OSMAN BILEN

Culture may be described, for the purposes of this investigation, as a system of questions and answers concerning the universe and man's behavior in it. This is a closed system in the sense of its acceptance as authoritative by a human society. In an Islamic society it is the scale of values which decides the relative position and the importance of the individual questions and answers. In the faith the question about the universe finds answers in a transcendent reality. The key is the affirmation of the divine Unity, One God: all follows from this affirmation down to its most remote echoes on the very periphery of existence. Practical questions find expression in the revelation of divine will, in laws and a code of conduct which are religious, not social in origin. The Muslim believes in One God; in his messengers, sent to mankind for its guidance from the beginning of time; that Muh ammad closed the circle of messengers so that there can be no further revelation of the divine law after him; and that the Quran is the word of God.

Those in close contact with Muslims will be accustomed to hearing the statement: "we will take the good things from Western civilization, we will reject the bad things." The key term in this statement is `civilization'. It is a very potent word; even the most ardent revolutionary, whether in the Muslim world or elsewhere, fears being described as "uncivilized." Frithjol Sc huon defines "civilization" as "urban refinement in the framework of a worldly and mercantile outlook," hostile both to virgin nature and to religion.¹ In any event, the consequent traumas of this distinction of civilized and uncivilized, which affect the great part of the non-European world, have been intensified among the Muslim people by special circumstances and affects almost every public manifestation of Islam today, whether intellectual or political.

Perhaps first among the Muslims, it was a group of Turkish intellectuals, fired by the ideals of the French Revolution, who, in the 19th century, sought to Westernize their country while clinging passionately to Islam. Early in this century three schools of Turkish intellectuals were dedicated to improving and glorifying their country. One group, beginning with Namik Ke mal (1840-1888), and symbolized by Mehmed Ak if, the great poet and friend of Muhammad Iq bal, sought a revival in and through Islam. A second group associated with Ahmed Ri za and Abdullah Ce vdet scoffed at traditional religion and culture. They were either free thinkers or believed in what now is called secularism, and called for a wholehearted and prompt Westernization. A third group favored a selective adoption of Western techniques. Ziya Gok alp, the social philosopher, stood for a combination of national elements which he called Turkification and Islamization, which made him essentially one of this third group.³

It is known by all well-informed persons that the conflagration of sedition, and wickedness which broke out a few years ago in France, scattering sparks and shooting flames of mischief and tumult in all directions, has been for many years in the minds of certain accused heretics, and had been a quiescent evil which they sought an opportunity to awaken. In this way, the known and famous atheists, Volt aire, Rous seau and other such materialists, had printed and published various works consisting, God preserve us, of insults and vilification against the pure prophets and the great kings, of removal and abolition of religion and of allusions to the sweetness of equality and republicanism, all expressed in easily intelligible words and phrases, in the form of mockery. . . .⁴

What were the main characteristics or consequences of the French Revolution which attracted Turkish intellectuals who in turn overturned the Ottoman Sultanate and the history of the nation? Under the Ottoman Sultans the ruling classes consisted of the military, the civil service and the Ul ama (traditional intellectuals). As the classical Ulama lost their position in the decision-making process of state affairs, a new group of intellectuals emerged. They either became ruling elite as the military or civil servants, or provoked and inspired new ideas among educated people.

It was not the content of the Rescript--since not much in it was new--which intellectuals criticized in the press, but rather that it was not radical or it was made under the political pressure of European countries. In the years preceding Tanzimat many structural and visible changes had been made. Western style uniforms for officials become compulsory. State departments were reorganized according to western models. When French commercial law was adopted in its entirety only a weak protest came from the classical Ul ama, but the Tanzimat movement did not succeed immediately in putting it into effect. It was accepted, a few years later and in the eyes of the leaders of the movement, `Holy Law has nothing to do with it.' In Turkey this code was the first formally accepted system of law and judicature independent of Ulama. Despite the facts, in this period the general feeling expressed by the European press was that the ancient institution and structure of the Empire was barbarous and irretrievably bad. Only the adoption, as soon as possible, of a European form of government and way of life would admit Turkey to the rank and privileges of a civilized state.

