CHAPTER V

 

THE TRADITIONAL SELF

IN A CHANGING SOCIETY

RICHARD A. GRAHAM

There tends to be a difference between East and West and between the free market and the socialist societies, on what the place of the person in society should be. It stems from a difference in emphasis on whether individuals create societies or whether societies create individuals. In both East and West and in both kinds of societies, there is now an issue of great urgency: how can individuals be educated for the modern world without loss of cultural identity? It is closely akin to the question: how can a diversity of cultural traditions be preserved while, at the same time, a sense of a multi-cultural nationhood is strengthened?

These issues have become salient in hundreds of traditional societies now undergoing rapid social change. Traditional social values are changing rapidly in most of the world's societies and, because of it, great numbers of persons now feel uprooted. They sense both a weakening of authority in their society and insufficient authority within themselves. Many of them sense a need for greater authority from cultural traditions or from religion but are wary of increasing the authority of the state.

In the small group of philosophers that came to Catholic University from around the world to consider those issues, there was general agreement that a society does much to provide a kind of authority that helps to shape an individual and that individuals, through shared beliefs that guide or constrain the leaders of a society, preserve and, to some degree, shape society. There was little agreement however on whether societies tend to progress, or tend to maintain a fixed character or whether they tend to respond to some kind of cycle, some kind of ebb and flow of civilization.

Although the participants in this semester-long discussion came from quite different cultures, the methods of analysis were much alike. They tend to re-sort the thought of prominent philosophers in the light of history and anthropology and of slowly changing religious doctrine.

I want to speak from a different perspective, the perspective of human development as it is viewed in light of developmental psychology. I want to look to recent research, most of it naturalistic, some of it experimental. I want to suggest how this work can provide insights on the reasons for the perception that many of the world's cultures are now threatened and that a great number of individuals in these societies sense themselves uprooted. I believe that this research may help to show why in time more individuals in more societies throughout the world may come to find a more integrated sense of self in a more lawful society of humankind and why progress is a more likely descriptor of the future of persons and societies than is a fixed human nature and a fixed character of a society. I hope to show why progress is a more likely metaphor for societies and civilizations than cycles or the swings of a pendulum. I would like to go on to give reasons for believing that the changes that are occuring in the place of the person in societies thoughout the world tend to represent progress and that the changes are mostly for the good. This then is an essay in three parts. The first a weighing of evidence, from a psychologists' perspective, of what the individual has been in society, is now, and is in the process of becoming. The second part is a resorting of philosophical conjecture about what individuals and societies ought to be and the third develops the conclusion that individuals and societies are gradually becoming what they ought to become.

I will draw in large part upon studies of the ways that individuals in each of some forty societies throughout the world have been found to develop their judgment about what is fair between persons1 and hence, what is the just way to act as an individual in society. I will draw as well upon hundreds of studies, stimulated by Lawrence Kohl berg and his colleagues at Harvard University on the step-by-step process by which an individual develops moral judgment. I believe that this growing body of research helps to explain why most people in most societies have looked to their cultural traditions for guidance on what is right and why increasing numbers of people no longer do so. I believe that the research helps to explain what happens when individuals or their societies decide that their traditions are not an adequate basis for judging right and wrong, but have not yet settled on a better basis of judgment.

Over the past thirty years Kohlberg and others2 have noted that in each of the societies where longitudinal studies were conducted an individual's judgment progresses in an invariant stage-by-stage sequence. This progress in reasoning takes place without skipping a stage and without regression to a lower stage, but also without assurance of continuous development to the higher stages. Development of judgment, it turns out, can be arrested at any stage and in all societies, for all but a few individuals, it is arrested. But it is arrested before it reaches the highest stage for which reliable measures have been worked out. But the development of reason is arrested not for want of a person's inherent mental ability, rather for want of education and experience.

