CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:

THE STATE AND THE PEOPLE

A. T. DALFOVO

This analysis relates the crisis of development to the state, which virtually has taken over the management of development in line with its monolithic function in society. The people need to reappropriate the responsibility for their development. At the same time, the state needs to revise its function to help development as a mediator between the local and global communities.

THE PREDICAMENT OF DEVELOPMENT

Development has been an ubiquitous issue in international relations, in national planning and in the activity and thinking of many communities and individuals for half a century. Vast physical and human resources have been invested. At the same time, one notes the wide gap between such enormous efforts and their limited results and is left wondering whether development is solving a problem or it is itself a problem.

On 20th January 1949 Harry S. Truman (1884-1972), in his inaugural address to Congress, described the greater part of the world as underdeveloped and declared that "a greater production was the key to welfare and peace".1 From that day, development became a supreme objective motivating the policies of individuals and nations; production, which meant industrialization and later modernization, became the means to development. The assumption of a world divided between the developed and the not developed set off on a race with a few nations at immediate advantage in the lead and the rest of the world behind.

As the liability and insolvency of development emerged, it was felt that a wider approach had to be devised by improving the old models of development. Initially, the prevailing development model was that of growth through the three evolutionary phases of agriculture, industry and technology. Then it was found that growth had to be combined with a just distribution of wealth. Subsequently it was agreed that the basic needs for survival such as food, health and housing, had to be guaranteed before any other developmental project could be considered. A further emphasis was that the technology necessary for development had to be local and that the people needed to be involved in their own development. Of late, such fundamental values as justice, cooperation and ecology have received greater emphasis as essential parts of development.

Development has to be endogenous and in line with the choices, authentic values, aspirations and motives of the people involved.2 The above search for a better approach to development moved from a predominantly economic and material understanding towards a more integral and human consideration, including both material and spiritual values, and tried to recognize the person as both its principal subject and its supreme objective.

However, the various definitions and models of development devised to improve its understanding and efficacy, though positive in themselves, did not help it out of its predicament. One of the main reasons for the failure was that such attempts did not sufficiently consider the wider political context of development. The past attempts at improving the models of development generally have been based on the assumption that the matrix of development, the state, was sound. Hence it was believed that any model of development could and had to remain within that given socio-political paradigm.

The contention of this analysis is that the question of development needs to be formulated within the more ample context of the condition of the state and of its capacity to fulfil its present functions. The developmental crisis is indicative of a wider crisis involving the state itself whose crisis generates that of development.3

THE MODERN STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

The Evolution of the State

The state is taken to mean the entire setup of authoritative and legitimately powerful roles and institutions by which people finally are controlled, ordered and organized. More specifically, the state is the body politic as organized for supreme civil rule and government; this is the basis of civil government; therefore government is invested with supreme and coercive civil power by a specific country or nation at a particular time of its history. This meaning may be extended to the body of people occupying a defined territory and organized under a sovereign government, and also to the territory occupied by such a body.4 This extended meaning however is not the one used in this analysis.

There are several bodies and sets of activities in society interacting among themselves, like kinship, religion, trade and politics. In the course of history, the political component gradually evolved a more ample set of relations, activities and controls, acquiring a considerable amount of power over the other bodies. Such political power developed to its present paramount importance, differentiating itself from the other set of activities to become a holistic system standing in the place of society itself and giving rise to the modern state. The modern political system has attained its paramount position by managing the historical challenges faced by society in a more effective manner than the other social units. In this way it established its effectiveness fostered legitimacy which, in turn, helped effectiveness.5

This evolution that has created the modern state, which is pivoted around the political system, is now entering into another challenging historical phase, namely that of globalization. The state gradually is being absorbed into a globalizing trend involving every aspect of state activity like finance, commerce, information and communications. No public or private enterprize in any country can now segregate its objectives and strategies from the international context.

Globalization challenges the state as it highlights, among other things, the latter’s rigidity vis-a-vis the flexibility and mobility required by international markets and opportunities. The modern state appears to be so overloaded internally that it finds it difficult to meet and facilitate international competitiveness. The state needs to be more present, agile and effective on the international scene.

