CHAPTER VI
A QUESTION MARK AGAINST UBUNTU:
COMPARISONS WITH RUSSIAN
COMMUNITARIANS
OLGA YURKIVSKA
This paper presents a comparative study of Russian and African thinkers on communitarian philosophy and ethics. The ideas of Ubuntism as an African philosophy of life are analysed through the philosophy of Russian obschina (the traditional peasant community), as reflected in the views of Khomyakov, Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy. The analysis shows that despite some historical and cultural differences there are notable similarities between the main features of ubuntu and obschina. These include a strong and rather special spirituality, collective consciousness, emphasis on the values of co-operation, sharing, participation, reciprocity, empathy, harmony with nature, and so on. The latter strongly suggests that the history and downfall of the Russian obschina and the Soviet collective could be of great theoretical and practical interest in contemporary Africa, even though the lessons it teaches could be seen as rather trivial: a) any concept if taken out of its historical, socio-economic, and cultural context could become open to idealisation, distortion, and abuse; b) in order to determine the viability of the concept in the current situation, its true meaning should be analysed from the perspective of its origins and socio-economic foundations; c) communalism for its own sake cannot and should not be the ultimate goal, since its value is determined by the nature of the community in question.
I will start with outlining the basic views of Ubuntu.
1
- Ubuntu as an African philosophy of life or an African world view occupies a special position and is usually opposed to Western individualism and socialist collectivism alike.
- Ubuntu as an African humanism is often defined as the distinctive collective consciousness of Africans.
- Most authors consider Ubuntism as inseparable from religious beliefs, and almost unanimously claim that Africans have religion of their own.
- As ‘profound spiritual/religious experience’, African humanism is described as being primarily emotional and as such is opposed to rationalism as the core of Western humanism.
- The ethical values and virtues of Ubuntism are plentiful and vary from author to author: but the most frequently mentioned are those of solidarity, respect, sharing, loyalty, co-operation, participation, reciprocating, sympathy and empathy.
- Ubuntu has its roots in traditional African (tribal) society. It had no written records in the past and was handed on by oral tradition. It has been revived and articulated by the academics and politicians in recent years, and is, therefore, open to different interpretations.
OBSCHINA AS AN ETHICAL IDEAL
To draw the parallels between Ubuntu and the philosophy of Obschina we shall need a brief look into Russian history and philosophy in the second part of the 19
th century. While Western Europe was fast developing industrial capitalism, Russia was still in the clutches of monarchy, feudalism and an agricultural economy (serfdom had been abolished only in 1861, the event marking the beginning of the capitalist epoch). The literary and philosophical scene of that time has been characterised by the battle of so-called Westernisers and Slavophils2 .The latter attempted to substantiate the idea of an original, genuinely Russian way of social development, which would be totally different from that of the Western European. The originality of Russia was seen in the absence of class struggle in its history; in the Russian village commune (obschina) and, so called, artels; and in Orthodoxy, which was believed to be the only true form of Christianity. All Slavophils fanatically believed in the virtues of the common people, "folk principles" and the values of communal life. The greatest name among Slavophils was undoubtedly Khomyakov. He asserted that one-sided Western rationalism and individualism led to the loss of a person’s spiritual integrity (which, according to him, lay in the unity of reason, feeling and will, and was inseparable from faith). Against it, Khomyakov asserted what Russian Orthodoxy had, in sobornost, the authentic spirit of community in which there was a true freedom for the individual. According to him, the Orthodox Church alone knew true freedom and true community. Sobornost is a notion coined by Khomyakov from such Russian words as sobor (cathedral) and sobranie (gathering of fellow men) and encompasses the ideas of free unity, spirituality, and harmony, which according to him were the unique characteristics of the Russian spirit and were found in the traditional Russian rural commune – obschina.
