CHAPTER XIV

CHAPTER XIV

THE NUCLEAR OPTION FOR GHANA

J.K.A. AMUZU

INTRODUCTION

All countries, particularly the industrially developing ones, share a common concern over energy. In today’s economic environment, inflated energy prices are still on the rise and oil sources are growing more tenuous. So many industrially developing countries, having fuelled their progress by importing oil, now face additional challenges to maintaining or increasing their growth. In the early 1970s oil supply problems and dramatic oil price increases became facts of everyday life; which then led industry and research institutions to increase their efforts in the development and improvement of energy conservation techniques and energy supply alternatives.

Today, the panic of previous years concerning oil seems to have given way to a mood of optimism. However, world forecasts of energy supplies and demands up to the year 2000 indicate that this new optimism is unjustified. By adopting various scenarios and speculating from alternative assumptions about relevant factors (such as population and economic growth), projections for world energy requirements in the year 2000 stood at roughly 400 to 100 quod.1 All the recoverable non-renewable energy resources of the world put together stand at 161,000 quods, of which crude oil accounts for only six percent and natural gas for five percent.2 Many analysts believe that conservation and greater reliance on non-fossil and renewable energy resources is the key to bringing under control our insatiable appetite for oil. Fortunately, several energy resources that make it possible to do this are found all around us. Solar energy is above; wind and biomass surround us; nuclear potential lies below; and buried even more deeply beneath the surface of the earth lies the enormous reserve of thermal energy associated with the earth’s hot interior.

On November 25, 1964, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of the Republic of Ghana, declared:

We have been compelled to enter the field of Atomic Energy, because this already promises to yield the greatest economic source of power [emphasis mine] since the beginning of man. Our success in this field will enable us to solve the many-sided problems which face us all, in all the spheres of our development in Ghana and Africa.3

It was clear that Nkrumah had decided to lead the country along the path of the nuclear alternative.

Several events probably drew him to make that decision. Firstly, a general awareness of the enormous potentials of atomic energy had begun to grow in the country with the initial experiments involving the application of radio-isotopes at the University of Ghana (Legon) in the early 1950s. Secondly, around 1958 a nuclear fallout monitoring service was undertaken by the University of Ghana on behalf of the Defense Ministry, whose administrators had become concerned over potential public hazards from radioactive fallout arising from nuclear weapon tests. Out of these efforts came a proposal from the Physics Department of the University for the establishment of a Radioisotope and Health Physics Unit under the aegis of the National Research Council. The activities of the Unit included the provision of health protection monitoring services for users of X-rays and other penetrating radiations, monitoring of radioactive fallout and the establishment of specialized facilities and research equipment for work in atomic physics.4

THE GHANA NUCLEAR REACTOR PROJECT

In 1961 came the decision by the government to initiate the Kwabenya Nuclear Reactor Project, "to introduce nuclear science and technology into the country and to exploit nuclear energy in its peaceful applications [for] the solution of problems of national development."5 Viewed in contrast to the modest activities initiated at the University, this decision represented a huge leap. Among the initial tasks was to set up the Ghana Atomic Energy Committee in order to implement the Project. This committee was later replaced through an Act of Parliament, by the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission (GAEC) in 1963. It is mildly surprising that the initial agenda of the GAEC included building a nuclear research reactor, since the training of staff had only just begun. As it turned out, the bilateral agreement with the former USSR under which the Project was to be executed provided that scientists and technicians from the former Soviet Union were to man the initial stages of the project. It was no wonder, therefore, that when the First Republic fell the coup-makers suspended the project, for they disliked President Nkrumah’s close ties with the East. Indeed, at the time that the change of government occurred, work on the physical structures had reached such an advanced stage that the whole project would have been completed and commissioned by the end of 1966.

At this point, Sir John Cockcroft, the renowned British physicist, undertook a review of the nuclear project for the new government. He concluded that a reactor was not necessary for the research envisaged, and that the operation of a reactor would require too large a proportion (about one-third) of the total number of physicists and chemists in the country. Further, in his view the capacity of a recently commissioned hydroelectric power plant was so great that a nuclear power plant would not be needed for some twenty years.6 Consequently, the Project was scaled down to the establishment of a National Center for Radioisotope Applications. The Radioisotope and Health Physics Unit at the University at Legon was subsequently transferred to the new Center at Kwabenya. These reorganizations led to the departure of a number of the scientific and technical staff specifically trained for the Reactor Project.

