CHAPTER XX
THE "INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK"
PAUL E. MUR
RAYVol
taire's Candide anticipates well the experience of dislocation and discontinuity in a world of diverse and often competing and clashing cultural systems.* In a world that is continuously reminded of its interdependence, the search for some commonalities amid the discontinuities takes on a special urgency. The League of Nations and the United Nations represent attempts to chart out and to institutionalize some basis for common action. A major symbolic expression of the hope for unity has been the use of international staffing in the secretariats of these institutions. The bureaucracies of the UN system are among the most intensely and certainly the most intentionally multicultural social settings in existence. But what understandings and practices provide the basis for a shared organizational life among actors of many nationalities, cultures and tongues?This paper summarizes the findings of ethnographic research I conducted in four UN secretariats of the "food agencies" headquartered in Rome: the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Food Programme, the World Food Council and the International Fund for Agricultural Development. This study included nine months of participant observation in the headquarters of these agencies and extensive interviews with staff at directorial, professional and general service levels. An examination of discourse within these settings reveals a recurring interpretive pattern in which "persons" and personalistic constructs are employed as mediating terms in attempts to bridge and to resolve conflicts between the apparently opposed domains of thinking and feeling. These findings highlight an underlying and intractable problem in post-Enlightenment efforts to organize society on the basis of reason, namely, what are the sources of evaluative guidance? The appeal to "persons," which represents only a partial and momentary resolution of this issue, is a strategy that is fundamental to the classic paradigm of international civil service.
From its inception with the founding of the League of Nations, the international staffing of international secretariats has been based on understandings about the personal qualities that should characterize international civil servants. Ideas about these qualities generally remain implicit in organizational charters and designs, although there are allusions to them in organizational oaths and job announcements. Memoirs, speeches, histories and organizational studies are the principal textual vehicles and repositories of these understandings. In an extension of ideals of national civil service as apolitical, objective and disinterested, international civil service is based on the idealized premise that secretariat employees detach themselves from national loyalties and cultural affinities to comply with requirements that are conceptualized at some more rationalized, "international" level of perception.
Notions of international service have been variously presented in terms such as "international loyalty," the "international outlook," "international spirit," and "maturity." Each of these terms focuses attention on "persons" or "personality," indicating a key practice within the cultural system on which international organization is based that mediates in personal terms the presumably separate dimensions of thinking and feeling. Value-laden ideologies and political allegiances (feeling) are to be surrendered in favor of rationally conceived obligations (thinking) to the "international" community. This interpretive framework has set the terms for many of the issues that have been problematic in international organization since the founding of the League of Nations, including what happens to national loyalties, the influence of national, cultural, and political biases, whether employees should have "permanent" contracts or be hired on "secondment" from national administrations, and the role of the "Secretary-General" or executive head as exemplary international civil servant vis-ā-vis the world community. These issues indicate the problematized locus of "persons" within the conventional paradigm of international organization. On the one hand, persons are understood as essential to the resolution of the dilemma of the opposition between domains; shedding inappropriate values, they will presumably adopt new ones ("international loyalty") and behave appropriately in the international arena. On the other hand, this resolution is fraught with dilemmas, since not all actors appear to manifest authentically "international" values and, more profoundly, the nature and sources of these new values remain unclear.
BEGINNINGS
When the United Nations system was established by the victorious Allied Powers in the closing months of the Second World War, its architects invested it with a Secretariat and required that "due regard . . . be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible."1 Most observers now take some form of international staffing to be the sine qua non of international administration. Sir Eric Drummond, first Secretary-General of the League of Nations, was the originator of this method of recruitment for the League's Secretariat. Precedents for permanent, internationally controlled administrations, e.g., the German-French Rhine River Commission (1804), the Universal Postal Union (1878) and the International Telegraphic Union (1868)2 generally were staffed by nationals of one of the participating states. International staffing is not a necessary consequence of international organization, but it represents a strategy for international organization that is consistent with Western and, especially, British notions about the relationship of bureaucratic service to personal values, including national and "cultural" ones--in particular, it reflects the notion that it is feasible to have a disinterested, public service to which personally held values, of whatever origin, are irrelevant.
The founding governments of the League gave little collective consideration to its actual administrative structure. The Covenant of the League addresses the subject only briefly (Article 6), calling for the establishment of a "permanent" Secretariat and indicating that it "shall comprise a Secretary-General and such secretaries and staff as may be required." These vague instructions afforded Drum
mond great scope for his own ideas in structuring the Secretariat.A major feature of Drummond's administration was its adoption of "the secretariat method" which had developed in Britain in the late 19th and early 20th centuries,3 first as a method of imperial administration and then in the War Cabinet of Prime Minister Lloyd Ge
orge during the First World War. According to Jor dan4 the introduction of the secretariat method entailed a shift in the Cabinet from informal methods of decision-making and record-keeping to formalized procedures for drawing up agendas and recording minutes. The Secretariat of the Cabinet not only assisted in these "secretarial" tasks, but under the direction of Lord Hankey, evolved as a strong, centralized executive body which was responsible for carrying out the Cabinet's decisions.The secretariat method was first adopted on the international level by the Allied Supreme War Council and the Supreme Council at the Paris Peace Conference.5 Han
key, who refused the position of Secretary-General of the League of Nations, disagreed with the notion of an independent, international secretariat for the League and, according to James,6 preferred a system modeled after that of international conferences, in which each Council state would be permanently represented at headquarters by its own secretary and staff, with the Secretary-General as coordinator of activities among the separate delegations.Drummond, however, succeeded in convincing the Organizing Committee to adopt the secretariat method and international staffing.7 As Secretary-General, he proceeded to organize the Secretariat of the League along British lines, central to which was the "concept of the disinterested official."8 Ba
rros, in his biography of Drummond,proposes 9 that Drummond was "too much of a realist to believe" in the ideal of a "non-political international secretariat." Barros' analysis, however, which employs the familiar theory-versus-reality opposition of Western thought, disregards the cultural significance of Drummond's actions. While Drummond may have held private reservations about the independence of international secretariats and may himself have acted in ways inconsistent with the theory (always a matter of interpretation, of course), his conceptualization of the League's Secretariat extends definitively to the international arena an approach to organization that ideally separates technical, legal and practical matters (the "thinking" dimension) from various national and cultural interests and values (the "feeling" dimension). Drummond thus set in motion the predominant method in this century for organizing international administration and, in so doing, set the terms even of its problematic dimensions, such as how to be "impartial" and indeed "objective" about value-motivated decisions. The British cultural model of the "disinterested official" which seeks resolution of such oppositions in personality, not only suggests a model of civil service that Dru
mmond sought to introduce, but anticipates an interpretive pattern. This would recurrently turn to "personality" in several ways to explore and resolve the boundaries and contradictions between opposing domains in international life.The feasibility of a form of bureaucratic administration staffed by persons who presumably separate political, regional, religious or other interests from technical, legal and official pursuits is a relatively modern idea which emerged gradually in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. During this period there was a progressive adoption of impersonal, bureaucratic ideals in Western countries. For example, several countries shifted from a system of appointments based on patronage (the "spoils system," in the United States), that is, the making of appointments for personal or political motives, to the use of open competition and examinations. This process began in Great Britain in the mid-nineteenth century10 and somewhat later in the United States. With the passage of the Pendleton Act in 1885, Congress attempted to organize the administration of government on the basis of "merit,"11 an ostensibly more rational basis for selecting personnel than patronage. Ideologically, the shift away from patronage to merit was linked to the desire to replace aristocratic models of administration and rule by "notables" with more democratically-based models.12 This suggests that what mattered was not only getting a job done, but getting it done in a way that is expressive of the avoidance of personal values. A corollary development was the notion that civil servants should be politically neutral, a doctrine that was strongly emphasized in Britain. The meaning of neutrality, as explained by Leonard White,13 a United States Civil Service Commissioner, is that civil servants may have "private convictions," but that they must not allow such convictions "to color the impartial advice which it is their duty to give." The opposition between ideas and values is therefore resolved, ideally, in persons who are presumed to have both the ability and the inclination to subordinate personal choice to rational procedures.
