CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER IV

ETHNICITY, CULTURE AND

SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION

A.R. BYARUHANGA

The challenge which Africa faces is how to ensure that identities of religion, ethnicity and tribe are accommodated without allowing the forces of bigotry and all forms of intolerance to exploit that accommodation. . . . The challenge we face is to build a culture of tolerance and to use our diversity creatively as a source of strength rather then of division.1

INTRODUCTION

These are the words of the Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity. I would repeat them, but add that, actually, the problem of identities has now engulfed the whole world: racism in America, the recently publicized separation of Aborigine children in Australia, the IRA in Britain, racism in Germany, the tragic events in the former Yugoslavia, minority and immigrant problems in France, and many others. Nonetheless, in Africa it is alarming: the Zulu problem is a thorn in the flesh of the body politic of South Africa; the ugly wars affecting the Great Lakes region have been explained in terms of ethnic identity; closely related, but being sensitively whispered, is a supposed Hamite plot to rule Central and North Africa.2 In Uganda, the accusation that the Banyankole are nepotistic, and many other similar cases underscore the pervasiveness of the problem of ethnicity. This is, of course, a shame to so-called world civilisation and calls for a re-examination of our assumptions about the social reality, especially in Africa, before we can talk about its reconstruction.

After a thorough examination of the problem of social identity, Martin reaches a conclusion that we are all cultural hybrids.3 This is a pertinent observation because it underlines the significance of culture in social interaction with specific reference to ethnicity. Drawing from this, we assume that culture plays a large role in ethnic conflict. On this basis, we shall try to clarify the meanings of ethnicity and culture, consider the relationship between the two, suggest a reconstructive approach to the problem of the two phenomena. We hope, by this endeavour, to contribute to meaningful social reconstruction because culture and ethnicity are a fundamental aspect of our social reality.

THE NOTION OF ETHNICITY

"Ethnicity" is a derivative noun from the Greek term "ethnos" which means race. Hence, etymologically ethnicity means a large group of people of common ancestry distinguished from others by such physical characteristics as stature, skin colour, hair type, eye colour, etc. The known principal races are the Mongoloid, Negroid and Caucasoid. Hence, the term "ethnicity" as used to describe our current particular conflictual situations is misleading for a racial conflict would be very wide, cutting across continents. It would be equivalent to the conflict existing between the whites and blacks or between orientals and whites.

Instead, ethnicity as used tody is based on the terms "ethnie" and "ethnic" which refer to the small group which we enter at birth. Hence, ethnicity is described in primordial terms, namely, as the initial psycho-social network we enter and acquire at birth. This is so fundamental that it later determines our values and goal priorities, our beliefs, perceptions, conduct and consciousness.

This primordiality is mentioned by the American anthropologist, Clifford, Geertz. He contrasts social relations that arise from kinship, neighbourhood, commonality of language, religion, beliefs and customs, with those based upon personal attraction, tactical necessity, common interest or incurred moral obligation.4 Geertz describes the former as "given", "unaccountable," and as having an overpowering force "in and of themselves." As all of us enter these social relations, some scholars argue that they do not necessarily constitute the grounds for violent conflicts,5 but instead provide us with an epistemological, cultural and emotional base.

Moreover, it often happens that people retain and emphasize their primordial, youthful world in pursuing specific projects in the larger adult world characterized by multiple cultures. This phenomenon is known as ethnogenesis and its product is an ethnie. Thus, an ethnie is a group in which membership has some of the qualities of the simplest type of infantile group with the same kind of emotional warmth and sacredness.6 When the term ethnicity is employed, one ought to have the ethnies in mind.

FEATURES OF ETHNICITY

Social Identity

One most important connotation implied by the use of the term ethnicity is social identity. It is presumed that an ethnie is an identical group. However, "identity" is not only a metaphysical term whose concrete applications are vague, it is also abstractive and most general. It refers to the state of the being of a thing or things; as such, it is neutral since it excludes moral precepts. Identity exists in the absolute and therefore its usage in concrete situations is only partially reflected. One cannot point at it and say, it is this or that. Instead, it can be described as a state of homogeneity and permanence, which on close examination implies difference and change. For example, if one identifies the colour of the car which killed the cyclist, it means that one inextricably rules out those which are not the identified color. Another example is an identity card, which indicates that a person is this one and no other, much as it indicates that this same person belongs to this group or to that.

Thus, identity implies sameness and uniqueness, much as at the same time it implies inclusion and exclusion. Identity, therefore, cannot be discerned independently; it has to be discerned vis-a-vis other identities. Applied to society, this means that a group of people are generally similar in many ways, but not that they are the same in height, age, colour, behaviour and other characteristics. It simply means that some people display certain generalities which can be divided into two categories. Outward identity includes religion, language, history or culture, physical characteristics and many others. For instance, the physical presentation of the Somalis is quite different from the physical presentation of the Bakiga in Western Uganda. Inward identity is expressed through beliefs, values, emotion and, most importantly, consciousness or the implicit philosophy or "spirit" of the community. This inward identity informs the outward expression of social identity. For example, the inward identity of the Tutsi in the current hostility in Rwanda and Burundi clearly is different from the inward identity of the Hutu because they are antagonistic.