The stages of judgment are presented at greater length in Table I but, with considerable simplification, the sequence can be described as beginning for individual in every society at a stage where what is right is to do what the powerful command or to suffer the consequences. This reasoning is characteristic of young children, of some adults in primitive societies, and of a few adults like Adolph Eich mann even in modern societies. Right resides in the power of kings, fuhrers, general secretaries and presidents; or in unforgiving gods or nature.

Next, judgment develops to "do unto others as they do unto you," tit-for-tat or fair exchange. It is a pattern of judgment that is characteristic of children in the early elementary grades in modern societies and of many adults in primitive societies. An individual's judgment then progresses to "be guided by your cultural traditions" or "do what the members of your group or society expect of you" and next, to "do what your laws require."

These two latter stages of reasoning, taken together, are characteristic of the great majority of adults in modern nations throughout the world. But the judgment of increasing numbers of individuals in modern societies continues to progress beyond "do what your laws require" and, when it does, their reasoning begins to be guided by the principles of justice that are set forth in most constitutions of most constitutional democracies. It is upon these principles of justice that the laws of modern nations are ostensibly based.

This fifth stage of reasoning is often referred to as autonomous in that it is based not on social convention or cultural tradition or the laws of the state but rather upon the principles of justice arrived at through an individual's own reason. Generally, it is a stage of judgment arrived at after realization that the conventions and the laws of one's society all too frequently are in conflict with principles of justice.

The research data indicate, perhaps as strongly as social science research can that, in political terms, judgment develops in this sequence of five stages for everyone, everywhere, from (1) "raw power," to (2) "equal exchange," to (3) "cultural traditions and the expectations of associates," to (4) "legal nationalism," and, if judgment continues to develop, to (5) autonomous judgment that is congruent with "principled constitutionalism."

However, as an individual's judgment progresses to a new stage, it does not wipe out the content of thought that made sense at the previous stage. At the new stage of judgment the same content of information that has been acquired through education and experience is reorganized in a new structure of reasoning so as to make greater sense in a greater variety of situations. The new structure of reasoning produces a higher order of fairness in answering the question "What is the truly right thing to do in this particular situation"?

In many situations a person neglects to ask "Is this fair and what should I do about it? He or she does not attend to an issue of fairness, does not exercise his or her own best judgment about what is fair and what he or she should do to make it more fair.

Hence, while the stage of an individual's reasoning can be measured with great reliability, this does not by itself tell much about the individual. There is much more to character than reasoning. Indeed, at the intermediate stages, knowing a person's structure of reasoning, does not tell much about how a person will behave. For those individuals whose reasoning is guided by their society's expectations, the group to which one belongs, the strength of affiliation with the group, the values that the group shares, and the strength with which members of the group hold to the values of their group tells more about how the person will behave. The structure of reasoning may be the same whether one belongs to a street gang or a scout troop. It is differences in the values of the group that largely determines differences in behavior.

The studies on which these findings are based have been conducted throughout the world in many kinds of societies, primitive, developing and modern. The studies, for the most part, have been conducted by psychologists and anthropologists who are native to the society. They have prepared structured interviews that are designed to be sensitive to the mores of the society and they administered them in the language of that society.3

I want to emphasize four things about these findings. First, that the content of knowledge present at an individual's earlier stages of reasoning is not replaced in later stages. The content is however reordered. In a sense, all that an individual has learned takes on a new coherence. For example, in moving from the third to the fourth stage of reasoning, the individual will retain his or her sense of cultural heritage as a basis for personal identity but, when attending to an issue of justice, he or she will judge what is right upon the basis of law as a social compact rather than upon the social conventions of his or her society.

Second, in the period of transition from one stage to another, that is, in the period when one structure of reasoning is sensed to be inadequate but a new structure of reasoning has not yet been consolidated, the individual feels uprooted. His or her underlying basis for both individual judgment and personal identity has been severed.4

Third, these are research findings, not just plausible opinions. They are findings from rigorous social science research that can be, and has been, duplicated time and again, research that meets well-established standards for validity and reliability. Further, it is not just empirical evidence. It is, in John De wey's words, readjusting intelligence. The strength of Kohl berg's findings lies not so much in that they have been duplicated in dozens of societies as in their having been tested in practice and the theory refined in the light of that practice.