The idea of an international civil service, which seemed at the time Drummond introduced it quite novel and to some fairly radical, represented an extension of these administrative principles to the international level. If it is possible to provide impersonal administrative services within nations, why should it not be possible at the international level, which only entails setting aside "national" preferences--another aspect the personal/affective/evaluative side--so as to provide for the efficient functioning of a rationalized world order? Indeed, the international civil service is arguably the quintessential expression of depersonalized, functional, administrative service.
The presumed logic of this separation structures an unresolvable tension into the notion of international civil service as actors and observers discover the multiplicity of the evaluative aspects of even seemingly innocuous, technical and practical matters of international cooperation. As my ethnographic data14 on the UN "food agencies" show, the intrusion of "politics" into an organizational life that is ostensibly politically neutral and its bearing on the fulfillment of organizational objectives continues to be a central preoccupation of international civil servants. Concerns about the influence of "politics" exist also in national administrations, as indicated by Hugh He
clo's study15 of the interface between the US executive service, the top positions in the administration that are politically appointed, and the US civil service, which is presumably protected from "politics" through guarantees of job security. Heclo employs "politics" to designate not only party politics and patronage, but also any use of a public office as "private property."16 He finds this to be focused on activities at the executive level, whereas my data indicate the awareness of "politics" to be pervasive at all ranks in the UN food agencies. Discourse about the problematic distinctions between politics and internationalism, whether hypocritical or sincere, explores endlessly the implications of the thinking/feeling opposition for international service and searches for mediating terms to explain how it is possible for individuals to provide "disinterested" service at the international level. Notions of "international loyalty," "international spirit" and "international outlook" represent attempts to construct such a mediating or encompassing third term.INTERNATIONAL LOYALTY
The first generation of literature on international civil service problematized its political dimensions. There were many questions about the meaning and possibility of "international loyalty," a concept first introduced to describe the stance of the League's Secretariat. For example, critics suggested that the stance implied disloyalty to one's own nation.17 H
ill18 notes concerns that employees "do not lose all sense of nationality or become unaware of the interests of their respective states."Employees of the League were expected to detach themselves from the interests of their own nations and to work within the framework of the League's apparently neutral and transcendent perception of international requirements. Beginning in 1932, this stance was formalized in a "declaration of fidelity," required of all incoming officials, which committed the individual employee "to discharge my functions and to regulate my conduct with the interests of the League alone in view and not to seek or receive instructions from any Government or other authority external to the Secretariat of the League of Nations."19 Identical wording is used for oaths in the UN system.20
Van Wagenen observes21 that "the loyalty question" now seems dated, given the endurance of the concept. It is important to recall, however, that this notion intentionally links international service with a detachment from national values or perspectives. How this detachment of individuals from their presumed attachment to their cultural and political origins takes place goes unexplained. That which takes the place of domestically oriented values, namely, "international loyalty," is not completely clear. Who defines the "interests" of the League or any other international agency? Governing bodies, which are made up of delegations representing national interests, define policies; but how do representatives of discrete, national governments generate an "international" perspective? The United Nations Charter explicitly gives scope to the Secretary-General to operate as an independent authority on behalf of international interests and, in effect, to define those interests. This attempts to correct what some perceived to be a constitutional weakness in the League in which, as Je nks observes22 "no officer . . . had an acknowledged continuing responsibility for shaping . . . policy . . . in the interests of the League as a whole"; but leaves unattended what those interests are. The central interpretive responsibility is therefore vested in a person, the Secretary-General, who will presumably bring appropriately "international" values to bear on rational procedures.
"International loyalty" represents an attempt to redefine the political identities of some individuals so that they may, in a sense, enjoy the license to pursue the most rational or reasonable solutions to problems that affect mankind globally or internationally and that defy solution by individual national governments acting independently. Sir Harold Ni colson, a British diplomat, expresses23 the conviction that by "collaborating constantly together," individuals of differing nationalities "acquire a truly international spirit" which they will then hopefully be able to transfer "to the politicians who attend the Councils and Assemblies." This acknowledges that international loyalty reflects some more profound level of experience than is implicit in the simple fact of individuals from many different nations and cultures working together in common organizational settings.
INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
Outlook
The corpus of literature on the Secretariat of the League of Nations consists, by and large, of the impressionistic descriptions of former League officials,24 rather than of sociological inquiry. Much of it was written in the mid_1940s with a view toward the creation of a successor organization and is liberally sprinkled with advice on organizational structure, leadership and style, recruitment and other personnel policies. These writings constitute a valuable data base on the League's Secretariat, especially as understood by its senior officials.
