CHAPTER XVIII
THE
NEW NATIONALISM AND THE GOSPEL WITNESS:
Western
Tolerance vs. Christian Repentance
VIGEN GUROIAN
Loyola College
Early
in the summer of 1990, I visited Armenia for the first time. This was on the
heels of the massive protests and rallies of 1987-88 and the terrible earthquake
in December 1988. In Armenia the expectation was that Gorbachev’s days were
numbered -- as indeed they were -- and talk everywhere was of independence. Even
the cautious and conservative Armenian church had begun to shift its position
and had begun to support the popular nationalist movement.
How
could I help but embrace these Armenian hopes for so-vereignty and
self-determination, having been raised knowing how much this meant to my
grandparents? And when I returned in the spring of 1991, it looked as if their
dreams were coming true. Still, I was wary of the excess of the nationalist
fervor in Armenia, dan-gers that I had identified before my visits and that
looked even more serious when viewed up close.
I
was especially troubled by the behavior of the Armenian church. The diversity of
opinion on the national question within the political realm gave reason for a
cautious optimism -- a genuine civic life and political culture seemed to be
emerging. However, the unmistakable mark of expediency in the church’s shift
from coo-peration with the Communist regime to sacralizer of the new
na-tionalism was worrisome; its neglect of the spiritual needs of the people was
conspicuous and unforgivable. The gospel pure and simple needed to be preached
and practiced in the cities and in the remotest villages. The hierarchy seemed
more comfortable wearing ethnic pride under filigreed ecclesiastical robes.
The
attitude that the Armenian church (and other churches like it in former Soviet
lands) takes toward the new nationalism is a critical matter. Western observers
obsessively try to take readings on how well democracy is doing in the emerging
democracies of Eastern Europe. The central question raised: Is this nationalism
compatible with liberal values? Certainly the development of de-mocratic
institutions is essential, but I submit the more important and immediate
struggle is a spiritual one.
What
are the possibilities for the self-professed Christians of these Orthodox
Christian lands to practice virtue and love to their neighbors during a time
when nationalism is on the rise and vio-lence is common? In Armenia people are
struggling with the tangled religious and moral question of the relationships of
faith, identity and Christian love. It is important to try to understand the
nature of the new nationalism in Armenia and how it exists in tension with the
Christian witness to the gospel, for Armenia is a microcosm of the struggle of
nationalism and the turmoil that affect much of the old Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe.
Before
proceeding, something needs to be said about the Western analysis of the ethnic,
religious, and nationalistic struggles going on in the East. From and Armenian,
Russian, or Ukrainian perspective,all Western observers sound remarkably alike,
judging the struggle of other peoples always from the insistent secular and
political criteria of whether the outcome will be liberal and de-mocratic in a
recognizably Western way. Pluralism and tolerance are not incidental concerns
for many people in the emerging democracies. But there is a kind of Western
blindness in easy as-sumptions about multiculturalism and nationhood that is
historically naive and patronizing as well as morally obtuse. As Benjamin
Schwarz has written recently in Atlantic Monthly (May 1995), "At
least as much as other countries, the United States was formed by conquest and
force, not by conciliation and compromise. . . . The ideas of foreign-policy
experts about finding reasonable solutions to internal conflicts are distorted
by an idealized view of America’s own history."
That
doesn’t mean conquest and force are to be condoned. But it does mean that
Americans should not expect democracy in East to look exactly like democracy in
the West or that pluralism and tolerance have been easily achieved anywhere.
Culture and history matter. Too often Western assumptions about Eastern Europe
display ignorance or lack of interest in the distinctive re-ligious histories of
the peoples of these Orthodox nations and how that history is related to their
aspirations for self-determination and national sovereignty. The United States,
after all, is arguably a na-tion founded on a set of ideas, not on ethnic
nationalism. Germany, France and England are also democracies, but in each
nationhood is much more entangled with questions of ethnic and/or religious
identity. Such is also the case in Eastern Europe.
In
an article published over twenty years ago, long before virtually anyone
anticipated the extraordinary events of the past decade, the liberal political
philosopher Sir Isaiah Berlin gave the "new nationalism" a name. He
called it "bent twig" nationalism. With this metaphor he brought
attention to the peculiar characteristics of nationalisms that are reactions
against repressive forces that have stolen people’s dignity and imposed a
deadening control over their collective life. Such nationalism, Berlin argued,
has value in and of itself -- independent of democratic principles. It has the
potential of being an important first stage in the healing of old wounds.