In the obschina he saw a harmonious social organisation devoid of conflicts, a form of true fellowship, a "true unity" based on the common use of land, mutual agreement, community of religion, tradition, and custom that precluded both self-willed individualism and its restraint by coercion. He also maintained that obschina, governed by its assembly, the Mir,
3 was the germ of a new democracy. He was very fond of the idea, so common in Russia, that only decisions reached unanimously (Vsem Mirom) are truly democratic and binding upon the conscience of the individual. He had high praise for the artels, which were small groups of craftsmen running a business together and sharing their work, equipment, and profits. Though Khomyakov considered this way of life to be uniquely Russian, he saw in it a gift worthy of sharing with the whole world. The West was to learn from Russia the secret of a truly communal way of life.4This messianic note, the emphasis on the "universally human mission of the Russian people," was much stronger in Dostoevsky than in classical Slavophilism. Dostoevsky believed that the unification by Russia of all the Slavic people
5 would pronounce "a new word" that would bring about the rebirth and salvation of humankind. He attempted to clarify and promote the particularly Russian ideal of humanism as totally different to that of the West, which he accused of reducing human complexity to a shabby common denominator or, more likely, being simply a disguise for the desire to force everyone into the same mould. His idea of vsechelovek ("all-human-man") emphasised the integrated and fully fulfilled personality achievable only through harmonious communion with others.This typical antithesis of European and Russian values is a recurrent theme of Dostoevsky’s writings. In the essay cycle, Winter Notes on Summer Impressions (1863), based on his travels in Western Europe, Dostoevsky presented a critical view of capitalist civilisation, with its extreme rationalisation of life, the "colossal regimentation" and growing atomisation of society. In these essays Dostoevsky shows an unusually acute insight into the fact that it was the divisive power of bourgeois individualism that provided the driving force for Western civilisation. Individualism had created a powerful material force, but at the same time had isolated human beings, had brought them into conflict with nature and their fellow men. He emphasised the dehumanising power of bourgeois individualism and the negative character of bourgeois freedom, which resulted in a diminished personality.
Against the rational egoism of European capitalism, Dostoevsky set the ideal of the authentic fraternal community preserved in Orthodoxy and Russian folk traditions. There is no antagonism between an individual and community as the individual submits to it totally without setting conditions or calculating the advantages involved, while the community grants one freedom, full self-realisation and safety guaranteed by fraternal love.
6Another attack on the individualism and mechanistic rationalism of Western capitalism could be found in Notes from the Underground. In the form of a satire Dostoevsky portrays the irrational ultra-individualism of the "underground man" who has rejected all social bonds and is an embodiment of a protest against any subordination of "what is most precious and most important to us, namely our personality and individuality." "Is the world to go to wrack and ruin or am I to have my cup of tea? Well, so far as I’m concerned, blow the world so long as I can have my cup of tea" (1864; 136) – is his motto in life.
It is worth noting that according to Dostoevsky, the rationalisation of the social bonds was common to both Western capitalism and socialism. "Shigalev’s system" in The Possessed is a gloomy version of a society based on absolute obedience and absolute depersonalisation and is a caricature version of what Dostoevsky called materialistic or revolutionary socialism.
A modified and nobler version of Shigalev’s system is presented in the famous Legend of the Grand Inquisitor. The Legend was intended to be a parable of the just kingdom the socialists were trying to establish on earth. The Grand Inquisitor exchanges freedom for bread, and takes away freedom in order to bestow happiness on his "pitiful children." However, an indispensable condition of this happiness is total and herdlike depersonalisation. Knowing that men are weak, the Inquisitor relieves them from the burden of freedom, conscience, and personal responsibility; he replaces freedom by authority, "free unity" by a "unity based on compulsion". The Church, transformed into State, unites "all in one unanimous and harmonious ant heap."
According to Andrzej Walicki (1980: 319), the notion that there was an organic relationship between Catholicism and socialism, emphasised in the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor, was one of Dostoevsky’s favourite and most obsessive theories. He called socialism, as protest against individualism and anarchy, a secularised form of the Catholic "unity through compulsion" (Valicki: 319). Dostoevsky uses the term "Russian socialism" to describe the ideals he attributed to Russian people – "the ideals of the state as church (in opposition to the Catholic ideal of the church as state), of universal brotherhood, and the free unity of mankind." By the state he definitely meant the Russian nation, and the latter for him was synonymous with common people of peasant obschina. Therefore, the cornerstone of Dostoevsky’s Orthodox utopia was the idea of a return to the people, to the "native soil," to the free unity and traditions of Russian communal life.