These authors optimistically address questions regarding the heterogeneity of the staff: national, cultural, religious and linguistic. That is, the experience of the League is taken as proof that international staffing is feasible; yet, its success depends on recruiting staff who are able to maintain what Je nks, in a famous passage, calls the "international outlook":
an awareness made instinctive by habit of the needs, emotions, and prejudices of the peoples of differently circumstanced countries, as they are felt and expressed by the peoples concerned, accompanied by a capacity for weighing these frequently imponderable elements in a judicial manner before reaching any decision to which they are relevant.25
Not all are presumed able to assume this outlook. Indeed, Ransh ofen-Wertheimer insists26 on the rigors of international service as "the most severe test to which a civilized man of the twentieth-century world can be subjected." Such assertions hierarchize the relationship between domains, subordinating value-laden nationalism to rational internationalism.
This literature emphasizes internationalism as an attitude or quality which individuals may or may not have. Loveday's Reflections on International Administration,27 widely considered a classic, relies upon a rough, informal psychology to analyze the experiences of international civil servants. While offering little on factors that enable some individuals to obtain an internationalist outlook, Lov eday insists that organizational effectiveness requires it. National administrators, as well, need to be tactful and able to promote mutual understanding among others, but what is required of the international civil servant is an even "greater sensibility to the feelings of others when the persons on whom the art of persuasion is exercised are drawn from different parts of the globe."28
The international outlook represents, then, two major steps with respect to feelings: first, the ability to detach oneself from the presumably natural feelings that incline one to favor the interests of one's own nation; and second, the ability to comprehend and to communicate effectively with persons of different cultures (with their special "emotions," "prejudices," and "feelings").
Society
At times it is not clear whether, when describing intercultural sensitivity, these authors mean the ability to communicate effectively in various countries, or internally, within the organization. Evidently they regard the two situations as integrally united. The international secretariat is seen as providing a kind of "international society" that is implicitly a microcosm of the entire world. When Loveday writes, for example, of the qualities required of international civil servants--"understanding and consequential loyalty," "diplomatic capacity," "constructive imagination," et cetera--he includes the Spanish word, "convivencia," for which he finds no English equivalent. `Convivencia' suggests, to him, not a mere capacity to "co-exist," but an apparent empathy for others that enables one to work effectively with them, regardless of cultural differences. So in addition to "rationality," the secretariats become models of the specifically international order implementing that "rationality."
It is the presence or absence of such traits in individuals that explains their ability or inability to be a part of "international society." Lov eday describes "international society" as a setting that "never affords full scope for the natural development of the individual personality from its own cultural roots."29 Success in this environment, he insists, requires individual resourcefulness in finding ways to give expression to these "suppressed" parts of the personality. Failure to do so results in the "dessication" of individuals and the risks of this "are greatest among the members of the clerical staff and those more senior officials--translators, precis writers, etc.--who are engaged in repetitive work."30 In addition, Loveday recommends a management style based on "trust," rather than on a system of rigid, hierarchical "control," which he finds in the UN system. He argues that the heterogeneous staffs of international secretariats can develop as "a group with a sense of common purpose" only under a liberal, administrative structure. By introducing "freedom," a frequent companion of "rationality" in Western thought, Loveday restates, but does not resolve, the dilemma about the sources and forms of evaluative behavior within international settings.
Adequate freedom is not ensured by defining with nice precision the functions, responsibilities and mutual hierarchical relations of each individual, but by allowing the personality of each to adjust itself to that of each other, by allowing each to find out for himself from whom he can best obtain the help he is conscious of needing.31
Loveday thus attempts to redefine the locus of persons in these environments, based on the view that internationalism is an attitude generated by interpersonal relations in international settings.
Some distinguish the right kind of internationalism or "international loyalty" from the wrong kind. Ranshofe n-Wertheimer dismisses32 "members of the cosmopolitan tribe, globe trotters, and persons without a country" as potential recruits, in favor of those who are "most useful for international service . . . combining the best characteristics of . . . national origins with belief in and devotion to the international agency." Je nks, similarly, denies33 that international outlook entails a lack of national pride or "of attachment to any one country." Effective international service is, therefore, not radically disconnected from the world of nation-states. "International loyalty," however, remains a self-contradictory term, except in transcendent contexts that are not perceived to exist without it.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM
The Charter of the United Nations makes much more explicit than did the Covenant of the League the role of the Organization's Secretariat, which it presents as one of the Organization's principal organs, together with the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the International Court of Justice. Moreover, drawing on the precedent established by Dru mmond, the Charter insists34 on the Secretariat's "exclusively international character," meaning that officials are "responsible only to the organization" and member states shall refrain from influencing staff "in the discharge of their responsibilities."
The "geographical distribution" of posts (or the "quota system") provides a principal strategy for guaranteeing the independence of UN secretariats from the influence of any one nation. It is a strategy which has been adopted in several versions throughout the UN system as a whole.35 Several observers36 have described the quota system as a recruitment strategy that structures a major contradiction into the heart of international civil service, since staff loyalty is supposed to be directed toward the organization rather than toward any particular government, while nationality plays a key role in recruitment and promotion. This policy, therefore, mitigates against the selection of personnel on the basis of merit alone and, hence, represents one of the clearest indications of how the "governmentalist" bias of the UN system37 structures its bureaucracies. It is a system that continuously reminds staffs that the "constituency"38 of UN organizations is always governments, rather than individuals.39 This represents an escalation of bureaucratic "depersonalization" beyond that of governmental agencies.40
The notion that a special ethos is generated by the cultural diversity of a staff appointed according to country quotas has often been expressed by UN system officials and observers. For example, Trygve L ie, the first Secretary-General of the UN (1946_1952), writes that geographical distribution
meant bringing together people of many languages, races, and stages of development, of all the great cultures and religions, from Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Americas. It meant harmonizing all this diversity into an efficient and unified force, with all differences of background and outlook subordinated to the oath of office.41
This statement reaches beyond governmentalism to a "cultural" pluralism (or multiculturalism) that envisions all cultural orientations, of whatever origin, as subordinate to the rationally conceived obligations of an international civil service.42
Dag Hamma rskjöld, the second Secretary-General of the UN (1953_1961), who is widely regarded as the exemplar par excellence of "internationalism," also speaks of "international service" in a way that seeks to encompass cultural and personal diversity.
