CHAPTER XII

PERSON AND THE COMMUNITY

KAGUONGO WAMBARI

During the struggle for fre edom from colonial bondage in Africa, three decades ago, Kwame Nkr umah urged Africans to seek political independence, promising that once political independence was achieved all other things, e.g., economic, cultural--even personhood--would be added to them. Today with almost all of Africa having gained political independence, Nkrumah's promise is far from having been fulfilled. The realization that the promise has not been fulfilled has prompted a search for a second liberation among some Africans1. This is because it has become painfully clear that political independence, though a necessary condition for a people's self-realization, is not sufficient. Equally, it is painfully clear, from the African experience, that national autonomy does not always lead to personal autonomy. Much of the discontent in independent Africa today has to do with the specter of politically independent nations of people who have not yet achieved personal independence.

Frustrated expectations of meaningful free personal involvement in the affairs of one's state and society have caused not only disillusionment, but sometimes also cynicism. The citizenry has missed the experience of sharing power and felt intimidated since "the African state has remained set apart from the populace after political independence because of excessive concentration of power in the hands of a small group of people drawn from a ruling political party, the civil or military service"2. "Instead of using their `voice' (option) and registering their opinion, people prefer to use their `exit' option, i.e., to withdraw from public affairs,"3 and thus to become alienated. A second liberation, it seems to me, ought to endeavour to establish a self-fulfilling place for the person in social and political life.

This paper examines the place of the person in community life, evaluates personal self-determination and attempts to clarify conditions which render achievement of selfhood difficult. It discusses the communalism characteristic of pre-colonial Africa vis-a-vis the individualism of post-independence Africa and suggests that the status of the person, the basic unit of the community, is vital in the individual relationship with society. The paper points to the possibility of a coexistence of both personal autonomy and communal responsibility.

The Pe rson

In philosophy we understand a person to be a rational self-conscious being: the person is the only creature that is fully self-conscious. A person has a privileged knowledge of him/herself through experiencing his/her self-consciousness. No one else can experience this consciousness of self except the self. To Desca rtes the discovery of the certainty and exclusivity of this knowledge of the "I am" marked a breakthrough in epistemology in particular and in philosophy in general; this established him as the father of modern philosophical thought. "My self-awareness is, to myself, the most immediate and indubitable of all realities, because I am self-awareness," writes Theodosius Dobz hansky4. It follows similarly by analogy that your self-awareness is for you, the most immediate and indubitable of all realities, because you are your self-awareness. The same holds true for other persons, but because no one can enter another's stream of consciousness this cannot be known indubitably.

Persons are conscious of themselves as unique beings with needs and aspirations that they, more than anyone else, are aware of. They also have their own interests arising from the unique ways in which they experience themselves; in particular, persons have an interest in being identified with their needs and aspirations. Persons endeavour to meet these needs and aspirations themselves by use of rationality (i.e., reason) to enable them to make their social and natural environments habitable and their lives more than mere existence. It is in his or her conscious activities that a person expresses himself or herself uniquely as a member of humanity, if I may parody Karl M arx.

A persons is aware of his potentialities and endeavours to actualize his choices among these potentialities. That one is open to his potentialities, and that it is up to him to actualize his choices among them, points to the fact that a person is ever unfinished and always in the process of becoming. In the words of John Mac quarrie, a person "is in a process of transition towards new forms of existence, or to put it another way,-- the human being is unfinished and confronts an openness in which he has still to shape himself".5 A person cannot therefore be fully known as an object, for any one time he is an unrepeatable becoming subject best known to himself.

A person's rationality enables him to direct his social impulses so as to relate to others in harmonious ways. For as a social creature a person is at his best when sharing companionship with other persons. A person has the capacity to distinguish between actions that enhance harmonious relationships with other persons and actions that stand in the way of those relationships. He can distinguish between what is and what ought to be. In other words, a person has moral sensibility and because of this he is capable of preferring the good of the community, of which he is a member to his personal good, especially when the two goods conflict. A person's moral sensibility enables him to prefer long term good to immediate or short term good if the latter stands in the way of the former.