Tolstoy’s philosophical ideas revolve around and evolve from the existential and moral crisis he experienced at the peak of his creative genius. During the crisis he went through a period of severe cynicism and depression, and seriously contemplated suicide. Analysing the roots of the crisis he realised that they were in the system of values he shared with the Russian aristocracy. In his Confession he pointed out that the whole system was based on hypocrisy and extreme individualism and resulted in life devoid of any meaning. From the perspective of individualistic morality, the inevitability of death made life a total absurdity, a cruel and stupid joke played on humanity. The meaning of life and death was of utmost interest and importance for Tolstoy, an obsession that was a torment of his life. It was personal, it was of a great empirical interest for him as a novelist, observing and depicting life, and at the same time purely theoretical. In the story Three Deaths we already find the characteristic Tolstoyan contrast between the fear of death felt by the "upper classes" and the peaceful resignation of the simple people as they face the end. Condemnation of individualism runs as a continuous motif through War and Peace, where individualism is contrasted again and again with the instinctive "truth" of the common people. In the most condensed and graphic manner two opposite value systems, two ways of life, and two attitudes towards death are presented in the Death of Ivan Ilyich. In the Confession Tolstoy concludes that from the point of view of the individual clinging to the idea of personal survival, human existence must be summed up in the words "vanity of vanities, all is vanity." The time- and space-bound individual cannot escape discovering his life being totally absurd; the way to salvation lies, consequently, in overcoming "the principle of individuation."
Having come to this conclusion, Tolstoy relates in the Confession, he set out to look for spiritual help from men of religious belief. At first he turned to men of his own circle, but soon he understood that their faith was not genuine, but hypocritical. He, therefore, "turned his eyes to the huge masses of simple, ignorant, and poor people" – pilgrims, monks and peasants, orthodox Christians, as well as Old Believers and sectarians. He realised that while, according to the rational understanding of learned people, life may be meaningless, the vast masses find meaning in life on the basis of instinctive and intuitive understanding of faith. He understood faith neither as a revelation nor as a belief in something supernatural. He also disagreed with the idea that faith could be reduced solely to man’s relationship to God. For Tolstoy faith was a supra-rational insight into the meaning of human existence, thanks to which man does not annihilate himself. It is simply a universal wisdom, which proclaims that the world is governed by a superior will, and that he, who would understand its meaning, should bow before it.
7The best exposition of Tolstoy’s philosophy of life can be found in his treatise On Life. "The true life of man," he writes, "is the aspiration toward goodness, which is achieved by submitting one’s individuality to the law of reason" (1894: 86). It is time and space that lie at the roots of the "principle of individuation." It follows from this that to renounce individual welfare is not an act of exceptional merit, but a necessary law of life. In order to live a true life – not a life of animal instincts – it is necessary to be reborn and become a "reasonable consciousness," to transcend individuality by identifying one’s own welfare with the welfare of others. Whoever achieves this finds that death no longer holds any terror and perceives the world as a reasonable whole, subject to a single law. Individual life is not a true life. Individuality is evil, an illusion that cuts man from his true nature, imprisons him in the world of phenomena and condemns him to suffering and death. The way to transcend individuality is through love – love not as an emotional impulse, but as a total submission to the tranquil clarity of the "reasonable consciousness" that enjoins men to renounce their individual welfare. The renunciation of "individual welfare" does not mean the renunciation of personality as such. True personality as a sense of identity, according to Tolstoy, could not be found in individual consciousness. One can become a true person only through others.
The Tolstoyan philosophy of life is rather extreme in its ethical implications. It postulates not only such values as empathy (ability to feel for others), non-violent resistance to evil, and love of one’s fellow men, but also calls for ascetic resignation from the world. In practice it led him to the idealisation of the collective consciousness at the pre-individuation stage, to a cult of simplicity and to a condemnation of civilisation. Following his own call for humility in the face of the "people’s truth" and total immersion in the "masses", Tolstoy chose to live a life of Russian obschina.
The character who best exemplifies the "people’s truth" is Karataev in War and Peace – a simple peasant who is only a small part of the anonymous crowd and feels that he has no separate existence. Pierre Bezukhov longs to experience Karataev’s truth: "To be a soldier, simply a soldier," he muses before going to sleep. "To enter with all one’s being this general life, to adopt the qualities that made them what they are. But how to throw off everything superfluous, demonic, this burden of the pseudo-man?" So, what are those qualities so much admired by Pierre in Karataev, which Tolstoy could not find in his aristocratic milieu. They are the universal wisdom preserved by tradition, a simple and at the same time extraordinary spirituality of folk faith in God, empathy and great tolerance, patience in the face of misfortune and sympathetic understanding of the needy, the quiet acceptance of life without despair and death without terror. To achieve them one has to forget one’s own individuality, to abolish the barriers between the self and the other, and immerse in universal unity of love for one’s fellow men.