Far from demanding that we abandon or desert ideals and interests basic to our personality, international service . . . puts us under the obligation to let those ideals and interests reach maturity and fruition in a universal climate.43
"Maturity," a term also employed by informants in the UN food agencies44 harkens back to Kant's definition of "enlightenment",45 as a state of freedom from intellectual tutelage to authorities, guides and doctrines. This recalls the personalistic dimensions implicit in the paradigm of rationality from which models of international service and life have been constructed.
Hamma rskjöld conceives of the "universal climate," where one is presumably exposed to the "ideals and interests" of others, as a training ground for "maturity of mind" which is a kind of transcendence corresponding to that of internationalism.
The second generation corpus of academic literature on international secretariats is, like its predecessor, largely a digest of impressionistic reflections by those who have served as officials or consultants in international organizations. While, with few exceptions46 it lacks sociological depth, it does provide an important source of data on participants' views about their organizational life. In it, authors grapple with the intractable contradictions of internationalism and engage in the cultural practice of constructing a series of mediating terms that appear to resolve, momentarily, the contradictions.47
Generally, these authors concur that the cultural heterogeneity of staffs "works," that is, it seems not to be a problem in terms of organizational efficiency. For example, Van Wagenen of the World Bank, asserts48 that it provides some "advantages." First, it exposes decision-makers to "different viewpoints" (especially about developing countries) that go "beyond mere factual knowledge"; second, it affords staff at headquarters a chance to sharpen their skills in relating to other nationals, which should enable them to be more sensitive in relating to the "field" (developing countries); and third, it provides the social basis for the organization's "credibility" in dealing with different parts of the world. Van Wagenen goes on to reflect49 on the social-cultural dimensions of international staffing, noting that the "personal level" of these working relationships requires special attention. He shares administrators' concerns about methods for honing the staff's diversity into a serviceable "conformity." In laying out the problem, he notes that the feeling dimension presents special challenges because "an international staff has no common cultural background and no symbols transmitting emotional voltage."50 He quotes a "pseudonymous UN Secretariat member" who wrote that his organization is "an institution derived from an exclusively rational recognition of the need for its existence" (emphasis added). Van Wagenen emphasizes51 leadership and "organizational tradition" as generators of staff solidarity.
Van Wagenen strains to account for the distinctive contribution that international staffing makes to UN bureaucracies, as compared to other types of organizations. He calls it an "extra dimension . . . like a wild card in poker," a chance factor, but comments that "it is tempting to stop at the standard observation that everyone is different and that affinities are made by professional and social interest and matters of taste, regardless of nationality."52 He finds this "standard observation" uninformative, but seems unable to go beyond it, adding only the speculation that the busyness and frequent duty travel of World Bank staff members may explain why "the normal rubbing of personalities is not enough to chafe and irritate deeply"53. I suggest that a more productive way of examining such apparently "standard" observations, which I find in wide use in the discourse of UN food agency actors as well, is as a form of cultural practice, a way actors employ to organize ideas about the cultural diversity of secretariats. To initial inquiries about the experience of working with persons of many nationalities and cultures, I frequently received the response that such differences are not a problem or are not even noticed, because everyone is considered only in terms of his or her professional contribution (i.e., the organization exists for technical and professional reasons only). Moreover, if the heterogeneity of nationalities is considered, it is in terms of its being a potential problem, something that occurs on the "personal" level, where it may erupt in tensions between individuals.
Johan Gal tung, a Director of the United Nations University in Tokyo, provides54 a sociologically insightful account of UN bureaucratic culture. For example, he describes55 the UN's "intellectual style" as "Saxonic," which results in an emphasis on data and an avoidance of theory. Geographical distribution notwithstanding, he finds56 that homogeneity is recovered through the "MAMU (middle-aged males with university education) complex" that dominates the system. Galtung concludes57 that the effectiveness of the UN system is impaired by the limitations of its organizational culture which removes it too far "from the spaces where true human and social development take place--the inner human spaces, the micro space surrounding any one of us." Once again, then, the UN system is portrayed as a setting where intellectual traditions and empirical emphases (the thinking dimension) somehow subordinate the personal domain (the feeling dimension), resulting in a cultural impoverishment internally and some degree of practical ineffectiveness externally, that is, impaired effectiveness in both organizational and "human" terms. Galtung's observations maintain the hierarchical order of the cultural system by not questioning it, while focusing on its instrumentalities.
THE LOCUS OF "PERSONS"
Data provided by this literature suggest that "international" versions of the conventional paradigm of Western, bureaucratic culture, which intentionally separates thinking and feeling so as to structure organizations as depersonalized, technically efficient "machines," problematize the relationship between these domains in ways that are particular to these settings. My ethnographic study of the UN food agencies demonstrates a continuity of terms and interpretive practice between the conventional paradigm of international organization and the particular setting of these agencies' headquarters. This study shows that actors attempt to organize that paradigm, and their world, by conceptually separating the domains of thinking and feeling. However, as they inevitably encounter in this process contradictions and paradoxes that stem from the problematic place of evaluative behaviors within the system, they deploy a series of mediating terms to idealize the "right" relationship between domains or to account for problems. In each case, the mediating terms center on the place of "persons," or, more abstractly, of "personality," within the paradigm. That these mediating terms fail to resolve in any final sense the conceptual dilemma is suggested by the problematic issue of the locus of "persons" and "personal" behaviors within the UN food agencies.
Actors' recognition of the problematic place of evaluative behaviors in international organizations begin with suggestions that UN secretariats differ from national administrations, suggestions found both in literature on international organization and in informants' testimony. "Rules," "beliefs" and "traditions" are held to be more easily generated within national administrations than they are within the UN system, because (1) dominant national cultures provide guidance (e.g., national ideologies or accepted practices for superior-subordinate relationships) that cannot legitimately exist at the global level among theoretically equal sovereignties; (2) ruling governments provide executive leadership that brings interpretive guidance (i.e., clues to "acceptable" evaluative standards) into the heart of organizational life, while UN secretariats operate always at a remove from their own acephalous governing bodies; and (3) national bureaucrats work within national social settings that have well established expectations, whereas no equivalent social setting exists at the international level, but rather the frequently shifting and competing expectations of governments.58
Dilemmas about the relationship between thinking and feeling come into focus very quickly as actors attempt to consider the place of "culture" (of both countries and individuals) within their work and organizational environment. "Culture" is, in their usage, a non-rational, value-laden domain which includes the sets of preferred behaviors ("likes" and "dislikes") that individuals acquire when living in particular societies, most especially their native place. In the ideally impartial setting of international organizations, where some actors, especially "international civil servants," presumably shed culture-based behaviors for the sake of more rational and "international" ones, the processes and structures that enable this process are not delineated, but presupposed. It is presumed that personality is capable of rightly mediating between domains, but the folk tradition is silent on how personality accomplishes this. "Persons," then, bearers of personality, become the constructions where the boundaries and connections between thinking and feeling are presented and examined, both to idealize successes and to vilify failures.
