Theoretically, two or more values may be said to be in conflict when they cannot be sustained simultaneously on the grounds of logical or moral incompatibility. Given the context of increasing cultural diversity and value pluralism in Ghana there exists the possibility of multiple conflicts of values. Since value conflicts carry a potential threat to the stability of the society overall and to the well-being of the people, there is a need to analyze such conflicts of values in order to control them.

In this essay I draw attention to a phenomenal conflict that has emerged between the practice of democracy and the use of the mass media in Ghana. I present evidence that indicates this conflict is the result of political manipulation of the mass media by the incumbent government, at least since the beginning of this decade. I argue that the most rational solution to this conflict, which threatens the democratic process as well as the peace and well-being of the nation, cannot be any laissez faire or ad hoc policy. Rather what is required is a set of carefully considered principles of intervention. The approach I suggest can be applied beyond the current situation in Ghana, for resolving this and similar types of value conflict within other emerging democracies of Africa. As a preparation for demonstrating current political use of the mass media in Ghana, a logical starting point is a general review of the nature of political manipulation as a moral phenomenon.

In her critical examination of the practice of commercial manipulation, Claudia Mills has identified three conceptions of ‘manipulation’ pertinent for a philosophical analysis of political and other forms of manipulation.

Manipulation as covert persuasion: According to Mills, any attempt at persuasion is in some way covert when the person doing the persuading wants to hide his intention from its targets. If the primary reason for hiding an intention is morally evil, the act of persuasion is a form of manipulation and should be strongly condemned as unjustifiable deception or dishonesty.

Manipulation as appeal to emotion: Any attempt to persuade someone to believe or to do something that does not appeal to reason, but rather to the targets’ emotions constitutes an act of manipulation. While deception or lying may not be involved, this form is comparably reprehensible since it dehumanizes the targets involved by failing to treat them as rational agents.

Manipulation as playing on a weakness: A third form of manipulation proposed by Mills is equally pervasive and morally repugnant. The manipulator exploits some specific emotional vulnerability of the target, e.g. fear, lust, greed or loneliness. The moral evil here lies in how the manipulator dehumanizes and takes unjustifiable advantage of the target. Most readers are undoubtedly familiar with commercial and religious manipulation in the advertising and activities of American religious cult founders and fanatics (e.g. Jim Jones, Jim Baker, Jimmy Swaggart and David Creche). What may not be so obvious is the use of similar strategies in the political arena to gain undue political advantage.

The Nature of Political Manipulation

Political manipulation is no less morally reprehensible given the deception, the lies, the dishonesty, the dehumanization and the abuse of human rights involved. A paradigm case of political manipulation can be observed in African dictatorships that are in the process of metamorphosing into instant democracies. In order to entrench themselves in power during such transitions, some governments try to prevent the emergence of media pluralism. They suppress opposing political views by maintaining a monopoly on television, radio broadcasting and journalism. The media is the best means of mind control, as communication experts (such as Cantril and Allport) have observed over decades:

When closing his seminar address, Kumado remarked sadly:

In October 1994 the government published the National Communications Authority Bill, a draft ostensibly intended to provide a legal and administrative framework for private broadcasting in the country. It was hailed by the government’s sympathizers as a bold initiative to dissolve the existing contradictions and legislative constraints on the media. Upon closer examination, however, it could be described, in the words of Dr. Koomson as "a threat to broadcasting pluralism." Consequently, several amendments were made to the draft before Parliament passed the bill. But when the president realized that in the end the amendments would diminish government control of the media beyond a certain threshold, he refused to sign the bill into law.

Feeling betrayed and frustrated as chairman of the Ghana Media Commission, whose duties were being usurped, Professor Kumado vented disappointment with the government’s suspicious strategies:

Forty-eight hours after the 1995 Conference on ‘Prospects for Private Broadcasting’ had adjourned, the first private independent station, "Radio Eye" began broadcasting, presuming upon the constitutional right to do so.