It is evident that a person's rationality is closely connected to his morality; as the guiding principle of thought rationality guides morality. Rationality also guides sociality which in turn depends a great deal on morality. Thus rationality, morality and sociality, all of which figure significantly in the understanding of a person, are closely related and interconnected.

Personal Autonomy

Paul Tay lor defines "full personhood" as the "most complete actualization of powers of autonomy and rationality required for choosing one's own value system and for directing one's life on the basis of that value system".6 He thus connects the concept of the person and that of autonomy.

Personal autonomy can be understood as "self-direction according to a life-plan which conforms to the individual's long term (dispositional) nature and interests".7 This conceptualization of personal autonomy requires that the person be free from any form of manipulation. It also requires that the autonomous person know himself, understand who he is, what he would like to make of his life and how best he can make of his life what he believes it should be. One must also be the originator of one's actions because one's beliefs and values are identified with oneself. In the words of Robert Y oung, "Self-directedness of one's life is exemplified by the fact that in the main, it is ordered according to a plan or conception which fully expresses one's own will".8 An autonomous pe rson is therefore the individual who not only is conscious of who one is, but who also has a clear picture of the life he wished to lead, his place in his community; he makes carefully reasoned choices that guide him towards realization of the aspired life. Personal autonomy has, therefore, to do with self-understanding and self-expression.

John Be nson sees being autonomous also as putting "oneself in the best position to answer for the reliability of one's beliefs"9. It is putting oneself in a position in which one is accountable for one's life. Personal autonomy rejects blind conformity to tradition or authority of any sort while accepting that the "burden of proof that departure from the guidelines will be creative and integrative not only for the individual involved but also for the larger community rests with those who make the exception"10.

Personal development to autonomous status is closely connected with the personal development of rationality and a sense of value. Three stages of such development are broadly identifiable. In the earliest stage a child merely responds to the world around him, repeating behavior that is rewarded by those in his life and discarding behavior that is frowned upon. Approval or disapproval determines to a large extent the way the child responds to his social and natural environment. It is much more a matter of adaptation to the environment than of rationality or conscience, both of which initially are only potential. One is other-directed at this stage because reason as a guide to action and the sense of value as determining of what is worth one's life are at best latent and almost inoperative.

Gradually a person enters a second stage internalizing the values from one's environment. The family, the clan, the school, the church, the club, the party, or whatever social grouping one happens to be affiliated to become the source of one's values. Approval and disapproval are inherited first without questioning; conformity to the group becomes the norm. Reasoning and sense of value are activated at this stage of development, and it is reasoning and sense of value that reflect the society of which one is a member. Rationality and moral conscience emerge, but they do not uniquely and fully set apart a person who determines his own life. Society's beliefs become one's beliefs, society's likes and dislikes become one's own; though more or less passively received. The individual is molded by his society. One's reasoning and valuing, not unlike his language, are no more than acquisitions from one's society. One develops an uncritical traditional conscience which unquestioningly receives values.

The first (adaptive) and the second (heteronomous) stages of individual development share in common other-directedness in contrast to the third (autonomous) stage where one is self-directed and determines one's own values. Personal autonomy is characterized by a critical independent conscience consisting of a combination of cognitive and motivational elements. The cognitive element is responsible for the determination of value while the motivational element functions in a way to incline one's will to pursue what is judged right and eschew what is judged wrong by the cognitive element. Persons at this stage do their own thinking to arrive at choices which they themselves consider correct and are in a position to support rationally. An autonomous person as a member of society sometimes will accept the values of society, but will actively adopt them by choice rather than merely inherit them wholesale.