The modern state generally has been modelled on the welfare pattern, thus expressing its legitimacy in a concrete manner. Now globalization is curtailing the capacity of the state to attend to the welfare of its citizens, since attending to national welfare and investing in global competitiveness and are tasks that cannot easily be catered to simultaneously and harmoniously. Faced with the choice, the state feels compelled to opt for the global scene, relinquishing several aspects of its welfare program to the private sector.

The globalizing trend does not imply that the state is going to become redundant or disappear. The state will continue to be at the crossroads of social activities, but it needs to recast its functions within the framework of global competitiveness. If the state were not to change, it would continue to experience a chronically critical disability to attend to its genuine function and objective. In contrast, the state of duly revised to meet the present challenge could actually compete on the global scene with higher capital and better offers than, for instance, those from the private sector.

The Idea of Civil Society

The development of the political system that has shaped the modern state and that has given rise to its related challenges emphasizes, among other things, that such development is not the only one possible, or the ideal. Another social order could be hypothesized resulting from the development of other bodies in society such as trade or religion and their gaining the supremacy now held by the political body, or a social order where the various parts in society establish a balance of power among themselves.

Such a theoretical possibility leads to a distinction between the idea of state and that of civil society.6 In the present condition the political system dominates such other social institutions as trade, religion, education and kinship. Civil society considers these institutions all as essential parts of society, none necessarily superior to the other. The idea of civil society envisages a situation without the paramount position held by the political system in the present state; instead the social institutions relate among themselves in a different way.7 Civil society would then be the substratum of the forms of state organization.

The distinction between state and civil society helps to establish the limits of the political system vis-a-vis the importance of the other social systems, and to balance the relations among them such that the political system may not acquire undue preeminence at the expense of the others. The distinction highlights also the essential pluralism of society which any social action, whether political, economic, educational or otherwise, must take into consideration.

The rethinking of the state within the more ample framework of civil society helps to meet the above-mentioned challenge of globalization, which finds the welfare state unable to fulfil its role and retain legitimacy. Without attaining the welfare objective and as a result its legitimacy being unattained, the modern state needs to find new foundations for its legitimacy. This may require a de-modernizing and post-modernizing of the state by reconsidering it in the perspective of civil society; this, in turn, may require retrenching the political power of the present state. If, on the other hand, the state were to entrench itself in its present pattern and consequently fail in finding acceptable reasons for its legitimacy, it would be compelled to devise other alternatives, which, in such desperate cases, tend to be overt or covert force exercised against the people. The use of force and the resulting lack of freedom would create a situation in which development can only be affected, not effected — which is equivalent to saying that the denial of freedom leads to the denial of development.

THE AFRICAN STATE

Succession and Consolidation

Although the colonial scramble for Africa had economic exploitation as its aim, the African reaction was levelled at the state which solidified political domination. However, this reaction was not against the state as such, but at its occupants. In other words, the struggle for independence was aimed at replacing the state colonialists, rather than at demolishing the colonial state. Hence, the colonial state with its structures, functions and ideology passed into the newly independent nations:

In Africa, even during the struggles for national independence, politics, with maybe a few exceptions, has been essentially referred to the state principle, i.e. that politics is the state and the state is politics. It referred not to a position of antagonism with the colonial state order — an organized form of consciousness — but to the replacement of colonialists inside the colonial state, i.e. to the occupation of the state posts.8

After independence, the state in Africa was strengthened in its centralized and overall power, consolidating its paramount importance. Such development was seen as a necessary measure to build the newly independent nation which generally was very diversified. That diversity had to be moulded into a unity. This was effected both ideologically and structurally through the oneness of leadership, government and organization, in other words, through the paramount oneness of the state. The natural diversity and pluralism of society were cast into the one mould of the state. That merger directly concerned the people, but they had no direct say or active role in it. They were the objects rather than the subjects of unity, and the power of their numbers was dwarfed by the power of the system.

African society became statized: society was forced to serve the state. Governments, whether Marxist or capitalist, civilian or military, tended to become increasingly authoritarian, creating a sense of helplessness in the people. Some reactions were attempted against such monolithism, but generally they failed. Those that initially seemed to succeed, when faced with the reality of the social pluralism they had liberated, lost courage. The lure of uniformity was simpler to follow than the complex pluralism of assemblies and opinions, of diversity and opposition.