Most public broadcasters will admit only in private conversation that political manipulation effects their professional decisions. But the two most widely distributed (state-owned) newspapers, The Daily Graphic and Ghanaian Times — as well as their weekend editions, Sunday Mirror and The Weekly Spectator — make no secret about the ideological determination of their content. Violating its own long-established policy not to run any form of advertising on its front page, The Daily Graphic published a front page color advertisement just prior to election day. The picture featured an arrow pinpointing the way to vote specifically for the incumbent NDC party (National Democratic Congress) and thus for the incumbent presidential candidate. This sort of pictorially graphic display makes a significant impression on a population wherein the average newspaper-holder reads, in the literal sense, only superficially.

Speaking in defense of their pro-government bias, one of the editors of The Graphic argued that since the private newspapers (in particular The Free Press, The Ghanaian Chronicle and The Statesman) were anti-government in their editorial policy, the state-owned newspapers had no option but to write in favor of the government. Moreover, he argued, since the NDC candidate was none other than the current president himself, every story about him was automatically headline news; and headline news is what every newspaper strives to publish. Such remarks suggest that the depth of political indoctrination and manipulation in the country is so great that even professional journalists cannot distinguish between a state-owned newspaper and a pro-government newspaper, a distinction particularly crucial to sustain for the sake of democratic process during an election year. Yet in a country under economic siege, the issue devolves to a matter of crude economics for some working journalists who state their position rhetorically: ‘Where will money to feed my children come from if I am sacked for not singing the master’s tune?’

When the NPP 1996 presidential candidate Mr. J.A. Kuffour complained that he could not work with such irresponsible journalists if he won the election, he was widely criticized for issuing a threat. Yet no one concerned denied the allegation that a lively pro-government bias was at work in the press corps. George Sydney Abugri, a columnist for The Graphic (and recipient of the Journalist of the Year award in 1998) admitted that the media is "politically polarized" and that:

The degree of existing political manipulation may surprise someone who regards Ghana’s democratic process as the ideal showcase for Africa, just as the IMF claims it to be. Recall that the Rawlings administration was a professed Marxist-socialist government forced by famine and poverty to accept the externally imposed IMF/World Bank mandate to shift from political authoritarianism towards political democracy and economic liberalization. The Head of the School of Communications at the University of Ghana, Mr. Karikari explains:

It is difficult to overlook the deception and manipulation apparent in Rawlings’ purported penitence concerning atrocities committed in 1979, if one juxtaposes this public expression of regret with his recurrent public speeches celebrating the great sacrifices and heroism exhibited during the June 4 1979 Revolution. These occasions of self-congratulation do not exclude the extra-judicial killings for which he is held responsible in that year.

When he realized the political pay-off from such controversial theological statements for his re-election campaign, the president subsequently intensified their use. The Chronicle records that the president deployed no less than six of such controversial but divisive and diverting theological ‘dog-bones’, each of which was featured prominently by the media:

- Claiming that he did not fear God.

- Mocking Jesus for not assembling an army like Mohammed did to fight his enemies.

- Claiming that God is not democratic.

- Expressing amusement that Christians in Ghana prayed to God for a change of government in 1992 but God had not listened to them.

- Being very emphatic that Christ exudes violence by driving traders out of the temple.

The president used yet another manipulative strategy in the form of ‘political prophecies’ through the state media. Here are just two examples: An Ewe Catholic priest from the president’s natal Volta Region, preaching a few weeks before elections in the leading Roman Catholic Cathedral of Accra, blatantly campaigned for the incumbent when he declared that God had sent a messiah to deliver the people of Ghana from all their hardships, whose name was President Jerry John Rawlings — Rawlings was then shown by the government-controlled GTV to be seated in the front pew. Further, the GTV featured on prime-time an aged founder of an independent church in the Central Region, who showered praises on President Rawlings and then prophesied that God was going to make sure Rawlings would win the election once again. That was televised just two days before the elections.