Before analyzing the role of Young Ott omans in the process of intellectual and structural change in the society it would be worth mentioning the shift in the function of intellectuals. As an institution, traditional Ulama, literally "those who possess knowledge," was a collection of roles servicing a number of diverse social functions throughout the Islamic history. While in principle indivisible, from the early period of the history of Islamic institutions Ul ama was differentiated into a number of specialized groups. Generally speaking, jurists (fuqaha) who did not receive fees or income from the state, were concerned solely with the study of legal science; the judges (qadis) formed another group concerned with giving legal decisions and administrated the law in courts under the authority of the ruling power.

Although this situation might suggest that the legal profession, both theorists and practitioners, was entirely dominated by the civil authorities, we must note that religious law and legal institutions were elevated by the Ottoman Sultans to a position of supreme social eminence. The Ottomans organized the judicial system under a hierarchy headed by the Shayhk al -Islam, whose legal judgement could, in theory, override the will of Sultan. Furthermore, in the Ottoman system the Ulama represented a powerful class of governing authority, for the term designated not only scholars or religious scholars, as it normally did in the Muslim world, but official status as well. Ulama had their own financial sources, indeed all religious institutions had their own revenue producing foundations (wakf). These Islamic institutions originally had land or property dedicated to charity or some other pious purposes, such as aid for orphans, the poor, or debtors. A ruler could seize these properties only by disregarding the law and the Ulama. During Tanzimat these foundations were centralized and Ulama became officials with fixed salary. The last effect of the Ulama in state affairs was to refuse to accept a legal code adopted from Europe besides the commercial code, and the attempt to codify classical Islamic law--the sole in the Islamic world.⁵

Late Otto man intellectual movements were not homogenous. What they had in common was their opposition to the traditional institutions and to a certain extent to their mode of thinking. They represented an effort to understand and explain the problems of society, person and universe in terms of rational or secular thinking. In this respect the new trends resemble the enlightenment; they were not a genuine revival of an aspect of their own traditional thought, but an adoption of Western thought. This begins with dissatisfaction with the interpretations given by traditional thinking concerning the political organization of society. At the very beginning of these movements the main concern was political solutions to the problems faced by the society; later it came to include every aspect of life, from its natural and material, to its religious, interpretation. These materialistic and naturalistic approaches manifest the real breakdown of all forms of traditional thinking, for the over-rationalistic currents in religion were a shift from the older interpretations. In both cases, however, Western thought served as the base. The institutions which were a result of their efforts come into being not through a return to indigenous values on the part of those concerned, but through observation of Western ideas and ideologies, alien and revolutionary as the case might be.

As a matter of fact Islam had encountered other civilizations and cultures during the first centuries of its history in quite different circumstances than this encounter of the West as a newly developed civilization. For instance ancient Middle Eastern and Hellenic materials transmitted to the Islamic community were used for the advancement of philosophical and scientific speculation and for many practical applications in these fields. Men like al -Farabi, and Ibn S ina wholeheartedly devoted themselves to the study of these materials and generations of men toiled and, sometimes by sheer intelligence, managed to reject error and falsehood.⁶ A series of brilliant and original men had built, on the basis of Greek philosophical thought, a comprehensive and systematic view of the universe and of man, which they were able to synthesize with certain key concepts and doctrines of Islam to their own satisfaction and that of many in the sophisticated Muslim intelligentsia.⁷ This body of thought, called philosophy, gave violent affront to orthodoxy on several issues. In some circles, even skeptics, materialists, naturalists and, most of all, a kind of atheistic philosophy of the time found some supporters. But the orthodox Ulama responded in effective ways, and the shocks were absorbed.

The Young Ottomans' movement succeeded in its goal to the extent that a first constitution--first both in the history of the Ottoman Empire and of Islam--was accepted. With the inauguration of the constitution the first political election was held. After the new parliament decided to enter the war against Russia, Sultan Abd al -Hamid closed the parliament and suspended the constitution. These events opened a phase in the intellectual movements which became known as the "Young Turks" movement. Before treating this, however, let us return to the characteristics of the Young Otto mans.

