GEORGE F. M cLEAN

I. In what does a cultural her itage or trad ition consist: how is it constituted; on what basis is it a point of reference for human action?

II. Can a traditional cul ture have new meaning for these new times: how does it both live through time as a tradition and in each new age make specifically relevant contributions?

III. Can a culture critique the past which it inspired and be a guide to yet unknown pathways of p eace: what is the basis for a transforming critique which will enable the culture to be an authentically libera ting, rather than an enslaving, force?

It is characteristic of modern times__and possibly foundational to our problematic__that tradition has progressively ceded its standing to tec hnique. This may be traced to Desc artes who, at the end of the Ren aissance, resolved to sort through its tumultuous accumulation of knowledge, new and old, in order to select and order that which was clear and distinct to the mind's intuition. Further, though a conclusion once clearly seen by someone did not have to be rejustified by that person each time it was used, this dispensation was non_transferable.¹ Hence, the image of the thinker became that of a solitary hero working out the interconnections of ideas. That these are best seen in isolation while life is lived with others forces one to ask whether this understanding has not lost sight of the relevance of thought to life--as M arx was keen to observe.

This has been undertaken by Prof. Hans Georg Gad amer in continuation of the phenomenological work of Martin Heide gger. In Truth and Method, Prof. Gadamer undertook to reconstruct the notion of a heritage as: (a) based in community, (b) consisting of knowledge developed from the experience of living through time, and (c) possessed of authority. Because tradition is sometimes interpreted as a threat to personal and social freedom I would like to focus especially upon the way our cultural heritage is a reflection of our life as free and responsible members of a concerned communi ty.

Autogenesis is no more characteristic of the birth of knowledge than it is of persons. Just as a pe rson is born into a family on which he or she depends absolutely for life, sustenance, protection and promotion, so one's understanding develops in community. It is from one's family and in one's earliest weeks and months that one does or does not develop the basic attitudes to trust and confidence which undergird or undermine our capacities for subsequent social relations; that one learns care and concern for others independently of what they do for us; and that one acquires the language and symbol system in terms of which to conceptualize, communicate and understand.³

Similarly, through the various steps of one's development, as one's circle of community expands through neighborhood, school, work and recreation one comes to learn and to share personally and passionately an interpretation of reality and a pattern of va lue responses. For the phen omenologist this implies that life in community is a new source for wi sdom. Hence, rather than turning away from daily life in order to contemplate abstract and disembodied ideas, the place to discover meaning is life in the family and in the progressively wider circles into which one enters.

Time and the Building of Trad ition

First, the process of trial and error, of continual correction and addition in relation to the evolving sense of human dignity and purpose, constitutes a type of learning and testing laboratory for successive generations. In this laboratory of history the strengths of various insights and behavior patterns can be identified and reinforced, while deficiencies are progressively corrected or eliminated. But this language remains too abstract and limited to met hod or tech nique.

Second, while it can be described in general and at a distance in terms of feed-back mechanisms, what is being spoken about are free acts, expressive of passionate human commitment and sacrifice in responding to concrete danger, building and rebuilding family alliances, and constructing and defending one's nation. The cumulative result of this extended process of learning and commitment constitutes the content of a tra dition.⁴

Third, the impact of the convergence of cumulative experience and reflection is heightened by its gradual elaboration in ritual and music, and imaginatively configured in such epics as The Mahab arata or in dance. All conspire to constitute a culture which, like a giant telecommunications dish, shapes, intensifies and extends the range of our personal sensitivity, free decision and mutual concern.

Perhaps the greatest point of tension between a sense of one's heritage and modern liberals relates to auth ority. Is it possible to recognize authority on the part of tradition and still retain freedom through time; could it be that authority, rather than being the negation of freedom, is the cumulative expression of, and the positive condition for, an authentic human freedom.