In my study I examine "persons" or "personality" in actors' constructions as loci that mediate thinking and feeling in diverse ways. I examine three principal constructions: executive heads, images of the self as "transcultural" and international work as "craft"--as "cultural operators"59 that conjoin and confound different conceptual orders. Boon finds "cultural operators" to provide particularly succinct ways of communicating about socially held understandings of the relationships that exist between distinct orders, because they belong to both. He finds60 that societies develop particular cultural operators that take on a privileged status because their property of conjoining what is ideally kept separate appears essential to maintaining the proper relationship between orders. Examples of this quality abound in religious settings, where, for example, only designated persons, who represent the "natural" or "secular" order may handle certain sacred objects which represent the "sacred" or "spiritual" order. Such conjoinings of the sacred and the secular are often considered inherently dangerous; but somebody has to do it.
"International loyalty" was an early construct that indicates the pattern of locating the relationship between thinking and feeling in exceptional personality, namely, personality that is capable of subordinating the presumed claims of nationality and culture for the sake of a rationally-based "internationalism." This construct, like the cultural operators that I examine, deploys some category of "persons" or "personality" to mediate between domains. Those who behave "internationally" and "impartially" are persons, however apparently "depersonalized" their conduct, just as priests are persons still, however sacralized their conduct. But persons are also bearers of "feelings" in this construct, i.e., the evaluative standards of cultures, politics, and ideologies which it is the work of international secretariats to neutralize with respect to their own work (see Figure 1).
THINKING
|
|
| FEELING
| |
| |
IMPERSONAL, |
BUREAUCRATIC <---------> PERSONS <-----------> VALUES, STRUCTURES "CULTURAL"
BEHAVIORS
Figure 1
Central as persons may be to this cultural system, the locus of persons--whether employees or outsiders--is also problematic for it because not all persons exemplify the ideal subordination of feeling to thinking; and, beyond that, because the proper source of evaluative behavior within the system is never addressed. In the UN food agencies these conceptual dilemmas become evident in many ways, including how personnel talk about their relationship to the organization. For example,
many employees find themselves precariously situated in UN secretariats. Responsibility for decisions made in one's own area of competence frequently needs to be referred up the hierarchical ladder, even in simple matters such as sending a telex to a field officer. Many find that excellent work is not rewarded by opportunities for advancement, due to the influence of nationality and patronage networks, further problematizing their sense of professional and personal solidarity with their agency. Moreover, as professional work generally is performed in the name of the organization and therefore efforts usually remain "anonymous," which depersonalizes still more the relationship of the individual with an agency. It is possible to publish independently, in one's own name, but few find the time. Practices designed to secure the workplace by requiring the use of building passes which must be relinquished at retirement are mentioned with a touch of bitterness by retirees, who feel that their personal worth and dignity thereby are impugned. Even after many years of service, some employees have only short-term contracts, while those with permanent contracts speak often of going elsewhere to advance their professional careers or, if older, of looking forward to retirement.
The cultural operations that inform constructions of executive heads, transcultural selves and international craft explore the relationships between thinking and feeling in ways that turn in each case on some central understanding about "persons." Such constructions become occasions to locate the place of persons in, and in relation to, these complex organizations, which, more profoundly, means the relation of feeling (the presumably more personal dimension) and thinking (the presumed generator of bureaucratic organization) as an interpretive framework (see Figure 2). Here, that framework is applied to identities mediating its oppositions and relating to others those oppositions specific to the organization.
While space does not permit a discussion of these mediators in detail, I will present each of them briefly in order to note some of the continuities and connections with previous literature.
Executive Heads as Cultural Constructs
The executive head of a secretariat is both one of its major emblems and a frequent topic of conversation in the secretariats. Executive heads are structurally positioned at the top of their organizational charts, the only authorized channels of communication on policy and administrative matters between governing bodies and the secretariats. In conversation the personality, nationality, politics and character of executive heads are explored for their meaning in agency life. The executive head provides a juncture where feeling, in an officially sanctioned way, impacts on thinking (and, therefore, politics, or "culture" on presumably rational and legal procedures, character on technical priorities, et cetera).
During the interwar period, ideas about the role of executive heads of international organizations were constructed around the contrasting examples of Eric Drum
mond, of the League, and Albert Tho mas, Director-General of the International Labour Organization (ILO) (1920_1932). Whereas Dru mmond is widely portrayed as the quintessential "civil servant," that is, a quiet functionary who rarely exercised his right to address the League's Assembly and Council,61 Tho mas is considered the more aggressive leader, seizing the initiative in preparing his organization's budget and in establishing the agenda for the Governing Body and Conference of the ILO.62 Both examples employ what C ox terms63 the "great-man theory of international organization," which is based on the "implicit assumption . . . that it is the man who makes the institution." Cox attempts64 to go beyond idiosyncratic approaches to construct a theory of executive leadership in international organizations in which the executive head's "personality and style" are accounted for in relation to other "possibly weightier variables."65 Examining variables such as the relationship of executive heads with senior staffs and with external "pressures," Cox essentially substitutes "personality" with "leadership," which restates, without resolving, the problem of how personality mediates presumably separate domains in international settings.If we consider the cultural and social purposes that shape and influence discourse in which the subject of executive heads appears, the "great-man theory" that pervades both academic literature and everyday discourse about executive heads within international organizations may be approached non-referentially as a process of symbolic construction. In these terms executive heads become key symbolic foci that relate impersonal, bureaucratic structures to the evaluative domain that includes culture, politics and ideology in two respects. First, executive heads are able to provide this symbolic function because they alone officially link secretariats to governing bodies and, second, they do so in their personal capacity. They "act," a quality of individuality denied, symbolically, to the "depersonalized bureaucrat."
