DEMOCRACY AND URBANIZATION IN AFRICA FROM TRADITION TO MODERNITY

ARMAND EPAS-NGAN ATOMATE

Introduction

The purpose of this account is fourfold: (a) to synthesize in what democracy consists and concerns. It will be argued that democracy is "good, fair and just government", corresponding closely to Abraham Lincoln's definition of democracy as "government of the people, by the people and for the people". (b) To evaluate democratic practices in the African traditional societies. It will be argued that the African traditional societies were, in the majority of cases, open and participatory. Decisions often were made on a consensual basis, the concern being always the welfare of the community. However, exceptions were to be found in those societies which had stratified socio-political systems and a rigid structure of authority. The bureaucratization of their socio-political life acted against democratic behavior. But the problem was confined to only a few areas. (c) To explore the relations between this phenomenon of culture and the phenomenon of urbanization taken at its point of furthest development, then moving on from tradition to modernity. As may be expected, this specific project involves directly two very important sociological factors, relating to different methods: on the one hand, the sociology of the less "advanced" African traditional societies and, on the other hand urban sociology which is itself part of the sociology of the more industrial states. (d) To identify the urban pathology and to propose a possible therapeutic. It shall be argued that although the city in Africa is an "exchange agent", transforming tradition into projections of the future, it also risks being the place where man in general and the African in particular perceives the absence of all collective and personal projects, the meshing of means in the absence of ends, and the loss of meaning.

Democracy can be said to have at least three moments or dimensions: in its abstract moment it exists in the imagination, in its practical moment it exists in ways and means, and in its concrete moment it exists as our experience.

This multifaceted mode of existence no doubt is one of the principal reasons why there is so much disagreement about what it really is. To the point, George Orwell writes: "in the case of a word like `democracy' not only is there no agreed definition but the attempt to make one is resisted from all sides."¹ Nevertheless, in the interests of clarity we must specify the facet of democracy to which we are referring.

It is not the purpose of this study to review of the myriad

and diverse theories and practices of democracy which have arisen through the ages. Rather, it is intended to use these as a broad point of departure and source of inspiration in an attempt to elaborate a synthetic definition which both reflects the substance of the diverse, contrasting and sometimes contradictory definitions and usages of the concept "democracy", and transcends or surpasses any one of its forms. In this sense, democracy means simply "good, fair and just government"; in Abraham Lincoln's words, it is "government (or rule) of the people, by the people and for the people."

Therefore, democracy has been described as an umbrella concept used to refer to, and to designate, a multitude of diverse and varied socio-political systems or realities. It has become so"universally sanctified"² that no one dares say he or she is anti-democratic.³ The general term "democracy" has come to have an unequivocally "laudatory meaning,"⁴ though "democracies" and "democrats" come in all colors, shapes and sizes: social democracy, christian, liberal, popular, national popular democracy, African, Arab, progressive democrats and just plain democrats.

One would imagine that democracy is the antithesis of dictatorship. But in Marxist parlance the "dictatorship of the proletariat" is simply another name for "popular democracy," which supposedly is a more substantive type of democracy, at least materially or economically than the purely "formal" liberal/bourgeois/capitalist variety. Indeed, General Pinochet of Chile speaks of "authoritarian democracy"!

What is meant by "government of the people, by the people and for the people"? Without belaboring the Greek origins or the linguistic subleties of the term, we should state that democracy in its etymological sense means simply "rule by the people". As to what is meant by either "the people" or "rule" there hardly exists a consensus. To some authors indeed "Kratia"(-cracy) refers not to "rule" but to "power"^5. This controversy is not of great consequence for present purposes, however, because it is possible to define "rule" to include power relations. To this end, we shall define "rule" as "the exercise of power, authority and influence in society".

As a result, the democratic ideal or model proposes that the people be the rulers--the rulers of "themselves". This implies that the people should have their destiny, and that of their society, in their own hands; they should order, organize and manage their own affairs. In a word, the people should be free.

But--and this is the other hitch--who exactly are "the people"? Various conceptualizations have been advanced as to who or what constitutes the people; Giovanni Sartori⁶ gives the following list:

- people meaning an approximate plurality, just "a great many";

- people meaning an integral plurality, "everybody";

- people as an entity, or as "an organic whole";

- people as a plurality expressed by an "absolute majority" principle;

- people as a plurality expressed by a "limited majority" principle.