Power. Tonnies describes ethnies as not purposive and existing for their own sake.7 However, such more recent writers as Geertz, Barth, Roosens, Nnoli, Rex and others see ethnies as organised depending on the project at hand. For Nnoli, ethnies are organised along a number of social processes including labour, religion, politics, juridical and other social axes.8 Weber contends that ethnies often produce leaders that use symbols. He defined an ethnie as a primary political community, with an inspiration and belief in a common identity, supportive of an ideological framework towards a specific purpose.9 The leaders draw upon the ethnic unity to mobilise it for political purposes. Martin too, treats ethnicity as a narrative of power.10

However, we find contestable the view that the ethnic purpose is political, because, the Gypsies have maintained their ethnic distinction by way of keeping a primitive, nomadic economy; Sokols seem to be organised on the axis of gymnastics and singing; others are based on oral and written traditions. Here in Uganda, the Karimajong conflict with the Iteso over cattle rustling, but there are internal conflicts among the Karimajong — the Bokora versus the Matheniko. In this regard, Barth’s position seems more amenable to the description of the purpose of the ethnies whose ultimate goal seems to be the security of the group. This refers more profoundly to the above terms of identity. Otherwise, it would be reasonable to talk of political ethnies, economic ethnies, religious ethnies etc.

Ethnocentricism. Ethnicity presupposes the existence of more than one ethnie. However, it is to be noted that these ethnies have a belief in the intrinsic superiority of their own ethnie over others. It is assumed by the members that their values, achievements, goals or even their physical features are better, while at the same time holding others’ ethnic qualities including their beliefs, values and organisation to be inferior and not to be preferred. This involves dislike and contempt for other groups. Hence, being centred on one’s ethnie implies the choice of this one and ruling out others. This characteristic of inclusiveness and exclusiveness is a strong basis for conflict and ethnic hostilities.

Emotionality. Ethnicity seems to be based on emotionality organised along three main poles — the relationship to the past, the relationship to space and the relationship to culture.11 However, Rex adds that the emotional feelings are based on the warmth drawn from the members’ experience of belonging together, the unique history of the group, and the mysterious sacredness attached to the relations among its members.12 In either case, fear and trust, love and hatred, persecution and glory are invoked. These emotions are so sensitive that any provocation is conducive to severe conflict.

Consciousness. Closely related to emotionality is the phenomenon of consciousness or awareness immanent in the cognitional acts of the members of the ethnie. Members become aware of their similarity as a group in values, goals and mode of life generally. According to Nnoli this is one important characteristic that defines ethnicity.13 This consciousness keeps the members together, much as it is also a tool for exclusion. Moreover, the consciousness members share may conflict with the consciousness had by non-members. This phenomenon, too, is a fertile ground for conflict.

Competition. In the world of scarcity and survival, there are struggles for power, scarce resources, survival and many others. Whatever be the object of struggle, power is needed to win and therefore all possible resources are mobilised, including the unity of the people. As time and circumstances vary , those who struggle will mobilise any available tool to achieve their ends. Consequently, ethnies choose one of the many channels like religion, ethnies, history, place, stature and make it relevant in the struggle. In actuality, there are many channels for ethnic mobilization, but competition is one of the means most suited.

CULTURE: ITS NOTION AND ELEMENTS

The term "culture" is metaphorical; it is a derivation of the Latin word cultura, meaning cultivation of the soil to which, in classical times was compared cultivation of the mind. This was very close to civilisation. Two points can be raised before we go further: first, even at that stage, culture was seen as a conscious and teleological process, rather than a condition or an achieved state; second, culture was perceived as a personal, rather than a social project.

In modern times, based on that meaning, culture is understood in a number of ways. Firstly, it refers to a general state or habit of mind or of human perfection, close to the original meaning — civilisation. Secondly, it refers to the general state of intellectual and moral development in society as a whole. Thirdly, it may refer to the general body of the arts and intellectual work. Fourthly, more comprehensive and popular, it denotes the whole way of life of a specific society, whether material, intellectual, spiritual or moral. This is the meaning that interests us and upon which we shall focus here.

Conceived as a complex or whole way of life of a people, culture has two fundamental levels of expression, each reflecting on the other by which it is informed. One form of expression is the implicit core or philosophy(ies), of which the other is the explicit material expression: the explicit reflects and vindicates the implicit. Let us look at the second expression first.

The material expression of culture can be approached from two levels, the material proper and the behavioural. The material proper involves the unique physical heritage of a people; it is perceptible by the senses and includes the structure of houses, cloths, works of art, tools and instruments, roads, modes of production and their products, etc. The behavioral expression, on the other hand, involves institutions, modes of organisation, government, rituals, traditions, customs, language and practices developed over a long time either consciously or unconsciously. This behavioural heritage is transmitted from generation to generation through participation by members of the cultural continuum. In modern times, there is a conscious effort to transmit cultural knowledge by both formal and informal means through cultural departments in the foreign countries in addition to the intra-cultural educational institutions which act as transmission agents and channels.