Sometimes Tolstoy’s philosophy of life is defined as metaphysical impersonalism (Zenkovsky, 1953: 387), with which I strongly disagree. I would have called it a philosophy of anti-individualism, which merges with communitarianism in its ethics. The reason (apart from its content speaking for itself) is that Tolstoy found inspiration for, and a confirmation of, his theories in Russian obschina, in the communal way of life based on patriarchal links, in the culture and social consciousness of Russian peasantry, who were still at the pre-individuation stage. Lenin called it a "shift to the position of the patriarchal peasantry" and maintained that Tolstoy’s ideas should be treated "not as something individual, not as a caprice or a fad, but as the ideology of the conditions of life under which millions and millions actually found themselves for a certain period of time," as an ideology of Russian obschina, of "an Oriental, an Asiatic order."(Lenin, 1967: 66-67)
Tolstoy did not limit his praise of obschina only to its philosophy of life and ethics. He went further to an idealisation of its natural economy based on communal property and relations before the division of labour. In his infatuation with obschina Tolstoy rejected Western capitalism, revolutionary socialism, civilisation in general, and the culture of individualism as completely incompatible with the spiritual needs of humanity. In this wholesale condemnation he included contemporary science as well. The role of science, he wrote is to satisfy artificial needs and to create the means of control over the people. It is totally immoral, for it has lost sight of the only truly important issue – understanding the nature of man’s vocation and the essence of virtue.
In his articles on Tolstoy, Lenin perceptively summed up that philosophy. As a thinker, he wrote, Tolstoy is great because his ideology is a reflection of the "great human ocean [of Russian peasantry], . . . with all its weaknesses and all its strong features" (Lenin, 1967: 63). At the same time he stressed that the Tolstoyan doctrine was certainly utopian and reactionary in its content. As an exponent of the feelings and aspirations of the patriarchal peasantry, Tolstoy looked backward rather than forward; he wanted to re-establish an archaic and pre-industrial way of life and openly proclaimed that "the ideal of our times is behind us."
CRITICAL COMMENTS ON THE RUSSIAN
COMMUNITARIAN IDEAL
I hope that even this very brief summary shows the striking similarities between the ideas of Russian obschina and those of Ubuntu. It is clear that obschina was a way of life based on a particular form of social and economic relationships, which produced a particular world view and code of ethics. Its values were outlined in oral tradition and embodied in the customs which regulated social behaviour. Russian so-called intelligentsia (intellectuals of all kinds, like historians, literary critics, writers, and philosophers) have articulated its philosophy. And as you have seen from the above, each of them gave to it his own interpretation depending on his personal agenda, but all of them in a way expressed the sentiments, psychology, and philosophy of patriarchal peasantry. It was a standpoint of protest against advancing capitalism, its values, disorder and destruction of the traditional peasant life, and the impoverishment of the masses of peasants, who were uprooted, dispossessed of their land, and were rapidly losing their sense of identity in the face of alien values. An uncritical and inevitably idealised perception of the past tradition was a natural outcome of that protest. Andrzej Walicki describes it as "romantic nostalgia for a lost ideal" and goes even further to define Slavophile philosophy, in particular, as a conservative utopianism, which had "a strongly compensatory element, for dreams of a lost harmonious world always conceal some sense of alienation and deprivation"(1980: 107).
One of the contemporary movements, the so-called narodniki (from narod, which means people) saw in obschina an almost complete cell of socialist society. It believed that this would guarantee Russia an original way of historical progress, and would rescue peasants from the torturous process of capitalisation and socialist revolution. At the end of the 19
th century, the dispute between narodniki and Russian Marxists under the leadership of Lenin became particularly acute. The degree of its intensity and importance to the future of Russia could be judged by the involvement of Marx and Engels in the discussion. A profound analysis of obscina could be found in the multiple writings by both Marx and Engels, and in Marx’s extensive correspondence with Vera Zasulich (a representative of narodnics). I will summarise briefly their most essential conclusions.As a primordial form of social organisation obschina appeared on the basis of natural relationships of kinship. As such, it was a universal institution that carried all social functions and determined all social relations: production, distribution, and legislation, as well as domestic. It was a necessary prerequisite for the productive activity of men. An isolated individual was helpless before nature, had no means to provide for himself, and had very little chance of survival on his own. To be part of a community was an indisputable condition of life itself. An individual could exist only as a part of a family, kin, clan or tribe. The primitiveness of labour and the means of production determined its collective character as well as the collective form of appropriation and distribution of produce. It was a first form of co-operation, which resulted in collective consciousness. A single individual had no separate existence. Such communal form of social organisation was typical for all primitive societies. While German mark and Scottish clan, were practically eradicated by developing feudalism, in Latin America, India and Russia this form continued to exist within the feudal social relationships.