Berlin’s
thesis was an advance over standard liberal preju-dices and blindness, which
often insisted on a coercive univer-salism. Liberal universalism was, after all,
notoriously sympathetic to imperialism. The "bent twig" analysis
encouraged a broader approach to nationalism and even argued that nationalism
needn’t be antithetical to broad liberal values and democracy. The interplay
of faith, identity, conflict and concord in Eastern Europe or Russia needs to be
seen in this light.
Michael
Ignatieff, a British historian and journalist, examined these issues in
characteristically liberal and Western fashion in his Blood and Belonging:
Journeys into the New Nationalism (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1994).
Ignatieff argued that there are two kinds of nationalism, ethnic and civic.
"Ethnic nationalism claims . . . that an individual’s attachments are
inherited, not chosen. It is national community that defines the individual, not
the individuals who define the national community." For Ignatieff, this is
not acceptable. Civic nationalism, on the other hand, embraces pluralism and
en-visages the nation as a community of equals in which ethnicity is only one
component of modern identity, and a diminishing factor at that. Ignatieff
concludes that of the two types of nationalism, civic nationalism "has a
greater claim to sociological realism" because "most societies are not
monoethnic; and even when they are, common ethnicity is only one of the many
claims on an individual’s loyalties. Civic nationalism is right to hold that
what keeps a society together is not roots but law."
Rhetorically
this abstract celebration of law sounds very soothing to Western ears. But I
find Ignatieff’s claim about where the greater realism lies incredible. What
makes him think ethnicity (and its accompanying component of religious
belonging) are diminishing as a source of identity? Like so many other
observers, he chooses to disbelieve what he sees. Ignatieff dismisses as
fantasies of nationalist ideology the testimony of people in Croatia, Serbia,
Ukraine, and other places who insist that religion and ethnicity are the core of
their identity. But if self-determination is a democratic goal, mustn’t we
take the identity claims of self-dete-rmining people seriously?
Ignatieff
describes himself as aa nationalist in the limited sense of civic nationalism.
He equates this with cosmopolitanism -- a creed, as he says, that is not beyond
the nation because it depends upon "the capacity of nation-states to
provide security and civility for citizens. . . . [As] civic nationalist, [I am]
someone who believes in the necessity of nations." But have nations ever
been forged or defended out of such a thin sense of identity? Believing in the
necessity of nations in an almost administrative sense is very different from
believing that one belongs to a nation in a deep, thick, bloody and membranous
sense. It is not surprising that Ignatieff’s discussion of Christianity in the
Orthodox and Roman Catholic lands, especially East European countries and the
Ukraine, is largely anecdotal. He doesn’t dig deeply into the religious and
ethnic identity issues, which is the underbelly of so much of the new
nationalism.
Much
of what we in the West want or fear will happen in the East is a projection of
our own worries or conceits. Even among many who take religion as a serious
component of democratic culture, the unstated assumption is that a rigidly
secular liberalism is somehow a prerequisite and precondition of civic virtue.
Equally unacceptable to the West is the notion of church that (in Ernst
Troeltsch’s sense) is identified with a people or land as an ecology and
history and not just real estate sold or distributed by contract. We even
sometimes call such expression of solidarity unchristian.
Given
such assumptions, it is next to impossible for us to appreciate why a Bosnian
Muslim or Serbian Orthodox would fight to the death over the same land, why
Palestinian Arabs and Jewish Israelis spill blood over the territory of the West
Bank, or why Armenians surrounded by Azerbaijanis refuse to abandon the
mountains and valleys of Nagorno-Karabagh. Or, I would suggest, why Virginians
opposed to slavery felt compelled in honor to fight for the Confederacy and
Northeners with no sympathy for abolition were willing to die to preserve the
Union. Fundamental allegiances are complex and overdetermined, never merely
self-interested.