The implicit core, the spirit of a people sometimes is referred to as the ethos. This is the distinctive internal character, philosophy, or mind set of a people. This collective mentality is both spiritual and moral. Like explicit culture, this is inherited and embodies the beliefs, values, goals, ideas, and attitudes of a people. It is variously referred to as the "soul" or "inner aspect",14 the implicit core15 or theoretical culture.16 This informs and directs the material and behavioural cultures. For example, in most traditional Ugandan societies, women kneel before men because of the assumptions or beliefs the society has about the relationship between men and women.

In general, therefore, culture is an embodiment of the material, psychological, intellectual, and moral expressions of a people. It identifies and provides them with the basis for stability and progress. Much as it is a social production, it exercises great influence on the choices and actions of a people. In fact, to a great extent, it defines those who live that culture — in this case, the ethnie. Or should we say that culture and ethnicity are one and the same as, Martin claims?17

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

ETHNICITY AND CULTURE

We said earlier that ethnicity involves identical representations, but what makes a people identical? The fundamental explanation of ethnic identity is culture. Not only is the implicit expression of culture the identifying factor, but also the explicit expression of culture acts as a form of its vindication. The Indian female dress, for example announces clearly to whom the dress belongs, e.g., a sari to an Indian; in Uganda, the Kinyankole dress will tell that this person is most likely a Munyankole, the Kiganda is Kanzu, etc. If one is familiar with a specific language and the conduct of a people in particular situations, like kneeling while greeting, it will be much easier to identify the person.

Regarding the implicit culture, we noted that ethnicity is most quintessentially represented by consciousness of what Outlaw called "implicit philosophy"18 or Masolo called the "theoretical culture".19 Culture binds the mind of the ethnie together; it gives them a logical unity and a practical basis for pursuing any perceived project. Is it not often heard among the Hutu that they are many and will therefore overpower the Tutsi? And conversely, is it not always said by the Tutsi that the Hutu have never ruled, and therefore they will never rule? Culture, however, is both permanent and changeable: it is unified but diversified, and even though identical it is different. This is the relativity of culture which in turn affects ethnicity.

Whereas it is true that culture is a social relation, and therefore that a group of people is bound by it, it is also true that society is made up of individuals who can transcend a culture not only rationally but in other ways as well. Not only are persons born different, they are not entirely bound by birth. They meet new conditions and interact with individuals from other groups on a different basis which, in turn, influences them to think anew of their cultural assumptions and develop independent vistas and personalities. In this way the ethnic identity may be shattered; the new vista that emerges may even put the individual in conflict with his culture: hence, the problem of the individual and the society. For example, in traditional Ankole, there is a claim that the men exerted social, psychological, political influence over the women because the former, so it was presumed, paid bride price and took care of the family including the wife. However, this influence is waning because, in the recent past, women have been empowered to play new non-traditional social roles. This reality not only shows the possible tension between individuals and societies, but also emphasises the "unidentity" of identity or "impermanence" of permanence.

This cultural relativity is not only intrinsic, but can also be extrinsic. That is to say, a culture can interact and influence other cultures or be influenced not only spatially, but temporally by other cultures. This phenomenon has been highlighted in the criticism of Europeans as guilty of unconscious prejudice or ethnocentricism by their interpretation of all cultures in terms applicable only to European cultural phenomena. This erroneously denied cultural dynamism in time and space; it seemed also to fix a universal value system in conformity with Platonic forms — an already discredited view.

The implications of this cultural relativism for ethnicity can easily be understood. In the first instance, if there can be intra-cultural relativity, and culture is a fundamental identifying factor of ethnicity, then, an ethnie is bound to defy identification. This is to allow for difference which shatters the basis of ethnic definition and characterisation. For example, in spite of the hateful hunt for the Tutsi in Rwanda in the 1994 genocide, some Hutu condemned such a project. In fact, some Hutu were killed by their fellows for not supporting them or for condemning them in their awful project — hence the terms "extremist" and "moderate" as applied to the Hutu. Another example is from the Ankole in Western Uganda. With the coming of the colonials, almost all Bahima converted to Anglicanism while the Bairu divided into almost equal halves: one half became Catholic while the other became Anglican; negligible numbers remained traditionalist, while others became Moslems. When party politics was organised on the religious axes, Catholics joined the Democratic Party while Protestants joined the Uganda Peoples Congress. But most Bahima joined the Democratic Party, a party mainly for Catholics. Hence there are intra and extra contradictions or relativity within and between ethnies. This undermines organising people along ethnies to achieve certain objectives, for such objectives are not universal for every member of the society. This re-emphasizes the basic importance of the freedom of the individual and the role such an individual can and ought to play in a social project.