8 Marx distinguished three basic types of communes, according to the stages of disintegration of original communal unity into the unity of independent households: Asiatic, Ancient, and German (from the primordial unity, based on the kinship relations of blood, to the territorial, based on the relations between neighbours not related by blood, with a combination of both in between (Marx and Engels, Vol. 46: 461-508).By the end of the 19
th century, Russian obschina was definitely a variety of the third type. It was a community of peasants based on the territorial principle. It had a very strong institution of self-government, in whose authority was the distribution of land, co-operation of agrarian works and use of equipment, organisation of mutual help in domestic matters, election of the village leaders, collection of money for communal needs and resolution of civil, domestic and petty criminal cases. After Agrarian Reform of 1861, obschina became the lowest link in state administration, a part of the monarchic establishment. But as Marx pointed out, at this stage obschina ceases to be a classless social organisation. The separation of governing and organising functions from those of production, their concentration in the hands of most influential and wealthy members of the community, led to the continuous stratification and social differentiation of the community into agrarian, bourgeois and proletariat. New capitalist relationships started the destruction of obschina from within and induced the development of a new person incompatible with the old socio-economic relationships. Collective consciousness was gradually undermined by the conflict of economic interests and growing individualism. Values and norms of communal life became means of oppression and manipulation used to keep community together, as its own stability had been eroded. Nothing could save obschina from self-destruction.Marx, Engels and Lenin highly appreciated such features of obschina as traditions, forms and skills of collective labour and distribution, the democratic character of its self-government based on solidarity and co-operation, the traditional consciousness of communal land-ownership, collective consciousness with its traditional values of mutual help, reciprocity and empathy. But they were far from its idealisation. They questioned the originality and uniqueness of obschina as a communal way of life, and suggested that the time of messianic nations had passed forever. The main weakness of obschina they saw in its parochial insularity. Being a "localised microcosm", it more often than not resulted in "centralised despotism" (Marx), did not respond well to contacts with other peoples and cultures, and, therefore, promoted a mentality of narrow-mindedness, prejudice,
9 superstition, inertia, ignorance and barbarism.Lenin maintained that the socialist revolution would liberate obschina from all the negative characteristics, while the socialist collective would take over all the positive ones. Communism was considered as the only social organisation where the free development of each individual was a condition for the free development of all (Engels). It would be difficult to summarise even briefly the extensive research and publications produced by Soviet philosophers, sociologists, psychologists, and educationalists on the problems of collectivity and the person. At this point. it would suffice to mention only that their major concern was to promote the ethical values of collectivism and to ensure that the socialist collective would generate a person with fully realised human potential. In reality it often led to conformism, indifference, lack of creativity, and depersonalisation. But the problems of the socialist collective are a matter of special analysis, while the main points of Marxist analysis of Russian obschina could find their application in the analysis of Ubuntu and its roots.
APPLICATIONS TO UBUNTU
Most of the Ubuntists emphasize the African way of life as an indisputable source of Ubuntu.
10 In such cases they should agree that it is a product in particular historical, socio-economic and cultural conditions. At the same time, the values of Ubuntu are proclaimed to be universal in character and are used without regard to their historical and cultural context, which results in a certain degree of idealization. A. Shutte seems to be the only aware of the problem: "If Ubuntu is to become real in our own contemporary South Africa it will show itself in ways that are very different from the past. President Mandela may pay a lobola of cattle for his new bride, but this can no longer be an authentic expression of Ubuntu in family life in a new South Africa. One has to distinguish the heart of Ubuntu from its various outward manifestations. Many of the old customs would be a betrayal of the spirit of Ubuntu in our contemporary society" (Shutte: 6). How much does his philosophy of Ubuntu have in common with the original one? Is it going to be of universal value due to the African origination and heritage or despite them? Further, is Ubuntu a way of life and world view that survive without the socio-economic relationships on which it was based? Is its collective consciousness compatible with capitalism, private property, market economy, and division of labour with consequent conflict of interests, competition and individualism?In order to avoid a romantic and idealised view of Ubuntu as an African way of life and African world view, it must be analysed in the context of the social organisation from which it has originated and its so-called universal values have to be related to the customs and traditions from which they have been born or reflect.