Co mmunity

The term "community" refers to a group of people with common ties, interpersonal relationships and common interests and goals, each member perceiving himself as belonging to the group and participating in its life. Given this understanding, anonymity, impersonality and detachment would characterize absence of community.

Robert Paul W olff defines a community as a group of persons who together experience a reciprocity of awareness.11 Thus what Wolff calls affective community is the reciprocal consciousness of a shared culture. It is the mutual awareness on the part of each that others share that culture, and through such mutuality we are many together rather than many alone.12 Affective community could as well be a reciprocal consciousness of shared blood-relation, like the family or kinship; it could be that of shared race or nationality.13 Pre-colonial African community was typically affective and based on reciprocal consciousness of kinship. As John Mb iti observes:

The deep sense of kinship, with all it implies, has been one of the strongest forces in traditional African life. Kinship is reckoned through blood and betrothal (engagement and marriage). It is kin ship which controls social relationships between people in a given community: it governs marital customs and regulations, it determines the behavior of one individual towards another. . . . Almost all the concepts connected with human relationship can be understood and interpreted through the kinship system.14

The form of African comm unity is communal. Communalism is understood as the view that the group (i.e., the community) "constitutes the focus of the activities of the individual members of the society".15 Kwame Gy ekye points out that "the doctrine of Communalism places emphasis on the activity and success of the wider society rather than though not necessarily at the expense of, to the detriment of the individual."16 Communal social order is motivated by the well-being of the community, its solidarity, co-operation, mutual concern and reciprocal obligation, as well as fair distribution of benefits and burdens among its members. African communal social thought is characterized by the outlook of mutual social responsibility, calling upon all members of a community to act in such a way as to enhance the good of the group. The good of the group as a whole is taken to include the good of the individual members so that enhancement of the good of the community implies the enhancement of individual persons. In the words of Nye rere,

provided he is willing to work, no individual within that society should worry about what will happen to him tomorrow if he does not hoard wealth today. Society itself should look after him or his widow, or his orphans. This is exactly what traditional African society succeeded in doing. . . . Nobody starved . . . he could depend on the wealth possessed by the community of which he was a member.17

African social philosophy has much to recommend it when it comes to discouraging individualism, that is the tendency on the part of the individual to be motivated, in life and action, by one's own interest often at the expense of other members of society or the group as a whole. Writers like John Mb iti18 and Jomo Ken yatta19 describe the absence of individualism in pre-colonial African society, showing how allegiance to the community had a significant place in human relations. They see individualism, attributed to western influences, as the scourge of contemporary life in Africa. These and some other writers, however, appear oblivious to individuality, that is, the quality of an individual characterized by independence of thought and action. Reading such writers, one gets the impression that African social thought does not recognize individuality--the quality conducive to personal autonomy.

Kwame Gye kye,20 however, in his analysis of the concepts of communality and individuality among the Akan of Ghana, indicates that their social order is ambiguous manifesting features of both communality and individuality. These two features are expressed in the Akan art motif of the "Siamese" crocodile21--a crocodile with two heads but a single stomach. The Akans say that although the two heads have a common stomach they always struggle for food. The crocodile symbol has reference to Akan social thought articulating the uniqueness of the individual and his or her relationship to the society. The head emphasizes unique individuality indicating the will, tastes, needs, aspirations and interests of the individual and therefore his or her desire for self-expression and determination. The common stomach in the symbol indicates that the basic needs and aspirations of the community are the same. It symbolizes the common good for the group. The individuals contribute to that common good, but they are also the beneficiaries from that common good. The symbol thus indicates compatibility between individuality and communality--reciprocal relationship between the per son and the commu nity.