It was pointed out earlier, that ethnies are built and supported by emotion, which in turn is built on the axes of space, history and culture. Let us begin with cultural emotion.

Culture entails a system of meaning and understanding, implicit and explicit, which underlies the logical unity of human groups, ethnies included. Different situations and events are understood from a cultural context. As such, events are recreated in the present milieu drawing upon the experience of where one grew up, acted and communicated, all of which now have become part of oneself. This involves strong feelings, trust and security in knowledge and existence; the negation of this experience would probably mean the annihilation of the individual concerned. For examplem, it may be difficult to appreciate new foods or fashions like mini-skirts in a traditional Ganda society, conduct of rituals, etc. This cultural experience is closely related to past history where the roots of the group are claimed to be located. Whether the group believes it has a glorious or even a traumatic history, past experiences are recreated to explain the current situations and used to legitimise contemporary attitudes and behaviours.20 Common historical experiences give groups strong common feelings

Space, too, generates strong emotion. Ethnies appear as a field where the necessities of life are situated, where the community originates, where it is sustained and where its destiny lies. Great events, rituals, foods and music are related to a specific space. Owing to this factor the majority of Ugandans want to be buried at home, they do not want to sell their burial grounds, and will celebrate important events at their homes. Most groups resent others in a struggle for power. This is demonstrated clearly by the case of the Banyarwanda in Uganda and Zaire-Congo. And both president Chiluba and former president Kaunda in the Zambian election process manifested the relevance of emotion in ethnic mobilisation. Where strong negative emotion is involved, conflict and violence are likely consequences because emotion shuts out other avenues. In short, emotions are presented as truths of the past and present; they are used to organize and create groups as well to select and skew meaning and logic to suit the projects at hand.

It can be conceded then, that since emotion is an important aspect of mankind, its role should be appreciated. However, emotion is a subjective phenomenon that should be directed and controlled by reason and objectivity. The absence of this effort undermines rationality, freedom and choice. In this context, it is imperative that cultural emotion, which is the same as the ethnic emotion, should not be over-emphasized to build conflict and violence, but rather critically appreciated. Emotion should not be projected as an absolute truth on which a conflict can be created as were the 18th and 19th centuries’ subjective and prejudicial views towards other cultures.

In general, the philosophical issues involved in the phenomena of culture and ethnicity are epistemological relativism and objectivism, identity and difference, one and many, and permanence and change — all expressed socially as the problem of the individual and society. Therefore, if headway is to be made in solving the ethnic problem, recourse to the above problems has to be made. This is an arduous project!

SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION

The term "social reconstruction" is adequate because societies have been "constructed" a million times, even though they continue to break up. To be able to come to terms with this problem, many suggestions have been made. The problem goes as far back as the days of Heraclitus and Parmenides — the problem of "unity in diversity" or "identity in difference" or "universality and relativism". This is a metaphysical problem, but can be also an issue of epistemology. When it is translated into social terms, it becomes the problem of the society and the individual, which also is expressed differently as multiculturalism, democracy, federalism versus centralism, etc.

Drawing from this duality in the reality of the universe, some philosophers have constructed either unifying or diversifying doctrines. The foundation of socialist systems is built upon a unifying doctrine, whereas the liberal ones are based on diversifying ones. To a great extent both extremes seem untenable, and so reconcialiatory doctrines have been suggested on which the welfare state and democratic socialism can be constructed. Here, the hermeneutic approach seems especially attractive.

Both Agazzi and Outlaw point to a positive reconciliation of the contradictions within and between cultures. Agazzi, for example, points out that since culture is a relative phenomenon we should not conceive our own culture as an absolute, while others are conceived as wrong or inferior. Instead, we ought to see cultures or other people as merely different. Another people’s culture serves as a pivotal base for the meaning of life by orienting their choices. Outlaw contends that there should be an effort of sympathetic comprehension of values, parameters of judgement and ways of approaching existential problems which are fundamental to the other. To this approach, Outlaw adds a hermeneutic understanding by which is meant an experiential encounter that involves the merging of the subject’s horizons of her/his own historical and meaningful being with the horizon of the one to be understood.21 This, of course, requires agreement and appreciation on both sides.

In ethnic terms, this approach means mutual appreciation and tolerance of cultural diversity, coupled with equality of opportunity and minimum social rights for all.22 This can entail some elements of a welfare state such as catering for "Nkuba Kyeeyos"23 (economic refugees) by European states.

Multi-culturalism recognises the right of minorities to their own culture for three reasons. First, separate cultures may have values which are important in their own right and actually enrich the entire society. For example, the communalist tenet practised in traditional Africa, if appreciated at a wider community level, would go a long way to alleviate some of the social problems not only in Africa, but also the world over. Second, the cultural structures of the minorities accord them protection and emotional support vis-a-vis the larger state, although this also could be a source of the problem of the individual and the state. Third, cultural or ethnic belonging empowers people to fight more effectively for their rights.24 This, however, opens a Pandoras’ box.

