The contact of African culture with external cultures, especially European, has led to a process of social transformation. Two crucial elements have emerged, i.e. diversity in the conception of the new cultural milieu, and a new dimension of conflict between social cohesion and individual human freedom resulting from the formation of the nation-state as a new socio-political entity.

The conceptual diversity involves three main metaphysical stances. First, some people conceive experience strong attachment to African cultural values and urge for their relevance as underlying change, but most importantly as ensuring the continuity of African identity. The Afrocentric argument in support of the African heritage, which has characterized post-colonial Africa, is an important instance of this tendency. Second, some incline towards alien values as logically more relevant to the modernization entailed in the change. This thinking is manifested in the reverence for European civilization and for modernization, viewed as synonymous with European civilization. The third position envisions a synthesis of the African and the alien cultures as both are crucial contemporary realities. Such a synthesis would draw what is fundamental and positive from each, and enable each to enrich the other. This conception can be said to have motivated, either consciously or unconsciously, the scholars who have attended to the subject of social cohesion in African traditional society. In view of the Euro-African cultural interaction which made manifest that the element of individual autonomy as the fundamental constituent of the European mind, there arose need to elaborate on social cohesion, the fundamental constituent of the African mind.

There exists a situation of tension between loyalty to a person’s specific social entity where the ethnic group seems to be the most significant, and the larger social unit or the colonial nation-state composed of a complex web of ethnic diversity and other social entities. The ethnic group is perceived as the primary source for one’s social identity and self-preservation, in contrast to the nation-state which is a colonial artifact established through coercive means. At the same time there is a conflict between one’s personal freedom independent of the ethnic community, and the common good demanded by the nation-state. This is especially so, given that in contemporary times individuals are becoming increasingly more conscious of their autonomy. This awareness is partly founded in one’s being and identity, but it is also a result of increasing social interaction motivated both from within and from outside societies. There is some resentment against tradition, socio-political authority, the family (on the part of young people) and the educational system, which in Africa has tended to be coercive, suppressive and manipulative. Moreover, each of the three metaphysical stances entails a value for society and social cohesion, which in turn induces a new consciousness of oneself.

Given the three dichotomous situations the life of the person in contemporary society is a pendulum between opposites, but the self seems to be gaining more momentum. Awareness of one’s own self places more stress upon the individual’s being or individuality, thus straining social relations. How to wed the two realities or opposites is a major contemporary moral challenge in the African socio-cultural milieu. It is a problem of the perception of one’s identity in one’s culture, and particularly in cultural change and social relations. For, as one searches for order or harmony between the conflicting realities, one’s moral consciousness endeavors to grasp what would ensure one’s ethical existence in the midst of contemporary change.

All three problematic elements pertaining to the pendulum situation may not exist in the perception of each individual person in the African society, and in some people one may not be quite conscious of any of them. But they seem to have considerable influence on the thinking and conduct of people, especially those who have had much exposure to external influences and numerous social encounters.

The problem of the self-identity of the individual within the context of social transformation in Africa is motivated largely by coercive tendencies generated by the socio-cultural confrontation between Africa and the outside world, as well as by the coercive impact of indigenous social authorities. Thus its expression in one’s consciousness tends to be resentment, or a generalized largely negative stance. However, the problem itself is positive. It focuses on an instance of human nature which it urges us to try to understand. More significantly it points our attention to understanding the underlying moral constitution of the individual person which is essentially positive, but has been corrupted by society which causes the individuality of the person to degenerate into individualism. Therefore, moral education must be so structured as to build up one’s intellectual capacity to balance individual interests with the social good, especially when the two conflict fundamentally. This paper emphasizes moral education because African nations have not given attention to integrating it into the conception, policies and programs of development.

Three levels of the human mind can be distinguished, a combination of which constitutes moral consciousness. These are: perception of one’s own self-identity, perception of the identity of other persons, and moral knowledge.

By this perception of oneself as an individual being one’s conscious of one’s individuality as an entity separate, in an abstract form, from other persons. Here perception and consciousness are used synonymously. Thus, to have perception of the self is to be self-conscious.

The perception of my own self-identity and the personal identity of others is a matter of knowledge. It consists in having a conception of the reality of my individuality and of that of others. This is a capacity of every person’s cognitive faculty and is basis of moral consciousness, and subsequently of moral behavior. There cannot be morality without consciousness of the self and of others.

Normally people endeavor to do what they think is good or is bound to be good for themselves, while at the same time they think it is or can be good for others as individuals and as a community. This is because one is conscious of oneself and of others, both as individual beings and as constituents of a community. This awareness is natural and had by those who biologically are still at a minimal age.

When I consciously do what is beneficial for myself and others, I have knowledge of our co-existence and of the need for co-operation or mutuality. I am conscious of the interests of others, as well as of the likely effects of my actions upon them. My self-awareness and awareness of others goes beyond the primary epistemological level of simple awareness of their existence at a moral level.

The moral consciousness central to the moral orientation of persons is capable not only of developing but sometimes of degenerating. This suggests the need for moral education. Education plays an important role in the development of moral consciousness and as a result in contributing to the moral development or enhancement of a person. In the philosophical thinking of the early Western philosophers one notices the concern that morality can, and should, be taught. They considered that moral education provided the ability for a better assessment and evaluation of moral situations and for facilitating moral judgement and action.