There is some irony in the fact that it was another group of coup-makers who decided to reactivate the Ghana Reactor Project in 1973, following another review. A new management committee and a Reactor Technical Committee were appointed, and once again the site of the Project bristled with feverish activity. Setting aside Sir Cockroft’s earlier advice, arrangements were again initiated to acquire a research reactor. This time the management turned to the former Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). A one megawatt reactor belonging to Frankfurt University was to be donated by the state of Hessen to the government and people of Ghana.7 Fortunately, the newly elected government, which succeeded the military regime that had reactivated the Project, fully supported these fresh moves towards acquiring a reactor. The government therefore signed all papers and made payments towards the dismantling of the donated reactor in Germany, its shipment to Ghana and subsequent assembly at the Project site at Kwabenya, outside Accra. But before any of these things could happen, a fresh set of coup-makers arrived and the government of the former FRG cancelled all the arrangements.

By this time, in 1981, the National Nuclear Research Institute (NNRI) had already been established and therefore was obliged to carry on without a reactor. Its research activities and services included radiation protection, nuclear medicine, sterilization of medical and pharmaceutical products, environmental monitoring, food preservation, pest control and planting-material conservation. Meanwhile, the ambition to acquire a reactor remained undiminished. With massive support from the International Atomic Energy Agency, a Chinese 30-kilowatt miniature neutron source research reactor was installed and became operational in December 1994.

Since the NNRI now has only a small research reactor, the prospects for harnessing nuclear energy to generate electricity for the whole country are on hold. Furthermore, no commitment to nuclear power has been expressed by the government of Ghana since the idea was proposed by President Nkrumah back in 1964. Consequently, it would be useful to discuss here whether the nuclear option for generating electricity nationwide is indeed a viable proposition for Ghana at this time. In this analysis we shall endeavor to avoid the selective and politicized approach which is sometimes apparent in writings on the various facets of the nuclear debate.

NUCLEAR POWER IN INDUSTRIALLY

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

As indicated earlier, rapid escalation of the world’s energy requirements and doubts about the sustainability of conventional energy sources have led many to focus on nuclear power’s promise of cheap electricity: one pound of nuclear fuel (uranium 235) the size of a golf ball can create as much energy as 1,500 tons of coal.8

However, nuclear power is now counted among the most controversial items on the world scene. It is something that divides people—you are either for it or against it. This is partly because it is a radically new energy source involving forces that have never been released on Earth before. The reasons are also historical; since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki crises, many people have grown to dread anything at all that is labeled ‘nuclear’. Some observers claim that important yet unresolved practical questions stem from the use of nuclear power, e.g. the problem of safe nuclear waste disposal. Others see this form of energy production as a grotesquely extreme form of mega-technology.

For industrially developing countries, except for a few of the largest and most technically advanced, the advantages promised by nuclear power are largely illusory. The very high capital cost and the difficulties with international agreements and restrictions on fuel supply may be the main obstacles. There is also the fact that currently the smallest available power-generating reactor is quite large in relation to the system size for most of these countries, and this consideration proves to be unhelpful in negotiations for funding. Hence it is argued that perhaps only India, Brazil, Pakistan, Israel, Argentina, Egypt, Korea, Mexico, The Philippines and Thailand could economically utilize the power plants that are now commercially available.9 Of these, none except the last four have ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As such, these countries would face additional obstacles in negotiating agreements for the supply of critical components of a plant.

THE PROSPECTS FOR A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

IN GHANA

Unanimously, scientists at the NNRI agree that nuclear power is a viable option for the formulation of a coherent, rational energy plan which will enable the country to meet the consumption levels required for sustaining her socio-economic development and for protecting the environment. They base their support on several considerations. With about a third of the total electricity production from the country’s hydroelectric plants exported to countries in this sub-region of West Africa — 45 percent taken by the smeltering plant of the Volta Aluminum Company (VALCO) — only about 20 percent is available for domestic consumption. An oil-fired thermal plant is nearing completion, and this will provide an additional 100-megawatts of electricity; this same plant will be upgraded to 300 megawatts by 1999. Further, it is hoped that the large reserves of gas which the country appears to possess may eventually make it possible to replace oil with gas at this thermal plant in the near future. On the other hand it is argued that the drive to curb the use of fuelwood, in a bid to preserve the environment, may be undermined by such a development since this could mean the diversion of gas from its use as domestic fuel. Although about 1,000 megawatts of power remain to be tapped from the country’s hydroelectric energy potential, this can only be achieved with many relatively small dams. The environmental impact of several small dams may be as unacceptable as that of coal-fired plants. Large tracks of arable land will have to be sacrificed to build these small dams. Also, subtle changes in the local climate and the risk of water-borne diseases becoming endemic are troubling consequences that could come with these dams.