One of the most important characteristics of the human person is one's capacity for development and growth. One is born with open and unlimited powers for kno wledge and for lo ve. Life consists in developing, deploying and exercising these capabilities. Given the communitary character of human growth and learning, dependence upon others is not unnatural__indeed it is quite the contrary. Within as well as beyond our social group, we depend upon other persons according as they possess abilities we lack, but need in the process of our own growth and actualization. This dependence is not primarily one of obedi ence to their will, but is based upon their comparative excellen ce in some dimension, whether it be the doctor's professional skill in healing patients, or the wise person's insight and judgment in matters where profound understanding is required. The preeminence of wise persons in the community is not something they usurp or with which they are arbitrarily endowed, but is based rather upon their abilities as these are reasonably and freely acknowledged by others. The role of the community in learning, the contribution of extended historical experience, and the grounding of dependence in competency combine to endow tradition with authority for subsequent ages. 

There are reasons to believe, moreover, that trad ition is not a passive storehouse of materials simply waiting upon the inquirer, but that its content of authentic wisdom plays a normative role for life in subsequent ages. On the one hand, without such a normative referent prudence would be as relativistic and ineffective as muscular action without a skeletal substructure. Life would be merely a matter of compromise and accommodation in any terms with no sense of the value of what was being compromised or of that for which it was compromised. On the other hand, were the normative factor to reside simply in a transcendental or abstract vision, the result would be an idealism devoid of existential content. 

In history, on the contrary, one finds vision which both transcends its own time and stands as directive for the time that follows. The content of that vision is a set of values and of human and social goals which, by their fullness and harmony of measure, point the way to mature and perfect human formation and thereby orient the life of a person.⁶ Such a vision is his torical because it arises from the life of a people in time and presents an appropriate way of preserving that life through time. It is also nor mative because it provides a basis upon which past historical ages, present options and future possibilities are judged. The fact that humans do not remain indifferent before the flow of events, but dispute bitterly over the direction of change appropriate for their community or shared life reflects the fact that every humanism is committed to the realization of some common--if general--model of perfection. Without this even conflict would be impossible for there would be no intersection of divergent positions. A shared vision of what is desirable for life at least in some broad terms is the condition of possibility for debate and even for conflict.

This stands in stark contrast to one's heritage or tradition as the rich cumulative vision evolved by men through the ages to a point of normative and classical perfection. Exemplified architecturally in a Parthen on or a Taj Mahal , it is embodied personally in a Confu cius, Gan dhi, Bol ivar, or Lin coln, a Martin Luther Ki ng or a Mother Theresa . Superseding mere historical facts, as concrete universals they express that harmony of measure and fullness which is at once classical and historical, ideal and personal, uplifting and dynamizing, in a word, liberating.

No velty and Appl ication

To understand this we must, first of all, take tim e seriously, that is, we must recognize that reality includes authentic novelty. This implies that tradi tion, with its authoritative or normative character, achieves its perfection not in opposition to, but in the very temporal unfolding of, reality. Because persons determine their changing social universe and its values, for an adequate sense of culture one must attend to the truly new elements introduced by historical acts of encounter in commun ity.

As response to the good takes place in concrete circumstances, the guiding principles of human action, even in ethics as a science, must be neither purely theoretical knowledge nor a simple historical accounting from the past, but must provide help toward moral consciousness in one's concrete circumstances. This implies an important difference of ethics from te chné. In the latter, action is governed by an idea as an exemplary cause which is fully determined and known by objective theoretical knowledge. Skill consists in knowing how to act according to a well understood idea or plan. When this cannot be carried out some parts of it simply are omitted in the execution.

That the law is perfected by its application in the circumstances is driven home by the experience that a simple mechanical replication of the law works injustice rather than justice. If ethics is to be an instrument of realizing the good it must be, not only knowledge of what is right in general, but also the search for what is right in the situation. For this epoc hé and equ ity are required in order to perfect the law and complete moral knowledge.⁸ This is particularly essential in situations of personal and structured inequality in which an ordinary application of general and abstract laws can be expected only to extend and deepen the injustice. Hence, special attention must be paid to the concrete circumstances of persons in their mesh of psychological, economic and social interrelations.

The question of what the situation asks of us is answered in the light of what has been discovered about appropriate human action and exists normatively in the tradi tion. This is properly the work of inte llect (no us) with the virtue of p rudence (phron esis), that is, thoughtful reflection which enables one to discover the appropriate means in the circumstances. But to be appropriate the means must truly fit all who are engaged in the situation. Hence, it is essential to be finely tuned to other persons, and this precisely as they are persons with their own freedom, feelings and understanding. Such an assessment of what is truly appropriate will require also the virtue of saga city (sunes is), that is, concern for others, for adequately to appreciate the situation one must undergo it with the affected parties. Truly ethical knowledge can be had only by one who is united in mutual interest or love with the other. Such knowledge is profoundly social.