Ziya Pa sha (1825-1880) and Namik K emal, despite their cultural and religious conservatism, favored the reformist ideas. Ziya Pa sha, while recommending the formation of a national assembly and a constitutional government, disapproved of the imitation of Western literary models. For him, each civilization had its own genius.⁸ This distinction, which later will become very important for some groups of intellectuals, can be found in the writings of Ziya Pa sha and Namik Ke mal; upon it their criticism of the Tanzimat movement depends.

In all this he seemed not only to criticize the Turkish reformists' abandonment of traditional values, but also some movements in the West. When the French scholar, E. Re nan, gave a lecture at the Sorbonne on "Islam and Science"⁹ in 1883, Namik Kemal wrote a response.¹⁰ He criticized Renan's arguments against the place of science in the Islamic tradition as well as his approach to science. Modern science asserts the eternity and immutability of the natural law, but does not leave room for a God who is the creator and the sustainer of the universe and who will destroy it at the approach of the Day of Judgement. Namik Kemal's sees the attitude of science in this as but scientism.

However, this book seems not only romantic, but apologetic for the purpose of winning the respect of Westernizers for traditional Islamic values. His proposals for the political reform reflects an attempt to systematize the political theories. The political theory he exposed is derived largely from Montesquieu and Rousseau, but he tried to show that the ideas of natural law, and natural rights are comparable with Islamic law, shari'a. He identifies the natural law of which Montesquieu speaks, with the wise and just rule called for by Islamic law. "The nature of things" is the way God creates things, in other words, natural law means `divine law' itself. Namik Kemal's approach to the modern philosophical ideas and his interpretation of religious issues in terms of these respectives reflects Islamic modernism represented by C. al-A fghani and M. Abduh. N. K emal tried also to base his political theory on Islamic traditions. The sovereignty of the people is no more than baya, the formal oath of obedience given to the caliph of the Prophet. The principle of government by representation and consultation can be justified by the commands of the Quaran which require consultation among the believers (Quaran 3:153). This verse, which he quotes, would become one of the favorite theses of nineteenth and twentieth centuries Turkish and other Muslim liberals.

The effects of his ideas can be seen among the Young Turks. His patriotism for the fatherland reflected a united Ottoman nation and the Young Turks took this passionately as a response to the need for identity among all Ottoman citizens. The Young Otto mans revolt against old institutions and traditional thinking provided a model for the younger generation.

During the period of exile the Young Turks were divided into two groups. On the one hand, was liberalism promoting a measure of decentralization and some autonomy for the national and religious minorities; on the other hand, was nationalism with a program for ever greater authority and Turkish domination. They formed the "Committee of Union and Progress," a name inspired by A. Co mte. They agreed that all should move together on the constitution, and with the help of the army managed to make the Sultan accept the Constitution of 1908. From that time until the final defeat of the Ottoman Empire these intellectuals were the dominant group.

In many ways Young Turks had characteristics quite different from their predecessors. They did not confine their efforts to criticizing the governing powers and to shaping a reform, but tried to abolish the remaining system and take control themselves. At the same time, this policy fed the different interests which resulted in both ideological and methodological divisions. From the philosophical point of view, despite being eclectic and eccentric, the movement showed a far greater philosophical character. Besides French philosophy, which was almost the only source for previous movements, the range of philosophy then known and read widened to include such philosophers as Schop enhauer, Nei tzsche and Sp encer. The Materialist philosophy of Buc hner and Hae ckel also was familiar to these intellectuals; the French sociologists, Co mte and La Play, and the historian, Ta ine, were models for their minds. In literature, the naturalism of Z ola and the works of Vol taire and Rous seau had become known. Da rwin's evolutionary theory found supporters among them. They knew about Marxism, but expressed no interest in it in their writings.

a. One school was that of the Islamists which suggested some of the characteristics expounded by Namik Ke mal. The new generation of this movement, while following the same line as N. Kemal, developed their own theory of Islamization. At the beginning of this century modernist Islamic intellectuals proposed distinguishing historic from authentic Islam. These attempts were echoed among the Turkish intellectuals, most of whom had some Western education and saw the need for some changes in the traditional understanding of Islam. They tried to achieve this goal without endangering the religious and cultural heritage of Islam, or the unity of Islamic world. Science and technology could be taken from the West, since Islam does not restrict human progress; but political, social and other solutions already existed in the Islamic heritage; hence such matters as government, law and education should remain dominated by Islam.