Drawing on Du rkhiem5, Dewey6, Pi aget7, George Herbert M ead8, Vygo tsky9, and others, Kohlberg helped establish "Just Communities" in prisons10 and inner city schools11. In these small societies within a society the members develop a sense of community. They develop a sense of "we-ness" and they agree upon rules of conduct that are based upon fairness. In doing so, some of them complete the transition from the second stage of reasoning based upon "instrumental exchange" to the third stage based upon "do what the members of your group or society expect of you." A few, while a member of such a community, will then progress to the fourth stage of reasoning, namely, "do what the laws of your society require."

The fourth point I want to emphasize is that, alongside the sense of uprootedness that most individuals sense as they progress from one structure of reasoning to the succeeding stage, there is also a sense of uprootedness which can stem from rapid changes in the traditions of the society itself. Individuals who look to the culture and traditions of their society for standards of judgment, often sense personal uprootedness when a society has abandoned its traditional conventions but has not yet adopted replacements. Since the research indicates that a majority of individuals in a majority of the world's present societies look to cultural traditions as their basis for judgment of what is right or wrong, and since most of these societies are now undergoing rapid change in their conventions, a large number, perhaps a majority, of individuals throughout the world sense uprootedness. Add to this the growing number of individuals who are beginning to question their cultural traditions as a basis for judgment but have not yet progressed to reasoning based upon social compact or law--college freshman and sophomores throughout the world are typical examples--and add to this the growing number of individuals who are in transition between the stage of social compact and the stage of autonomous judgment--the Baza rovs and Raskoln ikovos12 of this world are extreme examples--and one can account for most of the uprootedness in any society.

If then, the natural course of development of human reasoning can account for much of the current uprootedness in the world, what are the future prospects for a more secure sense of self and purpose for the person in society? There is, according to the research, no turning back of reasoning for an individual though, unlike individuals, societies can regress for a time as they have under despots like Hitler and Stalin--but not for long, at least not theoretically. For there is strong evidence that the education and experience that is necessary for an individual to function well in a technological society also provides the foundation necessary for the development of moral judgment and a sense of personal identity that is less dependent upon the approval of others.13 This is not to say that one becomes less concerned about others. To the contrary, it is largely through taking responsibility in a democratic, pluralistic society, that a person gains the experience that promotes the development of greater ability to see things from the perspectives of others and, with it, a foundation for the development of higher stages of reasoning about what is fair.14

The education and experience necessary to think abstractly in matters of science or administration is however insufficient, by itself, for the development of advanced stages of moral judgment. It is not enough to be able to see things from the perspectives of others who are different. It is also necessary to exercise one's ability to see things from the perspectives of others. It is necessary to sort out duty and justice in ways that organize a new structure of reasoning about what is fair between individuals from a multitude of perspectives. It becomes a mental structure that is well integrated in the sense that it achieves coherence between an individual's rights and obligations and is well differentiated in the sense that it can be applied to a broad range of situations.15 But even at the stage of autonomous reasoning, an individual's capacity for moral judgment does not, by itself, guide behavior. One has to attend to issues of fairness in order to call judgment into play and one's attention is much influenced by one's capacity for empathy or caring and one's sense of responsibility in a particular situation. As studies by Agusto Bl asi16 at the University of Massachusetts and by Klaus He lkama17 at the University of Helsinki have demonstrated, a sense of responsibility to act is associated with an assessment that the situation provides reasonable assurance of the ability to act effectively. This includes assessment that external circumstances are sufficiently favorable to permit the individual to prevail in a course of action without neglecting other competing responsibilities.