Some scholars in the African socio-cultural milieu, such as Njoroge and Bennaars, have studied moral education and come to a similar position. In Europe and the USA it is also a major issue today, invoking a call for educational reforms which will provide for moral education.

This justification of education for developing moral consciousness does not suggest that a person who would not have access to education could not develop moral consciousness. Such a person’s moral choices and decisions would depend mostly on the prevailing morality in his society, on his sense of values, and to some extent on his perceptions — all of which may not provide sufficient guidance. Given such complex situations as that of contemporary Africa, involving numerous and at times fundamental conflicts of interests and values, without education one would be bound to fail in making the necessary evaluation and hence fail to make the reasonable decisions or choices which respond to the interests of the persons involved. Such a person’s decision or choice could be reasonable or desirable only as far as the attainment of one’s own goals is concerned, especially were one to take into consideration only one’s own often prejudiced, point of view.

In contrast, education normally opens the mind to diverse points of view. It enriches one intellectually, enabling one to broaden one’s moral perspective in order to accommodate the divergent, and sometimes fundamentally conflicting views characteristic of today’s diversified society. This enables one to make an intelligible analysis and evaluation and even to explain established views or opinions.

The central problem to be addressed by education with respect to developing moral consciousness is the conflict between individual and collective goods. To state the two suggests a dichotomy between them; they are perceived as opposites and in real life situations they may contradict one another. Despite the apparent contradiction, however, it is possible to build a theoretical basis for harmony between them from which appropriate human behavior could flow.

The individual and collective goods are two realities essential to human existence in society. Individuality can be equated with the pursuit of self-oriented goals, but these can, and sometimes do, have moral worth or value. If my own interests are pursued and realized, they may entail goods not only for me or for a small fraction of the society, but for a larger universe. But when we infer a unity, harmony or commonality of interests it should not be expected that every person will be conscious of them.

My self-interests can be said to be in harmony with those of other persons if their attainment does not harm other persons or hinder the present and subsequent realization of their goods, and may even contribute positively thereto. Where fostering my self-interests is negative in that it harms the good of others or obstructs its realization, my individuality becomes individualism in that it cannot harmonize individual and common goods.

The two dimensions of personal identity as both self and social are crucial in an individual’s mental state, the perception of one’s self-preservation is founded thereupon. Further, one perceives clearly and experiences practically the mutuality between oneself and others. However, the common tendency among humans, in the case of a conflict of interests between the two identities, is to pursue one’s own interests. Self-identity is the primary dimension in one’s perception of self-preservation; even among those who commit themselves to the common good, the individual cannot forfeit oneself or one’s individuality, which are primary constitution of the person. This is not a mere abstract statement; as metaphysical it concerns one’s very existence. This individuality is the very foundation of moral perception: one cannot appreciate the moral worth of others when one’s individuality and thus one’s moral worth are constrained.

A morality essentially motivated from within the individual will equips one with the capacity or competence to develop one’s own thinking, to initiate one’s own decisions and actions, and thus to develop an ability to manoeuvre one’s own way through the complex and constantly encountered conflicts and crises of values and interest. In the contemporary African socio-cultural milieu this complexity becomes more problematic with the increase of social and perceptual diversity and the subsequent of diversity in interests and values. In one’s moral conception one evaluates one’s own conflicting values and interests not only in relation to oneself, but also as they relate to those of others and to one’s society generally in order to justify one’s decision both to oneself and to others.

Moreover, one would be able, where necessary, to make assess and evaluate one’s own system of values and principles, and if necessary to modify one’s moral beliefs as may be demanded by one’s life experience and expectations. One is able to develop cognitive and moral flexibility as different situations may demand, yet at the same time to develop and sustain consistency.

Inasmuch as moral evaluation is a natural tendency of human beings, education which fosters personal initiative is bound to enhance it.

1. A number of scholars of African society have explained this phenomenon of "social cohesion". They include: Kwasi Wiredu, Kwame Gyekye, D.N. Kaphagawani and John S. Mbiti. It is a major theme in Gyekye’s recently published book, African Cultural Values (Accra: Sankofa Publishing Company, 1996).

2. Ibid., pp. 47-50.

3. C.O. Evans, The Subject of Consciousness (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1970), p. 19.

4. Ibid., p. 23.

5. Ibid., p. 37.

6. Roger Sperry, Science and Moral Priority (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 90.

7. Evans, p. 23.

8. David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (New York: The Bobbs - Merrill Company, Inc., 1957), p. 5.

9. Anthony O’Hear, What Philosophy Is (London: Penguin Books, 1985), p. 282.

10. William K. Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 45.

11. Ibid., p. 2.

12. Ibid., p. 68.

13. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue. Part II of The Metaphysics of Morals (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1964), p. 145.

14. Stuart Hampshire, Morality and Conflict (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 140.

15. W.D. Hudson (Ed.) New Studies in Ethics. Vol. 2 (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1974), p. 12.

16. Jean Jacques Rousseau, Emile (New York: Barron’s Educational Series, Inc., 1964), pp. 180-181.

17. Ibid., p. 181.

18. Sperry, p. 125.

19. Frankena, pp. 65-66.