⁴ But this does not stand scrutiny, according to Singer, because these unbalances are at the very core of industrialization and of the capitalist structure (whether autonomous or dependent); they are unavoidable consequences of this mode of production.⁶⁵

Up to this point the crucial question is: can the necessary changes be made within the capitalist system in order to overcome these disparities (e.g., by a more rational urban and regional planing) or must we change the system radically to solve these problems? To put this in other words, how can the economic rationale and the social and human rationale be wed?

Current policies carried out by most Latin American countries to abridge these inequalities (e.g. industrial decentralization and the creation of new growth poles) have been unable to alleviate these contrasting urban inequalities.⁶⁶ But if neither capital nor state alone are able to change this situation, where can we look for these changes? In Friedmann's words,

if there is to be another development, it will come neither for the state nor from the powerful international organizations that represent the old order of things, but from among the people themselves, as they perceive new possibilities for action.⁶⁷

The importance of the community as a key agent of change in the city and in society is usually overlooked, as if people could not change the dominant social relations and were only the outcome of social forces beyond their control.⁶⁸ Obviously this is not new, "for in the beginning were the people."⁶⁹ Communities are challenging the current values of capitalist society and raising new values in their stead, as was pointed out by Castells in his later work (see table XII).⁷⁰ Where these new grassroots movements and their values will lead is difficult to foresee, but in the meantime the communities are changing "their" world.

When people find themselves unable to control the world, they simply shrink the world to the size of their community.⁷¹

This does not mean that a new development can be hinged upon these new social movements alone, but rather that we need new ways to engaged people, capital and state--ways in which people are not means to achieve a goal, but are the goal.⁷² Kant said that the human person is an end in itself. We must bear in mind this simple and fundamental idea in order to build a better society and a better city in which people matter.

Universidad Católica Andres Bello

Caracas, Venezuela

1. Theodor W. Ado rno et al., The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1976).

2. M. Caste lls, The city and the Grassroots (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p. 302.

3. Ibid., p. 311.

4. See Derek Gr egory and John U rry (eds.), Social relations and spatial structures (London: MacMillan, 1985), pp. 1-8 passim.

5. Ibid., p. 3.

6. See "The Difference the Space Makes" in Social Relations and Spatial Structures, pp. 49-66.

7. Peter Saunders: "Space, the city and urban sociology" in Social relations and spatial structures, pp. 67-89.

8. Ibid., pp. 70-76.

9. Idem.

10. Stephen M ayo et al., "Shelter Strategies for the Urban Poor in Developing Countries," in Research Observer (The world Bank), I (n. 2, 1986), p. 183.

11. "Human settlements" in World Resources, 1986 (New York: Basic Books, 1986), p. 31.

12. Idem.

13. Idem.

14. Idem.

15. Si nger has criticized this catastrophic view based upon demographic projections in Economía política de la Urbanización (Mexico: Siglo XXI Ed., 1986), pp. 81-84 passim. Also see World resources 1986, p. 32.

16. "La urbanización dependiente en América Latina" in M. Cast ells et al., Imperialismo y urbanización en América Latina (Barcelona: Ed. Gustavo Gili, 1973), pp. 7-26. See also La cuestión urbana (Mexico: Siglo XXI Ed., 1985). In this book Castells criticized the functionalist view of The Chicago School as well as the very idea of a urban sociology. He considered the idea of an "urban culture" to be a myth which assumes the characteristics of modern capitalism, specialization and heterogeneity along with modernization, urbanization and westernization which derive from the German sociology.

17. Anibal Quij ano, "Redefinición de la dependencia y marginalidad en America Latina," in Cuadernos de la Sociedad Venezolana de Planificación, N. 94-95, Caracas. See also "Dependencia, cambio social y urbanización en América Latina" in América Latina: Ensayos de interpretación sociológico-política (Santiago: Ed. Universitaria, 1970) and " La urbanización de la sociedad en América Latina," Revista Mexicana de Sociología, XXX, 1967.

18. Quijano, "La urbanización..", pp. 684f.

19. Quijano, op. cit., pp. 679-684 passim. See also Castells, "La urbanización dependiente," p. 16.

20. Cas tells, op. cit., pp. 16f.

21. R. Gw ynne: Industrialization and Urbanization in Latin America (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 137.

22. Castells, op. cit., pp. 17f.

23. Thomas Ang otti, "Urbanization in Latin America: Toward a theoretical synthesis," in Latin American perspectives, n. 53 (14-2-87), p. 139.