The only realistic and tenable conceptualization of "the people" would appear to be one which is both practically operationalizable and empirically demonstrable or ascertainable, that is, the "people" as a plurality expressed by "the majority" principle. Here, "people" is merely the plural of "person". The people therefore refers to merely many individuals and not to a quasi-monolithic and transcendental being possessed of its own independent existence. Nor does it refer to some assemblage in which each and all count for the same. Rather, it refers to a relatively large number of people: to "many" at least in comparison to some other group or assemblage of people. This leads immediately to the idea of majority which can be defined as "the many" in contrast to a smaller number or "minority", meaning "the few".

Most definitions of democracy, therefore, stop with an etymological clarification of at "rule" and "people". It is our contention, however, that the conjunction concepts "by" and "of" are of much more than superficial significance. Many authors define democracy as "rule by the people" or "rule of the people", to which Abraham Lincoln in his celebrated definition has added the third: government (rule) "for" the people.

In very succinct terms we can say that the "of" raises the question of the "genealogy" of the rule; the "by" raises that of the "mode of existence" of that rule; and the "for" raises the question of the "purpose" of the rule.

In proposing that the rule should be "of the people, by the people and for the people", then the democratic ideal postulates that this is the only way to establish the ideal, the perfect or best government of men and women in society. But then, what concrete or substantive meaning can we attach to the concept of the ideal or perfect government or rule; In real, concrete terms what kind of government should be considered ideal or perfect, or as close to that as can be?

This paper suggests that such a government must be able to be described as good, fair and just and possesses or manifests the characteristics and attributes of each of these three concepts taken as absolute categories. To support the argument, we shall analyze these three concepts.

Good: First of all, "goodness" can be conceived as a "social category". In so far as it is a matter of form, structure and appearance. From this standpoint a government or social system stands all the more chance of being qualified as "good," and to that extent democratic, if it is the government "of" the people. By "of" is meant that the rule and the rulers are "born of," "issue of", or are "begotten of" the people. The rule and the rulers are a creature or creation of the people. This implies immediately that the government/system is socially legitimate, meaning recognized and accepted by the people who "fathered" or "begot" it.

It is in this the sense that we say that the "of" raises the question of the genealogy of the rule/system. A democratic system is one which has its roots in the people, and therefore is not alien, imposed or forced upon the people.

Apart from being a social category, the faculty of "goodness" is also a "functional attribute". In the case of a government, this means that the government functions according to or in conformity with written or unwritten, explicit or implicit rules, procedures and regulations established by the people. In a word, it means governing or ruling according to or in conformity with, the constitution. To the extent then that the rule of law is established by the people, it is the people who rule--it is rule "by" the people.

Finally, "goodness" can be taken in terms of "results". In relation to this criterion a system is good if it "delivers", that is, if it serves some useful or practical and concrete purpose. A democratic government in this perspective is capable of producing good results in terms of tangible or intangible benefits for the people. It lives up to "its purpose for existence" or justifies its existence on the strength of the good it does for the people, the goods and services it provides them. As a government "for" the people it is one which serves the material, social and other interests of the people.

Fair and Just: The analysis of the meanings of the concepts "fair" and "just" follows or parallel lines. As a "social category" a fair government is the one which is of the people concerned, "begot" by them: it resembles them or is "cut in their image"; a just system is truly "representative" of the people. Viewed from a "functional standpoint, a fair and just government is the one in which there is rule of law. This is the opposite of a bandit or rogue government which does not respect and enforce the law, plays foul, and is arbitrary and capricious. Finally, a government which fair and just conretely or in terms of its results must be a profitable or beneficial enterprise giving adequate returns in goods and services to the people as well as ensuring a fair and just distribution of the nations resources

This three-dimensional perspective on democracy immediately incorporates and transcends the various oppositions between "substantive" and "formal" democracy between "economic" and "legalistic" democracy between the "material" or "real" and the "mystificatory" or "unreal" . The "of" and the "by" of the people are important in that they bring out "l'art et la manière d'être" of democracy, that is, its "form" and "mode of existence"; the "for" of democracy is equally important because it brings out the "substance" of democracy.