But if human development research can account for why millions of people throughout the world feel uprooted in their societies, can this research, or some combination of research and philosophy, suggest a way out, a way for an individual to find a better place in society? Given the state of the world, is it likely that the individual will find a more coherent sense of self in a more lawful society of humankind? Are individuals and societies progressing toward greater order and justice? In effect, this is the question that man has wanted to answer above all others. Is the universe friendly to humankind? Is there a loving God? There are several bits and pieces of evidence and much in the way of philosophic thought to support an answer in the affirmative.

For hundreds of years philosophers and, more recently, psychologists, have dwelt upon the idea of a biogenetic law or a theory of biological recapitulation according to which the reasoning of an individual develops stage-by-stage, following the same patterns of normative thought that have developed in societies over the centuries. Physiologically the human foetus appears to develop in a way parallel to the evolution of the human species and, psychologically, the development of children in modern societies appears in some ways to reflect stages in the historical development of human consciousness. There has been little agreement that this rule-governed repetition has bearing on mental and moral development or that, sociologically, the development of societies tends to parallel human psychological development. Yet, around the turn of the century, Leonard Trelawney Hob house made a case for this idea and Koh lberg has argued that his research supports it. The corresponding argument, that the development of the human species recapitulates the physical and mental development of its most highly developed individuals has not, to my knowledge, been made though some evidence for it might be found in the physical development of the human species and, implicit in Kohlberg's research, is the finding that the species is moving toward the wisdom of Soc rates and the moral judgment of Ga ndhi and Martin Luther King. That there is a natural groping toward greater strength and wisdom seems undeniable.

Philosophers have long seen the human quest as a search for meaning. As Jerome Br uner has observed from his studies of very young children, "From the start, the human infant is active in seeking out regularities in the world about him--behavior from early on is guided by means-end readiness and by search--(that produces) active pleasure from successful prediction."19 This search for meaning arises, as Spi noza20 perceived it, from the oonatus, the tendency to self-preservation which is common to all living things in Nature, human and non-human. But, for humans, preservation of the self and of the species as well, appears to involve a natural and necessary tendency of the human organism to maintain and increase its own power and perfection. As Teilhard de Char din21 saw it, it is the drive to the evolution of a progressively more conscious mind.

As indicated by the research on the development of judgment described above, everyone, everywhere is engaged in a search for more reasonable authority. As Koh lberg observed in "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away With It in the Study of Moral Development,"22 the search for authority not only is a universal characteristic of the human species, but ought to be. It ought to be in that the search, until it is arrested by forces too strong for the individual, leads to a greater sense of the order of things, a greater equilibrium of reasoning. The psychological theory that has been developed from Kohlberg's research as to why people factually do prefer a higher stage of reasoning to a lower is broadly the same as a moral theory as to why people should prefer a higher stage of judgment to a lower. However, while psychological theory and normative ethical theory are not reducible to each other, the two enterprises are isomorphic or parallel. The formal psychological developmental criteria of differentiation and integration, of structural equilibrium, map into the formal moral criteria of prescriptiveness and universality. At the higher stages of reasoning there is greater prescriptiveness about what a person ought to do and greater universality in its application. In effect, the categorical imperative becomes self-developed by an individual.

In his conclusion to "From Is to Ought" Kohlberg claims to have found no better summary statement of the implications of his studies than that made by So crates:

First, virtue is ultimately one, not many, and it is always the same ideal form regardless of climate or culture.

Second, the name of this ideal form is justice.

Third, not only is the good one, but virtue is knowledge of the good. He who knows the good chooses the good.

Fourth, the kind of knowledge of the good which is virtue is philosophical knowledge or intuition of the ideal form of the good, not correct opinion or acceptance of conventional beliefs.

Knowledge of the good, as Socrates says in the Meno is true knowledge, not right thinking and it is based upon reasoning that is autonomous not heteronomous. It is reasoning that approaches a universal perspective.