Of all international civil servants, executive heads are uniquely nominated, i.e., called by name, by the governors representing the world of nation-states. It is noteworthy that in the Covenant of the League of Nations, only one proper name appears: "First Secretary-General of the League of Nations The Honourable Sir James Eric Drummond, K.C.M.G., C.B."66 Dag Hammars
köjld stresses67 the "personal responsibility" given the Secretary-General of the United Nations, "who is solely responsible for performing the functions entrusted to him for the appointment of all members of the Secretariat." Hammarskjöld notes68 that a proposal that had been rejected for the Charter at the founding Conference in San Francisco69 was one that called for the appointment of Deputies Secretary-General "in the same manner as the Secretary-General," a rejection rooted in the theory that the "international" perspective of a secretariat is the responsibility and achievement of its executive head, who may develop it only if given sufficient independence from the world of nation-states. This understanding informed the structuring of the League, as well. While the founders of the League rejected the title "Chancellor" for the executive director position, they nevertheless uniquely positioned, whether intentionally or not, the Secretary-General as the one individual who could, as Bou dreau states70 "hold up before the national representatives the League view, the international aspect of every problem." The language adopted by the Council of United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, which met in Atlantic City in late 1943 to plan for the League's successor organization, draws on this understanding of the executive director's role: "the vesting . . . of full executive authority and responsibility in the Director General, requires that he act with the greatest possible freedom in the selection of personnel and the establishment of personnel standards."71Underpinning the "great-man theory" that the man makes the position, but the position requires the "right" sort of man, is an understanding that the point of convergence between the neutral, impartial, rational perspective and the evaluative domain of culture and politics is found at the personal level, and specifically, in the individual who is uniquely authorized by a governing body to head up its secretariat and thus to have a "personality." This understanding is reflected both in institutional terminology and by analysts of the position.
The title, "Secretary-General," for the highest executive head and arch-exemplar of the role, emphasizes the secretarial relationship of the executive head to the governing bodies, but does not describe his relationship to the secretariat body72 where, as we have seen, broad discretion was left to Dr
ummond to structure the Secretariat of the League as he saw fit. This broad discretion enabled the development of an understanding, now seen throughout the United Nations system, in which the executive head of a secretariat is the only individual who may enact secretariat business with personal authority.The crucial positioning of the person of the executive head within the structure of international secretariats has been noted by several observers. Ranshofen-
Wertheimer, for example, writes:All authority in the Secretariat stems from the Secretary-General. . . . Everything that is done in the Secretariat is done by him, figuratively speaking. The actual day-to-day work is either personally executed by him, done under his direct instructions and control, or delegated by him to others.73
Four decades later, Gal
tung makes an essentially identical observation. Secretariats, he writes,actually work in his [the `executive director's'] name, papers are published in his name (or at least circulated in his name); his stamp of approval is what matters inside the organisation although he may sometimes delegate it to lesser officials. Thus secretariats tend to become extremely vertical and very steeply so, with just one point at the top: He.74
Such observations (see also Sym
onds)75 suggest that in international secretariats the "great-man" not only "makes the institution" but, in some ways, paradoxically is the institution. He is more than the voice of the institution. Whatever the personal attributes and styles various executive heads, such as Dru mmond and Th omas, may bring to bear on their administrations,76 what remains everywhere the same is a recurrent structural emphasis on the person of the executive head in both organizational charters and in everyday discourse, which reveals this structuring to be a central, cultural practice in these settings. This, I will suggest, is because the executive head mediates thinking and feeling, the paradoxically related terms with which any effort at international organization must come to terms.The Transcultural Self
The image of the self as "transcultural" is also a frequent construction among actors who believe themselves to be changed, as a result of living abroad, often in many countries, and working in multicultural organizations. In general, the focus of this image is on oneself, including the expanded "self" of spouses and children, although the transculturalism (or "internationalism") of other selves is also explored. This is a second, major theme, one which brings "personality" home to staffs in the UN food agencies. Many actors find that their thinking and attitudes have changed in ways that make it difficult to imagine returning to live in their native countries or to work in national administrations, where they would lack the stimulus of continual exposure to many different nations and cultures.
Constructions of the transcultural self practically mediate paradoxically related aspects of thinking and feeling which arise as tensions between the presumed impartiality of international organizations and the perspectives of persons and nations that are presumed to be determined by national interests and cultural perspectives. "Personality" provides the locus, once again, where these terms are mediated. This personality is presumed to be exceptional with respect to its independence from any one culture, whether due to innate characteristics or to exposure to the exceptional learning afforded by multicultural milieux. This is a construction that announces the success, to a degree, of international administration as a cultural project; that is, it is a construction that confirms the possibility of an "international outlook," the prerequisite of authentic, international administration. Its construction, over and over, becomes a central cultural practice in these milieux.
Previous ethnographic work on intercultural contact and perception has called attention to the strategic importance of self-presentation in such settings. For example, Ly
man and Dou glass,77 Bri ggs,78 and Ba rth79 researched the strategies for managing ethnic identity (including multiple identities) in settings of ethnic multiplicity. Ba teson comments80 on the development of an "ethos of pidgin" in New Guinea, in which indigenous peoples, who represent hundreds of distinctive cultures, are nevertheless perceived by Europeans as being "remarkably similar" because of the common "tactics" they have adopted to deal with Europeans. The exploration of "impression management" strategies and tactics, however, does not provide a sufficient method to account for intercultural contact in intentionally international milieux, where individuals find themselves and others to be changed by the setting itself. But they do point to creation, attempted creation and, more interestingly, to recognition of "transcendent" or inclusive identities. Work on organizations as multicultural settings that develop their own "culture"81 or within which a "third culture" develops between two or more different groups of nationals82 confirm the sociological reality of these phenomena, without accounting for their symbolic underpinnings. What require further study are the symbolic structures that inform these emergent cultures. Within the intentionally multicultural settings of the UN food agencies, understandings of the self as transcultural constitute a practice that provides direct access to the structures and symbolic systems that structure interaction.International Service as Craft
Actors' presentations of work accomplishments and agency competencies feature the technical domain. Forestry studies, loan programs for the rural poor, increases in crop yields and the successful transport of emergency food assistance are among the examples actors provide when presenting the practical results and meaningfulness of agency work. Because of the casting of technicality as a thinking domain within this cultural system, technical excellence is ideally seen as separable from national, cultural, ideological and other evaluative systems. Recognizing that international agencies must perform in a setting that is circumscribed by less-than-rational value choices, actors construct a mediating term, which I designate as "craft," to indicate the personal characteristics that enable technical success to take place in the "real" world of politics and ideology. "Craft" links person to technique.