The struggle for independence, begun on the political front, had to be extended to the economic front in order to strike at the heart of colonialism. This economic struggle was compounded by the economic crisis at the world level, but it would have been, as it actually was, a necessary issue of African emancipation were colonialism to be dismantled entirely. But this economic problem also was managed by the state within its unitary vision and action. The people were not involved; the handling of the economic crisis was referred to the logic of state imposition, outside of mass participation. Economic rights and social welfare were frozen as conditions for the so-called ‘economic recovery’.9

Globalization has posed a challenge to the African state as well, but a challenge compounded by an additional meaning of globalization that has become essential to its understanding when considered from an African perspective. That new insight in the concept of globalization derived from the recent expansion and consolidation of a world order that has had Western political and economic powers as its driving force. Sub-Saharan Africa experienced the impact of that drive as a new form of colonial aggression, with the added danger of its apparent innocence vested in such words and ideas as "global responsibility", "global family", "one humanity", "new world order" and "globalization".10 These words supposed a world equality that allowed a just interaction among peoples. But centuries of sour relations and exploitation among the rich and the poor have made such relations idealistic. In the eyes of the poor, globalization has been the continuation of a colonial expansion which independence did not seem to have stopped, but merely rerouted.

This perception of globalization by sub-Saharan countries should have challenged not only these countries, but other countries as well. All countries should have become aware that globalization was not simply the long awaited target of a beneficial world unity or a smooth and balsamic wave melding humanity into a family. Globalization may be inevitable, but it is not entirely positive. Consequently, all countries must contain its negative implications, which otherwise will backlash against them.

The negative repercussions of globalization indicate that the problematic approaches to development could be reimported into a country that rid itself of them. This possibility implies that globalization does not necessarily lead to genuine development. A better guarantee for development derives, as already said, from the reformation of the modern state through a reappraisal of civil society so that the people may acquire a more meaningful exercise of public power. Such reformation is inevitable in the context of globalization which poses both positive and negative challenges to the state and also to the people.

Developmental Characteristic

In Africa, the economic issue became a developmental issue and vice versa. As the state in general was characterized and legitimized by its welfare, the state in Africa fulfilled this characteristic and legitimacy in the task of development, becoming by definition a developmental state. Development was its supreme objective to which everything had to be referred.

The terms "development" and "independence" were born twins; they have been so closely associated as to have become almost synonymous. But it was an ambiguous relationship and it soon emerged that development had a stronger affinity with colonialism than with independence, as indicated by the second "scramble" for Africa. According to this persuasion, development did not terminate dependency, but actually continued it. The word "development" concealed elements of coercion impinging on freedom, justice and autonomy, and prejudicing the understanding and implementation of development itself. Hence, the very developmental measures intended to bring about economic independence thwarted it.

The three major obstacles to development were spelled out as poverty, ignorance and disease. The state was considered to be the most effective agent with the capacity to alleviate poverty, to sustain educational measures and to improve health conditions. The people themselves had that idea, not realizing that such expectation encouraged the state in its tendency to centralization leading to their own marginalization. In fact, the state tended to regard the people as uneducated and resistant to change. As a result of that opinion, the state felt it necessary to overcome the resistance of the people by exercising its power against them.11

That created a double paradox. First, the people could not attain development. Like growth, development is not vicarious, it cannot be delegated; thus it is only the people who can develop themselves. Second, the state was actually fostering underdevelopment. By usurping the development that belonged to the people, the state deprived them of their freedom and choices, thus becoming an obstacle to development. "The demobilizing of civil societies in Africa and the strengthening of the state apparatuses created a crisis by which the state itself constitutes the major obstacle to development."12

This paradoxical situation has been fairly well observed, understood and highlighted; yet the conventional and problematic approach to development continues unabated. Most people seem to be bent on it as if hypnotized by the mystique of development that continues to cast its spell on numberless activities in society. Development may have become a myth; nevertheless it continues to captivate reason. As a result of this, even when the state has proved unable to provide for basic needs and survival, it still can use the lure of development to request the sacrifice of anything — which request may turn out to be the people having to sacrifice their opinion and their freedom. Thus, for the sake of development, workers and farmers are not to ask for better wages and prices, activists are not to press for full rights, and people are not to call for every democratic freedom.