The development of more prescriptive and universal reasoning is then a major part of the development of the self and of self-realization. And according to Spinoza, self-realization is the fundamental striving of our nature. While we are all slaves to something, we can attain a stronger and more stable state of the self if we attain a stronger and more stable love of something that frees. The way to find it lies in trying to discover it and the discovery is in knowing the union of the mind with the whole of nature. As Teilhard saw it, according to the evolutionary structure of the world, we can only find our person in uniting together.

The search for authority in oneself and in God or nature involves an effort by each and every individual to reconstruct in his or her own mind an order of reasoning that reflects and interprets a pattern of order in nature. At the highest stage of reasoning where rights and obligations are seen as the same, the search leads to authority in natural law.

The findings of the research confirm the conclusions from the logic of St. Thomas Aqu inas, that "there is in man an inclination to the good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law."23

Though it may appear that fewer, not more people in the world are now law-abiding, it can be said, as it has since Plato, that error is always the privation of knowledge of the good. What human development research tells us is that right thinking about the good can be transmitted by cultural traditions or religious doctrine, but true knowledge must be developed by oneself in society.

Still the authority of natural law discovered through reason is, in effect the same as that of natural law revealed and accepted as authoritative by the individual through faith. It is the same because the act of finding authority in reason is itself an act of faith. It is faith in a progressively more lawful universe. It is faith that the record of the world as a speck of matter during an instant of cosmic time is indicative of God's true design.

The search for the place of the person in society is therefore a search for a means, not an end. To find the place of the person in society is to find a means to progress toward union with others. To find authority in the culture and traditions of one's society is one of a series of steps forward, the inescapable stage of the traditional self, which is one of several stages of human development that mark off the inevitable search for self-realization. It is a search that leads to finding authority in natural law.

Center for Education and National Development,

The George Washington University, Washington, D.C.

NOTES

1. John R. Sna rey, "The Cross-cultural Universality of Social-moral Development: A Critical Review of Kohlbergian Research," Psychological Bulletin, 97 (19 ), pp. 202-232.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Robert Keg an, The Evolving Self-Problem and Process in Human Development (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 83-110.

5. See Lawrence Ko hlberg, The Psychology of Moral Development (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1984), pp. 684-709.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid

10. Lawrence Kohlberg, Peter Sch arf, and Joseph Hi ckey, "The Justice Structure of the Prison: A Theory and Interaction," The Prison Journal, 2 (1972).

11. Lawrence Kohlberg, Education and Moral Development (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1990).

12. Protagonists in Turg onov's Fathers and Sons and Dostoye vsky's Crime and Punishment.

13. Kohlberg (1984), op. cit., pp. 212-320.

14. Klaus Hel kama, "The Development of the Attribution of Responsibility: A Critical Survey of Emperical Research and Theoretical Outline," Research Reports of the Department of the Department of Social Psychology, University of Helsinki, 3 (1979). Also see Kohlberg (1984), op. cit. pp. 498-581.

15. Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization," Child Development, 39 (1968), pp. 691-736.

16. Agusto Bl osi, "Bridging Moral Cognition and Moral Action: A Critical Review of the Literature," Psychological Bulletin, 88 (1980), pp. 1-45.

17. Helkana, op. cit., p. 43.

18. Leonard H othouse, Morals in Evolution: A Study in Comparative Ethics (New York: Holt, 1923; 1906).

19. Jerome Br uner, Child's Talk: Learning to Use Language (New York: Norton, 1983), pp. 24-26.

20. Benedict S pinoza, Ethics (London: Hofner Press, 1949).

21. Pierre Teilhard De Char din, The Phenomenon of Man (New York: Harper & Row, 1959).

22. Lawrence Kholberg, "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with it in the Study of Moral Development," In T. Mit chel, ed., Cognitive Development and Epistemology (New York: Academic Press, 1971).

23. St. Thomas Aqu inas.