Are we not then at the point from which we began: how is the relativity to be solved; what is to be done to resolve the conflict between ethnies and the higher national society or the state?

Note that this is a very old problem. However, as we have said, the ideal of multi-culturalism has been achieved in varying degrees by European states, and it may be relevant for Africa to borrow from that experience. Their strong ideal would seem to be respect for individual freedom, which implies ethnic pluralism. Left at this point it would be inconsequential, but supported with Outlaw’s and Agazzi’s hermeneutic approach this could constitute a step ahead.

Finally, the views of Mannoni and Recoeur provide a philosophical theory that tries logically to reconcile the Self and the Other. Ricoeur contends that the idea of the Self implies the Other.25 This is similar to Jesus’s "Do unto others what you would want them to do unto you." This rules out ethnocentricism or ethnic (or cultural) conflict. Mannoni on his part, points out that the Self needs the Other to exist, not only physically, but also logically; otherwise, how does the Self become aware of its existence26 In addition, the Other reveals the Self as psychoanalysts indicated. Even the term "we" implies the Other, and the Rastafarian (Jamaican) use of "I" is constitutive of the Other.27 In short, we have to reach out for the other in the very constitution of our difference. Hence, our differences should unite us.

CONCLUSION

In our present world ethnic and cultural problems seem to have become more difficult than ever before. However, they have always been present in time and space. Ethnicity can be defined mainly in terms of culture, which is its identifying characteristic. The underlying philosophical problem is one of permanence and change, of identity in difference, or even of determinism and freedom. Socially, it is expressed as the problem of the individual and society. The individuals who constitute the society should be paramount. It is hoped that there will be a hermeneutic understanding of the logical and ontological necessity of the other for the Self and of the Self for the Other, and in addition protection of individual freedoms.

NOTES

1. The Honourable Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity, Address to the Conference on Africa, Washington, DC. 26th June, 1994.

2. There is a rumour in East Africa that the Hima in Uganda and the Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi, together with the Banyamulenge in Congo (former Zaire), are conspiring to combine with the Himites in Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya to control state power in the region of East and Central Africa.

3. D. Martin, "The Choices of Identity", in A. Zegeye and D.T. Goldberg (eds.), Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture (Carfax: International Periodical Publishers, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1995), p. 16.

4. C. Geertz, Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1963).

5. J. Rex, "Ethnic Identity and the Nation State: the Political Sociology of Multi - cultural Societies" in A. Zegeye, and D. T. Goldberg (eds), p. 25.

6. Ibid., p. 26.

7. Tonnies, F, Community and Association, translated by C. Loomis (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955), in A. Zegeye and D. T. Goldberg, op. cit., p. 26.

8. O. Nnoli, "Ethnic Conflict in Africa", working paper 1/89, CODESRIA, Dakar/Senegal, p. 3.

9. F. Mwesigye, "The Quest for Ethnic Identity: New Challenges for Uganda," paper presented at the fith American Studies Association - East Africa conference, July 17 - 20, 1995, p.2.

10. D. C. Martin, op. cit., p. 10.

11. Ibid., pp. 11-13.

12. J. Rex, op. cit., p. 25.

13. O. Nnoli, "Ethnic Conflict in Africa", op.cit., p. 2.

14. A. T. Dalfovo, "Readings in African Philosophy" (manuscript), Kampala, pp. 52 - 62.

15. E. Agazzi, "Philosophies as Self-consciousness of Cultures" in H. Odera Oruka and D. A. Masolo, Philosophy and Cultures (Nairobi: Bookwise, 1983), pp. 1-5.

16. D. A. Masolo, in H. Odera Oruka and D. A. Masolo, op. cit., pp. 44-51.

17. D. C. Martin, op. cit., p. 25.

18. L. Outlaw, in H. Odera Oruka and D.A. Masolo, op. cit., "Philosophy and Culture: Critical Hermeneutics and Social Transformation," pp. 24-29.

19. D. A. Masolo, op. cit., pp. 44-51.

20. D. C. Martin, pp. 12-13.

21. L. Outlaw, op. cit., p. 25.

22. J. Rex, op. cit., p. 30.

23. The phase "Nkuba Kyeeyo" is translated as "I sweep", but it is a ridiculing description of the lowly paid menial jobs that economic refugees from Uganda and elsewhere do in Europe.

24. Both Rex, op. cit., 1995, p. 31 and Nnoli, op. cit., p. 8, share the same view.

25. Ricoeur, "Soi-meme comme un autre" (Paris: Le Seuil, 1990), in A. Zegeye and D.T. Goldberg, op. cit., p. 16.

26. Mannoni, "Clefs pour l’imaginaire ou l’autre scene" (Paris: le Seuil, 1969), in Martin, op. cit., p. 6.

27. Martin, op. cit., p. 6.

This has been appreciated in various ways in the past: in the totem which was the unifier for the life and universe of the primitive peoples, in the myths which united gods and nature in a genetic whole, in the One of Parmenides as the natural first step for metaphysics, and in the eschatologies and the classical hierarchies of being, to cite but a few. Now, however, after a long period of analytic and atomic thinking, under the impact of technologies which make conflict too costly and inundate us with global communications, there is special need to take up once again this sense of unity.