Meanwhile preachers from the mainstream churches who criticized either the government or the media’s biased coverage were openly condemned through the state media for diverting from gospel preaching and for meddling in politics. Most Christians and leaders of the mainstream churches were unhappy with this blatant manipulation of the pious sensibilities of Ghanaians. Although no one can tell for sure how these Christians finally voted, it was evident in their near boycott of the 1992 and 1996 post-election Thanksgiving services that they were unwilling to associate themselves with the victory of this so-called political messiah, the Junior Jesus for Ghana. Yet the GTV was used once again to portray the Thanksgiving services as spontaneous events organized by all Christian churches to honor Rawlings’ victory not only in Accra but throughout all the regional capitals.

Islam, the second most popular religious tradition in Ghana, was also manipulated through the state media. The President and the NDC government used the media to create the impression that the President was indeed a friend of Islam and would never disappoint the mullahs. First was the passing of a bill during an election year that renders two Islamic holy celebrations official and legally recognized holidays. Sustained debate was publicized concerning the passing of the bill, which was presented in the media finally as a personal gift from the president to the Islamic community.

Another major sequence of media events calculated to portray the president as a patron of Islam was the creation of a national body to facilitate the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1996, an election year. Another public relations event was the Islamic Peace Sacrifice and Thanksgiving Service at the Central Mosque in Accra, marking the end of local conflicts in Northern Ghana — a predominantly Moslem region of the country — although the hostilities had ceased two years earlier. Consequently frequent contingents of national and local Islamic organizations were repeatedly televised, trooping in and out of the president’s office on missions of consultation and gratitude for his unusual interest and support for the Moslem community. These visits invariably occasioned the president’s public reminder to provide reciprocal support in the form of votes for his re-election.

Another significant example of political manipulation of Islam was the choice of a slogan for an auxiliary political party that supported the president, the Democratic People’s Party (DPP): its motto was the Takbeer of Islam — "Allah ho’ Akbar" (God is great). This motto carries unequivocally religious connotations insofar as it is an excerpt from the Koran commonly repeated at the beginning of prayers. Yet by virtue of its Anti-discrimination Act, the Constitution forbids the formation of political parties along religious and ethnic or regional lines. So one is left wondering why the Electoral Commission permitted the slogan as the official motto of a registered political party.

In what follows, I present events associated with traditional African religious beliefs phenomenologically; there is no ontological commitment carried by their description, concerning the existence or non-existence of pantheistic gods and their alleged supernatural powers. President Rawlings is by no means the first to have introduced African Traditional beliefs into national political rhetoric in Ghana, but he is certainly the one to have manipulated this doctrine the most in serving his own political advantage. African Traditional Religion has been enjoying a revival under the Rawlings administration, chiefly because of the prominence given to it at televised national public functions. Although Christians and Moslems are often invited to offer prayers at some of these functions, the pouring of libation remains constant and is sometimes the only form of prayer solicited by Rawlings’ protocol. Such was the case when President Clinton visited Ghana and enjoyed his memorable welcome, or Akwaaba. Although he knew President Clinton was a Christian, the protocol ignored Christian representatives and called only a Traditionalist to offer a libation (a drink offering in which the gods and ancestors are invoked to mediate between the auspicious earthly proceedings and the Supreme Being).

The president professes Catholicism as his personal faith. Yet he is also on record as challenging anyone who is lying to go with him to swear before the powerful river god in Ashanti, Antoa Nyamaa. It is a precept of Ashanti traditional religious doctrine that anyone who blatantly tells falsehoods before this river god will be killed instantly by supernatural forces.