24. Gwynne, op. cit., p. 137.

25. Ibid., p. 138.

26. Idem.

27. Ibid., p. 139.

28. Angotti, op. cit., p. 139.

29. Castells, op. cit., p. 18.

30. Ibid., p. 19.

31. Idem.

32. As was pointed out by Singer this is a too simple typology to explain the urban forms that took place in Latin America. See op. cit., pp. 73ff.

33. Gwynne, op. cit., p. 22.

34. Ibid., p. 23.

35. Idem.

36. Idem; see also Quijano, op. cit., p. 686.

37. Castells, op. cit., p. 21.

38. Idem.

39. Singer, op. cit., p. 79.

40. Castells, op. cit., p. 22. Singer asks how can international entrepreneurs take over this process of "import substitution" if it is determined by the internal needs of each market. See op. cit., p. 78.

41. Idem.

42. Quijano: "Redefinición de la dependencia", p. 11.

43. Gwynne, op. cit., p. 149.

44. Castells, op. cit., p. 10. This fact can be explained as a classical process of capitalist penetration in an economy of subsistence. But the question is why this penetration has not brought about an authentic development of agriculture in most of these countries. See Singer, op. cit., pp. 91f.

45. Ibid., pp. 10-14.

46. Castells, op. cit., p. 14; see also Quijano, op. cit., pp. 5-19, 33f. This shift is also, to Quijano, the main cause of the growing poverty in industrialized countries. See p. 11.

47. Quijano, op. cit., p. 7-12 passim, 46.

48. Castells, The city and the Grassroots, p. 185.

49. Castells, op. cit., p. 211.

50. Castells, "La urbanizacion dependiente," p. 15.

51. Castells, The city and the grassroots, p. 187.

52. World resources 1986, p. 39.

53. Op. cit., p. 74; see also John Walton, "La economía internacional y la urbanización periférica" in Ciudades y sistemas urbanos (Claxo: Biblioteca de Ciencias Sociales), pp. 9-25.

54. Gwynne, op. cit., pp. 166f.

55. Ibid., p. 166.

56. Idem.

57. Ibid., pp. 35-42 passim.

58. "The right to the city" in Development dialogue (1987), p. 145.

59. Idem.

60. Gwynne, op. cit., p. 189.

61. Friedm ann, op. cit., p. 147.

62. Sin ger, op. cit., pp. 101f.

63. Ibid., p. 160 .

64. Ibid., p. 75.

65. Ibid., p. 151.

66. See Sonia Barrios et al., Urban Problem and Urban Policies in Oil Exporting Countries: The Case of Caracas Metropolitan area (Tokyo: Asian Economic Press LTD, 1985), p. 83.

67. "The right to the city", p. 148.

68. J. Wa lton, op. cit., p. 18.

69. Marc Ner ffin, "Neither Prince nor Merchant: Citizen. An Introduction to the Third System" in Development Dialogue (n. 1, 1987), p. 179.

70. E.g., The city and the Grassroots; see also Jorge Jatobá, "Alternative resources for Grassroots Developments. A View from Latin America" in Development dialogue (n. 1, 1987), pp. 114-134.

71. Castells, op. cit., p. 331.

72. For instance, in Mexico after the earthquake in 1985 new ways of coordination among capital, communities and state were very successful. See "Ciudad de México: una notable recuperación. La reconstrucción de vivienda económica después del desastre de 1985" in Horizontes urbanos. Ideas e innovaciones, II (n. 9, 1987). See also Aldo Pav iani: "La urbanización en América Latina: El proceso de constitución de periferias en las áreas metropolitanas" in Revista Interamericana de Planificación, ed. SIAP, XIX (n. 73, 1985), pp. 74-95; and Victor Fo ssi: "Desarrollo urbano y vivienda: la desordenada evolución hacia un país de metrópolis," in El caso Venezuela: Una ilusión de armonía? (Caracas: Ed. IESA, 1986), pp. 472-497.

tables:

a. 1-4, 6. 10. 11

b. 5, 8

c. 7,,9,12

R. Gwynne, Indudtrialization and Urbanization in Latin America (London: Croom Helm, l985).

Johannes F. Linn, Cities in the Developing World (Washington: World Bank and Oxford University Press, l985).

M. Castells, The City and the Grassroots (Berkeley: University of California Press, l983).