According to Winifred Hoernle (Shapera, 1966: 67), despite linguistic and cultural differences, the Bantu peoples shared more or less similar social organisations of the tribe or chiefdom. Apart from political reasons, the unity of the tribe was cemented by the communal ownership of the land and natural resources. The communal psychology of the Bantu was inherent in the communal use of land and the need for a joint effort in any undertaking. The social structure of Bantu society was constituted in the framework of relationships between the members of a community. This was manifested in an ordered group life, with reciprocal rights and duties, privileges and obligations, determining behaviour patterns for each individual member towards other members, and of moulding of feelings, thoughts, and conduct of members according to this pattern. Only in and through them can the individual achieve personal self-realisation and participate in the satisfactions offered by the life of his or her community.
In view of the Bantu social organisation the formula Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu
11 is simply a statement of social fact that what I am and who I am depends on my position in the complex network of social relationships. In this case it is apparently identical to Marx’s definition of a person as an ensemble of all social relationships (Marx and Engels, Vol. 42: 265). At this point it has no apparent ethical meaning, says nothing about the quality of my personality and does not guarantee these. It could be applied equally to the Italian Mafia as a very particular form of collectivity with a strong sense of kinship and group consciousness based on norms of participation, co-operation, sharing, respect and loyalty, where vendetta could be seen as a form of reciprocity in kind and omerta as a form of group solidarity. But we can hardly consider a member of the Mafia to be an ethical ideal of a person. Apparently it is not enough to be a part of a group or collectivity to become a good person: integrated, complete and with fully realised human potential. Although cricket is a team sport that presupposes a high level of co-operation, participation, mutual support, and collective effort, the ethical influence does not operate automatically, as evidenced by the occurrence of bribing. Hippies valued communal life and sharing to the extent of sharing their sex partners and children, but all in all their world view would be rather incompatible with the Ubuntu understanding of collective consciousness.I believe that the system of Bantu social and ethical values answered perfectly all the requirements of its social structure and organisation. It assured the formation of a person who could become a suitable member of the Bantu community, would "honour the chief and tribal custom, respect those older than himself, value those things which are of value to the society, and observe tribal taboos" (Krige, 1966: 106) It is not surprising that "the ubuntu practise stipulates that the person is expected to surrender to the cultural norms set forth in society. This is a package deal." (Maseko, 2000: 15)
"The so-called ‘communal system" of the Bantu was largely the manifestation of [the] close bond of solidarity and reciprocity arising out of kinship and affecting well-nigh every aspect of daily life" (Shapera and Goodwin, 1966: 166) It was a unity of kin; those not explicitly included were therefore implicitly excluded. It was patriarchal in nature, very hierarchical and highly discriminatory. Everything that anyone did was determined by his or her position within the complex network of relationships with its inflexible set of obligations and taboos. It was not completely homogeneous or harmonious. The class system flourished, even within what was in effect an extended family. Some were more equal than others.
12This was a kind of unity that thrives on the subsistence level and is founded on its particular socio-economic relationships. How many native South Africans gradually would disregard their kin provided all their requirements would be supplied by the neutral agencies? Would not the bonds of kinship become redundant as the self-contained capsulized individual became more and more established through modern technology, encouraged by capitalism?
The amount, diversity and complexity of the social rules, ethical norms, and taboos needed for establishing and maintaining Bantu social unity is almost shocking and suggests that the latter has not been easy and did not come naturally or spontaneously, but had to be heavily regulated and controlled. There is evidence that it was not always successful or peaceful where a conflict of interests was involved.
13Elaborate social structure, hierarchy, and the precise determination of conduct were designed in order to fuse a plurality of forces and interests into a close unit. They projected the totality of life style upon the individual and claimed him entirely. There was possibly a feeling of harmony and stability within such social structure, as it created the kind of organic self-sufficiency by virtue of which the same stream of life and consciousness flowed through all community members. The only condition was that every person knew his or her place and abided by the rules.
In such narrowly circumscribed society with considerable homogeneity and stability of standards, values, and roles, a person could feel quite comfortable, secure and even happy. This was possible because one identifies with one’s position in the structure of socially sanctioned roles and therefore one’s self-image corresponds to the image that others have of one. One’s self-respect and respect had from others was a function of one’s roles. Such a person would lack neither integration nor self-realisation, since the very self (including expectations, aspirations, and life-project) is given unambiguously by one’s social location. But there was also a possibility of such social relations becoming like a spider’s web: suffocating, oppressive, precluding the survival of any free, revolutionary, critical spirit.