The post-colonial independent African social set up, nevertheless, emphasizes the communal aspects of society at the expense of the individuality, thus thwarting expressions of individuality in the social life. Inevitably, the traditional sense of community has been undermined in pluralistic urban life as ki nship can no longer form the basis of reciprocal consciousness. Yet a reciprocal awareness of shared nationality has not developed sufficiently to form such a basis for the national community. The general style of leadership is what Maz rui and Ti dy22 have called the Elder Tradition. This follows the pattern of an extended family with the father figure as the head. It is characterized by a suppression of individuality manifested in the avoidance of free debate and open electoral processes. It is highly authoritarian and paternalistic according the leader the status of "father of the nation" with prerogatives of political power and opinion formation. The Elder Tradition has a preference for consensus and the father figure "expects that consensus and has profound distrust for dissent and dispute, even of the kind which is indispensable for a vigorous political and intellectual atmosphere."23 Intellectual independence and critical political consciousness are seen as evidence of disloyalty in the Elder Tradition, which clearly is incompatible with personal autonomy.

Ideology and the Pe rson

Kwasi Wi redu has discussed belief in the desirability and effectiveness of ideology in present day national life in Africa. He identifies two senses of ideology. The first is positive: a "set of ideas about what form the good society should take."24 In this sense ideology is intended to guide society in the right direction by means of some coherent ideas (emerging from the people) concerning its articulated ideal destiny. In the second sense, considered degenerate by Wiredu, "an ideology is a set of ossified dogmas used as a political weapon in the relentless pursuit of power or, when attained, the determined retention of it at all costs."25

The second sense of "ideology" is degenerate because ideology is not open to analysis, questioning, criticism or reconstruction. Ideology is intended to function (and does function) as a weapon of suppression and coercion in the interest of those in authority. It is meant to suppress any individuals who, perceiving the world differently, might doubt and challenge the leadership by questioning or offering an alternative ideology. Such a doubter automatically is silenced as a saboteur of the status quo. Such an ideology is an instrument of coercion forcing blind submission to authority and conditioning the populace to follow the leaders who, by dint of being in authority, can determine how all the rest (the masses of the people) shall live. Ideology in this sense robs the individuals of their individuality and personhood and reduces them to massmen.

A massman is an individual who on an important social issue will express either no opinion or, if at all, the given prevailing opinion. Never, however, will he express never an opinion contrary to the prevailing one for fear of risking the wrath of the authority behind the prevailing opinion. Massmanship is clearly the opposite of personal autonomy. I am compelled to agree with Wir edu that this degenerate sense of ideology is most in conformity with the realities of contemporary African political life. It is also consistent with its Marxist conceptualization as a "system of beliefs and attitudes which distort, for those held captive by the ideology, their understanding of the world and their positions and possibilities in it, and which result in social forces, characteristic of class societies, which in a persuasive manner tend not to bring ideas in line with reality."26

In Africa ideology tends to be a monopoly of politicians, leaving no room even for thinkers such as philosophers who, in the words of W iredu, could give it "conceptual preparation and analysis" for purposes of "impact upon basic thought habits".27 It is distorted because it presents a partial, unilateral view of reality paraded as the shared view of the real world. It projects an image of being interpersonal--rather than personal--and concerned about the interests of the whole society rather than of the privileged few. Degenerate ideology is guided most by appetites and less by ideas. Although it purports to be concerned about matters of truth, it will readily substitute factual information by propaganda and slogans. Since the populace is expected to show commitment and loyalty to the ideology it undermines the individual personal freedom to think for oneself. Philosophy, as a critically reflective activity which analyses ideas, beliefs, and attitudes with the aim of reconstructing them as necessary, is clearly at cross-purposes with ideology in this latter sense.

In Africa one finds signs of degeneration even in such "humanistic" ideologies as kaundaism,28 the ideology of the sole political party in Zambia and originated by President Kenneth Ka unda29 himself. Kaundaism as an ideology refers to "the beliefs, ideas or attitudes of an important person (i.e., Kaunda). These may be peculiar to him, but they affect his actions, and what he does has grave consequences for others.30 Kaunda confesses to have "great faith in the power of ideologies to condition people's thinking, to mold their value system."31 Clearly Kaunda has a preconceived image of the kind of people he wants Zambians to become and Kaundaism is the instrument to be used to manipulate their "thinking" and "mold their value system". The fact that these people are persons--conscious of themselves as having their own wills, their own ideas, their own aspirations and hopes for the future--does not appear to count. They are to acquire Kaunda's image passively; his ideology is to be imposed on the people who are unfree to think for themselves.