This goes notably beyond simply a concern for justice, that is, for rendering to others what is clearly due them by right. It is true that an ethical or moral situation cannot exist without justice. Nevertheless, justice is based upon persons as distinct. It distinguishes and even opposes one to the other in a mutual relationship of rights and duties as each party tends to look more to their rig hts and to what others owe them, rather than to their duties and what they owe to others. The result of a relationship based only upon ju stice is more likely to be strife than ha rmony and pe ace. This can be overcome and justice rendered only when concern for self is broadened to include others as well, that is, when sagacity (sunesis) is added to pruden ce (phron esis).

Hor izon and His toricity

We do not enter upon this task of understanding with a blank mind, as Locke supposed, or proceed to suspend all judgment under a pervasive Cartesian doubt. Instead, we summon up all our resources to construe an initial or prior conception of the meaning of the document or of the words of the one with whom we are in dialogue. Gadamer terms this a `fore_under standing', or `pre_ju dgment', and hence `pre judice' in a non-pejorative sense. This is a tentative projection of the general meaning of our interlocutor. The content of this anticipation is not an objective, fixed content to which we come; but what we produce as we participate in the evolution of the tradition and thereby further determine ourselves. For our horizon reflects not only the content of the past, but the sensibility of the time in which I stand and the life project in which I am engaged. This pre-judgment is corrected gradually in the process of reading the text in detail until it corresponds to the meaning the text has in distinctive relation to me. In this manner there is a creative unveiling of the content of the tradition as this comes progressively and historically into the present and, through the present, passes into the future.⁹

In this light time is not a barrier or separation, but rather a bridge and opportunity for the process of understanding; it is a fertile ground filled with experience, custom and trad ition. The contribution of time lies in opening new sources of understanding which reveal unsuspected elements and even whole new dimensions of meaning in the tradition. How does this take place?¹⁰

Horizons are not limitations, but vantage points, for the mind as open or mobile is capable of being aware of its present horizon and of transcending this through the acknowledgement of other hor izons and of the horizons of others. Indeed, historic movement implies precisely that we not be bound by one horizon, but move in and out of horizons. It is the very act of becoming aware of one's horizon which establishes historical consciousness, puts one's horizon at risk in dialogue with others, and thereby liberates one from the limitations of his and her horizon. When our initial projection of the meaning of the `text' or of the other will not bear up under progressive questioning we are justified in making needed adjustments in our projection of meaning and in the horizon from which we were thinking.

Because such discovery depends upon the questions, the art of discovery is the art of questioning. Consequently, whether working alone or in conjunction with others, our effort at finding the answers should be, not to suppress a question, but to reinforce and unfold it. To the degree that its probabilities are intensified it can serve as a searchlight to bring out new meaning. In contrast to op inion which suppresses questions and argu ing which searches out the weakness of the others' argument, conversation as di alogue is a mutual and cooperative search for truth. Through eliminating errors and working out a common meaning truth progressively is unveiled.¹¹

Further, it should not be expected that the text or tradi tion will answer but one question, for the sense of the te xt reaches beyond what even its author intended. Because of the dynamic character of being emerging into time, the horizon is never definitively fixed. At each step a new dimension of the potentialities of the text is opened to understanding, for the meaning of the text lives with the consciousness, not of its author, but of the many persons living in history and with others. This dialectic of our hori zon with that of the others intensifies our ability to ask questions and to receive answers that are ever new.¹²

Such openness is directed primarily, not to others as persons who are to be surveyed objectively or obeyed unquestioningly, but to ourselves. It opens our horizons, extends our ability to listen to others, and assimilates the implications of their answers for changes in our own positions. In other words, it is an acknowledgement that the cultural heritage has something new to say to us. The characteristic hermeneutic attitude of effective historical consciousness therefore is not methodological sureness, but openness or readiness for experience.¹³ Seen in these terms our her itage is not closed, but the basis for a life that is expanding, evermore inclusive, and more rich.