If democracy means "good, fair and just government" of men and women in society according to the various connotations of the concepts outlined above, it follows that it can be established, it can live, survive and thrive only in a country of good, fair and just people. The question is: where is such a land to be found? The sad answer to this question is: nowhere on earth. For, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau writes, "if there were a people of gods, they would rule themselves democratically. So perfect a government is not suited for men"⁷ The equally sad conclusion is that there is no democracy on planet earth-- at least not in its ideal or pure form. Democracy in the real world is negated or limited in the fullness of its concrete manifestations by the non-ideal or limited character of the men and women who must nurture or operate it.

To say that democracy does not exist in its ideal form, however, is not to say it does not exist in any form. To that extent we can advance the proposition that, rather than their being either democratic (or undemocratic) systems, what exists in the world are "more or less" democratic (or undemocratic) sytems, depending upon the perspective from which one chooses to look at them. What exists in the real world, as always when the ideal meets the real, are only "approximations of varying degrees of fidelity" to the ideal model.

The uncontestable fact is that some governments are more representative, more "cut in the people's image" than others. Some observe more scrupulously the rules of the game, primarily the letter and spirit of the constitution, than do others. Some are more useful and deliver more tangible benefits or goods and services to their people than do others. All these are parameters for measuring democracy.

The study of African traditional societies has raised more problems that it has solved. Pertinent issues include such questions as the following. Were there or were there not social classes in the African traditional societies? If there were, are these classes to be conceived in the classical Marxist-Leninist paradigm of the incompatibility of classe interests and attendant class struggle? Or, were these societies egalitarian in essence and perspective as Mwalimu Julius Nyerere has tried to show; in other words, were these societies without any class interests or class conflicts? What was the nature of political power in the centralized and the so-called decentralized polities? Were such concept as democracy, as C.R. Macpherson says, a new development within the Western liberal state that may be quite foreign to the African traditional societies and cultures?⁸

As proven in our contribution to the study, The Place of the Person in Social Life,⁹ many African and foreign scholars, politicians and historians¹⁰ have portrayed the African societies before colonialism as harmonious, undifferentiated entities enjoying democratic tranquillity. Rousseau's view of the Noble Savage in a state of Nature seems to be the background against which Nyerere developed his "Ujamaa" philosophy¹¹

This idea that African traditional societies were by and large democratic in the sense that the common citizens had a say in their governance is questioned, however, by other scholars who argue that, to a certain extent, there was no democracy in the African traditional societies. While observing that the problem was more accentuated in the stratified, centralized polities, they are quick to point out that even in the so-called democratic, decentralized political systems gerontocratic principles and practices militated against openness and popular participation. Therefore they consider the notion that African traditional societies were democratic to be a myth.

To support the argument, primarily with regard to the so-called centralized and class structured societies, Emile Mworoha asserts that in 19th century Burundi, and by extension the central African regions, political power and life revolved around the personality of the King and his aristocratic entourage¹²

Underlying the clear distinctions between the social classes in central and western Sudanic regions, Lansine Kaba declares that the society of the ancient kingdom of Songhay was divided into two groups for economic production^13, "large estates belonging to the crown and employing an extensive labor force" and those that belonged to the elite in the provinces and near Gao, the capital. These estates were that possessed by the crown, the elite and the military, who were very powerful in this militaristic regime; it was these classes that had access to resources, trade, power, knowledge and prestige¹⁴

Elsewhere in West Africa, Majhemout Diop notices a similar class structure. He states that in ancient Mali there was a three-tier system of castes composed of (i) "Rimbe Benangatobe", the upper and ruling class; (ii) "Rimbe Nangatobe", the middle class; and (iii) "Matioube", the inferior class or caste of slaves¹⁵

The conclusion which flows from the above descriptions of the so-called centralized political systems is that by and large, on the whole of the African continent, there was no democratic tradition.