Contraction

The situation is delicate however, for in so doing it is imperative to avoid the kind of abstractive thinking described above in which personal uniqueness is dismissed and only the universal remains.23

Cusa’s solution is found in the notion of contraction, that is, to begin from the significance of the whole and to recognize it in the very reality of every individual, so that the individual shares in something of the ultimate or definitive reality of the whole of being. One is not then an insignificant speck, as would be the case were I to be measured quantitatively and contrasted to the broad expanse of the globe. Rather I have the importance of the whole as it exists in and as me — and the same is true of other persons and of the parts of nature.

The import of this can be seen through comparison with other attempts to state this participation of the part in the whole. For Plato this was a repetition or imaging by each of that type of the one ideal form. Aristotle soon ceased to employ the term participation as image (mimesis) because of the danger it entailed of reducing the individual to but a shadow of what was truly real. Cusa too rejected the separately existing ideas or ideal forms. Instead what had been developed in the Christian cultures was a positive notion of existence as act24 whereby each participant in being was made to be or exist in itself. This is retained by Nicholas of Cusa.

But he would emphasize that the being in which this person or thing participates is the whole of being.25 This does not mean that in a being there is anything alien to its own identity, but that the reality of each being has precisely the meaning of the whole as contracted to this unique instance. To be then is not simply to fall in some minimal way on this side of nothingness, but rather to partake of the totality of being and the meaning of the whole of being and indeed to be a realization of the whole in this unique contraction or instance. It retains its identity, but does so in and of the whole.

De Leonardis formulates this in two principles:

- Principle of Individuality: Each individual contraction uniquely imparts to each entity an inherent value which marks it as indispensable to the whole.

- Principle of Community: Contraction of being makes each thing to be everything in a contracted sense. This creates a community of beings relating all entities on an ontological level.26

Let us stop at this insight to explore its implications for diversity. Generally multiplicity and diversity are seen as opposed to unity: what is one is not many and vice versa; to have many beings is to imply contrast and even possible conflict. When, however, each individual is appreciated as a unique contraction of the whole, others which are distinct and different are complementary rather than contradictory; they are the missing elements toward which one aspires and which can help one grow and live more fully; they are the remainder of the whole of which I am part, which supports and promotes me, and toward whose overall good my life is directed. Taken together they enhance, rather than destroy, the unity. This, of course, is true not of Parmenidean absolute and unlimited One which is the complete and full perfection of being, the fourth instance of unity cited above. But it is true of the third of the above unities which are precisely the reality of global unity, and the second type of unity which is its components seen precisely as members of the global whole.

Hierarchy. After the manner of the medievals Cusa saw the plurality of beings of the universe as constituting a hierarchy of being. Each being was equal in that it constituted a contraction of the whole, but not all were equally contracted. Thus an inorganic being was more contracted than a living organism, and a conscious being was less contracted than either of them. This constituted a hierarchy or gradation of beings. By thinking globally or in terms of the whole, Cusa was able to appreciate the diversity of being in a way that heightened this ordered sense of unity.

Lovejoy wrote classically of The Great Claim of Being27 in which each being was situated between, and in relation to, the next lower and the next higher in the hierarchy. We had, in other words, our neighbors with whom we shared, but there was always the danger that we were correspondingly distanced from other beings. Thus the sense of the human as "lord of nature" could and did turn into exploitation and depredation. Cusa’s sense of beings as contractions of the whole unites each one intimately to all other realities in one’s being, one’s realization, and hence one’s concerns. This converts the sense of master into that of steward for the welfare of the parts of nature which do not possess consciousness or freedom. These become the ecological concerns of humankind.

Another approach, built upon this sense of each distinct being as equal inasmuch as each participates in the whole, would image overall reality as a mosaic. But Cusa’s sense of each of those piece as also a contraction of the whole went further by adding the importance not only of each to the whole as in a mosaic, but of the whole in and by each being. Unity then is enhanced and is the concern of each being to the full extent of its own reality understood as an integral participant in the whole.

However, both these metaphors of a chain of being and of a mosaic are static. They leave the particular or individual beings as juxtaposed externally one to the other. Neither takes account of the way in which beings interact with the others or, more deeply, are even constituted internally by these relations to others. What Cusa sees for the realm of being is relationships which are not externally juxtaposed, but internal to the very make up of the individuals.

Internal Relations. This internal relationship is made possible precisely by a global sense of the whole.28 For this Cusa may have drawn more directly from the Trinity, but this in turn is conceived through analogy to the family of which individuals are contractions, especially as this is lived as the interpersonal relations of a culture grounded in such a theology. The philosopher can look into that social life as a point of manifestation of being. Indeed, hermeneutics29 would suggest that this constitutes not only a locus philosophicus whence insight can be drawn, but the prejudgments of philosophers which constitute the basic philosophical insights themselves. The critical scientific interchange of philosophy is a process of controlled adjustment and perfection of these insights.