Successes are conceptualized as representing something beyond technical competence alone; they testify to an adroit handling of various forces and stakeholders in international life, including donors and recipients, corporations and the media. International "craft," as a cultural operator, conjoins and confounds the domains of technicality and feeling by combining a high level of commitment to technical and rational excellence with the diplomatic and other personal skills required to relate this domain to persons enmeshed in value-laden domains. Persons and personality emerge, once again, as key mediators between opposing domains in a manner that defers, rather than resolves, problems that arise concerning how they are related. For this reason, it, too, is best thought of as an operator for pointing to (a) the problematic quality of the resolution, (b) the continuity of effort involved, and (c) the common problematization of relating thinking to feeling in "real world," yet transcendent, institutions.
The international setting of a multilateral agency is understood both as presenting special challenges (e.g., differing national ideologies) and as affording special opportunities (e.g., freedom to pursue more "rational" approaches to development projects than is possible within national frameworks). Addeke Bo
erma, the former Director-General of FAO, describes83 the contradictory situation faced by his agency, which is unable to address world problems as rationally as it would like in a world "circumscribed by the limits of political will":Logic would seem to dictate that, when there are world problems, they require world solutions. But humanity, alas, is all too seldom governed by logic. It generally takes men some time to accept the realities of what needs to be done. And, although there have been some signs recently that the world has woken up to the fact that individual nation-states around the globe are inevitably being forced into conditions of greater dependence on one another, the necessary action, both national and international, to cope with the consequences has so far been much too slow in coming.
"Dedication," "know-how," "balance," "adaptability," "diplomacy" and "coordination" are among the terms that actors employ to present the cultural operation of international craft, to describe executive heads and to recognize themselves. These terms describe the personal qualities that are required to provide technical services at the international level, in a world which, by definition, is less than perfectly committed to rationality. The appeal to the personal locus as mediator between domains begs the question of the evaluative behaviors that necessarily inform technical works, and thus returns to the dilemma. This interpretive dilemma becomes evident to actors, as they admit to resorting, at times, to a certain "craftiness" in "selling" development projects or fabricating statistics to "put a saving face" on a development program. It becomes evident in critical reflection on the executive heads of their organizations, and on requirements on themselves. Narratives of actor craftiness plainly announce the subordination of technical and rational behaviors to value-choices, in an inversion of the conceptual ideal of international administration.
The Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.
NOTES
*Acknowledgments: Partial support of the research and writing of this paper was provided by grants from The Institute for Intercultural Studies and The National Science Foundation (Grant No. BNS.8615746).
1. Formulas for determining national quotas in the UN and in UNESCO are discussed by T.G. We
iss, International Bureaucracy: An Analysis of the Operation of Functional and Global International Secretariats (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1975), p. 57; and Clare Wells, The UNESCO Secretariat `Decolonized'? Geographical Distribution of the Staff, 1972-84. In The Nature of the United Nations Bureaucracies, David P itt and Thomas G. We iss, eds. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 137-164.There do arise situations where UN staff are conscious of working as advocates for individuals and groups in ways that undermine the policies of governments within whose boundaries they reside. Ga
ltung finds that a variety of philosophical orientations exists among the various UN organizations, and that such orientations depend largely on the coalition of governments responsible for founding or controlling them. Thus, the UN system contains both "politically progressive" and "politically regressive" organizations. The political orientation of any given organization may have radical or even revolutionary implications for specific governments, for example, where "development" signifies altering the socio-economic structure of a society by enhancing the situation of a previously disenfranchised group. Even in these situations, then, an organization's advocacy serves the interests of its government constituents. Johan Gal tung, "On the Anthropology of the United Nations System, " in The Nature of United Nations Bureaucracies, David Pitt and Thomas G. Weiss, eds. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986a), pp. 1-22.The UN's International Civil Service Advisory Board also describes the purpose of geographical distribution in terms of the benefits of multiculturalism: "The Secretariat shall reflect and profit to the highest degree from assets of all the various cultures and the technical competence of all Member States". Weiss, ibid.
2. Gerard J. Ma
ngone, A Short History of International Organization (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1954), p. 139; Egon F. Ranshofen-Wert heimer, The International Secretariat: A Great Experiment in International Administration (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1945), p. 78.; Norman Hill, International Administration (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1931), pp. 10-14.3. Robert S. Jo
rdan, The Influence of the British Secretariat Tradition on the Formation of the League of Nations. In International Administration: Its Evolution and Contemporary Applications, Robert S. Jordan, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 27-50.4. Ibid., p. 35. See also Robert Rhodes J
ames, The Evolving Concept of the International Civil Service. In International Administration: Its Evolution and Contemporary Applications, Robert S. Jordan, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 51-73.5. Ibid., p. 28.
6. James, op. cit., p. 54. See also Hill, op. cit., p. 202.
7. Hill, ibid.
8. James, op. cit., p. 57. See also Trygve Li
e, In The Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954), p. 41 and Dag Hamm arskjold, The International Civil Servant in Law and in Fact. In Servant of Peace: A Selection of the Speeches and Statements of Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary-General of the United Nations 1953-1961, Wilder Fo ote, ed. (New York: Harper and Row, [1955], 1962), p. 41.9. James Ba
rros, Office Without Power: Secretary-General Sir Eric Drummond: 1919-1933 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).10. Leonard D. Wh
ite, The British Civil Service, In Civil Service Abroad: Great Britain, Canada, France, Germany, by Leonard D. Wh ite, Charles H. Bla nd, Walter R. S harp, and Fritz Marstein M arx (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1935), pp. 1-54.11. Robert H. R
oy, The Cultures of Management (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), p. 52.12. E.N. Gla
dden, Civil Services of the United Kingdon: 1855-1970 (London: Frank Cass and Company, 1967), p. 1.; Max Web er, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociolog, Guenther Ro th and Claus Wit tich, eds. (Berkeley: University of California Press, [1968], 1978), pp.956-1005.13. White, op. cit., p. 7.