14 Discipline and authority, economic duties, legal affiliations, and control played a determining part in the conduct and attitudes of the individuals, creating an atmosphere of repression and intolerance, in which protest often entailed social ostracism and even violence.Though the Bantu "communal system" based on kinship produced many positive features (which usually could be found in other communities all over the world), a number of features are particular (probably, unique) to Bantu society, like hlonipa (Sesotho, "respect"). I do not argue with their propriety in the old days, but it is clear that in the new social and economic conditions they become dangerous anachronisms. Critical assessment and re-evaluation of tradition is called for, whereby tradition is viewed not simply as the passive acceptance of values inherited from the previous generations, but as the creative shaping of the heritage from the perspective of ethical ideals in view of what people of South Africa want to become in the future.
When promoting the values and norms of Ubuntism it is necessary to define clearly in what sense such concepts as solidarity, reciprocity, respect, loyalty and so on are used. The authors writing on Ubuntu, while referring to the named values as traditional, view them from broader humanistic, but inevitably Eurocentric, perspective.
The confusion and misunderstanding seem to be unavoidable, considering that the majority of the people who continue the traditional way of living are native speakers. A contemporary Ubuntist would say "to respect" means to treat with consideration, avoid interfering with, harming, degrading, and insulting, whereas a traditionalist would think hlonepo with all its implications. One would say loyalty refers to loyalty to ideals of truth, justice and reconciliation; the other would refer it to allegiance to a chief or group loyalty, and so on.
There is another danger in values being used in their initial sense, as is the general tendency because kinship and clan mentalities are very much alive in Africa, namely, that in application to the changed social, economic and cultural context they are open to distortion and abuse. Recent and contemporary African history is full of examples of how clan solidarity produces xenophobia and feeds racial prejudice; from being an ethical value respect, turns into blind submission to authority and corruption of power and by power; uncritical loyalty to a leader results in a totalitarian regime; and the demand of kinship reciprocity breeds nepotism. As values are context-relevant, in order not only to survive but also to be able to promote its most important characteristics tradition has to keep pace with time. The Bantu "communal system" and the corresponding philosophy of Ubuntu carry a great potential for development, but also the seeds of self-destruction. The uncritical idealisation of Obschina to be found in Tolstoy and others might be taken as a lesson for the future debate on Ubuntu as an ethical ideal.
CONCLUSION
Both Russian and African thinkers start with the criticism of Western individualism as in the 19
th century individualism was not only the prevailing philosophy, but also the way of life for the majority of uprooted, industrialised and atomised Western Europeans. At that time Western philosophy reflected the progressive ideas and values of rising capitalism in opposition to outmoded and outlived values of feudal ideology, with the emphasis being on individual rights and individual liberty. Since then, Western philosophy has undergone a considerable shift in attitude. Critical alternatives to radical individualism have been offered for more than a century: by various Marxists, Hegelians and some existentialists; by behaviourists (Skinner); by social psychologists (Dewey, Mead, Royce); by anthropologists (Bateson); by Charles Taylor in his account of the self; by Joseph Raz in his recent defence of liberalism; by Jacques Lacan in his accounts of how the Subject remakes itself in encounters with the Other (Wayne, 1988: 238).Against these critical alternatives the notion of the self as an essentially private individual has proven astonishingly persistent. It is not hard to understand why resistance to the social mentality has persisted. For one thing, there were good reasons for the rise of individualism against various excessive forms of conformism. Secondly, capitalism as a prevailing form of social organisation is not very conducive to the formation of a collectivist mentality. And last but not the least, as some philosophers pointed out, it is a paradox of the human condition to be torn by two opposite drives: a striving to be an individual, free and unique, and a desire to belong, to share, to be supported, and to transcend the limitations of a finite individuality (Koestler, 1978). The problem left to be resolved is how to create a perfect community that would promote the development and self-realisation of the free and integral individual. Holding the values of communitarianism close to my heart, I have hope that the people of Africa will find the way.
NOTES
1. The basic views of Ubuntu have been comprehensively outlined in Prinsloo, 1995.
2. Despite the etymology of the word Slavophilism ("love of Slavs"), the actual meaning it conveyed was not of solidarity and brotherhood among all the Slavs. Its main purpose was to promote and cultivate the traditional native features in the social and cultural life of ancient Russia.
3. Mir could be literary translated as "peace" and "world", but in that context meant a gathering of the adult members of the community for the purpose of decision making. In its nature, purposes and organisation it was very similar to pitso in Basotho society.