To support this conclusion with regard to the so-called decentralized political systems, Wagner Gunther points out the inegalitarian character of lineage systems in the African traditional societies. Taking the case of the "Bukusu" of the Western Province of Kenya, he argues that in this system, the senior members had more privileges, material, legal and moral, than the junior members in the same lineage structure¹⁶ He concludes that such a system could not be democratic.

Elsewhere in Kenya, W.R. Ochieng has described the political organization of the Gusii people. According to him, "the Gusii society did not constitute one, but a collection of many political units.¹⁷ He asserts that the Gusii had a system of chiefs who were supposed to lead and make decisions with the consent and support of the elders.¹⁸ However, the position of chief was hereditary: "persons automatically assumed their position of chiefs by virtue of being the most senior survivors of the hereditary leading clan families."¹⁹ Furthermore, Ochieng argues that the Gusii society was egalitarian because "everybody was entitled to equal rights and privileges of their society."^{20 H}owever, the same author gives evidence which contradicts the statement. He says that among the Gusii there was also another type of leadership, "Omotang'ani", a person who by force of example, talent or qualities of leadership played a directive role, wielded commanding influence or had a following in any sphere of thought or activity.²¹

Here, we would be tempted to see the democratic essence of the recognition of personal merit, but the description of the lines of authority rules this out. From the level of the home the head of the family had enormous powers. All disputes were handled by him; his wives, sons and daughters had to submit to his authority. The clan chief presided over a council of elders who generally were heads of homesteads. This practice, therefore, defeats any argument of egalitarianism or democracy among the Gusii.

Describing the political institutions of the Kiyuyu, Muriuki argues along the same lines when he writes: "by the end of the nineteenth century, Kiyuyu society was patriarchical..."²² At the nuclear level, the head of the family or father was the supreme authority. He decided virtually all matters except really serious ones, where he consulted "all the initiated males who had attained elder status"²³ At the clan level, the "Mbari" council chose a head known as "Muramati" who was "the eldest son from the senior house line" (githaka)²⁴ Muriuki also states that although the initiated young men forming the military forces had "enough power and privileges in (their) hands they were strictly governed by their council. The titular head of this council was the `muthamaki'".²⁵ But, precise H.E. Lambert, not every muthamaki joined the council of elders.²⁶ Indeed, Muriuki notes that the age determined system in the Kiyuyu political system acted as "a very important agent of social control".²⁷

Analyzing the political organization of the Arusha Maasai of Tanzania, P.N. Gulliver asserts that they also have quite an elaborate age structure, with fourteen formal stages; and when these are exhausted, the cycle begins once again.²⁸

To conclude this section, what comes out of the examination of the political institutions and mechanisms of the African traditional societies is a mixture of democratic principles and practices, on the one hand, and aristocratic, autocratic, gerontocratic and/or militaristic practices and tendencies, with varying degrees of despotism, on the other hand. It would be incorrect to equate these democratic principles and practices, found especially in the non-centralized communities, with advanced forms of democracy. But we can call upon African scholars to delve into the study of these societies in order to bring out what can be blended with the present African political structures, institutions and practices regarding the phenomenon of urbanization.

Dennis A. Rondinelli's analysis²⁹ shows the African continent to be one of the world's less urbanized regions because of the relatively slow pace of urbanization there during the first half of the 20th century and the large percentage of the population which remains in rural areas. Nevertheless, the same author argues that although Africa is relatively late in urbanizing several cities (Kinshasa, Nairobi, Harare, Addis-Abeba, Lome, Abidjan, Bamako, etc.) emerged as significant urban agglomerations. Some of them have a long tradition in African history. They were

indigenous urban centers that emerged from commercial and trading functions or as defensive or administrative centers. Others were Islamic cities providing a combination of religious and trading functions. Many were formed for colonial purposes and shaped by European aesthetic principles. Still others have emerged as dualistic or hybrid cities that accommodate on integrate foreign and indigenous activities with varying degrees of harmony".³⁰

Therefore, in turning to the phenomenon of urbanization, I wish to consider a certain number of features³¹ chosen here as possibilities offered to modern African citizens by the large city in order eventually to confront them with the phenomenon of culture described above. These features are the following: relations and interchanges, accelerated mobility, concentrated organization and the image of human energy.