Let
me at least try to convey a sense of the thick human reality that often ties
Christianity to nationalism in the East and in so doing challenges some of our
bedrock secular suppositions. No one could possibly deny that the gospel of
peace and reconciliation is having hard going in Armenia, Ukraine, or Serbia. My
own experiences in Armenia have proven that to me. But I am equally aware that
the history and resources of Christian ethics in these Orthodox lands are not
well understood in the West. Several personal experiences illustrate this, but
also suggest how Christian ethics might actually begin to enter public life more
positively in Armenia and the East.
One
afternoon in June of 1991, I was strolling through the streets of Yerevan with
Lillet Zagaryan, a historian of medieval art, and Erna Melikyan, a classicist.
The two women explained to be how many Armenians were returning to church in
search of some-thing to believe in after the spiritual desolation imposed by the
Soviet system. Lillet said that a new morality was needed. She believed that
morality is a universal, but suspected also that there is something specific and
compelling about Christian morality, which requires supererogatory acts toward
one’s neighbor, even the neighbor who is an enemy. I said that I thought that
Christian ethics includes more than moral principles or universalizable rules,
that it is joined to a person whom Christians are asked to imitate and follow.
"You mean Jesus," she responded. "I do not dispute that he was an
historical person. . . . But Christianity teaches us to turn the other cheek and
love our enemy. That is difficult. How can we love Turks or Azeris? . . . When
faced with such enemies maybe its better not to be so moral, so Christian."
Erna agreed: "Such morality is nearly impossible for Armenians."
Several
days after my conversation with Lillet and Erna, I was with a group of young men
and women who form the core of an active youth movement at the diocesan church
of Saint Sarkis in Yerevan. The bishop, who was present, asked if someone would
explain what it means to be Christian. The young people were quick to respond.
"It means to follow Christ and become as much like him as possible"
was the unanimous answer. I asked these young people whether they were familiar
with the twelfth chapter o the epistle to the Romans, where Saint Paul exhorts
his audience to offer themselves to God to "conform no longer to the
pattern of this present world, but be transformed by the renewal of your minds,
and to know what is good, acceptable, and perfect." Everyone was familiar
with the message and they all volunteered that it was very important, especially
for Armenians.
"We
must reach an understanding," said one, about the passages that mention
blessing your enemies and not seeking revenge, but giving help to you enemy when
he needs help." I then told the group about what Lillet and Erna had said
to me, especially about turning the other cheek. The nearly unanimous opinion of
the eight or ten young men and women was that there was no escaping the
directness of these passages. They were not surprised by what Lillet and Erna
said. They had seen this resistance to the radical nature of the Christian
gospel in others and experienced it themselves. These youths were not pacifists,
although they enter-tained that possibility. Instead, they wanted to wrestle
with the question of who is truly an enemy and what is vengeful and uncharitable
in oneself.
My
young friends believed that nothing short of re-evan-gelizing the Armenian
people would supply the moral fiber needed to forestall violence and the cycle
of revenge. Remember, Arme-nians, like Russians and Ukrainians, live deeply in
the past as well as the present. All these peoples, even nonbelievers among
them, trace their origins as a people back to stories of conversion to
Christianity. Moreover, these young men and women were moved by the rock-bottom
truth of Christian faith that pride and fear block love, and that the gospel
clears the ground for love and justice to grow. Can any society afford to
squander such moral capital?
In
May of 1994, James H. Billington wrote on Russia and Orthodoxy in the New
Republic, grappling with the realities I have described. Billington urged
his readers to take seriously the power of the explicitly Christian language and
symbolism of repentance and forgiveness in Russian and how that has been a
fabric of social peace in Orthodox lands. He described the coup attempt of 1991
and how it echoes so much of Russian history and the religious imagination in
Russia:
After
the putsch collapsed, Russians were brought together emotionally by the quasi
religious burial procession for the three young men killed during the coup
attempt. Memories were evoked of the first Russian saints, Boris and Gleb, young
medieval princes who voluntarily accepted death in order to prevent dissension
in the Russian land. And the classic totalitarian avoidance of individual
responsibility seemed to end with the moving words addressed (by Boris Yeltsin)
to the parents of the three fallen martyrs:
"Forgive me, your president, that I was not able to protect and
defend you sons."