In a family all the persons are fully members and in that sense fully of the same nature. But the father generates the son while the son proceeds from the father. Hence, while mutually constituted by the same relation of one to the other, the father and son are distinct precisely as generator and generated. Life and all that the father is and has is given from the father to the son. Correspondingly, all that the son is and has is received from the father. As giver and receiver the two are distinguished in the family precisely as the different terms of the one relation. Hence each shares in the very definition of the other: the father is father only by the son, and vice versa.

Further, generation is not a negative relation of exclusion or opposition; just the opposite — it is a positive relation of love, generosity and sharing. Hence, the unity or identity of each is via relation (the second unity), rather than opposition or negation as was the case in the first level of unity. In this way the whole that is the family is included in the definition of the father and of the son each of whom are particular contractions of the whole.

To highlight this internal and active sense of contraction and hierarchy Cusa uses also the analogy of a seed.30 This is able to develop and grow only by heat from the sun, water from the clouds and nourishment from the earth. Hence, all of these elements of the whole are interrelated in mutual dependence. Moreover, thereby the seed brings new being into existence — which in turn will be creative, etc. Finally, by this action of the sun and clouds, the seed and the earth, precisely as contractions of the whole, the universe itself is made fruitful and unfolds. But this is identically to perfect and fulfill the universe. Hence, the plurality of beings, far from being detrimental to the unity and perfection of the universe, is the key thereto.

Explicatio-Complicatio. Cusa speaks of this as an explicatio or unfolding of the perfection of being, to which corresponds the converse, namely, by folding together (complicatio) the various levels of being constitute the perfection of the whole. Hence Cusa’s hierarchy of being has special richness when taken in the light of his sense of a global unity. The classical hierarchy was a sequence of distinct levels of beings, each external to the other. The great gap between the multiple physical or material beings and the absolute One was filled in by an order of spiritual or angelic beings. As limited these were not the absolute, yet as spiritual they were not physical or material. This left the material or physical dimension of being out of the point of integration.

In contrast, Cusa, while continuing the overall graduation, sees it rather in terms of mutual inclusion, rather than of exclusion. Thus inorganic material beings do not contain the perfection of animate or conscious being, but plants include the perfections of the material as well as life. Animals are not self-conscious, but they do integrate material, animate and conscious perfection. Humans include all four: inorganic, animate and conscious and spiritual life.

In this light, the relation to all others through the contraction of being is intensified as beings include more levels of being in their nature. On this scale humans as material and as alive on all three levels of life: plant, animal and spirit, play a uniquely unitive and comprehensive role in the hierarchy of being. If the issue is not simple individuality by negative and exclusive contrast to others (the first level of unity), but uniqueness by positive and inclusive relation to others, then human persons and the human community are truly the nucleus of a unity that is global.

A DYNAMIC GLOBAL ORDER

Thus far we have been speaking especially in terms of existence and formal causality by which the various beings within the global reality are to specific degrees contractions of the whole. To this, however, should be added efficient and final causality by which the ordered universe of reality takes on a dynamic and even developmental character. This has a number of implications: directedness, dynamism, cohesion, complementarity and harmony.31 Cusa’s global vision is of a uniquely active universe of being.

1. Direction to the Perfection of the Global Whole: As contractions of the whole, finite beings are not merely products ejected by and from the universe of being, but rather are limited expressions of the whole. Their entire reality is a limited image of the whole from which they derive their being, without which they cannot exist, and in which they find their true end or purpose. As changing, developing, living and moving they are integral to the universe in which they find their perfection or realization and to the perfection of which they contribute by the full actuality and activity of their reality.

This cannot be simply random or chaotic, oriented equally to being and its destruction, for then nothing would survive. Rather there is in being a directedness to its realization and perfection, rather then to its contrary. A rock resists annihilation; a plant will grow if given water and nutrition; an animal will seek these out and defend itself vigorously when necessary. All this when brought into cooperative causal interaction has a direction, namely, to the perfection of the whole.

2. Dynamic Unfolding of the Global Whole: As an unfolding (explicatio) of the whole, the diverse beings (the second type of unity) are opposed neither to the whole (the third type of unity) or to the absolute One (the fourth type of unity). Rather, after the Platonic insight, all unfolds from the One and returns thereto.

To this Cusa makes an important addition. In his global vision this is not merely a matter of individual forms; beings are directed to the One as a whole, that is, by interacting with others (unity 3). Further, this is not a matter only of external interaction between aliens. Seen in the light of reality as a whole, each being is a unique and indispensable contraction of the whole. Hence finite realities interact not merely as a multiplicity, but as an internally related and constituted community with shared and interdependent goals and powers.

3. Cohesion and Complementarity in a Global Unity: Every being is then related to every other in this grand community almost as parts of one body. Each depends upon the other in order to survive and by each the whole realizes its goal. But a global vision, such as that of Cusa, takes a step further, for if each part is a contraction of the whole then, as with the DNA for the individual cell, "in order for anything to be what it is it must also be in a certain sense everything which exists."32 The other is not alien, but part of my own definition.