The most pervasive way in which the president has identified himself as a patron of Traditional Religion is through his association with the country’s traditional chiefs, who are both political and religious heads of their respective communities. A few weeks before the elections, the president called upon most of the paramount chiefs in the country and attended their festivals and durbars; all of these visits were great media events, occupying many minutes of newstime on television and on the front pages of the state-owned dailies. In response, most of these chiefs pledged their personal allegiance. Out of keeping with the protocols of traditional consensual and participatory democratic process, these chiefs also pledged the allegiance of their sub-chiefs and peoples, and then poured a libation asking the gods and ancestors to give Rawlings and the NDC political victory over their enemies. Since the chiefs are custodians of the land and since they are the ceremonial grandfathers and grandmothers of the nation, one would expect that on constitutional or moral grounds they should play a neutral role in the major electoral race of a multi-party democracy. But this was not the posture assumed by most of the chiefs and queens whose support the president solicited. President Rawlings is the first head of state since independence to make an elaborate, highly publicized gesture of acknowledging these traditional rulers through the creation of a National House of Chiefs within the central government. Chiefs are also invited to express advice in the Ministry for Presidential Affairs. Hence the expression of their partisan allegiance to the ruling party can well be understood. But it cannot be morally justified, since such selective allegiance is blatantly unconstitutional and discriminates against opposing political parties.

The ruling party further monopolized the media for the sole purpose of campaigning when the first lady toured different parts of the country, attending traditional festivals, funerals and project sites. All such media opportunities portrayed the presidential couple as patrons of the traditional religion and cultural practices of different regions of the country.

Commenting on these and similar phenomena in the last two elections, Dr. Elom Dovlo, a church historian and expert on African traditional religions at the University of Ghana, has observed that Christian issues dominated the 1992 elections and that African traditional religious issues dominated the 1996 elections. The media carried several stories in which members of the NDC government were reported as consulting gods and seeking ‘voodoo’ powers for victory and protection against their political enemies.

Another strange development that frightened many registered voters into supporting the NDC occurred during the 1996 election. It was widely reported in the media that the NDC candidates forced anyone who had taken a bribe to vote for them also to take a traditional religious oath to reinforce the bribe. The penalty for failure to vote for the NDC and the president would be a curse with deadly repercussions, not only for the disloyal individual but also for that person’s relatives. The possibility of such spiritual calamity could not be ignored by most of these people since they believe in the efficacy of these oaths and curses. This is especially so when the gods invoked include the river god Antoa Nyamaa whose powers have been popularized by the President himself through the state media since 1979 when he led a successful coup d’etat.

In keeping with disaster-avoidance decision-making policy, those that had taken bribes in the form of money, salt (and, strangely, enemas) thought it wise to vote for the president and his party, to avert any terrible consequences. The same policy was followed by some that were unsure whether or not they had thus committed themselves. This sort of reasoning is typical of traditional doctrine adherents and less formally educated people. The private opposition presses may have thought they were undermining the chances of victory for the incumbent government by publicizing incidents of these bribes and curses. But rather, they succeeded unwittingly in spreading enough panic to make the public vote safe, thus averting potential harm due to these dreaded supernatural forces.

The government successfully manipulated public opinion and action by exploiting pious fears. The objection here is not that the president created a fear of supernatural forces that he himself regards as non-existent, thus exploiting the superstitions and ignorance of non-formally educated people through malicious deception. Rather, the morally objectionable behavior lies in his identifying himself with such beliefs through public pronouncements and through traditional challenges issued to any adversary. The substance of these repeated challenges was his invitation to his adversaries to accompany him to visit powerful shrines — like that of Antoa Nyamaa near Kumasi — in order to prove the veracity of their claims and appeals for justice.

The voting public could not afford to ignore such a threat. It was this very minister who allegedly had organized and ordered counter-demonstrating hooligans to shoot fatally four participants in an otherwise peaceful and popular demonstration called Kume Preko ("Kill Me Quick"), in protest against the government’s first attempt to impose the devastating Value-added Tax (VAT) just a year before the 1996 election.

Shortly after this incident of extra-judicial state-initiated killing, the New York-based periodical, The African Observer, reported that the Ghanaian government had purchased and deposited large quantities of ammunition in some neighboring West African countries. A brief news conference refuting the allegations would have minimized the fears of the people. But no such refutation was published in the media. The government chose neither to confirm nor deny any of the allegations in the media. This silence consequently provoked such a degree of fear in the public that religious and traditional leaders were obliged to advocate and pray publicly for peaceful elections.

Politicians must respect the military; they must also earn the trust of the military through their words and actions. Political parties and politicians who are contemptuous of the military have not had stable governments when they have been in power. It is essential for the good of Ghana, that the military and the politicians be able to work together in their respective capacities without the need to swap roles.