Kaunda's vision misconstrues human nature and is therefore in no position to uplift the people so that they can realize themselves. Little wonder then that "Kaundaism has not developed, nor its appreciation and understanding advanced a whit more during the two decades of its existence." This despite the fact that a government ministry was set up to propagate the ideology and an Institute set up at the national university to research and develop it. As long as an ideology is as personalized as is Kaundanism, it is difficult for other people to find their place in it; it cannot become an institution, and human resources for resisting such an imposition are unlimited.

For the second liberation in Africa to be meaningful, it must free individual persons from impositions of all sorts. To serve the community, an ideology should emanate from the people who dialogue freely to formulate a synthesis mobilizing ideas to approximate what they think an ideal society for them should be. As such an ideology will be fashioned after the people's perceptions of themselves and their aspirations. It should mirror the vision of the community. Only then can it be expected to give direction to people's aspirations and hopes. It needs to be constantly self-reflective in order to be clear what its own credentials are--examining its content, coherence and suitability in meeting the unique task of enabling the community to forge ahead. An ideology must never lose sight of the fact that as a social institution its contribution to the well being of the community and its individual members is its only justification.

One Party System

A prominent feature of independent African nations is the adoption of a one party system of government. While many arguments have been put forth to justify this widespread development in Africa, it is evident that concern for democracy could hardly be the motivating force for the preference. A one-party system of government limits free and open debate as well as an open electoral process because the absence or limited choice of alternatives loops back to further limit democratic opportunities for individual self expression and self-determination.

A one party system is primarily a device in the hands of those in power for controlling conflict and dissension by forestalling opposition from the rest of society. Like ideology in a degenerate sense, it often is used as an instrument of suppression and coercion. It is an arrangement that ensures that the authority and control of those in power is free from any threats by those who might aspire to offer alternative leadership. Establishment of a one-party system of government sees to it that all potential or actual sources of organized or unorganized opposition to the government are brought under the party, which assures an upper hand over other institutions in society and thus overshadowing them. In Kenya recently, the single party, Kenya African National Union (KANU) brought under its wings the giant nationwide women organization-- Maendeleo ya Wanawake,32--as well as the nationwide Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU). In Tanzania too the only party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), has brought under its control the trade union movements, co-operative organizations, women organizations, etc. In this position the party controls all other institutions after divesting them of their unique identities and steering them towards party conceived goals.

Individuals in one party states do not have full opportunity to determine the kind of state and society they want perceiving the government of the day as imposing itself on them. A chasm is thus created between those who rule and the ruled and the rulers are seen to use public institutions primarily to perpetuate themselves in office rather than to promote the good of the ruled. The rulers on their part become adverse to any desire by the ruled to express and pursue personal opinions and preferences. The ruled masses in the words of Wanyande, "sensing their inability to meaningfully influence the policies of state and the behavior of those in positions of leadership, tend to develop apathy and to withdraw from participation in the political processes."33 In many African states expression of contrary opinion or dissension from the party line is sufficient reason for the dissenter to be thrown out of the party and into a political wilderness. A person who fails to toe the political line does so at the risk of becoming a political non-person--an undesirable consequence in circumstances where party membership may very well mean one's livelihood.