"Forgive
me" is what Russians say to each other before taking Communion. They are
the last words uttered by an earlier Boris in Russia’s greatest national
opera, Boris Gudunov. "Forgive us" were the words on many bouquets
sent to Andrei Sakharov’s funeral in December 1989. Almost with these words
alone, Yeltsin seemed to invest power with a higher authority. Someone blameless
was assuming responsibility in a society where people in power never used to
accept responsibility for anything. And he did it in the language of faith.
Billington’s
reference to the Communion service of the Or-thodox faith is not incidental.
Indeed, eucharistic atonement is central to Orthodox ethics, and is the key to
unlocking an under-standing of our love of neighbor as a process that begins
with in-dividual penance and moves toward mutual reconciliation. Or-thodox
Christians consume the bloody flesh of their Lord after having embraced their
near neighbor, not just with a polite hand-shake but with a full embrace. They
are challenged in this act to embrace the flesh of their more distant neighbors
as gift and not to repeat the ancient legacy of the race to mutilate their
neighbor’s flesh and spill his blood. Billington did not mention that three
young men who died defending Russian democracy were of different faiths:
Orthodox, Muslim, and Jew. But, of course, this only adds more force to his
comments.
Unfortunately
many Westerners, and ironically many Christian Westerners, instinctively recoil
from such public religious language. Perhaps this is one reason why Alexandr
Solzhenitsyn (and often John Paul II) has been written off by many as a kind of
authoritarian crank. For Solzhenitsyn persists in calling Russia to repentance
and placing more faith in the power of the conversion of the heart than in any
modern political ideology. Listen to how he addressed his countrymen twenty
years ago before anyone se-riously imagined what we see happening today.
We
have so bedeviled the world, brought it so close to destruction, that repentance
is now a matter of life and death -- not for the sake of life beyond the grave
(which is thought merely comic nowadays) but for the sake of our life here and
now. . . .
It is now only too obvious that we have throughout the ages preferred to
censure, de-nounce, and hate others, instead of censoring, denouncing, and
hating ourselves. . . . [Nevertheless we are] reluctant to believe that the
universal dividing line between good and evil runs not between countries, not
between nations . . ., not even between good men and bad men; the dividing line
cuts across nations and parties, shifting constantly, yielding now to the
pressure of light, now to the pressure of darkness. It divides the human heart
of every man. . . .
We must stop blaming everyone else -- our neighbors and more distant
peoples, our geographical, economic, or ideological rivals -- always claiming
that we are in the right.
Repentance
is the first bit of firm ground underfoot, the only one from which we can go
forward not to fresh hatreds but to concord ("Repentance and
Limitation," in From under the Rubble).
We
in the West seem incapable of hearing this language of repentance spiritually or
with an appreciation for its powerful cultural and institutional embededness
within Russian national life. We think tolerance is a principle that stands on
its own outside of any larger moral narrative or agreement about the common
pur-poses of life. Naively, I think, we believe that democratic institutions and
procedures alone will secure civic peace. Yet it wasn’t so long ago that
Reinhold Niebuhr argued that the spirit of democratic tolerance is not solely
the product of secular values nor secured by democratic institutions alone.
Niebuhr judged that the humility born of repentance was "one of the great
resources of . . . faith for social achievement." He believed that strong
religious faith could and ought to be "a fount of humility" and that
if such humility became a disposition in political life it was "capable of
moving men to mo-derate their national pride."
Interestingly,
Reinhold Niebuhr was named by the religious intelligentsia that I met during
visits to Russia in the early 1990s as a Western theologian they found
particularly helpful in sorting out issues of faith, ethnicity, nationalism, and
democracy. These religious democrats dreaded the possibility of renewed
triumphalism within the Russian Orthodox church, but they also believed that
faith provided resources for building the moral foundations of a new, more
democratic order. That is at the heart of developments in the East.
At
least in this regard Solzhenitsyn many know the Russians -- and by extension the
Ukrainians, Armenians, and others -- much better than do the people who dismiss
his invocations of faith and repentance. The appeal to a self-consciously
Christian sense of repentance need not have anything to do, either, with a
worn-out belief in the old sacral order of Christendom. The progress of
secularism in Russia or Armenia, however, does not have the same history as our
liberal secularity -- it was imposed by totalitarian dictatorship, not by the
forces of individualism or consumerism. That makes a big difference.