This was correctly understood by the public as a military threat; it confirmed the unofficial ultimatum that unless the NDC and President Rawlings sustained their power Ghana would become another Liberia, Somalia or Burundi. Other fear-inducing strategies deployed in the media included the following:

- Reports of assault on NPP candidates and supporters by men in military uniforms.

- The imposition of several days of curfew on Kumasi directly upon announcement of the NDC victory in 1992 (Kumasi is the strongest seat of opposition to the NDC). Another curfew in Kumasi was imposed several days before the 1996 elections; explosion of deafening bombs to scare people at dawn two weeks prior to the election in Kumasi.

- The use of so-called ‘macho men’ and organs of the Revolution including the CDRS (Committee For the Defense of the Revolution), the June 4th Movement and Reformed Nkrumahists Brigades, at rallies.

- The media’s focus on the president’s visit to the permanent central military base in Accra, Burma Camp, (ostensibly to advise military officers how to ensure peace on election day) communicated a reminder of the strong and sustaining solidarity between the president, a former army lieutenant, and the armed forces. This announcement functioned effectively as another veiled threat of violence for a public familiar with political instability and coups d’etat as the norm for political change.

The burden of this paper has been to argue on the basis of a well-established notion of political manipulation, that the outcome of both the 1992 and 1996 national elections in Ghana cannot be explained without reference to the government’s engaging in various forms of political manipulation, relying chiefly upon the broadcasting and print media. It has been shown that the strategies included putting crippling legal restrictions on the campaign activities of opposition parties, monopolizing control over radio and television broadcasting, controlling editorial policy of the newspapers with the widest circulation, exploiting religious traditions and threatening the public with political and military violence.

In light of this evidence, the question yet to be resolved is whether there is any way to avoid perpetuating this political precedent in the future of Ghana’s emerging democracy. Two possibilities present themselves for consideration here: The society might adopt a free-market laissez faire principle towards political practice, and leave matters to develop as they will without intervention in future electoral races. Alternatively, some policy for arbitration and conflict resolution might be applied to prevent future abuses of political power. The first option is attractive to Ghanaians insofar as it is non confrontational. And with different personalities in office the strategies outlined here might never be employed again. But there is a long-term risk that they might be. Formerly successful dictators who have metamorphosed into ‘elected’ democratic leaders are particularly motivated to pursue these various forms of political coercion in order to sustain their positions of power in a non-violent ambience. There is wisdom in the familiar adage that evil triumphs when good men do nothing, particularly in the matter of preserving a social institution so fragile as the democratic process. Here are some steps that might ensure the media will no longer be manipulated:

- An independent Public Appointments Board should be established, backed by the constitution and the judiciary so that its decisions are legally enforceable, to ensure that state appointments to sensitive posts in the media are not influenced by partisan interests.

- Incumbent military dictators should be legally disqualified from contesting in political campaigns until they have vacated their offices for at least four years. This will discourage their demonstrated tendency to manipulate the electoral process while in office.

- Finally, once the Ghana Journalist Association has vowed to function as the watchdog of the constitution, the question arises, who watches the watchdog? An effective solution might be the formation of an association of fair-minded and apolitical intellectuals outside government who monitor the press corps and national developments, offering periodic reviews of media performance that are publicized internationally. Such an association could educate and support journalists in exercising their democratic right to free speech. Such a body could take an active role in guiding the press and protecting the public against either the excess of political intimidation that encourages propaganda, or the irresponsible abuse of established public figures through irresponsible accusations or insinuations in the media.

1. See Ghartey-Tagoe in Prospects for Public Broadcasting in Ghana, Bonnah A. Koomson, ed., (Accra: Gold Type Ltd., 1995), p. 43.

2. For a full account of the organization and results of the 1996 elections see Elections ’96 in Ghana, Part I, by Kwasi Afriyie Badu and John Larvie (Accra: Gold Type Press, published jointly by The Electoral Commission of Ghana and The Fredrich Ebert Foundation, Ghana Office, 1996).