City as Relations and Interchanges

The first general principle which seemed to lie at the base of nearly all African political systems was that the "age-set" tended to thwart or contain the aspirations of the more volatile, active and probably intelligent younger generations. In some cases, the age-set system seems to have combined with the class structure to lower the aspirations and rights of the lower echelons of the society--even to suppress them permanently--reducing thereby the network of human interrelations.

With the phenomenon of urbanization taken at its highest point of development, we move to a very large extent from more restrictive to a more varied, specialized, abstract and densely ramified network of human relations. Thus, the city is, first of all, a fact of "communication" similar to an enormous exchange or a giant name-board. To modern African citizens, this means ever more numerous opportunities for both encounter and choice. This phenomenon could be expressed in terms of "information".

With Harvey Cox, I am interested in the so-called "anonymity" of human relations. This ill of modern civilization must be described first of all in neutral terms as a new division between the private and the public, and even more fundamentally, as a defense reaction or even an immunization against the innumerable outside intrusions which result from a multiplicity of contacts.³²

This anonymity implies, in turn, a positive "depersonalization" of most of our relations in terms of the preservation of authentic encounters and means that not all social relations can be transcribed in the language of "I" and "You".

City as Accelerated Mobility

The second general principle found in the majority of the African traditional societies was the "insular type of structures", in other words, structures without upward mobility or open recruitment outside the set and rigid rules of procedure. In some instances, there was no chance of any upward mobility whatsoever.

With the phenomenon of urbanization, the modern city in Africa is characterized by an accelerated mobility which is geographic, residential, professional, social and psychological. This accelerated mobility implies "internal migration" which inaugurates the relations and contacts noted above, but at the same time represents an unavoidable ordeal for the modern African citizens forced to change socially and at times professionally. Nevertheless, accelerated mobility adds a new feature inasmuch as it means that for most African citizens the places of residence and of work are widely separated. This geographical distance symbolizes a psychological distance: the different roles are disparate and disjointed. For the underprivileged, this uprooting poses the problem of "adaptation" to the modern world while for the privileged it takes the form of a voyage or vacation, sometimes of dislocation, and always of an "estrangement"³³.

In spite of the "nomadism" and "deracination" which accompany this accelerated mobility, its cultural effects are largely beneficial. Most modern African cities, because of the important and sometimes dominant social and economic functions they provide that make them the most attractive locations for rural migrants,³⁴ have become national centers for social transformation. They absorb rural migrants, accommodate and encourage the integration of diverse social, ethnic, religious, or tribal groups; support organizations that help socialize and assimilate rural people into city life; and provide new economic opportunities for people seeking social and economic mobility.³⁵

City as Concentrated Organization

The third general principle which flowed from the examination and analysis of the African traditional political systems was the concept of "hierarchy". The societies and therefore their political organizations were conceived in a hierarchical structure with little or no horizontal checks and balances.

With the phenomenon of urbanization, the traditional hierarchical structure by and large is balanced by a "concentrated organization". The geographical concentration previously mentioned is only the superficial and quantitative aspect of a much more important functional phenomenon whose source is in the modern method of organizing work. The "metropolis" is a "technopolis"³⁶ dominated by the a bureaucratic division and organization of labor.

Around this technological core are distributed the quite diverse systems of public education, sanitation, recreation, legal institutions, etc. Rondinelli argues along the same lines when he writes:

As in other parts of the world, large cities in Africa perform important social and economic functions. Huge cities provide economies of scale and proximity that have been conducive to industrialization, allowing the cities to absorb significant numbers of workers in manufacturing jobs, and the government to construct the modern infrastructure and provide the advanced health, educational, commercial and other facilities required by large population concentrations in order to operate efficiently. Most large African cities now play crucial roles as communication and transport hubs for their surrounding regions, providing modern international ports, harbors and air facilities. Most have become national financial centers. Nearly all serve as important commercial, service, and administrative centers, providing large numbers of managerial, clerical, and professional jobs. The informal or small-scale service and manufacturing sectors of these cities absorb thousands of low- or nonskilled workers who cannot find employment in large industries or in the formal commercial sector."³⁷

For all of these reasons the modern African city is the logistic apparatus of social roles.