The problem of transferring technology and at the same time remaining loyal to their own values has been the main issue among Muslim intellectuals. Many different attempts have been made by the various Islamic countries. The failure to preserve basic human values in both Western and Eastern societies moved some contemporary Muslim thinkers to start a new movement. The advancement of technology in some cases at the expense of some human values, and its misuse in other instances, urged them to search for an Islamic base for a scientific epistemology which would prevent the negative side effects from present scientific epistemology. Most of the leading figures in this movement, such as I.R. al-Fa ruki and S.H. Na sr, have lived for a long time in Europe and North America. Many of them have a great deal of knowledge in both traditional and modern Islamic thought and modern Western thought.

The Islamization movement at the beginning of this century also preached enthusiastically the cultivation of science and the scientific spirit of the West. Fazlur Ra hman summarizes the integral constituents of their reasoning as follows: (1) that the flowering of science and the scientific spirit from the ninth to the thirteenth century among Muslims resulted from the fulfillment of the insistent Quranic requirement that man study the universe--the handiwork of God, created for his benefit; (2) that in the later middle ages the spirit of inquiry had so severely declined in the Muslim world that Muslin society stagnated and deteriorated; (3) that by cultivating scientific studies borrowed largely from Muslims, the West had prospered, even colonizing the Muslim countries themselves; and (4) that therefore Muslims, in learning science afresh from the developed West, would be both recovering their past and fulfilling once again the neglected commandments of the Quran.¹¹

Similar opinions are discernable between the lines of the famous poet, Mehmed A kif (d. 1936), whose collected poems is the best seller of all times. With a unique style he tries to provoke a dynamism in the minds and actions of the people, while at the same time touching slightly the stagnation of the traditional popular religious life. All these themes influenced the thinking of later generations.

So the second school of thought was politically more effective than the first. This movement, called Turkification and represented by the social philosopher, Ziya Gok alp,¹² is still taught in Turkey. It is characterized by a cultural nationalism. Before the 1908 Revolution the nationalistic movement was only romantic; indeed even the Turkish national idea, in the modern sense, first appeared only in the mid-nineteenth century.

Despite its changes through history, due to the language and common cultural sense of the society, a sense of Turkish identity had never been lost. After becoming Muslim, the past history of the society was almost forgotten, but not entirely, as Turks thought of themselves primarily as Muslims. Many factors contributed to the development of the national movement. The young Ott oman writers improved the language, its grammar and clarified its style. European Turcological researcher which uncovered the ancient history and civilization of the Turks also contributed to the development of the national idea. The detachment of some component national groups was another factor, as were the nationalist ideas formulated by some of the Young Turks.

Ziya Go kalp used the sociology of Dur kheim as a model for the framework of concepts within which he set up the first elaborated theories of the nationalist movement. Gokalp became a professor of sociology at Istanbul University, where he taught sociology, philosophy and psychology. He elaborated his ideas about social problems more philosophically than his other contemporaries, with his distinction between culture and civilization serving as a point of departure. Turkish society long belonged to Islamic civilization, which contains institutions, political organization, science and the arts. With the decline of the Ottoman Empire this civilization declined.

The social sciences, especially sociology, were used to formulate the ideas of this school, but the naturalist and materialist philosophies were by far the most influential. For its social theories, Comt e's three stages of human intellectual development adapted to the Turkish history provided a model and epistemological framework. Sp encer also exerted a great influence. Reading Ottoman history in a certain manner they considered the Ottoman Ul ama, identified with the higher clergy of Western Christendom as theocrats, jurists and teachers, to be principally responsible for Turkey's backwardness in the modern time. This determined the historical analysis of the Ottoman Empire for a long time among the scholars. One of the representatives of this school, Celal Nuri Il eri (1881-1937), wrote two volumes on the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Inspired by historians Ta ine and Spe ncer, he claimed that the root of decline goes back to the conquering of Istanbul when the Ottomans adopted the Byzantine clerical system.