The voice of the people has been muffled by the omnipotent state system, and their development stifled. People must regain their voices and their freedom to effect their own development and destiny. "In Africa, we must move away from a process of `nation-building-from-above’ insisting on political unanimity (`national unity’). This process has blocked people’s creativity and mass enthusiasm; it has complicated the treatment of differences among the people by the people themselves."13

The paradoxical conclusion is that both the state and the people appear to be simultaneously "for" and "against" development. This has caused, overtly or covertly, an impasse between the two, with the state fearing the people and the people fearing the state.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE THIRD POWER

A solution to the confrontation between the state and the people could be found in the above mentioned reappraisal of civil society, which could lead to discovering some new way of managing public power or, as some analysts specify, to elaborate a third dimension of power.14 The concept of civil society would create awareness about the various institutions existing in society through which people act and interact, encouraging them to locate other nuclei or sites, apart from those of the state already in place, where the people could express themselves politically. Examples of such sites from the past are the assembly of the ancient Greek democracy, the convention of the French Revolution and, more recently, the factory. In Africa, such instances are the palaver15 and the recent national conferences when gathered by public request and acting independently of the state.16

The universities in Africa could also offer such favorable sites for democratic and political expression. The African universities are meeting points of culture which is so much at the center of their interests that one could see the ancient European "University of Studies" (Universitas Studiorum), emerging as the new African "University of Cultures" (Universitas Culturarum). A university where international cultures and national ideas converge is particularly suitable to become a political site of free and democratic expressions. But this does not seem generally to have happened due, among the rest, to the elitism in some universities which prevents attention to the public interest and due also to the stifling of the political creativity of some universities by the state.

A question may arise here as to whether the state itself could successfully attempt a reappraisal of civil society which would then be effected from above. In principle such an attempt cannot be ruled out, particularly when it is motivated by a genuine desire of self-reformation and the people are allowed to regain the necessary power to stand effectively vis-a-vis the state.17 A significant manifestation of this effectiveness could be had in a permanent process by which the state accounts to the people and the people can eventually recall and replace their state representatives.18

The appreciation of civil society could be brought to bear on the search for a third way to manage society or a third system of power, as some expressly called it.19 Within this perspective, the first system of power is the political one within nations and in international alliances; it is the power of the prince. The second system of power is the economic one within such financial structures as markets, banks and multinationals; it is the power of the merchant. These two powers may be allied or opposed among themselves. In both cases they tend to be felt by the people as restrictive and also oppressive.

The third system of power emerges as a reaction on the part of the citizens to the restrictive powers of the prince and of the merchant. The citizens, weary of a political and economic situation that is unable to provide a rewarding welfare and development, seek an effective way to achieve those targets exercising their freedom and rights.20 The citizens gather their new power as they act more and more through institutionalized and voluntary associations outside the state system. Such power is derived from of the need for such organized action, of the role of civil society, and of their growing ability to find new ways or sites for their action. These include Non Governmental Organizations, Amnesty International, International Alert, Human Rights Associations, Minority Rights Groups, Green Peace and other independent bodies that have as their background civil society, not the state.

GLOBALIZATION AND LOCALIZATION

The third system of power goes beyond national boundaries and into the global arena. This new power develops from global solidarity and support, from global sharing of objectives and values, and from global awareness and belonging. Here the issue of globalization, which above was considered in its challenge to the state, is now found to be challenging also the people who are devising alternatives to the modern state power, whether prince or merchant. Globalization seems to be both a force from within one’s ability to widen the horizon of one’s existence and a force impinging from outside bent on narrowing down one’s freedom. This is the ambiguity of meaning challenging the modern state, and in particular the African state.

Hence, as citizens search for a third system of power, globalization releases them from local bonds and boundaries, ushering them into wider areas of action, interests and opportunities, and increasing their freedom and creativity. At the same time, their global belonging weakens their individual identity, culture, tradition and social ties, resulting in a degree of anonymity.

A person thus is caught between globalization and diversity, homogeneity and heterogeneity, a drive to more ample horizons and a pull to one’s roots.21 In becoming global, one’s existence appears precarious, weak and uncertain, and consequently the need to assert one’s identity becomes a condition for personal survival. To avoid fading into generality, one takes deeper roots within one’s particular community, for personal identity derives not only from the self but also from one’s social belonging: "I know who I am if I know to whom I belong."