Frantz Fa non perceived the dangerous undemocratic nature of the single-party when he wrote:

The political party in many parts of Africa which are today independent is puffed up in a most dangerous way. In the presence of a member of the party, the people are silent, behave like a flock of sheep, and publish panegyrics in praise of the government or the leader.34

He castigated the single party as "the modern form of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, unmasked, unpainted, unscrupulous and cynical."35

There is a connection between the single party system and degenerate ideology. The one party is used by those in authority to force the adopted ideology on the people, thus creating a false impression of unanimity among the citizenry. The truth, however, is that there can be no permanent unanimity of ideas among thinking rational beings. It is a "unanimity" bought at enormous price of personhood! The one party system and degenerate ideology are also connected to something which Grace Ibin gira36 calls winner-take-all policy, one that allows the winner or winners in a power struggle to monopolize its exercise. This policy manifests intolerance on the part of those in power and unwillingness to share it and all the benefits it brings. The winner-take-all syndrome accounts for the withdrawal from involvement in national life by the vanquished as well as the numerous unconstitutional governmental takeovers. It is a major pitfall of national consciousness standing in the way of national community.

The Per son and the Community

As the individual is the basic unit of society, society should be conceived in terms of the individual persons composing it. Individuals in any society contribute their share in molding for better or worse the character of the community, of which for better or worse, they are members. The community or society at large also determines to a large extent what its members become. What the individual person is and what his or her society is affect one another to the extent that neither could be what it is without the other. There is, thus, a mutual dependence between the individual and society, the recognition of which should accord the individual person his or her rightful place in social life. Throughout the ages, as if the individual were antithetic to society, the tendency has been and still is for society to exercise an upper hand over the individual persons, thus curtailing personal individuality or autonomy. As E.H. Ca rr has pointed out,

It would be dangerous to assume that the power of a modern national community to mould the character and thought of its individual members and to produce a certain degree of conformity and uniformity is any less than that of a primitive tribal community37

Molding the values, thoughts and attitudes of an individual by society seems to require authoritarianism, thus restraining the individual's life to the extent that he is rendered unable to develop and exercise his or her own will. Without freedom to exercise one's will one cannot mature as a real person. Yet, in the end, the kind of society a people creates is determined by the kind of individuals it develops. As M ill has argued,

in proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is, therefore, capable of being more valuable to others. There is greater fullness of life about his own existence, and when there is more life in the units there is more in the mass which is composed of them.38

The second liberation in Africa should aim at a greater fullness of life for the individual person in a community which accommodates and reflects his or her personhood.

Affective community based on reciprocal awareness of shared kinship cannot be created or sustained in African nation states composed of many ethnic groupings. In fact, it is this kind of community with its commitment to kinship that is to blame for divisive widespread tribalism and nepotism in African social life. The ensuing conflict and disharmony have undermined any chance for national consciousness and hence national community. Fa non laments such obstacles to national community, referring to them as "pitfalls of national consciousness"39. A community is the better the more it is guided by the principle of equal regard for all persons thus affording each one of them an equal opportunity to develop to the best of one's capacity. A maximum number of people can then develop themselves and participate in determining the society they create jointly while at the same time assuming responsibility for institutions that they are party to bringing about.

An ideal society would appear to be of the sort which Wolff calls rational community, "a reciprocity of consciousness which is achieved and sustained by equals who discourse together publicly for the specific purpose of social decision and action."40 It would be characterized by free participatory deliberation upon social goals and free participatory determination of social choices. It would be a community in which persons as rational and moral beings would experience themselves as counting for something in the collectivity to which they belonged as their membership in those societies would make a perceivable difference towards realization of some social good. Through exercise of personal will in such free participation one would realize not only one's good, but also communal well-being indicating harmonization of self-realization with realization of the community.

Conclusion

I have been arguing in this paper that the first liberation in Africa, i.e., political independence, achieved little more than national freedom and statehood. For the individual persons within the politically free states another level of freedom, namely, personal autonomy, is desirable if the person is to realize him or herself as a unique reality. It has been pointed out that effective community based on reciprocal consciousness of shared kinship should give way to an approximation of rational community--a reciprocity of consciousness achieved and sustained by equals who discourse together freely for the purpose of social decision and action. Such a community requires that the individual person, the basic unit of society, be accorded freedom to develop individuality and personhood in order to make possible the creative and constructive contribution of ideas for social change. For if society is to avoid stagnation it must create conditions suitable for the ever unfinished person continually to shape him or herself as a truly rational, moral and social being and to play his or her rightful role as an active member of one's community.