City as Image of Human Energy

The fourth general principle which seemed to characterize almost all traditional African societies was the perception of their societies as an "image of human energy". The collective picture men held of their societies was as important a part of the "society-phenomenon" as the reality itself. This is to say no more than that the traditional African societies had always an image of society much as were the mythical images of the "civitas", the visible face of a heavenly patron (a Babylon, Jerusalem or actually all of the "civitates dei") or the Greek identification of the city and the political unit or polis.

With the phenomenon of urbanization, African citizens have quite another and more modern image for themselves, a perception of the city which makes it the major witness to human energy. The city is the inverse of the earth, product of nature; the city is the complete artifact, the realized human project.³⁸ This sign of man's power is at the same time a sign of a force essentially directed toward the future. The city is always building, looking to its own future; it is where African modern citizens perceive change as a human project, the place where they perceive their proper modernity.

With regard to the features described above and in the context of modernity that the phenomenon of urbanization implies, democracy, along with a handful of other concerns such as health, development and peace, has become one of the core or foremost preoccupations of the peoples of Africa today. Millions of men and women are clamoring for it, ready to invest enormous sacrifices of sweat, tears and blood, including even death, in order to secure it. This is a measure of the value of democracy to civilized mankind.

Thus in modern Africa the quest for democracy has become more than ever the quest for freedom, justice, equality and human dignity. It is a quest for the liberation of mankind from all manner of servitude, injustice, discrimination and humiliation. It is a far-reaching and wide-ranging movement, encompassing the liberation of African citizens from local despots and tyrants, of women from domestic and social subjugation, and of nations from foreign domination and exploitation. In one vast panorama the story unfolds from women's efforts to obtain the simple right to vote and stand for political office to revolutions and mass uprisings that have changed the destiny of nations.

From this perspective, progress towards the realization of the democratic ideal in a modern and urbanized African continent is the great epic of mankind's movement towards civilized political behavior.

As succinctly described by Paul Ricoeur,³⁹ each of the four features around which we have tried to understand the phenomenon of urbanization presents its own pathology.

Communication: we experience it as an excess of signals, a flood of information which, in both the physical and psychical senses of the word, exhausts our capacity to integrate and discriminate. The congestion of our cities is a symbol of a general pathology, namely, the swelling and saturation of relations which no longer link up. We know also that anonymity is not only a way of immunizing ourselves against excess signals and signs, but a subtle destruction of private life itself.

Mobility: It is not only functional, but aberrant. The accumulation of junkyards at the edges of our cities, the flight of the rich to the suburbs, the rotting of great cities from the center, all attest to the fact that social mobility is not a solely beneficial phenomenon. The neo-nomadism of modern man is without roots or focus. The lowered value of tolerance due to an excess of confrontations results in cynicism and in indifference.

Organized concentration: It too has its pathology. Our cities suffer simultaneously from bureaucratic over-organization and under-administration. Today's African modern city is like an uncontrolled cancerous phenomenon so that man finds his destiny there to be at the same time cumbersome and dispersed. In the place of the generalized constraint and surplus-repression described by Herbert Marcuse, it is also the place of fragmentation of the personality.

The image of human energy: We have described it as an image of our own energy, but this energy, insofar as it is dominated by technology, risks losing itself in an empty futurism or useless Prometheanism through loss of memory. All technological progress accumulates by destroying its past. The "old cities" are also cities of art, sometimes veritable museums. The city is thus an "exchange agent" in a new sense, namely, it exchanges tradition for the projection of the future. But, insofar as the element which dominates the construction of the city is technological, the city risks also being the place where man perceives the absence of all collective and personal projects, the meshing of means in the absence of ends, and the loss of meaning.

Concretely, the implications of urban pathology on life in the African countries can be described in terms of "adversities of large-scale urban concentration", that is, serious social, economic, and political problems as the result of their high population growth rates and low levels of economic expansion.