Today, one of the strongest components of social belonging to a community is derived from ethnicity. Ethnicity refers to a combination of cultural and historical characteristics in which one roots one’s social identity.22 At one time, ethnicities were thought to hinder the achievement of development and to slow the pace of modernity. Consequently, it was thought that they had to be overcome, a task considered relatively easy as they were held to be transitional phenomena, destined to disappear. What has been happening in many parts of the world, particularly during the last 30 years, has contradicted such assumptions and expectations, prompting a reconsideration of ethnicities.23

In the nations formed by immigration like the U.S.A., Brazil and Australia, ethnic characteristics were at first seen as survivals from preceding generations, mere sentimental remnants. The ideology of the ‘melting pot’ in the U.S.A. was a reassurance that ethnic particularities would have been integrated into the general culture of the nation. It did not happen. The Americans were actually reminded by Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919) that they could identify themselves with reference both to their past origin and to their present condition by recognizing themselves as "hyphenated Americans"; hence, not simply Americans but, for instance, Anglo-Americans, Afro-Americans (with the hyphen joining the two identities).24

Europe has also been awakened to the ethnic issue by events in the former Soviet Union, in former Yugoslavia, in the Basque region and elsewhere. In Africa, the presence of ethnicities is felt particularly in those areas where geographical definitions have not emerged from demographic or historical developments, but as a result of external intrusions.25

Walter Connor estimates that nearly half of the countries of the world in recent years have experienced some degree of ‘ethnically inspired dissonance’.26 Hence ethnicity needs to be recognized and accepted as a fact; it cannot be denied or ignored for it constitutes the basis of one’s personality and of a community’s heritage. The problem is not about the existence of ethnicities, which is a positive fact; but rather about the way in which they are handled, which may be positive or negative.

The dual tension of globalization and localization, vision and identity, poses the temptation of coercive short cuts. But there are no such short cuts in growth; there is no forcing development. The actors of development are the people, and the stage on which to enact it is civil society. The state needs to accept its new function of mediator between globalization and localization and facilitate the sites of political expression, the creativity of the people and the presence of other social systems. The mediatory role of the state is also needed with regard to the very ethnicities of which it is constituted, in the sense that it should provide the legal instruments and the necessary coordination to guarantee respect, cooperation and development among them.27

* * *

In spite of the developmental predicament, there are reasons to bypass despair and to move into a vision of hope.28 B. M. Gourley envisages the dual perspective of our "tomorrow": "the winter of despair" if we look at the disconcerting challenges, but "the spring of hope" if we consider the promises of science and, we would add, a commitment to ethics.29

This ethical reference wants to be the conclusive thought of this analysis that has discussed the conditions for development. It pointed out that development pertains to the people. The people need to decide what ought to be done and which specific choices ought to be taken. Hence, the ultimate condition for development refers to choices and freedom; these are the ethical facets of development.

NOTES

1. W. Sachs, "Per un’archeologia dell’idea di sviluppo" in Volontari e Terzo Mondo, XVIII (N. 7, Luglio, 1990), 13-42.

2. P. Harrison, The Third World Tomorrow (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1983 [2nd Ed.]), pp. 23-42.

3. B. Hettne, "La crisi dei tre mondi e lo stato nazionale" in Dimensioni dello sviluppo, VIII (n. 1/2, 1991), 252-282. Beyond the popular understanding of crisis that equates it to a serious problem, one may consider it in its etymological derivation conveying the meaning of a pivotal condition in the course of an irreversible process. Such process implies an inevitable transition leading to a profound transformation. Generally, the ensuing radical change is not entirely predetermined; hence the persons concerned in the crisis can effect that such situation have a positive outcome. Concerning the scope of the crisis, this analysis focusses specifically on that of the state, leaving aside its other ramifications.

4. D. Robertson, Dictionary of Politics (London: Penguin Books, 1985), pp. 307, 308. Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. "State".

5. I. Colozzi, "La crisi dello stato-nazione fra localismo e internazionalismo", in Dimensioni dello sviluppo, Anno (n. 2, 1993), 15-31.

6. Civil society is considered here at the conceptual level, not empirically.

7. "Civil society is a concept in political theory which, though useful, is very seldom employed today, though it was familiar to most important political thinkers from the seventeenth century onwards. Among others, Hobbes, Locke and even Hegel distinguished between the state and civil society." D. Robertson, op. cit., pp. 44-45.