Although, Celal Nu ri¹³ represents the moderate wing of the Westernizers, his ideas were radical for that time. Theories like the evolution of Dar win, the materialism of Buc hner, the heroes of Car lyle appear in his writings applied to Turkish history and Islamic religion. One of his books bears the title History of the Future. Following the materialism of B uchner, he maintains that in the near future science will be able to solve the mysteries which occupy the human mind, such as the soul, and spiritual and invisible beings. When the instruments are sufficiently developed it could discover that these things are not different from things of ordinary observable material.

Clearly his thought follows Schopenh auer and Car lyle, though he does not mention their names. The book on his theory of the origins of religions is titled The Last Prophet, which is the name Muslims give their prophet. In 1914 these ideas were extremely radical for the Turkish Muslims. While some critiques were published in the Islamist magazine, it exerted some influence also upon other intellectuals.

Celal N uri, however, was not consistent throughout his intellectual career. As the author of more than twenty books and as a writer in important journals and newspapers, he was well known and read. He served as reporter for the committee for the Constitution of the Republic. After the 1923 Turkish Republican period he pioneered in the historical and social analysis of the Republican Revolution. His criticism of the policy of the first government caused him trouble and he lost favor. Probably for this reason his writings drew little scholarly attention.

With some modifications these trends continued to occupy intellectual life. But the general impacts of the reforms through the late period of Ott oman and Republican Turkey gave rise to cultural and other social changes. In this process of social changes in Turkish society intellectuals have played an important role. In general, failure was due to political pressure and cultural subversion by the West. The influence of this situation resulted, among the Western educated intellectuals, in denial of the basic beliefs and values of Islam. A European is an American who turns his back on Christianity remains heir to a rich culture and has no reason to feel that he has become a "non-person." In an Islamic society, on the other hand, one who turns away has empty hands and no longer cares who he is. The search for identity will become a new way for affirming the old values. For the most part there is not the culture shock or sense of inferiority vis-a-vis the West from which Turkish intellectuals suffered one generation ago. One of the professors who lived in both generations expressed his later thought about the cultural transformation: "when we first encountered the new civilization which has emerged in the West we were not a primitive community. On the contrary, we were carrying a distinct and great civilization."¹⁴ In these sentences the author is probably translating the inspiration of new generations to reaffirm the values which made them great.

1. Frithjol Sch uon, Light on the Ancient Worlds (London: Perennial Books, 1965), p. 9.

2. Gai Ea ton, Islam and Destiny of Man (New York: SUNY, 1985), p. 11.

3. For information about these thinkers see The Encyclopedia of Islam (Leiden: E.J. Br ill, new edition 1960-1986); Sherif Mar din, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1962); Bernard Le wis The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford, 2nd ed., 1968).

5. Prepared by a committee headed by Ahmad Jewdet Pa sha. This legal code is known as "majalla" based on Hanafi's, see Majid Kha dduv's and Herbert J. Lies besny, eds., Law in the Middle East I: Origin of Development of Islamic Law, Washington, D.C. 1955.

6. Al-Ghaz ali is famous as one of those who tried to defend the religious orthodoxy against other intellectual movements. For a good monograph see W.M. W att, Muslim Intellectual: A Study of al-Ghazali, (Edinburgh: Univ. Press, 1963).

7. Fazluv R ahman, Islam and Modernity (Chicago and London: The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 157.

9. Ernest R enan, L'Islam et la science (Paris: 1883), Arabic tr. by Hassam Afoudi As im (Cairo, n.d.) published almost in the same year.

10. He finished it in Myfslene in Sept. 1883; Neman Mulaja anamesi, ed. by Fuad Kop rulu, Ankara, 1962.

11. Fazluw Ra hman, Islam and Modernity, p. 50.

12. In English for Gohalp's writings see, Gok alp, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Zi ya Gökalp, ed. and trans. by Niyazi Ba rhes, New York, 1959.

13. For C. N uri I depend mostly on my Celal Nubi Ileri (1881-1939): Hayati, Eserteri, Fihirleri, (unpublished dissertation) Ankara, 1985.

14. Tahsin B anguoglu, Kendimize Gelecegiz (We Shall Recover) (Istanbul, 1986), Preface.