These are only some of the arguments that have convinced the researchers at the NNRI that the energy future of the country may be considered secure only if nuclear power becomes a serious option. The NNRI scientists report that GAEC:

. . . has embarked on the training of a core team of engineers and economists in the area of energy and nuclear power planning, in the hope of building up the country’s expertise to plan effectively for the future role of nuclear power in meeting the country’s energy requirements beyond the year 2020.10

The Safety of a Nuclear Power Plant in Ghana

Certainly a decision by the government to build a nuclear power plant in Ghana would take full cognizance of the rigor required in the safety regimes of its operation. But just as clearly, the country’s track record in the mitigation and management of disaster indicates that there is cause for concern. An accident at a nuclear power plant is not like any other accident. This is why after Chernobyl, people a world away from the site of the accident could not consume beef without the legitimate worry that they might be feeding themselves poison. Eleven years after the Chernobyl disaster, an area of radius up to 30 km from the site remains an exclusion zone; more than 100,000 people who were initially evacuated cannot return.

The release of radioactivity into the atmosphere during normal operation of nuclear power plants is only a small fraction (less than 1 percent) of the release from other sources such as nuclear weapon test fallout, cosmic rays and medical diagnoses. Nonetheless, there are many who believe that so long as the effects of small doses received over a long period of time remain undetermined, nuclear plants must be viewed with suspicion.

It is generally agreed that commercial nuclear power plants that have accumulated more than 800 reactor-years of operation in the United States have an excellent safety record. However, it has been suggested that the decision always to locate nuclear reactors in isolated places manifestly contradicts the claim that the chance of accidents at nuclear plants is no greater than the risk of accidents at oil refineries. Thus it is troubling that not all the compliance actions had been taken by the NNRI several months after the research reactor became operational. For example, the fire protection system had not been completed and communication infrastructure was inadequate. Even more troubling is the fact that although the scientists at the Institute knew exactly what to do they were constrained by lack of funds, telecommunication system, and other logistics. There is little comfort in the realization that some of those government officials and policy-makers that might be responsible for taking future decisions in the running of a nuclear power plant may be wholly unaware that nuclear technology and its safety precautions admit of neither budgeting short cuts nor any half measures.

Broader Issues

There are several more general issues that drive the nuclear power debate. Firstly, the problem of nuclear weapon proliferation is real. Militarily useful weapons with yields in the kiloton range can be constructed using reactor-grade plutonium separated from the spent fuel elements of a reactor.11 This is why so much attention and anxiety have been focussed on the possibility that non-nuclear weapon states with civil nuclear programs might acquire nuclear weapons, especially those having access to reprocessing technology. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has remained contentious among ‘Third World’ leaders who resent the injustice they perceive in endorsing nuclear weapons for the world’s most powerful nations while outlawing them for the industrially developing nations. Hence `Third World’ countries — including those (like Ghana) that have ratified the Treaty — are forced to contend with obstacles erected by the nuclear-empowered states within the international agreements required to develop civil nuclear programs.

Secondly, although there is a lot of uranium in the ground, less than one percent of it is the key isotope, uranium 235, upon whose fission nearly every reactor in the world today is based. It would appear that if present projections about the expansion of nuclear power are correct, and if the mining of various grades of uranium ore (mostly uranium 238) remain economically viable, then one can predict that conventional reactors will exhaust all the economically recoverable uranium 235 in some 40 or 50 years. However, the emerging technology of the breeder reactor can change this outcome. Breeder reactors are designed to produce electricity and, at the same time, to ‘breed’ more fuel than they consume to generate electric power. They are able to utilize the abundant but otherwise useless uranium 238 in the artificial production of the fissionable plutonium 239. This way the breeder reactor can stretch uranium resources by a factor of about 100.12 If this were to be the case, then — like the sun and like fusion fuel — using uranium in breeder reactors would mean essentially having an inexhaustible source of energy. However, because it is conceivable that a breeder reactor core could explode like a poorly designed atom bomb (nuclear explosion cannot occur in a conventional reactor) its future is legitimately shrouded in intense debate and is largely uncertain.

Also, there are many who fear other problems that are uneliminable not only at reactor sites but also at processing and reprocessing plants, waste disposal sites and during transportation of nuclear materials. The ever-present possibilities of theft or sabotage increase the security worries of a world already troubled by acts of terrorism if rapid expansion of the nuclear plant industry is encouraged.

DOES GHANA NEED NUCLEAR POWER?