14. Paul E. Mur
ray, "Paradox and Narrative: The Construction of Reality within International Secretariats," Ph.D. dissertation, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., 1989.15. Hugh He
clo, A Government of Strangers: Executive Politics in Washington (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977).16. Ibid., p. 69.
17. Wilfred C. Je
nks, The Headquarters of International Insitutions: A Study of their Location and Status (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, [1943], 1945), p. 94.18. Hill, op. cit., p.202.
19. Ranshofen-We
rtheimer, op. cit., p. 245.20. See FAO, n.d. a) I [Standards of Conduct of the International Civil Service: A Guide for Staff Members of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations], n.p.
21. Richard W. Van Wagenen, Observations on the Life of an International Civil Servant. In International Administration: Its Evolution and Contemporary Applications, Robert S. Jo
rdan, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 17.22. Jenks, ibid.
23. Harold Nic
olson, Diplomacy, Third Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, [1939], 1964), p. 95.24. Jenks, loc. cit.; Ranshofen-Wertheimer, loc. cit.; A. Loveday, Reflections on International Administration (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956).
25. Ibid.
26. Ranshofen-Wertheimer, ibid., p. 10.
27. Loveday, loc. cit.
28. Ibid., p. 25.
29. Ibid., p. 3. (Emphasis added.)
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., p. 105.
32. Ranshofen-
Wertheimer, op. cit., p. 244.33. Je
nks, op. cit., p. 95.34. Article 100.
35. Formulas for determining national quotas in the UN and in UNESCO are discussed by Wei
ss, op. cit., p. 55; e.g., Weiss, ibid., p. 54.36. Paul Stre
eten, The United Nations: Unhappy Family, In The Nature of United Nations Bureaucracies, David R oth and Thomas G. W eiss, eds. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,1986), p. 192.37. Ga
ltung, op. cit., p. 2.38. Ibid.
39. There do rise situations where UN staff are conscious of working as advocates for individuals and groups in ways that undermine the policies of governments within whose boundaries they reside. Galtung finds that a variety of philosophical orientations exists among the various UN organizations, and that such orientations depend largely on the coalition of governments responsible for their founding or controlling them. Thus, the UN system contains both "politically progressive" and "politically regressive" organizations. The political orientation of any given organization may have radical or even revolutionary implications for specific governments, for example, where "development" signifies altering the socio-economic structure of a society by enhancing the situation of a previously disenfranchised group. Even in these situations, then, an organization's advocacy serves the interests of its government constituents. Galtung, op. cit., (1986b).
40. Jens H. Schult
hes, The Effectiveness of Aid as a Problem of Bureaucratic Management (To appear in Poverty, Development and Food, Edward Cl ay and John S haw, eds. (London: Macmillan Press).41. Lie, op. cit., in Press, p. 53.
42. The UN's International Civil Service Advisory Board also describes the purpose of geograhical distribution in terms of the benefits of multiculturalism: "The Secretariat shall reflect and profit to the highest degree from assets of all the various cultures and the technical competence of all Member States," Weiss, op. cit., p. 57.
43. Hammarskj
old, op. cit., p. 81.44. Mu
rray, loc. cit.45. Immanuel K
ant, The Philosophy of Kant: Immanuel Kant's Moral and Political Writings, Carl J. Friedri ch, ed. (New York: The Modern Library, 1949).46. Galtung, loc. cit.
47. See Evens, 1985.
48. Van Wergenen, op. cit., pp. 12-13.
49. Ibid., p. 14.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid., p. 15.
52. Ibid., pp. 13-16.
53. Ibid., p. 16.
54. Galtung, loc. cit.
55. Ibid., p. 9.
56. Ibid., pp. 12-13.
57. Ibid., p. 17. See also Stre
eten, loc. cit.58. Schu
lthes, loc. cit.59. James A. Bo
on, "Further Operations of Culture in Anthropology: A Synthesis of and for Debate," The Idea of Culture in the Social Sciences, Louis Schne ider and Charles M. Bonje an, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 1-32.60. Ibid., p. 10.
61. Ranshofen-We
rtheimer, op. cit., p. 38.62. Jen
ks, op. cit., p. 94.; E.J. Phe lan, Yes and Albert Tho mas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949).63. Robert W. C
ox, The Executive Head: An Essay on Leadership in International Organization. International Organization, 23, p. 209.64. Ibid.
65. Ibid., p. 211.
66, Ranshofen-Wertheimer, op. cit., p. 35.
67. Hammarsk
jöld, op. cit., p. 336.68. Ibid., [1961]; (1962), p. 336.
69. Ibid, (1945).
70. Frank G. Bo
ndreau, International Civil Service. In Pioneers in World Order: An American Appraisal of the League of Nations, Harriet Eager D avis, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944), p. 79.71. Ibid., p. 84.
72. Ranshofen-Wertheimer, op. cit., pp. 35-36.
73. Ibid., p. 144.
74. Gal
tung, loc. cit.75. Richards Sym
onds, Functional Agencies and International Administration. In International Administration: Its Evolution and Contemporary Applications, Robert S. Jord an, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 110.76. Ibid.
77. Stanford M. Ly
man and William A. Dou glass, Ethnicity: Strategies of Collective and Individual Impression Management, Social Research, 40 (1973), pp. 334-365.78. Jean Br
iggs, Strategies of Perception: The Management of Ethnic Identity. In Patrons and Brokers in the East Arctic, R. Pa ine, ed. (Newfoundland: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1971), pp. 55-73.79. Frederik Ba
rth, Introduction to Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Differences (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969).80. Gregory Bat
eson, Naven: A Survey of the Problems Suggested by a Composite Picture of the Culture of a New Guinea Tribe Drawn from Three Points of View, Second Edition (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 184-185.81. Geert Hofls
tede, Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1984); Gregory (1983).82. Mohammed ElMutassim Huss
ein, The Presence of a `Third Culture' in a Western Society. Human Resource Management, 20 (Spring 1981), pp. 31-35.83. Addeke H. Boe
rma, Political Will and the World Food Problem. In The World Food Problem and U.S. Food Politics and Policies: 1972-1976: A Readings Book, Ross B. Ta lbot, ed. (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1977), pp. 165-167.