In consequence, democracy is affected by this "sociological sickness" and its principles are misused. Many electoral systems for example are institutionalized frauds. They include the so-called "democratic centralism" of communist systems and most one-party systems so that the people have hardly any choice in who their representatives shall be: one way or another the choice is made for them. Many African rules/governments/peoples pay only lip-service to the procedural aspects of their electoral system, such as it may be. The rules of the game are not adhered to except in the most perfunctory, formalistic and ritualistic manner. Quite often they are openly and directly or indirectly violated through such practices as vote rigging, fraudulent disqualification of candidates, harassment and intimidation of others, illegal arrests, corruption, bribery, violence. Certainly it is not through the most scrupulous adherence to the letter and the spirit of the electoral rules and procedures that, for example, some African rulers manage to be regularly elected with majorities of 99%.

Moreover, most African electorates are incapacitated by objective socio-economic conditions from playing an effective role in the choice of representatives. Television and other avenues of mass media political marketing are used with extraordinary effectiveness in the manipulation of the electorate and public opinion. At the other end of the scale, the illiteracy, ignorance and poverty of African masses, plus poor communication facilities, militate to a large extent against the full development of the democratic process.

Thus, if democracy does not fail due to defective procedures or mechanisms for its implementation, then it fails due to the bad faith of those who are to implement it or, if not that, due to the objective conditions of the social and material life of the people until, in the final analysis, democracy in its ideal form or fullest sense, remains in Africa, what it has always been everywhere--a dream. Perhaps for this reason, many people see it basically as impossible to realize: "Democracy is forever impossible,"⁴⁰ Carlyle wrote.

We have described "democracy" as "good, fair and just government" according to the three very fundamental meanings of each of these terms, and corresponding closely to Abraham Lincoln's definition of democracy as "government of the people, by the people and for the people". We have argued that if democracy means good, fair and just government, it can be established, it can live, survive and thrive, only in a country of good, fair and just men and women. But such a country exists nowhere on earth.

To say, however, that democracy does not exist in its ideal form does not mean that it does not exist in any form! Hence, after a close examination of some of the traditional African political systems, attention to different opinions about the existence and/or the non-existence of democracy in the African traditional societies, we have advanced the proposition that, rather than being either democratic or undemocratic, African traditional societies were "more or less" democratic or undemocratic, depending on the perspective from which one took in their regards.

Moving to the modern era, we have pointed out that the phenomenon of urbanization in many instances fundamentally changed the existing situation. It exchanged tradition for modernity, that is, for a projection of the future. In relation to democracy, we have argued that regardless of the existing form of government the phenomenon of urbanization or modernization at once brought with it a new form of authority to which all had to relate. The unification of the locus of authority in a territorial sense had introduced a new form of governance with which the old political order had to contend. The progressive loss of traditional institutional structures and authority that accompanied the phenomenon of urbanization/modernization was to deprive the old order of some of its democratic character and later, when cupidity, abuse and misuse of power were achieved, the situation in Africa tended to deteriorate in many respects.

For if governments by "divine right" virtually has disappeared in Africa, there remain still a dozen or so of them. If many have "gone down under," still they are too many african social and political systems where racial, religious, ideological, tribal, sexual minorities, privileged elites, castes and/or socio-economic classes, maintain oppressive and repressive hegemonies over the majority of the people. Although many African tyrants, dictators and despots of various hues have continued to bite the dust, it remains true nevertheless that there are still too many ruling with "iron fists" and leading heavily upon their people. Finally, if much has been accomplished in terms of liberating african masses from material misery and exploitation by fellow man, it remains incontestable that in many parts of our continent extreme poverty and deprivation are the order of the day, while slave and near-slave conditions are the daily lot of millions of men and women.

This misuse of democratic principles has been described as the results or implications of city pathology. But what is the city? We have approached this phenomenon in neutral terms as a new way humans can relate one to another. This opportunity is experienced in turns as liberation and as constraint: liberation from the constraints of town and village, constraint of a new sort.

Is this to say that the city has only positive aspects? We do not intend to deny the "pathology" of the city which is mixed inextricably with the search for a new balance in its movement. Precisely because this pathology is felt to be unbearable today there is such a thing as "urbanism".

Urbanism is the reply to urban pathology. Urbanism means that the city cannot continue to grow according to its natural movement; this must be dominated, controlled, directed. Not only is there a pathology of the city, but this pathology is the awesome expression of the pathology of global society; it plays the role of the abscess, drawing corruption and draining it with respect to diffused sociological sickness.