From this it follows that the realization of each is required for the realization of the whole, just as each team member must perform well for the success of the whole. But in Cusa’s global view the reverse is also true, namely, it is by acting with others and indeed in the service of others or for their good that one reaches one’s full realization. This again is not far from the experience of the family, but tends to be lost sight of in other human and commercial relations. It is by interacting with, and for, others that one activates one’s creative possibilities and most approximates the full realization of being. Thus, "the goal of each is to become harmoniously integrated into the whole of being and thereby to achieve the fullest development of its own unique nature."33

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

There is much more to be said on these topics. The role of the imagination should be exploited to understand the nature and role of cultures. If a global outlook be evolved in which unity is promoted by diversity then the progress of world unification can be not at the cost of the multiple cultures, but through their deployment and interaction. Strategy can move beyond the dichotomy of business and begging to the true mega project for the new millennium, namely to develop a global community in which all are looked upon with appreciation and progress is evoked by mutual respect.

For this Cusa’s global view has pervasive implications. To overcome past human tendencies to subdue and exploit nature some would want to eliminate the unique role of the humans in the hierarchy of being. Cusa would recognize the equality of all as irreducible individuals within the whole. Yet he would also recognize the unique position of humankind in that hierarchy as integrating all possible levels — inorganic, living, conscious and spiritual — within the one existing being. To express that humankind realizes all the types of possibilities of life Cusa uses the term "poss-est".

This, however, is not a license to plunder and exploit the rest, but a commission and destiny to assist in bringing out of others and of the whole realizations not otherwise possible to them. It is then the view of Teilhard de Chardin34 that it is precisely in man that we must look for further global evolution.

The relation of person to person also is shaped notably by such a vision. Generally it has been seen that order rather then conflict is the condition for the exercise of freedom. This is to appreciate the whole globally, rather than merely as a set of contrasting individuals. It is this context which truly enables and promotes the exercise of human freedom.

To see each as a contraction of the whole provides each not only with equality, but with definitive status as endowed by the significance of the whole. I cannot be instrumentalized, much less reduced either abstractively or concretely to a least common denominator. Thus equality can be promoted without the reductionism entailed by egalitarianism. At the same time, by thinking in global terms it becomes possible to see that diversity is the key to enriching the whole and thereby to drawing it closer to the fullness of perfection.

De Leonardis says this well when he concludes:

Human endeavors can be successful only to the extent that they achieve this integration whereby the isolation of the lone individual is overcome by social participation and the emptiness of alienation is transformed by unifying love into an active and liberating communal existence.35

NOTES

1. Lu Xiaohe, "G.B. Vico and the Contemporary Civil World", in Wang Miaoyang, Yu Xuanmeng and M. Dy, Civil Society in a Chinese Content: Chinese Philosophical Studies XV (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1997), pp. 37-45.

2. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged (Springfield, MA: Merriam, 1969).

3. XII, 71072b 26-19.

4. Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon, 1920).

5. (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1998).

6. Idiota de Mente / The Layman: about Mind, tran. and ed. Clyde Lee Miller (New York: Abaris, 1979).

7. Trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinnes (New York: Humanities, 1961).

8. The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy (New York: Harper and Row, 1963).

9. De Veritate, q. 1, 8. "Truth in the intellect is measured by things themselves," ibid., I, 5.

10. De Mente, 4, p. 53 and 55.

11. Miller in De Mente, intro., p. 24.

12. De Mente, 7, p. 63.

13. Ibid., p. 65.

14. Ibid., p. 59.

15. Ibid., p. 65.

16. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Chicago: Regnery, 1960), pp. 14-21.

17. Eugene Rice, "Nicholas of Cusa’s Idea of Wisdom," Traditio 13 (1957), 358.

18. Descartes, Discourse on Method, 2.

19. D. De Leonardis, p. 60.

20. Henry Bett, Nicholas of Cusa (London: Meuthin, 1932), p. 180.

21. Trans. G. Heron (London: Routledge, Kegan, Paul, 1954).

22. G. McLean, Plenitude and Participation: The Unity of Man in God (Madras: University of Madras, 1978).

23. Of Learned Ignorance.

24. G. McLean, Tradition, Harmony and Transcendence (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1994), pp. 95-102.

25. Of Learned Ignorance, pp. 84-88.

26. De Leonardis, p. 228.

27. Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (New York: Harper, 1960).

28. Of Learned Ignorance, I, 9-10.

29. H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Crossroads, 1975).

30. Dato Patris Luminum in Jasper Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa’s Metaphors of Contraction (Minneapolis: Banning, 1983), p. 25.

31. De Leonardis, pp. 233-236.

32. Ibid., p. 235.

33. Ibid., p. 236.

34. Phenomenon of Man (New York: Harper, 1959).

35. De Leonardis, p. 241.