4. Compare with the following statement: "At the centre of Ubuntu is the idea that Umuntu Ngumuntu Ngabantu, persons depend on persons to be persons. This is our hidden secret. This is something we can now reveal to the world. This is something the world needs. It can become our special product." (Shutte; 2); "Africans have this thing called Ubuntu: . . . the essence of being human, it is a part of the gift that Africa will give the world." (Desmond Tutu, in Mulemfo, 2000: 57). "Africa has a big role to play in helping [Western] societies rediscover the meaning and essence of human life." (Mulemfo, 2000: 56)
5. Compare with Ruel Khoza’s idea of encompassing values such as universal brotherhood for Africans as an expression of African collective consciousness.
6. Compare this with the following: "It is by belonging to the community that we become ourselves. The community is not opposed to the individual, nor does it simply swallow the individual up; it enables each individual to become a unique centre of shared life." (Shutte: 3).
7. Compare with the following: "God’s existence in Isintu is highly esteemed and acknowledged. God is intuitively known, i.e. is a knowledge, not so much concerned with details, as in science of reality but one that through the vision of totality that starts from intuitive axiom that an overall order must exist and it provides the protective shell within which the person’s existence may blossom. Hence, God is left shrouded in mystery yet loved and honoured as such" (Maseko, 2001: 17).
8. It could be of interest to know that attempts to idealise and revive the traditions of such communities are not that uncommon. For example, James Ogilvy (1977) maintains that the only opposition to both extreme individualism and extreme collectivism could be what he calls "a philosophy and democracy of some". The best example of the latter, according to him, is a traditional Scottish clan. I took the pains of reading the history of Scotland and found out not only that the Scottish clan had a lot in common with the organisation of Russian obshina and the African tribe but also that it was torn apart by internal conflicts, and feuds, arising from its very nature. It started when the chiefs drifted from the patriarchal ideal to a belief in their absolute power over people. Since then the history of the Scottish clan is a history of continuous fighting, cruelty, atrocity upon atrocity, piracy, disorder, betrayal, corruption, assassination, massacre, cattle-rustling, wife-exposing, and bloodshed (John Macleod, 1997).
9. As an example of racial prejudice I could name the pogroms (discrimination and extermination of Jews), the movement that was initiated within Russian obschina and was a result of exclusivity of the so-called Slavic solidarity. Another example of extreme chauvinism was presented by the Slavophile doctrine providing a whole range of arguments for the justification of the most harsh and cruel repression of the Polish uprising in 1863.
10. For example, "This vision is rooted in the history of Africa and is at the centre of the culture of most South Africans". (Shutte: 1); "Let us also note that there is no school where Ubuntu could be studied. It cannot be read in a book but it is rather a lived attentive experience." (Maseko, : 16).
11. Compare the different expressions of this central idea. Shutte: ‘Persons depend on persons to be persons.’ Maseko: ‘We are people through other people.’ Makhudu: ‘I am, because you are.’ Desmond Tutu: ‘A person is a person through another person, my humanity is caught up, bound up and inextricable yours.’
12. Marc Epprecht presents an extensive and very convincing analysis of the traditional Bosotho society in the 19
th century: development of capitalism from within (from what in fact has been patriarchal feudalism), class formation and the emergence of racial capitalist patriarchy, use of traditional patriarchy by the colonial establishment. According to him, "Sesotho defined clear hierarchies of gender, class and age, many of which were objectively oppressive and exploitative" (2000" 29).13. A. W. Hoernle, for example, describing the life of an average umzi (household) of Southern Nguni tribes, says that though co-wives of a polygamist may have a strong fellow-feeling for one another and usually co-operate, beneath this co-operation there is a conflict, because each mother aims to further the interests of her own children first and foremost. There is, therefore, an underlying tension and strain between the families of an umzi, which often reveals itself in mutual accusations of sorcery and witchcraft. (1966: 77)
14. "There are societies, in which firmly integrated personalities realise their ‘selves’, inasmuch as they fulfil the expectations they have of themselves according to the nomos they acknowledge – but a nomos which can be called their own only if one sees them, as one might see the members of a beehive, as manifestations of an organic social personality whose collective requirements are so homogeneous and so unshakably introjected that the individual would not know how to set about making the nomos his own by working through it critically and creatively. Traditional tribal societies are usually taken to exemplify such cultures" (Benn, 1988: 205).
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