3. Bonnah A. Koomson, ed., "Introduction," Prospects for Public Broadcasting in Ghana (Accra: Gold Type Ltd., 1995), p. 2.

4. Kofi Kumado, "Opening Remarks," in Prospects for Public Broadcasting in Ghana, ibid., p. 7.

5. Ibid.

6. Kumado, op.cit., p. 8.

7. Ibid., p. 7.

8. Koomson, op.cit., p. 1.

9. The Chronicle (Accra) Dec. 13-19, 1996.

10. David Ghartey-Tagoe, "Independent Religious Broadcasting in Ghana — Prospects and Challenges for National Development" in Prospects for Public Broadcasting in Ghana, op.cit., p. 44.

11. Daily Graphic, ibid.

12. George Sydney Abugri, The Daily Graphic, 19 September 1996, p. 5.

13. The Chronicle, op.cit.

14. Kwame Karikari, "Political and technological constraints on the development of independent broadcasting in Ghana" in Prospects for Public Broadcasting in Ghana, op.cit., p. 10.

15. John S. Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy (London: Heinemann, 1977), pp. 1, 3.

16. Ghartey-Tagoe, op.cit., p. 45.

17. The Ghanaian Times, May 20, 1997.

18. Plato, Republic, Book IV.

19. Professor of linguistics and literary critic Kwesi Yankah noted: "Suddenly it has been realized that the shortest route to The Castle* is the Church, and so, therefore, presidential aspirants (and doubtfuls) are building castles in the church, even when they are coming to embezzle funds. The whole trick has been to hold the Bible in one hand, the Constitution in the other, get the votes and throw the Bible away. They of course know the psychology of the electorate. ("Building Castles in the Church," The Mirror, Sept 12, 1992).

* ‘The Castle’ in local parlance around Accra refers to the government’s official presidential seat, which is in the Christianborg Castle built by the Danes in the l7th century, in a suburb of central Accra.

20. Kwame Nkrumah, Consciencism: philosophy and ideology for de-colonization and development in Africa (London: Heinemann, 1964), p. 68.

21. Ibid., p. 70.

22. An outstanding fact emphasized in critical appraisals of Rawlings’ political record is the extra-judicial executions in 1979 and in 1983 for which he is held responsible. The earliest of these were of public officials and former heads of state charged with defaulting on loans; the more recent killings were of six judges who had previously passed decisions unfavorable to Rawlings and other ruling members of his staff.

23. Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), p. 14.

24. Elom Dovlo, (May, 1997) "The Role of Religion in the Politics of 1996" Lecture delivered at University of Ghana, Inter-faculty Lecture series, p. 21.

25. E. Dovlo, ibid.

26. The Chronicle, "Utterances Against the Most High, Shall We Blame the President?" May 1996, pp. 6-7.

27. The Methodist Times, editorial, "Free, Fair, and Peaceful Elections" November, 1996; and GTV "In the Light," television talk show program, November 1996.

28. The president is half Ewe, half Scottish; his mother comes from the Volta Region.

29. The Daily Graphic, June 3, 1996, p. 7.

30. E. Dovlo, op.cit., p. 36.

31. "We will not probe or try Rawlings; we will leave him to his conscience. I am a Christian and I believe vengeance is for the Lord." Interview with The Christian Messenger October 16, 1992. Limann’s denial was expressed at Ho, Sept 10, 1992.

32. Free Press September 6-12, 1966. High school children in Ada (a coastal township about fifty miles from the country’s chief port, Tema) — when asked by their teacher why they wanted their parents to vote for the incumbent presidential candidate in 1996 — claimed that if Rawlings did not remain in power then the country might be bombed.

33. Free Press, ibid.

34. The Ghanaian Times, December 3, 1997.

35. P.A.V. Ansah, "An African Perspective" in Cultural Expressions in the Global Village, David Nostbakken and Charles Morrow (eds.) (Ottawa: Southbound, IDRC), pp. 39-57.