Kenyatta University, Nairobi, Kenya

NOTES

1. See "The state and the crisis in Africa: In search of a Second Liberation" in Development Dialogue (1988), pp. 4-29.

2. Ibid., p. 24.

3. Ibid., p. 23.

4. Theodosius Dobz hansky, "Evolutionary Roots of Family Ethics and Group Ethics," The World and I: A Chronicle of our Changing Era, Vol. 1, No. 3, Washington Times Corporation, March, 1986.

5. John Macq uarrie, In Search of Humanity: A Theological and Philosophical Approach (London: SCM Press, 1982), p. 32.

6. Paul W. Ta ylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 40.

7. Robert B. Y oung, Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive Liberty (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1986), p. vii.

8. Ibid., p. 8.

9. John Ben son "Who is the Autonomous Man?" in Philosophy, 58 (1983), 8f.

10. Milton A. Gons alves, Fagothey's Right & Reason: Ethics in Theory and Practice (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill Publishing Company, 1989), p. 333.

11. Robert Paul Wo lff, The Poverty of Liberalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), pp. 184-185.

12. Ibid., p. 187.

13. It is conceivable that affective community could be based on reciprocal consciousness of shared humanity thus yielding a global community of homo sapiens, the kind of community needed to address problems of environmental concerns.

14. John S. Mb iti, African Religions and Philosophy (Garden City, New York: Anchor, 1970), p. 135.

15. See Kwame Gy ekye, An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan conceptual Scheme (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 154-55.

16. Ibid., p. 155.

17. Julius K. Ny erere, Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 3.

18. See African Religions and Philosophy, pp. 293-94.

19. Jomo Ke nyatta, Facing Mount Kenya, intro., B. Malinowski (New York: Random, n.d.), p. 115.

20. Essay on African Philosophical Thought, p. 154.

21. Ibid., pp. 159f.

22. See Ali Maz rui & Michael Ti dy, Nationalism and New States in Africa (London: Heinemann, 1984), pp. 187-88.

23. Ibid., p. 187.

24. Kwasi Wir edu, Philosophy and an African Culture {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 52.

25. Ibid., p. 86.

26. Kai Nie lsen "Marx and Moral Ideology," in African Philosophical Inquiry, 1 (1987), p. 72.

27. Philosophy and an African Culture, p. 58.

28. See Roni M. Khul Bwalya, "On Kaundanism," An International African Journal of Philosophy (Lusaka, Zambia), 31.

29. Kaundanism is cited as an example because its originator is a leading African statesman--moderate and progressive--yet even his ideology is not free from degeneration.

30. Khul Bwalye, op.cit.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Maendeleo ya Wanawake (literally, Women Development) has been simply a social welfare organization that has in the past kept clear of political involvement.

34. Peter Wany ande, "Democracy and the One Party state: The African Experience" in Democratic Theory and Practice in Africa, eds. W.O. O yugi & A. Git onga (Nairobi: Heinemann Kenya, 1987), p. 77.

35. Frantz Fa non, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove, 1968), p. 182.

36. Ibid., p. 165.

37. See Grace Stuart Ibin gira, African Upheals Since Independence (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1980).

38. E.H. C arr, What is History? R.W. Da vies, ed. (Hanrondsworth: Penguin, 1987), p. 32.

39. John Stuart M ill, On Liberty, Currin V. Shi elds, ed. (New York: Library of Liberal Arts, 1956), p. 76.

40. See the chapter by this title in his book, The Wretched of the Earth, pp. 148-205.