8. E. Wamba-dia-Wamba, "Africa in Search of a New Mode of Politics" in U. Himmelstrand, K. Kabiru and E. Mburugu, African Perspectives on Development (London: James Currey, 1994), pp. 250-251.

9. E. Wamba-dia-Wamba, op. cit., p. 253.

10. W. Sachs, "One World", in W. Sachs, The Development Dictionary (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1993), pp. 102-115.

11. C.S.L. Chachage, "Discourse on Development among African Philosophers", in U. Himmelstrand, K. Kinyanjui and E. Mburugu, African Perspectives on Development (London, James Currey, 1994), p. 55.

12. Nzongola-Ntalaja, "The African crisis: the way out", in African Studies Review, 32 (No. 1, 1989), p. 118.

13. E. Wamba-dia-Wamba, op. cit., p. 257.

14. The World Development Report 1991 gives suggestions and state priorities to recover an efficient pattern of development. These proposals are addressed to developed and developing countries, and specifically to their respective governments. The implied invitation to "rethink the state" takes the validity of the present "state" for granted. This presupposition should be noted when considering the present crisis of the state vis-a-vis development. World Development Report 1991, The Challenge of Development (published by The World Bank; London: Oxford University Press, 1991). See "Rethinking the State", p. 9 and pp. 128-147; "Priorities for Action", p. 10 and pp. 148-157.

15. E. Wamba-dia-Wamba, "La Palabre comme pratique de la critique et de l’autocritique sur le plan de toute la communauté", in Journal of African Marxists, 7 (March 1985), 35-50.

16. E. Wamba-dia-Wamba, op. cit., 1994, p. 258. According to the same author, parties are not the genuine answer to present political needs. "Multi-partyism would not enhance the emergence of political consciousness; that is why even imperialism is agitating for the exportation of multi-partyism making it an extra condition for aid". However, parties can serve as a transitional measure. "If multi-partyism can achieve the eradication of those regulations (silencing people’s political viewpoints) then, as a transition to a new mode of politics, struggles for multi-partyism may be tactically supported." E. Wamba-dia-Wamba, op. cit. (1994), p. 259.

17. In Uganda, Resistance Councils were established at various levels, from the village (Village Resistance Councils) to the Nation (National Resistance Council). The word "Resistance" has now been substituted by "Local" and the "National Resistance Council" by "Parliament". These Councils have been organized from above and they are essentially within the established state structure.

18. E. Wamba-dia-Wamba, op. cit. (1994), pp. 256-257.

19. B. Hettne, op, cit., pp. 252-282.

20. The move to privatization is not necessarily a transition from political and economic elitism to popular comprehensiveness. It could simply be, for instance, a strategic sharing of power between the prince and the merchant, further compounding the freedom of the citizens.

21. G. Scidà, Globalizzazione e culture. Lo sviluppo sociale fra omogeneità e diversità (Milano: Jaca Book, 1990). In Dimensioni dello sviluppo, VIII (n. 3, 1991), 171-177.

22. The word "ethnicity" first appeared in the 1972 Supplement of the Oxford English Dictionary. Whether the concept of ethnicity is new or simply rediscovered, it gathers a set of ideas that are proving increasingly crucial in social dynamics and personal identity.

23. R. Rizman, "Il ritorno dell’etnicità", in Dimensioni dello sviluppo, X (n. 2, 1993), 33-36.

24. F. Bellino, Giusti e Solidali (Roma: Dehoniane, 1994), p. 193.

25. D. Robertson, op. cit., pp. 111, 112.

26. A. Bullock, O. Stallybrass and S. Trombley, The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought (London, Fontana Press, 1988), pp. 285, 286.

27. With regard to this, Basil Davidson perceives two positive tendencies in Africa today, namely a decentralization of power and a renaissance of African unity. "African Nationalism and the Problems of Nation-Building: Reflections on the Past 25 Years", Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, December, 1986.

28. T. R. Odhiambo et al. (eds.), Hope Born out of Despair (Nairobi, Heinemann Kenya, 1988).

29. B. M. Gourley, Universities and Ethics, Address at Installation as Vice-Chancellor of the University of Natal, University of Natal, April 12, 1994.