The relation between herm eneutics and social critique is dialectical. The social sciences provide an indispensable element of awareness and hence of emancipation in the world of increasingly technical and convoluted structures. But heritage and tradition must provide an essential context and the basic principles for the critique to which these sciences contribute. Paul Ric oeur has attempted to codify some of the contributions of the tradition.¹⁴

First, critique is carried out within a context of interests which establish the frame of meaning. The sequence of technical, practical and emancipating inte rests reflects the emergence of man out of nature and corresponds to the developmental phase of moral sensitivity. Haber mas studies Koh lberg closely on this and employs his work.¹⁵ To the question of the basis of these interests, however, no adequate answer is provided. They are not empirically justifiable or they would be found at the level of technical interests. Neither do they constitute a theory as a network of working hypotheses for then they would be regional and justified at most by the interest in emancipation, leaving them entrapped in a vicious circle.

The only proper description of these interests as truly all_embracing must be found in the direction of Heideg ger's existentials and hence of being itself with its unity, truth and goodness. These are hidden only in being so present that they are in need of being unveiled by hermeneutic method. Thus, Gad amer's hermeneutic project on the clarification of fore_un derstandings or `pre judices' and Habermas' critical work on interests by the social sciences, though not identical, share common ground.

Thirdly, today communicative action needs more than a model to suggest what might not otherwise occur to our minds, for the rationalization of human life has become such that all of its aspects are controlled pervasively in terms of instrumental action. Whereas M arx could refer in his day to surplus value as the motive of production, this is true no longer. Instead, the system itself of te chnology has become the key to productivity and all is coordinated toward the support and promotion of this system; it is the i deology of our day. As a result the distinction between communicative action and instrumental action has been overridden and control no longer can be expected from communicative action .

This raises a new type of question, namely, how can the interest in em ancipation be kept alive. Undoubtedly, communicative action must be reawakened and made to live if we are not to be simply subjects__indeed slaves__of the technological machine. But how is this to be done; whence can this life be derived if the present situation is pervasively occupied and shaped by science and technology as the new and now all_encompassing master? It can be done only by drawing upon our heritage in the manner suggested by Hei degger. We need to retrieve or reach back into our heritage__now as never before__in order to find the resources which are radically new because not attended to or developed through the centuries, and now are needed for ema ncipation in an increasingly dominated world.

Finally, there is a still more fundamental sense in which cri tique, rather than being opposed to tradition or taking a questioning attitude thereto, is itself an appeal to tradi tion. Cri ticism appeals unabashedly to the heritage of emancipation it has received from the Enl ightenment. But this tradition has longer roots which reach back to the liberating acts of Exo dus and the Resu rrection. "Perhaps," writes Ri coeur "there would be no more interest in emancipation, no more anticipation of freedom, if the Exodus and Resurrection were effaced from the memory of mankind."¹⁷

1. Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking for Truth in the Sciences, Parts I and II; and Meditations on the First Philosophy, Meditation I, in The Philosophical Works of De scartes, E.S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, trans. (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1969).

2. Hans_Georg Gadame r, Truth and Method (New York: Crossroad, 1975), pp. 241_45.

3. John Capu to, "A Phenomenology of Moral Sensibility: Moral Emotion," George F. McLean, Frederick Ellrod, et al., eds., Act and Agent: Philosophical Foundations for Moral Education and Character Development (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Education and The University Press of America, l986), pp. 199-222.

5. Ibid. Gad amer emphasizes knowledge as the basis of tradition in contrast to those who would see it pejoratively as the result of arbitrary will. It is important to add to knowledge the free acts which, e.g., give birth to a nation and shape the attitudes and values of successive generations. As an example one might cite the continuing impact had by the Magna Carta through the Declaration of Independence upon life in North America, or of the declaration of The Rights of Man in the national life of so many countries.

14. Jurgen Ha bermas, Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismis (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976), pp. 72_73; Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon, 1971), pp. 196_209; Thomas A. McCa rthy, Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas (Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1978).

15. Lawrence Ko hlberg, "From Is to Ought," in T. Misd el, ed., Cognitive Development and Epistemology (New York: Academic, 1971), pp. 151_236.