Altogether, rather than being either optimistic or pessimistic, we shall be realistic and bear in mind the city's ambiguity and ambivalence as we continue to reflect upon that therapeutic action for which the cultural and intellectual (and ecclesiastical) communities are responsible.

In the same way, freedom, equality and human dignity are goals that are still far from being realized in most parts of the world, particularly in the African continent. More thinking, more action and more sacrifice, therefore, continue to be called for in the move towards the creation of democratic society.

Les Facultés Catholiques The Catholic University of America

Kinshasa/Limete, Zaire Washington, D.C.

1. G. Orwell, Selected Essays (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1957), p. 149.

2. T.S. Eliot, The Ideal of a Christian Society (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 11.

3. G. Sartori, Democratic Theory (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 9.

4. J. Lively, Democracy (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 1.

5. G. Sartori, pp. 17 and 22.

6. Ibid.

7. J.J. Rousseau, Social Contract, vol. III, translated by G.D.H. Cole (London: J.M. Dent, 1913), p. 4.

8. C.B. Macpherson, The Real World of Democracy (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 153.

9. A. Atomate, "Solidarity, Power and Democracy in Africa," in George F. McLean, ed., The Place of the Person in Social Life (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy and The University Press of America, l989).

10. See: J. Nyerere, Nyerere on Socialism (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 10; J. Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya (London: Martin Secker and Warburg Ltd., 1938), p. 131; G. Muriuki, A History of the Kiyuyu, 1500-1900 (Nairobi: O.U.P., 1974), pp. 110-111; M. Fortes and F.F. Evans-Pritchard, African Political Systems (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 9-10; C.B. Macpherson, Op. Cit., p. 32; L.S. Senghor, On Socialism (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 77; J. Ki-Zerbo, Histoire de l'Afrique Noire (Paris: Librairie A. Hatier, 1972), p. 176.

11. J. Nyerere, p. 10.

12. E. Mworoha, Peuples et rois de l'Afrique des Lacs (Dakar: Les Nouvelles Editions Africaines, 1977), p. 86.

13. L. Kaba, "Power, Prosperity and Social Inequality in Songhay, 1464-1591", unpublished paper, University of Nairobi.

14. Ibid.

15. Diop Majhemout, Histoire des classes sociales dans l'Afrique de l'Ouest, vol. I: Le Mali (Paris: Francois Maspero, 1971), pp. 46-47.

16. W. Gunther, "The Political Organization of the Bantu of Kavirondo", in M. Fortes and F.F. Evans-Pritchard, p. 230.

17. W.R. Ochieng', A Pre-Colonial History of the Gusii of Western Kenya, C. 1500-1914 (Nairobi: E.A.L.B., 1974), p. 193.

18. Ibid., p. 196.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p. 197.

22. G. Muriuki, Op. Cit., p. 116.

23. H.E. Lambert, Kiyuyu Social and Political Institutions (London: O.U.P., 1956), p. 85.

24. G. Muriuki, p. 116.

25. Ibid., p. 121.

26. H.E. Lambert, p. 104.

27. G. Muriuki, p. 121.

28. P.H. Gulliver, Social Control in Society. A Study of the Arusha: Agricultural Maasai of Northern Tanganyika (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), Chapter 3.

29. D.A. Rondinelli, "Giant and Secondary City Growth in Africa", The Metropolis Era, vol. 1: A World of Giant Cities, Mattei Dogan & John Kasarda, eds. (London: Sage Publications), pp. 291-321.

30. Ibid., pp. 291-292.

31. See P. Ricoeur, "Urbanisation and Secularisation", in English by David Stewart and Joseph Bien, eds Political and Social Essays by Paul Ricoeur (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1974), pp. 176-182.

32. Ibid., pp. 177-178.

33. Ibid., p. 178.

34. D.A. Rondinelli, p. 303.

35. Ibid., p. 316.

36. P. Ricoeur, 179.

37. R.A. Rondinelli, p. 300.

38. P. Ricoeur, p.180.

39. Ibid., pp. 180-182.

40. T. Carlyle, Latter-Day Pamphlets, vol. I: The Present Times (London, 1850), p. 27; in G. Sartori, p. 52.