Most arguments for expanding and diversifying the energy infrastructure of a country have been based on the assumption that the pace of economic development may be seriously retarded if adequate and cheap supplies of energy are not available at the right time, in the right place and in the appropriate form. The OPEC embargo of the early 1970s caused serious dislocations in the economic activities of several countries. That embargo also demonstrated that it is possible for some countries to get along with much less electric power than they now consume, or at least with a much lower expansion rate. For example, in the United States electricity demand grew by about seven percent annually from 1900 to 1973. Following the 1973 embargo the growth in demand fell to only one percent in 1974 and two percent in 1975; since that time the rate has hovered around three percent. A survey concluded that "the United States can do well, indeed can prosper, on much less energy than has been commonly supposed;" and that "achieving low energy growth will not be easy nor cheap, but it will be far easier and less costly than achieving high energy growth."13 Another analysis indicates that conservation can greatly reduce the need for both nuclear and coal power during the remainder of this century, and that the renewable sources can be phased in fast enough to provide a significant fraction of our needs by the year 2000.14

It would appear, therefore, that given the uncertainties regarding the future technology for generating nuclear power, the decision to build these plants must not be taken in a hurry. Meanwhile, the NNRI is doing marvelous work in its varied applications of nuclear energy in the fields of agriculture, health-care delivery and industry. Radiation disinfestation is being used in the preservation of a wide range of foodstuffs, in an economic environment where food distribution and marketing are otherwise severely constrained by shortfalls in preservation technology. There is a project to eradicate the tsetsefly by radiation sterilization of large numbers of the male insects and releasing them into the environment. Research into new and improved varieties of crops (with such characteristics as higher yields per acre, early maturation, pest-resistance and disease-immunity) promises to make a significant impact on the country’s food production. In the field of health-care delivery, the Health Physics Unit carries out routine checks of radiation levels and leakage on every X-ray machine in all of the country’s hospitals as well as other sources of ionizing radiations. Scientists of the Unit also assist doctors in the diagnosis of several diseases including cancer. The analysis of geological samples (as an aid to the search for minerals and for the determination of the elemental composition of atmospheric pollutants) is carried out by the X-ray fluorescence laboratory of the Institute. The acquisition of the small research reactor has extended the range of public and private service activities of the Institute’s various sections; it also facilitates training scientists and engineers in several aspects of nuclear technology.

It may well be that these very useful activities involving the presently installed small research reactor should be continued and expanded at this time when nuclear power is still intensely controversial and its future prospects are so uncertain. A political decision to build a nuclear power plant may only serve to deflect the attention of the nation’s scientists away from their current crucial contributions to agriculture, medicine and industry. Additionally, over the years of their policy making, governments in Ghana have tended to view the delicate considerations concerning technical feasibility as arbitrary matters of superficial opinion or academic hair-splitting. There is a real danger that the future development of a nuclear power policy may focus too much on political and economic issues and too little on crucial technical concerns.

It is possible that Ghana’s efforts at industrial development can be seriously derailed if other sources of electrical power are not developed soon. Otherwise there may not be enough time to phase in the renewable sources. The relevant question then becomes: how do the problems of nuclear power compare with problems inherent in using other sources of energy? (This concern should replace the simple-minded question of whether nuclear power carries any problems.) However, it is crucial that there be a clearly demonstrated ability to frame such comparisons in a sober, rational and technically-driven atmosphere. At some point in the future most of the controversy and highly publicized anxieties about nuclear energy will be finally resolved. If at that time Ghana finds that she can get along without having to join the ranks of the nuclear elite, I suspect there are many who will think that is a better option.

NOTES

1. A quod is a quadrillion i.e. one thousand million million British thermal units (Btu). One barrel of oil contains about 5.8 million Btu and 100 cubic feet of natural gas about 1.02 million Btu.

2. E. Carim, ed., Third World Development, volume 1 (London: Grosvenor Press, 1984), p. 328.

3. "At a Glance," GAEC (1988) Publication No. 2. 88.

4. Kwabenya Nuclear Research Establishment Handbook, (1977), p. 5.

5. GAEC, (1976) Status Report 1962-1973, p. 3.

6. Ibid., p. 6.

7. From a speech delivered by Dr. K. Kyere, Director of NNRI, on the occasion of the Open Day of the Institute, June 1993.

8. "Electricity and the Environment — the Answers to your Questions," pamphlet of the Edison Electric Institute (1987) p. 31.

9. "Energy Options and Policy Issues in Developing Countries" World Bank Working Paper, No. 350 (1979) p. 74.

10. Much of the data on the electricity production and consumption patterns of Ghana was obtained from discussions with Dr. J.J. Fletcher and Dr. H.O. Boadu, both of NNRI, and from a paper they were preparing jointly for a forthcoming conference on energy.

11. The very few pounds of uranium 235 used in the Hiroshima bomb released nuclear energy approximately equal to the chemical energy that would be released by exploding 15,000 tons (i.e. 15 kilotons) of TNT.

12. A. Hobson, Physics and Human Affairs (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1982), p. 361.

13. Ibid. p. 374.

14. Ibid.